hypotheses behave in important ways like skepticalhypotheses. It is generally acknowledged that arguments that proceed from a skeptical hypothesis to a skeptical conclusion pose a significant challenge to knowledge claims—a challenge, moreover, that has not been met in any way that has commanded broad
Arguments for external world skepticism 1 from skepticalhypotheses begin by taking any proposition about the external world, p , which, if known, implies that the negation of some skeptical hypothesis is also known, and then concluding that one does not know that p
the world; the two only coincide for the global skepticalhypotheses, which is why I take those hypotheses to be colorful ways of demanding extraordinary evidence.
This might come out more starkly for another of Leite’s worries, this one about the Plain Inquirer’s policy of considering the grounds
encounter the skeptical reasoning … we find it immediately gripping. It appeals to something deep in our nature and seems to raise a real problem about the human condition” ( Stroud 1984 : 39).
But where does the appeal of skepticism come from? Skepticalhypotheses are generally intended to describe
them can be true whereas all the other skepticalhypotheses would turn out false given the truth of that one (since each skeptical hypothesis offered by the piecemeal skeptic will involve a different day in which the subject was envatted, e.g., sc 3 = S was envatted three days ago, sc 4 = S was
Chapter One of The Appearance of Ignorance is a reprinting of the journal article “Solving the Skeptical Problem.” In it, the classical form of skeptical argument, based on skepticalhypotheses, is presented. Then a contextualist response to the problem of skepticism, built upon the “Rule of
which case she is hardly embracing modern science, or she doesn’t seem to recognize that she can’t be deceived by something that doesn’t exist. Neither looks to me like a position the Plain Inquirer would be happy to hold.
Similar points can be made about the other global skepticalhypotheses
justification for belief in the external world. I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial features or spatial contents of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skepticalhypotheses.
This paper is thus an
knowledge attributions is needed to account for the “appearance of ignorance”—the appearance that we don’t know that skepticalhypotheses fail to obtain. I will then argue inter alia that we don’t need a contextualist semantics to account for the appearance of ignorance, and in any case that the “strength