Consider the skepticalhypothesis in which a particular subject S has always been a brain-in-a-vat ( biv ) such that S has never been in causal contact with the external world. When S utters the token sentence, “That tree is green,” she is mistaken since there is no tree, and this is true not
Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul ( 2010 ) suggest a version of skepticism according to which the skeptic posits a distinct skepticalhypothesis for each external world proposition that a person claims to know. For example, it may seem to S that she knows the following proposition:
Intuitive cognitions, including those obtained through the senses, are acts of immedi- ate acquaintance with a thing. An intuitive cognition can be called a perception, there- Ockham and Wodeham on Divine Deception as a SkepticalHypothesis * ELIZABETH KARGER Both William of Ockham and Adam Wodeham 1
Much of the weight of the argument turns on ru 1. In most general terms, it is relatively straightforward to see why this is the case. As noted, both the underdetermination skeptic and the skeptical dogmatist accept that mwh is at least underdetermined. From this it
develop holds that, although I do not know whether the skepticalhypothesis is true, I sill know what I ordinarily claim to know. The implication is that I can retain knowledge of commonsense propositions despite the possibility of deception.
The Radical Skeptical Argument
The problem of
The skeptical puzzle consists of three independently plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims: (A) S knows a certain ordinary proposition op; (B) S does not know the denial of a certain skeptical hypothesis sh; and (C) S knows that op only if S knows that not-sh. The variantist solution (to the skeptical puzzle) claims that (A) and not-(B) are true in the ordinary context, but false in the skeptical one. Epistemic contextualism has offered a standards-variantist solution, which is the most prominent variantist solution on the market. In this paper, I argue that the standards-variantist solution in general (and the contextualist solution in particular) is epistemically uninteresting. Proponents of the variantist solution should opt for the position-variantist solution instead. I will discuss some important implications of my findings.
and about the world at large. We might think of this as a global or multi-purpose scepticalhypothesis that could be wielded against countless items of putative knowledge. To look at it in a slightly different way, the presupposition that there are external objects and that our experiences result
thereby achieved, Sosa offers a transcendental argument against the skeptic at the end of the essay—a daring strategy in the face of Stroud’s famous objection against such arguments! The argument takes its starting point from a skepticalhypothesis of his own where the subject is faced with the threat of
about the colour of a table into easy knowledge of the falsity of a scepticalhypothesis. And the generation of easy knowledge “suggests that we were wrong to think we had the basic knowledge in the first place” (Cohen 2002: 311). Thus the problem of easy knowledge.
2 Responses to (EK
is false, because we cannot know ordinary propositions about the external world. Nozick 1981
Even if the argument’s premises are true, it is deductively valid, and its conclusion is deduced from its premises, one cannot come to know the falsity of a skepticalhypothesis on the basis of