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Author: Hamid Vahid

is precisely this intuition that underlies the postulation of basic beliefs in epistemology, that is, beliefs that are said to derive their justification from the contents of our experience. Innocent though this picture of perceptual justification appears to be, it leaves a lot of questions

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Annalisa Coliva

of which my Extended Rationality is a specimen—is a project worth pursuing, as it opens up new avenues for discussion relevant to all epistemology. 2 Alan Millar Alan Millar highlights an important point about my overall approach to perceptual justification, which I concede head

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Annalisa Coliva

’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. ( oc 105, 341–343) 2 The Moderate Account of Perceptual Justification Yet, the main bulk of Extended Rationality does not deal with the case of

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Ted Poston

’s introductory essay, there are fifteen essays coming in at over three-hundred pages built around questions about perceptual justification. Ernest Sosa provides an excellent opening essay on Descartes’s epistemology and its relation to Sosa’s own virtue epistemology. Sosa argues that Descartes’s epistemology

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Tommaso Piazza

most basic cases, perceptual justification is immediate – commits to rejecting Evidentialism, as it commits, specifically, to accounting for the mechanics of perceptual justification otherwise than by maintaining that perceptual experiences justify by providing evidence. In the second part of the paper

In: History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis
Author: Tommaso Piazza

ordinary cases of doxastic perceptual justification. If she answers Q2 by endorsing a Psychologist ontology of evidence, she is unable to account for ordinary cases of doxastic inferential justification. The second aim of this paper is to offer a new argument for the conclusion that the Evidentialist

In: Non-Evidentialist Epistemology
Editors: Uwe Meixner and Rochus Sowa
The purpose of this collection of eleven essays on the philosophy of Edmund Husserl is not to offer a comprehensive overview of Husserl’s philosophy. Of his many themes, only a selection is covered in this volume. But the collection is of interest for anyone in touch with the current philosophy of mind – which has undergone a remarkable broadening of its perspective: now, not only the causal and functional, but also the, broadly speaking, phenomenological and intentional aspects of the mind are being given what is due to them. Accompanying this broadening, there is a rediscovery – which for many philosophers from the analytic tradition means: a first discovery – of Husserlian phenomenology. The centre of this collection is formed by the five essays on Husserl’s views on perceptual experience and perceptual justification. These central essays are preceded by an essay on apprehension and an essay on motivation (both important Husserlian notions), and are followed by an essay on empathy and an essay on emotions (two Husserlian topics that are all too often neglected). The first essay of the collection presents, in a comprehensive and detailed way, complementarism as an alternative to Husserl’s classical phenomenological approach, transcendental reduction. The last essay concerns the issue of collective unity in Kant and Husserl, an ontological issue that is crucial for all transcendental philosophy. All of the eleven essays are new and have undergone a peer-review process. The authors: Audrey L. Anton, Carleton B. Christensen, Jasper Doomen, John J. Drummond, Richard Foley, Stamatios Gerogiorgakis, Michael Groneberg, George Heffernan, Hans-Ulrich Hoche, Burt C. Hopkins, Ansten Klev, Helga Meier, Manuel Lechthaler, Sophie Loidolt, Filip Mattens, Verena Mayer, Sean McAleer, Tommaso Piazza, Alexander Reutlinger, Adriane A. Rini, Sara L. Uckelman, Philip J. Walsh, Christian Wirrwitz, Kristina Zuelicke

Reviews Robert J. Fogelin, Hume’s Presence in the ‘Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion’ 245 Mark Spencer Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini (eds.), Skepticism and Perceptual Justification 250 Ted Poston Volume 8, No. 4 Symposium on

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In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Tommaso Piazza

the most basic cases, perceptual justification is immediate - commits to rejecting Evidentialism, as it commits, specifically, to accounting for the mechanics of perceptual justification otherwise than by maintaining that perceptual experiences justify by providing evidence. In the second part of

In: The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl
Author: Yuval Avnur

must make this assumption in order to have perceptual justification contradicts Liberalism, and that this assumption need not (and apparently cannot) be epistemically justified, or “warranted,” contradicts Conservatism. In this way, Moderatism breaks the stalemate of the Liberal vs. Conservative debate

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism