’s lead, his writings have been often seen as the locus classicus for the misguided a-historical conception of humannature. 2 These charges are related, although not equivalent, and we will deal with them in turn, hoping to become clearer, in the process, about the meaning of the alleged “historicity
favour of rights, and wisdom is replaced by information overload. This essay will elaborate these contrasts, arguing that a humanities programme that privileges identity politics, commodification, rights, and information is premised on a reduced, quantitative view of humannature, providing a fertile
of this paper, I will advance what I take to be the positive account of Epicurean social contract theory, one that critically relies on a ‘dynamic’ conception of humannature. I will show that while ‘brutishness’ is a feature of human beings prior to entering legal and political states, it is not one
between these two figures or their respective traditions.
This article aims to establish a dialogue between Bavinck and Mou by investigating their thoughts on humannature. Note that Mou himself is distinctly anti-Christian and has claimed that no true Chinese person should follow Christianity. 3 My
Matteo Ricci introduced into China the Western theory of soul, a term which he translated as linghun 靈魂. Afterwards, two other Italian Jesuits, Giulio Aleni and Francesco Sambiasi, separately completed two Chinese interpretations of the De Anima (On the Soul), the former privileging the word linghun, and the later, yanima 亞尼瑪, a transliteration for anima. Xia Dachang 夏大常 (Mathias Hsia) is probably the first Chinese person to write specifically on the topic of the soul. However, he used a different term, lingxing 靈性 (human spiritual nature), and also he titled his work “The Theory of Human Nature” (“Xingshuo” 性說). Xia’s work has received little scholarly attention, and this paper aims at investigating how he adopts the Western theory of the soul, why he still uses the concept of lingxing, and which Chinese editions of De Anima or other works written by the Jesuits had influenced him. We shall also see how Xia Dachang uses traditional Chinese sources and Catholic doctrine to support his viewpoint of human nature and how he criticizes theories of human nature within Chinese philosophy. This will enable us to comprehend how Chinese Christians in the Early Qing dynasty understood the theory of the soul and to reflect on the contemporary relevance of this theory in Chinese culture today.
When speaking of pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature, past scholars divided Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi into three categories, and they tended to divide the theories into moral categories of good and evil. The discovery of bamboo and silk sheets from this period, however, has offered some valuable literature, providing a historical opportunity for the thorough research of pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature. Based on the information on the recently excavated bamboo and silk sheets, especially the essay titled “Xing Zi Ming Chu” on bamboo sheets unearthed in Guodian, this essay examines pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature from a new perspective. In doing so, it looks forward to a breakthrough in academic patterns of thought which typically defined pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature as good or evil, and thus a closer look at the original appearance of pre-Qin Dynasty theories on human nature as a whole.
In Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature, fate is the original source of xing (nature). Heart is the appearance of nature. There are two aspects to nature and heart: ti (form) and yong (function). From the perspective of form, nature is liangzhi (the goodness in conscience) and liangneng (the inborn ability to be good) in human beings and heart is human’s conscience and original heart. From the perspective of function, nature is the four things of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, and heart consists in compassion, shame, respect, right and wrong. As the foundation for the theory of the original goodness in human nature, conscience and heart are a combination of human moral instinct, moral rationality and moral volition, whereas moral instinct gradually rises to moral volition and passes through moral rationality. Mencius’ theory of the original goodness in human nature is not a theory of future goodness, but a theory of original goodness.
"What is human nature?" is considered to be one of the key questions of anthropology. Throughout history, anthropologists have interpreted this question in different ways and often inferred moral conclusions from their answers. Such discussions about anthropological statements and their moral dimension gain new importance when we think about possibilities of self design brought to us by modern biotechniques. Human traits, so far conceived as unchangeable, are now subject to individual design. For that reason, the traditional questions about human nature and its moral significance have to be reconsidered in new ways. This anthology attempts to clarify some of the problems emerging in this context by reconsidering modern concepts of human nature as broadly as possible. It includes a wide spectrum of aspects concerning human nature and its implications for self design, starting with the discussion of anthropological aspects and extending to embedding present and future biotechniques into ethical analysis. Mit Beiträgen von Josep Call & Michael Tomasello, Margo DeMello, Boris Fehse, Logi Gunnarson, Nikolaus Knoepffler, Peter Kramer, Hans-Peter Krüger, Gerald Loeb, Neil Roughley, Gregor Schiemann, Thomas Schramme.