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1. Intentional Binding for Unintended Effects We perceive stimuli, which we — intentionally — elicit by our actions (i.e., effects) as earlier compared to stimuli not elicited by an action ( Haggard et al., 2002a ; for a review, see Moore & Obhi, 2012 ). This temporal illusion is typically

In: Timing & Time Perception
This book contains eleven original papers about intentionality. Some explore current problems such as the status of intentional content, the intentionality of perception and emotion, the connections between intentionality and normativity, the relationship between intentionality and consciousness, the characteristics of the intentional idiom. Others discuss the work of historical figures like Locke, Brentano, Husserl and Frege.
Author: Agata Paluch

intentionality. 25 Intentionality is here understood as conscious focus and awareness directed toward both an external (verbena) and internalised object (divine name invoked in the adjuration). It may be assumed that although some recipes, such as the ones concerning verbena, were predominantly concerned with

In: Aries
Author: Andrea Marchesi

What prompted Husserl’s inquiry into the nature of intentionality is well known: from Brentano he inherits the idea that a crucial task of philosophy is to focus on experiences, 1 which according to the Brentanian view are necessarily intentional; from Bolzano he inherits the burden of

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: Doris Gerber

can have unintended consequences: “Philosophers have used up a great deal of ink attempting to analyse the nature of intentional activity. But from the point of view of the social sciences, it is hard to exaggerate the importance of the unintended consequences of intentional conduct.” 3 I believe

In: Journal of the Philosophy of History

This paper approaches the intentional structure of the emotions by considering three claims about that structure. The paper departs from the Brentanian and Husserlian ‘priority of presentation claim’ (PPC). The PPC comprises two theses: (1) intentional feelings and emotions are founded on presenting acts and (2) intentional feelings and emotions are directed specifically to the value-attributes of the presented objects. The paper then considers two challenges to this claim: the equiprimordial claim (EC) and the priority of feeling claim (PFC). The EC asserts that the presentational and affective dimensions of intentional feelings and emotions are equiprimordial. I respond to this challenge to the PPC by revising it, claiming instead that the founding relations exist between the presentational and affective senses (rather than the acts) in an experience whose presenting and affective aspects are equiprimordial. The PFC grants priority to the affective, a grant which presupposes the independence of the affective from the presentational. I argue that the PFC is mistaken, and that the revision of the PPC can handle the examples on which the PFC is based.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: LI Zhongwei

In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Philosophers from this tradition (Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.) generally share the following two commitments: (i) intentionality is an essential property of consciousness; and (ii) all intentional states are directed at, and are intentionally related to, objects. This view of consciousness has two pressing problems. Firstly, philosophers such as John Searle and David Rosenthal have suggested raw feelings and some forms of seemingly undirected and thus non-intentional feelings as counterexamples to the essential intentionality of conscious states. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Føllesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. This paper presents a Husserlian view concerning the essential intentionality of consciousness. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective.

In: Frontiers of Philosophy in China