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Author: Alan Thomas

error removed we are restored to our ordinary perceptual knowledge. This is the least plausible part of McDowell’s latest position: it is, I think, straining credulity to say that the very idea of an intentional mental state that always has “the world in view” is a piece of uncontaminated common sense

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Barry Stroud

industrious we can find out, for instance, whether that tower in the distance is square or round. Error, or even the possibility of error, does not in itself present a general threat to perceptual knowledge of the world. Descartes is certainly correct about that. J.L. Austin would agree, and for the same

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: Jörg Tellkamp
Thomas Aquinas' theory of knowledge has mainly been studied from the point of view of his theory of intellect. However, one of the constituent elements of such a theory has been widely neglected: perception. This work tries to disentangle the different aspects of Aquinas' theory. First, the causes of perception are looked at, including analyses on the physics of perception. Secondly, the psychology of perceptual knowledge and the theory of sensibles are explored, and thirdly, the importance of the perceptual apparatus is sketched by stressing the role of the outer and inner senses in the process of the acquisition of perceptual knowledge.
In order to give a comprehensive account of his theory, three main aspects are taken into account.
In: The Dutch Trading Companies as Knowledge Networks

powerfully developed by Charles Travis, I find McDowell’s account of perceptual knowledge untenable. I also find it incompatible with Wittgenstein’s central ideas about knowledge and certainty. Following McDowell, Schönbaumsfeld thinks that to understand how perception can engender knowledge, we need a

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Tommaso Piazza

1 Introduction Epistemological Disjunctivism ( ed ) is the view, championed by Duncan Pritchard (2012) , that when one has paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that P, one’s epistemic support for believing P is constituted by S’s factive state of seeing that P. It is an alleged virtue of ed

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Naturalized Epistemology, Perceptual Knowledge and Ontology
For more than a century, from about 1600 until the early eighteenth century, the Dutch dominated world trade. Via the Netherlands the far reaches of the world, both in the Atlantic and in the East, were connected. Dutch ships carried goods, but they also opened up opportunities for the exchange of knowledge. The commercial networks of the Dutch trading companies provided an infrastructure which was accessible to people with a scholarly interest in the exotic world. The present collection of essays brings together a number of studies about knowledge construction that depended on the Dutch trading networks.

Contributors include: Paul Arblaster, Hans den Besten, Frans Blom, Britt Dams, Adrien Delmas, Alette Fleischer, Antje Flüchter, Michiel van Groesen, Henk de Groot, Julie Berger Hochstrasser, Grégoire Holtz, Siegfried Huigen, Elspeth Jajdelska, Maria-Theresia Leuker, Edwin van Meerkerk, Bruno Naarden, and Christina Skott.
Author: David Forman

Abstract

For Sellars, the possibility of empirical knowledge presupposes the existence of “sense impressions” in the perceiver, i.e., non-conceptual states of perceptual consciousness. But this role for sense impressions does not implicate Sellars’ account in the Myth of the Given: sense impressions do not stand in a justificatory relation to instances of perceptual knowledge; their existence is rather a condition for the possibility of the acquisition of empirical concepts. Sellars suggests that learning empirical concepts presupposes that we can remember certain past facts that we could not conceptualize at the time they obtained. And such memory presupposes, in turn, the existence of certain (past) non-conceptual sensory states that can be conceptualized.

In: The Self-Correcting Enterprise