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Pragmatic Moral Realism

A Transcendental Defense


Sami Pihlström

This book examines the issue of moral realism from a pragmatist point of view, drawing attention to our human practices of ethical evaluation and deliberation. It defends the essentially ungrounded and humanly fundamental place of ethics in our thought and action. Ethics must remain beyond justification and ubiquitous in our human form(s) of life.

Preston J. Werner

defend here. First, I assume that some version of non-skeptical moral realism is true, where by this I mean that (a) there are at least some moral properties whose existence does not depend on the mental states of human beings—at least not in any interesting sense, and (b) at least some human beings

Spencer Case

Introduction Both beliefs and actions can be assessed as reasonable or unreasonable, right or wrong, good or bad. Some philosophers have thought that these commonalities are evidence for moral realism. After all, if epistemic and moral facts share all salient features, then the moral anti

Caj Strandberg

(New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 196 pp. isbn 9781441161185 (pbk). £25.00. Although it is not explicitly stated, it appears that Kevin DeLapp’s Moral Realism has three distinctive but interrelated purposes. First, to provide an introduction to metaethical moral realism. Second, to defend a

Daniel Crow

moral epistemology that takes this perceptual language literally. They argue that we literally perceive moral facts. 1 It may seem surprising that these accounts of moral perception have been hospitable to non-naturalism. 2 A species of moral realism, non-naturalism claims that moral facts are not


In this essay, I consider two challenges implicit in Russ Shafer-Landau’s criticism of constructivists: the realism challenge and the relativism challenge, respectively. I do not try to offer a decisive set of objections to the challenges; instead I argue that some objective versions of constructivism, especially Rawls’s constructivism, are not susceptible to the criticisms.