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the security services, or siloviki, 2 as they are often called in Russian, has been recurrent in the Western press and Western books about Russia. 3 Even in academia, the idea of the Russian government being controlled by the siloviki has been regularly advanced. In two widely cited

In: Russian Politics

-seeking behavior by the siloviki can become at the regional level. In some Russian regions, governors and leading security officials change frequently, and have as a result short time-horizons that might well lead to a behavior similar to that of the roving bandits described by Mancur Olson. 6 In other

In: Russian Politics

region.” 2 Critics of these moves similarly honed in on the status of many of these appointees as siloviki —individuals possessing prior service in Russia’s “force structures” or “power ministries,” those institutions entrusted with marshaling armed force in defense of the state from potential

In: Russian Politics
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In spite of its rich energy resources and strategic location, and in spite of the declared commitment to further liberal reforms by politi-cal leaders, Russia seems to be experiencing some transition and de-velopmental problems. Economic growth is uneven and relatively slow (compared with other BRICS and oil/gas exporters). The Russian state remains centralistic, controlling, corrupt and inert. Russian politics is undergoing a retrogressive ‘authoritarian turn’ accompanied by a tightening of control over the media. The political competition for the top political offices is so skewed, the opposition so restricted, and the mass media so constrained, that the Freedom House no longer classi-fies Russia as ‘free’ and ‘democratic’. State patronage, protectionism and the taxation burden remain high, corruption is endemic, access to financing is limited – all constraining Russia’s development and pre-venting the advanced modernisation of the state, economy and society. These developments in contemporary Russia are analysed and ex-plained as correlates of the outlooks, strategic goals and power inter-ests of the new Russian elite – Putin’s siloviki. The developmental problems of contemporary Russia are linked to the ‘Soviet legacies’ of socialist ‘quasi-modernisation’ revived by Putin’s siloviki in their at-tempt to consolidate power and stabilise politics by ‘restoring’ Rus-sia’s power and influence.

In: Transcultural Studies

, increasingly, between new power networks represented by the St Petersburg siloviki 8 created severe constraints. It hindered a developmental agenda during the challenges of the 2008-09 global crisis, the economic stagnation after 2012, and the ensuing geopolitical tensions. 9 The relative stability of the

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In: Russian Politics

today. 4 In Russia, the color revolutions of the 2000s, as well as the protests in 2011 and 2012 led to a profound concern about the possibility of a color revolution, and the significant increase in influence by the siloviki 5 – the Russian security forces – after 2012. 6

In: Russian Politics

Counter-Revolution Practices after the 2011–2012 Winter of Discontent and the Euromaidan  466 Stephen G F Hall Symposium: The Return of The Siloviki Editor Michael Rochlitz Introduction The Return of the Siloviki  493 Michael Rochlitz

In: Russian Politics

literature that Putin’s regime frequently relies on former military and security personnel (the so-called siloviki ) for staffing the bureaucracy and the political elite. 10 At the same time, there is a strong variation among the CFI s in terms of their background: while in some regions the center

In: Russian Politics

state to a monopoly. In this monopolistic structure, siloviki play the key role. It is true, that the existing political system in Russia is nothing else but an authoritarian regime, but this situation is quite logical and should not be surprising. It is a textbook maxim that the move from a

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elite: the administrative class (some scholars also refer to this as a “service class” composed of top state servants), the siloviki (the members of the political and administrative classes who came from the military and the KGB ) and so forth. This book does not meet such broad expectations

In: Canadian-American Slavic Studies