classic pragmatism, another kind of pragmatism has recently emerged that advocates a thesis known as ‘pragmaticencroachment’.
While both classic and new pragmatists reject the evidentialists’ claim that pragmatic factors are epistemically irrelevant, the two differ in their construal of the
In this paper I argue that Kant would have endorsed Clifford’s principle. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I review Kant’s argument for the practical postulates. In the second, I discuss a traditional objection to the style of argument Kant employs. In the third, I explain how Kant would respond to this objection and how this renders the practical postulates consistent with Clifford’s principle. In the fourth, I introduce positive grounds for thinking that Kant would have endorsed this principle.
since they have bearing on the controversial claim of pragmaticencroachment in epistemology ( Fantl & McGrath 2002, 2007, 2009, 2012 ). First, a proposition that is more informative in the sense used in the dual component model is a proposition with a lower prior probability. It does not mean that it
sustained attention. Feldman embraces a narrow notion of evidence possession because he recognizes that a more expansive view opens the door to pragmaticencroachment into evidence possession. A narrow view of evidence possession has unpalatable consequences, however, and Feldman’s strategy for avoiding
Stichwort „pragmaticencroachment“ und in ähnlicher Form in der Wissenschaftstheorie unter dem Stichwort „induktives Risiko“ diskutiert wird. Ich will die heterogenen – wenn auch zusammenhängenden oder zumindest verwandten – Ansätze, die zu so unterschiedlichen epistemischen Aktivitäten wie dem Glauben oder
: Oxford University Press .
, and M. McGrath. ( 2011 ). “ PragmaticEncroachment .” In
The Routledge Companion to Epistemology
, 558 – 568 . New York : Routledge .
results shows that one didn’t already know one’s ticket has lost.
The above also suggests that there is “pragmaticencroachment” for the epistemic closing of epistemic cases (though it does not suggest this for knowledge): whether an epistemic case can be closed depends on the practical stakes. Let “End