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Author: Eric Yang

Consider the skeptical hypothesis in which a particular subject S has always been a brain-in-a-vat ( biv ) such that S has never been in causal contact with the external world. When S utters the token sentence, “That tree is green,” she is mistaken since there is no tree, and this is true not

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Philip Atkins

Anthony Brueckner and Jon Altschul ( 2010 ) suggest a version of skepticism according to which the skeptic posits a distinct skeptical hypothesis for each external world proposition that a person claims to know. For example, it may seem to S that she knows the following proposition: [P1] S

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

Intuitive cognitions, including those obtained through the senses, are acts of immedi- ate acquaintance with a thing. An intuitive cognition can be called a perception, there- Ockham and Wodeham on Divine Deception as a Skeptical Hypothesis * ELIZABETH KARGER Both William of Ockham and Adam Wodeham 1

In: Vivarium
Author: Mark Walker

One Skeptical Hypothesis Much of the weight of the argument turns on ru 1. In most general terms, it is relatively straightforward to see why this is the case. As noted, both the underdetermination skeptic and the skeptical dogmatist accept that mwh is at least underdetermined. From this it

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Justin Remhof

develop holds that, although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I sill know what I ordinarily claim to know. The implication is that I can retain knowledge of commonsense propositions despite the possibility of deception. 2 The Radical Skeptical Argument The problem of

In: Contemporary Pragmatism
Author: Kok Yong Lee

The skeptical puzzle consists of three independently plausible yet jointly inconsistent claims: (A) S knows a certain ordinary proposition op; (B) S does not know the denial of a certain skeptical hypothesis sh; and (C) S knows that op only if S knows that not-sh. The variantist solution (to the skeptical puzzle) claims that (A) and not-(B) are true in the ordinary context, but false in the skeptical one. Epistemic contextualism has offered a standards-variantist solution, which is the most prominent variantist solution on the market. In this paper, I argue that the standards-variantist solution in general (and the contextualist solution in particular) is epistemically uninteresting. Proponents of the variantist solution should opt for the position-variantist solution instead. I will discuss some important implications of my findings.

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Martin Smith

and about the world at large. We might think of this as a global or multi-purpose sceptical hypothesis that could be wielded against countless items of putative knowledge. To look at it in a slightly different way, the presupposition that there are external objects and that our experiences result

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Mikael Janvid

thereby achieved, Sosa offers a transcendental argument against the skeptic at the end of the essay—a daring strategy in the face of Stroud’s famous objection against such arguments! The argument takes its starting point from a skeptical hypothesis of his own where the subject is faced with the threat of

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Mark McBride

about the colour of a table into easy knowledge of the falsity of a sceptical hypothesis. And the generation of easy knowledge “suggests that we were wrong to think we had the basic knowledge in the first place” (Cohen 2002: 311). Thus the problem of easy knowledge. 2 Responses to (EK

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: James R. Beebe

is false, because we cannot know ordinary propositions about the external world. Nozick 1981 (2.2) Even if the argument’s premises are true, it is deductively valid, and its conclusion is deduced from its premises, one cannot come to know the falsity of a skeptical hypothesis on the basis of

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism