to be raised is whether Coliva has given us enough to make sense of this idea.
Perception, Experience, and JustifiedBelief
I begin with the common sense thought referred to above. The thought is that when, for instance, you look at something, say the contents of your fridge, you can, and
epistemically justifiedbelief that he can jump the chasm. Rather, the evidence suggests he will most likely fall to a very unpleasant death. But would we really say that his belief that he can jump the chasm is illegitimate? Would anyone say this man has no right to choose to believe that he can save himself
justifiedbeliefs even if one cannot resolve the disagreements about them. The question I want to address in this paper is whether this non-dialectical view of justification is correct. Should one not be able to defend one’s beliefs in order to be justified?
That justification should be dialectical is a
propositions in question; it just states a fact about justification, that the chains of justifiedbelief ultimately rest on non-inferentially justifiedbeliefs for which an argument cannot be given.
A problem with this sort of response is that while it may constitute a response to skepticism, it does not
epistemic normativity generally; I am interested in the dynamic of epistemic norms as these are understood within naturalized epistemology. I am most interested in whether what makes for objective epistemically justifiedbeliefs is itself variable and conditioned by antecedent epistemic situations and
According to the deontological view on justification, being justified in believing some proposition is a matter of having done one's epistemic duty with respect to that proposition. The present paper argues that, given a proper articulation of the deontological view, it is defensible that knowledge is justified true belief, virtually all epistemologists since Gettier. One important claim to be argued for is that once it is appreciated that it depends on contextual factors whether a person has done her epistemic duty with respect to a given proposition, many so-called Gettier cases, which are supposed to be cases of justified true belief that are not cases of knowledge, will be seen to be not really cases of justified belief after all. A second important claim is that the remaining alleged Gettier cases can be qualified as cases of knowledge. This requires that we countenance a notion of epistemic luck, but the requisite kind of luck is of a quite benign nature.
The lack of knowledge—as Timothy Williamson famously maintains—is ignorance. Radical sceptical arguments, at least in the tradition of Descartes, threaten universal ignorance. They do so by attempting to establish that we lack any knowledge, even if we can retain other kinds of epistemic standings, like epistemically justified belief. If understanding is a species of knowledge, then radical sceptical arguments threaten to rob us categorically of knowledge and understanding in one fell swoop by implying universal ignorance. If, however, understanding is not a species of knowledge, then three questions arise: (i) is ignorance the lack of understanding, even if understanding is not a species of knowledge? (ii) If not, what kind of state of intellectual impoverishment best describes a lack of understanding? (iii) What would a radical sceptical argument look like that threatened that kind of intellectual impoverishment, even if not threatening ignorance? This paper answers each of these questions in turn. I conclude by showing how the answers developed to (i–iii) interface in an interesting way with Virtue Perspectivism as an anti-sceptical strategy.
internally consistent. But there’s a wrinkle. Stephen Schiffer (Wright 2004, 177 n. 8) has argued that Wright faces, what Wright himself terms, the leaching problem:
How exactly does [my analysis] promise to shore up the possibility of justifiedbelief in [(1)]? We are proposing to concede, after all
-grounded. Responsibilists care about traits like conscientiousness, intellectual courage, honesty, humility, open-mindedness, and impartiality and appeal to such traits in their definitions of knowledge and justifiedbelief. So, for example, Zagzebski defines justifiedbelief as ‘what a person who is motivated by