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Benjamin Sachs

Rationality , with a confession: he used to be a hard-core utilitarian. He explains that he came to reject utilitarianism for two reasons. First, it would require an agent to kill on account of the fact that that act of killing would result in a net gain of a single utile. Second, it would require an agent to

Roger Crisp

Ethics Without Reasons? * R OGER C RISP Uehiro Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy St Anne’s College Oxford, UK roger.crisp@st-annes.oxford.ac.uk This paper is a discussion of Jonathan Dancy’s book Ethics Without Prin- ciples (2004). Holism about reasons is distinguished into a weak version, which

Richard Norman

Particularism and Reasons: A Reply to Kirchin R ICHARD N ORMAN School of European Culture and Languages University of Kent Canterbury, UK r.j.norman@kent.ac.uk Valency switching can appear especially puzzling if we think of moral rea- sons as ‘pushes and pulls’—considerations whose job it is to

Amelia Hicks

Introduction Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge write: One danger that has not been lost on particularists is that their extremely ecumenical view of moral reasons for action threatens implausibly to ‘flatten the normative landscape’. After all, even if we think that in the right context

Jonas Olson

impersonal value, is analysable in terms of reasons for attitudes. As we shall see, in the case of personal value of the kind that Rønnow-Rasmussen is mostly interested in, the relevant attitudes are what he calls ‘for someone’s sake ( fss ) attitudes’. This review essay focuses on three main themes: section

Jonathan Dancy

December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp’s distinction between ultimate and non- ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don’t here consider what other particularists might

Simon Kirchin

essential claim, which I take to be, roughly, that what can be a reason that helps to make one action right need not be a reason that always helps to make actions right. This claim challenges a central assump- tion on which most, if not all, normative ethical theories are supposedly based. We owe this way

Brian Talbot

not. This is mostly because, were they not to defend, someone else would, and there are not good reasons to expect this person to be less capable than they. This completely changes how we weigh the reasons for and against defending. Given that a lawyer expects to be replaced in this way, and that the

One Fell Swoop

Small Red Book Historicism Before and After Davidson

Constantine Sandis

This paper was presented in 2013 at the Society for the Philosophy of History apa Session in San Francisco, (March 17–23), the Welsh Philosophical Society Colloquium , Gregynog Hall, (3–5 May), and the ‘50 years of Davidson’s “Action, Reason, Causes” ’ conference in Duisberg-Essen University

Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star

In two previous papers, we argued that a fact is a normative reason for one to do a particular act just in case this fact is evidence that one ought to do this act (and, similarly, a fact is a normative reason for one to believe a particular proposition just in case this fact is evidence that