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Abstract

Does R. G. Collingwood’s theory that concepts in philosophy are organized as “scales of forms” apply to his own work on the nature of history? Or is there some inconsistency between Collingwood’s work as a philosopher of history and as a theorist of philosophical method? This article surveys existing views among Collingwood specialists concerning the applicability of Collingwood’s “scale of forms” thesis to his own philosophy of history – especially the accounts of Leon Goldstein and Lionel Rubinoff – and outlines the obvious objections to such an application. These objections however are found to be answerable. It is shown that Collingwood did indeed think that the scale of forms thesis should apply to the philosophy of history, and even that he identified the “highest” form in history as a kind of scientific research or inquiry. But it is not claimed that Collingwood identified the “lower” forms explicitly. An account is provided of the three distinct forms that can be identified in Collingwood’s philosophy of history, and of the “critical points” by which (according to Collingwood’s meta-philosophy) lower forms are negated and incorporated by higher forms. But it is also explained that these forms are not neatly coterminous with the stages in Western philosophical thinking about history as Collingwood narrates them in The Idea of History.

In: Journal of the Philosophy of History
Author: Annalisa Coliva

? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy is an incredibly original and thought-provoking book. It is also an extremely ambitious piece of work, since it knits together two of the hardest topics in philosophy—i.e. skepticism and meta-philosophy. And it does so admirably, with a clear and approachable style

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

This paper is devoted to the role hinge propositions play or should play in epistemology and meta-philosophy. It starts by distinguishing different ways in which propositions can be basic or fundamental and by arguing that the foundational status of hinge propositions cannot be reduced to any of the others. The second part maintains that hinges have anti-sceptical potential, provided that one combines Wittgenstein’s critique of sense with Moore’s method of differential certainty. The final part briefly considers implications of the idea of hinge propositions for two debates in which they have not featured so far—once concerning peer disagreement, the other the role of intuitions in philosophy.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

The nature of intuitions remains a contested issue in (meta-)philosophy. Yet, intuitions are frequently cited in philosophical work, featuring most prominently in conceptual analysis, the philosophical method par excellence. In this paper, we approach the question about the nature of intuitions based on a pragmatist, namely, Wittgensteinian account of concepts. To Wittgenstein, intuitions are just immediate ‘reactions’ to certain cognitive tasks. His view provides a distinct alternative to identifying intuitions with either doxastic states or quasi-perceptual experiences. We discuss its implications for intuitions’ role in conceptual analysis and show that a Wittgensteinian account of intuitions is compatible even with ambitious metaphysical projects traditionally associated with this method.

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis

The nature of intuitions remains a contested issue in (meta-)philosophy. Yet, intuitions are frequently cited in philosophical work, featuring most prominently in conceptual analysis, the philosophical method par excellence. In this paper, we approach the question about the nature of intuitions based on a pragmatist, namely, Wittgensteinian account of concepts. To Wittgenstein, intuitions are just immediate ‘ reactions ’ to certain cognitive tasks. His view provides a distinct alternative to identifying intuitions with either doxastic states or quasi-perceptual experiences. We discuss its implications for intuitions’ role in conceptual analysis and show that a Wittgensteinian account of intuitions is compatible even with ambitious metaphysical projects traditionally associated with this method.

In: Analysis and Explication in 20th Century Philosophy
Proceedings of AFOS ‘94 Workshop, August 15-26, Madralin and IUHPS ‘94 Conference, August 27-29, Warszawa
Author: Penelope Maddy

This book aims to do two things at once. One of those things is what you might call comparative meta-philosophy, an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of a range of different approaches to philosophical problems. But it’s not really possible to evaluate a meta-philosophy without seeing

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Wittgenstein’s analogies and in Dretske’s framework, as well as two common conclusions that both philosophers share regarding the status and the scope of sceptical doubts. Hans-Johann Glock’s “Philosophy Rehinged?” addresses the role hinge propositions play or should play in epistemology and meta-philosophy

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

) Wittgensteinian investigation, then this is a ‘transcendental deduction’. Of course, one might say that what © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI 10.1163/174552409X402403 270 Book Reviews / Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2009) 266–272 is true of ethics is also true of meta-philosophy. As much as the

In: Journal of Moral Philosophy
Author: John D. Caputo

in order to show how that logic arises and how it is doomed to fail. We might be tempted to call this meta-philosophy, except that would be precisely to set up a space beyond precisely in the manner of philosophy itself which has always turned on the gesture implied by the "meta-," the reflective

In: Research in Phenomenology