Search Results

No Access

Kristy Ironside

reflected one of the major dilemmas of the Khrushchev era: how to incentivize voluntary cooperation with the state’s economic plans without resorting to Stalinist forms of coercion? Economic historian Mark Harrison provides a useful framework for understanding coercion and the kinds of choices it entails

No Access

Iji

Dartmouth Conference. To provide structure for the analysis, the concept of the three roles of a mediator – communication, formulation, and manipulation – is employed. The article argues that multiparty mediation can create unique incentives for conflict management not available through a single mediator

No Access

Gareth Thornton, Paul Nathanail and Bernard Vanheusden

350 Are Incentives for Brownfield Regeneration Sustainable? A Comparative Survey Gareth Thornton, Bernard Vanheusden and Paul Nathanail* Reusing brownfields for new purposes is frequently not enabled by the economic, environmental and social barriers present at the site. Therefore, the European

No Access

Series:

Nora El Qadim

14.1 Introduction While other chapters in this section examine different ‘levers’ or ‘incentives’ for obtaining the cooperation of reluctant third countries in migration policy, for example trade relations (Garcia Andrade, 2018 ), circular mobility or visas (Reslow, 2018 ), this chapter examines

No Access

Mari Minn

not have access to it in some Member States. Furthermore, the incentives created by the Regulation 141/2000 in combination with patent protection may in fact hinder access to innovative drugs targeted at orphan diseases, as the proprietor has a wide range of legal guarantees that help keep the

Nwogugu, Edwin Ifeanyichukwu

. 177  2. Legal incentives to capital investment pp. 178  3. Legal structure of incentives. pp. 180  4. Security of investment incentives pp. 182  5. Deterrents to foreign investments pp. 182  6. Indigenisation laws pp. 184

No Access

Yiu and Saner

further develop the theory and practice of third-party intervention into persistent and malignant conflicts characterized by interference from multiple external stakeholders. Keywords: Cyprus, external stakeholders, incentives, intractability, malignant conflicts, third- party intervention Third Party

No Access

Storholt

mix of informal and formal negotiations at different stages of the conflict, by appropriate third party intervention, and by popular participation from civil society. All of these factors were essential to success. Keywords: civil society, incentives, internal violent conflict, Mali, negotiation

No Access

W. Paul Williamson and Aresh Assadi

RELIGIOUS ORIENTATION, INCENTIVE, SELF - ESTEEM, AND GENDER AS PREDICTORS OF ACADEMIC DISHONESTY: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH* W. Paul Williamson** and Aresh Assadi*** ABSTRACT It is widely assumed that religion is responsible for dictating and guid- ing moral behavior. This study investigated

No Access

Yue Shen, Youjun Xu and Jingming Hao

This paper develops a two stage game model with two competing firms in a mixed oligopolistic market, a public firm and a private firm, and only the public firm giving its manager an incentive contract. The paper presents three types of public firm owner’s objective function and each objective function corresponds to three types of delegation, either of a profit-revenue type, or of a relative performance, or, finally, of a market share one. In an equilibrium, the public firm owner has a dominant strategy to reward his manager with an incentive contract combining own profits and competitor’s profits. Different from Manasakis et al. (2007), this paper suggests that the dominant strategy of the public firm owner is to reward his manager with a profit-revenue type of contract or a market-share type of contract, that is to say profit-revenue is identical with market-share. Using relative-performance type of contract will move the manager away from the owner’s true objective function when the public firm owner only pursues maximizing the social welfare. The private firm will be crowded out and the public firm is the only producer of the market. Under profits-revenues type of contract, the owner’s objective of maximizing the summation of the profit and consumer surplus leads the manager more aggressive. Different combinations give us different results. By comparing the results, each type of incentive contract is an owner’s best response to his decision.