The paper argues that it is a mistake to interpret Thomas Reid as holding a libertarian notion of freedom, and to make use of Reid to argue in support of a libertarian position. More precisely, this paper shows that Reid’s theory of agent-causation may not be what these philosophers take it to be, once such crucial notions as agent-causation and active power in Reid’s theory of free agency have been fully explicated. Reid is more committed to accepting the view of freedom as rational self-control over the determination of the will than a contracausal view of freedom.
John Duns Scotus on Parts, Wholes, and Hylomorphism, Thomas M. Ward examines Scotus's arguments for his distinctive version of hylomorphism, the view that at least some material objects are composites of matter and form. It considers Scotus's reasons for adopting hylomorphism, and his accounts of how matter and form compose a substance, how extended parts, such as the organs of an organism, compose a substance, and how other sorts of things, such as the four chemical elements (earth, air, fire, and water) and all the things in the world, fail to compose a substance. It highlights the extent to which Scotus draws on his metaphysics of essential order to explain why some things can compose substance and why others cannot. Throughout the book, contemporary versions of hylomorphism are discussed in ways that both illumine Scotus's own views and suggest ways to advance contemporary debates.
various uses 'focus' on one thing, 'a source of change in something else' (1019b35-1020a4). This is what we today call an 'active' power. Under this heading is included the power to accomplish something 'at will' (1019a23-4), i.e. a skill, and passivepower is defined in terms of active: an object has the
it in detail.
According to Aristotle, action is an exercise of an active power, whereas passion is an exercise of a passivepower. In Metaphysics 9.1, 1046a10-11, Aristotle first defines ‘active power’ as an “origin of change in another thing” ( archē metabolēs en allō ). 67 That is to say, for
external stimuli, and this, in its turn, will nourish the erroneous belief that even our will is a passivepower. As such passivity sits uneasily with freedom, Olivi thinks the activity of human perception needs to be safeguarded to establish the freedom of the human will. It is no surprise, then, that
's physics, psychology and politics form a unity. Active and passivepower In the Short Tract (written in the first half of the 1630s) Hobbes defines 'agent' as a body that has power to move, and 'patient' as a body that has power to be ` I am indebted to Olli Koistinen for many useful comments and for
of an action. The force of these two verbal voices is illuminated by John Locke's observation that "Power... is twofold ;... as able to make, or able to receive, any change: the one may be . called 'active,' and the other 'passive,' power."'° Remembering what Maclntyre has said about how "each of our
Bemuhungen schlagen sich nieder in der Vorstellung der Seele als einem hierarchischen Gefuge, als 'regnum', und als einem Mikrocosmos" (Stadter, 57). '2 Stadter, 58.
64 antidote to the Aristotelian views that the will is a passivepower moved by the known good and that the intellect has the power of com
de Cordemoy was a fol- lower of Descartes who departed from the master in holding a version of atom- ism. See his Discernement du corps et de l'âme (Paris, 1666), in Cordemoy, Oeuvres Philosophiques, ed. P. Clair and F. Girbal (Paris, 1968).
339 tics understand thereby the primitive passivepower