Anna Ventouratou for invaluable research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
un targeted sanctions, especially those related to terrorism, have had their fair share of the limelight recently, particularly in view of important decisions by the European Court of Justice
protective shield in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and which is Iran’s biggest oil customer, would have sent a powerful political signal to Tehran. But when Beijing announced that it would not cut back on crude oil imports from Iran and would not join this latest round of Western sanctions over
With some 40 different types of restrictive measures in force, the European Union is undisputedly one of the major protagonists of today’s sanction regimes. Measures such as selective trade embargos, asset freezes and travel bans have been adopted by the EU not only to implement Security Council mandated sanctions, but also in addition to (as with Iran and North Korea) or in the absence of UN action (as with Syria and Russia). Further, EU recent practice evidences that sanctions (Myanmar and Zimbabwe) have served the EU and its member states’ own interests also with the view to promoting (the European construction of) values generally shared in international society. After outlining the legal discipline and the policy framework of EU restrictive measures, the present article analyses the legal issues emerging with respect to EU sanctions over the last four years. Among these, the 2017 ruling of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU in Rosneft, Brexit and its consequences on the implementation/adoption of sanctions by the United Kingdom, and recent developments concerning the legal position of candidate countries which refused to align with the EU sanction adopted in reaction to the Ukraine crisis, are the most important.
The Security Council’s reaction to the nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) in 2016 through Resolutions 2270 and 2321 have significantly changed the picture of UN sanctions regime against this country and created the most comprehensive, legally-binding, sanctions program imposed against a State since Iraq in the 1990s. While raising questions on their lawfulness under international law, the DPRK’s military actions have repeatedly challenged the international community. At the moment of finalising the present article, the situation seems more precarious than ever: despite the severity and comprehensiveness of the sanctions regime, the DPKR’s launches of ballistic missiles hit the headlines again, and its military aggressiveness does not appear reversed. The article examines this regime against the background of the Council’s past practice and the international rules on non-proliferation, also by discussing legal issues related to the different actions by Pyongyang. Ultimately, it seeks to assess the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests vis-à-vis relevant international law and to determine the main limitations of the new set of binding obligations placed upon Member States to thwart the “North Korean threat”. For, in order to succeed, sanctions must be capable of coercing their targets into adjusting the particular course of behaviour that, according to the Security Council, poses a threat to international peace and security, the article concludes that the new sanctions regime is still affected by weaknesses that impair its effectiveness.
The first comprehensive and systematic analysis of the impact of armed conflict on children has been submitted to the UN General Assembly in 1996. The UN has since adopted and implemented a large number of initiatives and resolutions, making up the basis for the enhancement of monitoring and accountability of all parties responsible for violations perpetrated against children. The efforts to quantify and monitor violations against children committed not only by States, but also by Armed Non-State Actors, are an important milestone in the attempt to improve the protection of children. Nonetheless, the current UN architecture on children and armed conflict presents a number of shortcomings, in particular the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms, which hinder its capability to increase the achievement of more concrete results. After presenting an overview of the UN architecture on children and armed conflict, lingering on its constitutive elements as well as on its current weaknesses, this article will question if and to what extent the imposition of sanctions against individuals and entities can enhance the comprehensive strategy to thwart the harmful impact of armed conflict on children and the long lasting consequences it has on durable peace, security, and development. Furthermore, the present article will identify possible ways forward to improve the current framework, by discussing, inter alia, how the wealth of information gathered through the UN Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism could be used to feed into a more integrated information platform within the UN and also to strengthen accountability in international criminal tribunals.
Introduction For the last two decades, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing ( IUU fishing) 1 has been a cause of constant concern for Spain. This European Union (EU) Member State has been a pioneer in carrying out real initiatives to deter, control and sanction this illicit form of fishing
The article examines the actions taken by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) against the delegation of the Russian Federation in response to the crisis in Ukraine. In 2014 the Assembly decided to suspend some of the rights of the Russian delegation and menaced to annul the credentials of the delegation if an effective effort was not made on the part of Russia to sort out the situation and to reverse the annexation. The adoption of sanctions against the Russian delegation raised several legal issues related to the very existence of a sanctioning power of the CoE and in particular of the Assembly. The question is whether the powers to “penalize” the parliamentary delegation have been exercised by PACE in conformity with the Statute. The Statute of the CoE does not attribute sanctioning powers to the Assembly in order to target the states which are in breach of Article 3 or international law more generally. This power falls firmly in the hands of the Committee of Ministers as a way to put pressure on, deter, and eventually punish a state which has seriously violated the core of the principles of the CoE system. PACE, in the exercise of its functions, may certainly contribute to activating procedures to monitor the activities of the member states, but the last word is in the hands of the Committee which may suspend the rights of representation of a state and request that the offending state withdraw from the Committee entirely. The Statute plainly does not attribute this power to PACE. In the absence of the jurisdiction of a Court to deal with the problems caused by the lack of harmonisation between the sanctions adopted by the Committee of Ministers and the ones introduced by the Parliamentary Assembly through some modifications of the Rules of Procedure, the recent call for a 4th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the CoE by the Assembly in order to “preserve and further strengthen this unparalleled pan-European project currently threatened by divisions and a weakening of member States’ commitment” by “harmonising[…] the rules governing participation, representation and responsibilities of member States in both statutory organs, while fully respecting the autonomy of these bodies” should be welcomed.
. The appropriate body to take action in such an event would be the Assembly itself through warnings and sanctions. 42 The provision for further referral to the Court only amounts to a concession on the binding nature of the Commission’s ruling in the first instance. Furthermore, given, as will be
-building. This article focuses on the role of the Security Council in addressing these issues. Sanctions have been the prevalent tool used by the Security Council to address predatory resource exploitation in recent armed conflicts. 6 These sanctions regimes have increasingly moved away from direct crisis
This remarkable book scrutinizes the rationale and enforcement of the continuing United Nations sanctions in Iraq—a program widely criticized for imposing misery on an entire population in a fruitless attempt to humble a cynical tyrant. It is the first book-length study ever undertaken of the functioning of a Security Council sanctions committee. It analyzes in detail substantive UN sanctions law, the operation of mandatory Chapter VII sanctions, and their practical enforcement strategies. The author offers recommendations, both legislative and organizational, for improving the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions measures in the future. Providing a rare insider’s view of this aspect of international law and organization, and based largely on previously unpublished documents, United Nations Sanctions Management will be of great interest for the light it sheds on the background to the current UN impasse on Iraq. There are two statistical tables, four flowcharts, lists of committee members and meetings, and a select bibliography.
Published under the auspices of the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute (PAIL). For more information about PAIL go to pail-institute.org.
Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.