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The radical forms of naturalistic epistemology look more like revolutionary manifestos than a reasonable alternatives. A modest form of naturalism is worth promoting. This modest form can cooperate with hermeneutics to solve epistemic problems, and therefore wins the title of cooperative naturalism, and benefits from the hermeneutic account of experience. Cooperative naturalism somewhat bridges the gap between analytic and continental philosophy.

In: Frontiers of Philosophy in China
Author: Jason Blum

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2011 DOI: 10.1163/157006811X567706 Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 23 (2011) 83-102 brill.nl/mtsr M E T H O D T H E O R Y in the S T U D Y O F R E L I G I O N & Pragmatism and Naturalism in Religious Studies Jason Blum * Department of Philosophy and

In: Method & Theory in the Study of Religion

This essay proposes a synoptic way of understanding the various dynamic “fields” that are ordered constituents of John Dewey’s emergent naturalism . For Dewey, experience is always situated within and interactive with a greater context. With this basic idea in mind, I offer an exposition of

In: Contemporary Pragmatism
Author: Joe Campbell

1 Introduction This is an explication and defense of P. F. Strawson’s theory of free will and moral responsibility ( 1962 , 1985 ), aka Strawson’s naturalism . I respond to criticisms leveled by free will skeptics ( Smilansky 2001; Pereboom 2001, 2014; Sommers 2007 ; G. Strawson 2010

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Editor: Jason N. Blum
The traditions and institutions that we call religions abound with references to the supernatural: ancestral spirits, karma, the afterlife, miracles, revelation, deities, etc. How are students of religion to approach the behaviors, doctrines, and beliefs that refer to such phenomena, which by their very nature are supposed to defy the methods of empirical research and the theories of historical scholarship? That is the question of methodological naturalism. The Question of Methodological Naturalism offers ten thoughtful engagements with that perennial question for the academic study of religion. Contributors include established senior scholars and newer voices propounding a range of perspectives, resulting in both surprising points of convergence and irreconcilable differences in how our shared discipline should be conceptualized and practiced.
Author: Peter S. Fosl

interestingly different, concerning scepticism in their thought. 1 I wish to tarry a bit myself, then, in this essay and reflect upon a number of the alignments and misalignments I find in the work of these two philosophers towards the end of figuring something about how naturalism relates to scepticism in

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: John H. Zammito

something to be reconsidered in the idea of normative naturalism? The connection between post-positivism and naturalism will be my guiding thread in considering this “last dogma of positivism.” 4 In the twentieth century, two extreme positions proved deeply invested in the fact/value dichotomy: those

In: Journal of the Philosophy of History
Author: Fred Wilson

this world consists in locating regularities in it. In thinking about this way of thinking about the world, we can do no better than beginning at the beginning with Anaxagoras. 8 Anaxagoras had a sort of naturalism in terms of which he hoped to explain what happens in the world. 9 The world begins as

In: Idealist Alternatives to Materialist Philosophies of Science

This paper explores the normative rationality of hope, given philosophical naturalism. To narrow the discussion, I focus on hope with respect to three items of perennial human concern: (a) personal immortality, (b) the indefinite continuation of the human race, and (c) the indefinite existence and habitability of Earth. Drawing upon recent work in philosophy and science, I argue that the well-informed naturalist cannot be rational in having hope with respect to these items. Along the way, I add nuance to previous philosophical treatments of hope, and I develop criteria for evaluating the normative rationality of a given hope.

In: The Resilience of Hope
Author: Frank Jackson

properties (a proper sub-set, because there are descriptive properties that are not ethical properties, being warm and being near Mars, for example). Streumer calls this view reductive realism. We might also call it reductionism, and often “naturalism” is used for views of this kind. Streumer (p. 9f) details

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism