correctness” is a cautious position vis-à-vis skepticism. It does not admit that the skeptic’s question is legitimately posed, or fully natural. And indeed, Stroud’s writings after The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism more strongly suggest that it is the epistemological project itself that is the
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Skepticism in the Modern Age
Building on the Work of Richard Popkin
Series:
Edited by José Maia Neto, Gianni Paganini and John Christian Laursen
Since the publication of the first edition of Richard Popkin’s classic The History of Scepticism in 1960, skepticism has been increasingly recognized as a major force in the development of early modern philosophy. This book provides a review of current scholarship and significant updated research on some of the main thinkers and issues related to the reappraisal of ancient skepticism in the modern age. Special attention is given to the nature, importance, and relation to religion of Montaigne’s and Hume’s skepticisms; to the various skeptical and non-skeptical sources of Cartesian doubt; to the skeptical and anti-skeptical impact of Cartesianism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and to philosophers who dealt with skeptical issues in the development of their own various intellectual interests.
Pierre Le Morvan
. 2012 . The Wizard of Lies . New York : St. Martin’s Press . Santayana G. 1955 . Scepticism and Animal Faith: Introduction to a System of Philosophy . New York : Dover Publications . Taber C. & Lodge M. 2006 . “ Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of
Steven Luper
’s approach and skepticism: they want to acknowledge that we cannot know the falsity of skeptical hypotheses, yet salvage commonsense knowledge claims. These latter theorists include proponents of “sensitivity” conditions, such as Fred Dretske (1970 , 1971) and Robert Nozick (1981) , and contextualists
Skepticism and Elegance
An Explanationist Rejoinder
Kevin McCain
1 Introduction A promising response to the threat of external world skepticism is the Explanationist Response ( exp ). 1 According to exp , the hypothesis that “our sensory experiences are caused by ordinary objects having roughly the characteristics we commonsensically take them to have
James R. Beebe
/External Divide ,” 145 – 157 in Greco J. and Sosa E. (eds), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology . Malden, MA : Blackwell . Stroud, B. ( 1984 ). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Vahid, H. ( 2013 ). “ Skepticism, A Priori Skepticism, and the
Rethinking the History of Skepticism
The Missing Medieval Background
Series:
Edited by Henrik Lagerlund
The history of skepticism usually ignores the Middle Ages. It is customary in most historical overviews to say that epistemological skepticism and external-world skepticism did not find its way into the Western philosophical tradition until Sextus Empiricus was rediscovered and retranslated into Latin in the Sixteenth century. It is the aim of this book to show that this is not true and that the history of skepticism must be rewritten. It is only once the rich discussions of both epistemological and external-world skepticism in the Middle Ages are included that the whole history of skepticism can be written, and only then can the development of modern thought be understood. This book begins this rewriting of the history of skepticism by tracing discussions of skepticism from Al-Ghazali to sixteenth century Paris.
Contributors are Taneli Kukkonen, Martin Pickave, Claude Panaccio, David Piche, Christophe Grellard, Gyula Klima, Dominik Perler, Henrik Lagerlund, and Elizabeth Karger
Contributors are Taneli Kukkonen, Martin Pickave, Claude Panaccio, David Piche, Christophe Grellard, Gyula Klima, Dominik Perler, Henrik Lagerlund, and Elizabeth Karger
Daniel M. Johnson
1. Introduction Perhaps the most popular and historically important way of responding to skepticism is by an appeal to non-inferential justification. Such an appeal figures most prominently in the foundationalist reply to the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s regress problem, but it is also important in a
Susan Feldman
Amidst the concern that classic brain-in-a-vat skepticism is weak because it is too generic, 1 Bryan Frances (2005a) devises a way to revitalize the skeptical challenge to knowledge. 2 No one actually believes brain-in-a-vat hypotheses, which makes them targets for charges of irrelevancy
Anthony Brueckner
In “Perceptual Entitlement, Reliabilism, and Scepticism,” Frank Barel (2012) explores some important and under-discussed questions regarding the relation between Tyler Burge’s views on perceptual entitlement, on the one hand, and the problem of skepticism, on the other. In this note, I would