Since at least William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience , ineffability has been a supposed hallmark of mystical experience. The notion of an experience that cannot be articulated in language, however, runs counter to dominant trends in modern Western philosophy
ritual practice) counteract the linearization of oral storytelling by exposing temporality and iconicity as properties of the narrative, which on the contrary help to define the fundamentals of patrilineal transmission and the status of the transmitted ineffable in almost tautological terms as something
Abstract: Ineffability is the quality or state that applies to things that are incapable of being expressed in words. While the purported range of such things can be vast, the deployment of ineffability in religious studies is usually limited to mystical experiences and ultimate realities. ⸙
Scepticism and Ineffability in Plotinus DOMINIC J. OÕMEARA A BSTRACT The rst part of this paper traces back to Plotinus a strategy applied by Augustine and Descartes whereby sceptical arguments are used to set aside sensualist forms of dogmatic philosophy, clearing the way for a dogmatism
Proposing that Lyotard could be approached as a writer who writes in order to think about writing, this chapter begins by demonstrating that writing, for Lyotard, is a process of thinking or of witnessing thought—or, better, of trying to do both. It does so by focusing on two Lyotardian forms of re-writing which align with the modern and the postmodern. One form of re-writing is after a new “zero point” or beginning, and seeks to clarify errors from past writings under the command of the intellect and understanding. The second form of re-writing is one in which the writing works over the subject and takes on a life of its own. Here the task is not to shore up errors but to let the ineffable infiltrate the writing—and by consequence, the writer. In the end, I advance the list and the ellipses as two forms of re-writing that set thought apart from knowledge.
Some facets of making music are explored by combining arguments of Raffman's cognitivist explanation of ineffability with Merleau-Ponty's view of embodied perception. Behnke's approach to a phenomenology of playing a musical instrument serves as a further source. Focusing on the skilled performer-listener, several types of ineffable knowledge of performing music are identified: gesture feeling ineffability—the performer's sensorimotor knowledge of the gestures necessary to produce instrumental sounds is not exhaustively communicable via language; gesture nuance ineffability—the performer is aware of nuances of instrumental gestures, e.g., micro-variations of intensity or duration of musical gestures, but cannot perceptually, and consequently conceptually, categorize those fine-grained variations; and ineffabilities of inter-subjectivity—the non-verbal interaction between performers that makes a performance a vibrant dialogue is similarly incommunicable. An attempt to identify some of the ineffable dimensions of this dialogue is proposed. Further ineffabilities relating the acoustical embedding of performing are identified.
“The ineffable” in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is an essential term that has various interpretations. It could be divided into two types, namely, positive and negative, or real and fake. The negative or fake type can be clarified by logical analysis, while the positive or real type can be understood only through philosophical critique. Both the positive and negative types consist of infinity or absoluteness, but the infinity is subject to distinctions in meaning and logic.
Having looked at Proclus on the One in Chapter 4 , and some of the difficulties that emerge from his approach, 1 we should now consider how Damascius understands the One and why it leads him to posit the Ineffable. 2 Damascius is perhaps most well-known for diverging from nearly all prior