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Author: Philip Atkins

either [3] is false or [3*] is false. We can then conclude that either Piecemeal Argument 1 or Piecemeal Argument 2 is unsound, and so one of S’s beliefs (either P1 or P2) survives the skeptical threat. ( 2015 : 255–256) This is the crux of Yang’s criticism of piecemeal skepticism. SC1 and SC2 are

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Eric Yang

serious problem for such “piecemealskepticism. Consider one instance of the standard skeptical argument—using the proposition P1 and the skeptical hypothesis sc 1—which we will call ‘Piecemeal Argument 1’: [1] If S knows that P1 and S knows that if P1, then sc 1 is false, then S knows that sc

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Prediction Objection  193 Esben Petersen Underdetermination Skepticism and Skeptical Dogmatism  218 Mark Walker Discussion Against Piecemeal Skepticism  253 Eric Yang Book Reviews Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism  257

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Volume 7, No. 1 Articles Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts  1 Luca Moretti and Tomoji Shogenji P. F. Strawson’s Free Will Naturalism  26 Joe Campbell Discussion In Defense of Piecemeal Skepticism  53

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Mikkel Gerken

equally well appeal to the assumption that all veridical memories are replaced with mistaken apparent memories. But this assumption would put the original BIV skepticism back in business. So, if the kind of assumption that RE4 exemplifies is required for the piecemeal skepticism but is, in effect, strong

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism