Let me turn, then, to those aspects of Coliva’s epistemological package that I find more questionable. The first has to do with her notion of propositionalwarrant and the way she employs it in her treatment of the connected closure principle. The distinction between propositional and doxastic warrant
—not beliefs that would continue to be verified into the indefinite future.
Dewey’s account comes into clearer focus in one of his final discussions of truth, a response to Russell’s An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth . In “Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth” (1941) Dewey argues that truth is
University Press , 1991 ).
. 1941 . “ Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth .” in
The Essential Dewey, Volume Two: Ethics, Logic, Psychology
(ed 2), eds.
( Bloomington : Indiana University Press
63 L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology 1 , ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright, and H. Nyman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), §266.
64 J. Dewey, “Propositions, Warranted Assertibility, and Truth”, The Journal of Philosophy 38 (1941), 178–9.
65 Ibid., 178.
concerned with whether or not these four propositionswarrant Relihan’s reading of Boethius’ book as a Menippean satire. My point will simply be that the definition of Philosophy they entail is quite at odds with the specifics of the text, and detailing its shortcomings will accordingly provide a convenient
). Tolstoy, Vygotsky, and the making of meaning . College Composition and Communication , 29 ( 3 ), 249 – 255 . Dewey , J. ( 1916 ). Democracy and education: An introduction to the philosophy of education . New York, NY : The Free Press . Dewey , J. ( 1941 ). Propositions, warranted assertibility
belief. And justification comes in solving problems, not through the establishment of propositionalwarrant, except in those cases in which the problem to be solved lends itself to such justification. In other cases, the justification must be understood to be appropriate to the problem to be solved, to