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Author: Penelope Maddy

mind. Since the Evil Demon can produce ideas in our minds that correspond to nothing in an external world, we can’t learn anything about it by perception, we can’t infer from inner to outer. As far as I can tell, Stroud is saying that Descartes begins from the very representative theory of perception

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Barry Stroud

directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, etc.). (110) Maddy calls this view “the representative theory of perception.” I think this is the conception of the restricted scope of perceptual

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Amedeo Giorgi

representative theories of perception, for the differences between, and even the existence of, the role of the image in knowledge, for the dif- ference between nominalism and conceptualism, and he used it as a basis for critiquing association theory (1890/1950, pp. 277-279) and tradiional interpretations of

In: Journal of Phenomenological Psychology
Author: Amedeo Giorgi

commentators (Wild, 1969; Wilshire, 1968) have noted how the psychologist's fallacy has been responsible for numerous errors in the history of thought. James believed that it was responsible for the difference between presentative and representative theories of perception, for the differences between, and even

In: Journal of Phenomenological Psychology
Author: A. W. PRICE

The point invites emphasis: this is not a representative theory of perception of the kind that we associate with the British empiricists. Aristotle's visual 'percepts' differ from mental sense-data in two ways. First, they are also physical changes, and so exist within the body and not within visual

In: Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy
Author: Matt E.M. Bower

– 189 . Zahavi Dan 1994 . “ Intentionality and the Representative Theory of Perception .” Man and World 27 ( 1 ), 37 – 47 . 1 Technically, what I will describe here is the naïve realist account of veridical perceptual experience only. Naïve realists almost universally accept a

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: FRED D. MILLER

. 71 Everson 1997 in contrast ascribes a representative theory of perception to Aristotle, according to which "the subject is aware of an icon, which represents an external object, or objects, to him." The supposed icon is the aicr 61 1JJ4 understood as a "mental picture" which represents the external

In: Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy
Author: Harry Redner

representative theory of perception. And just as with regard to mind, where we are coming closer to Aristotle at the end of the Cartesian era, so, too, in perception some contemporary approaches, such as Gibson’s ecological theory, do away with the representative theory of perception and arrive at a view of

In: Quintessence of Dust: The Science of Matter and the Philosophy of Mind
Author: Jonathan Vogel

reject. We can and should move on to other things. 1 §2 takes up three broadly Cartesian themes: the epistemic priority of experience, underdetermination, and the representative theory of perception. I challenge some common assumptions about these, and their connection to skepticism. 2 §3 shows how

In: The Mystery of Skepticism
Author: Harry Redner

that he had adopted a naïve realist philosophy of perception. But this is far from the case, and is due to a deliberate misunderstanding of his purely psychological approach, as we shall seek to show. However, it is true that Gibson eschews any representative theory of perception, or any that relies on

In: Quintessence of Dust: The Science of Matter and the Philosophy of Mind