obtain preferred outcomes in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, and aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. While many real-world situations involve all three types of power, and softpower alone is rarely sufficient, its
preferred outcomes in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, and aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. While many real-world situations involve all three types of power, and softpower alone is rarely sufficient, its presence can be
Very often these appeals can be approached through the concept of softpower that represents an alternative to the realist and territorially-determined ways of thinking about international relations, including their geopolitical component. The idea of softpower itself stems from a
governments play “softpower” games and develop distinctive strategies for reviving Chinese-language education in Thailand. Below is a discussion of the formation of modern Chinese schools in Southeast Asia which may shed some light on Chinese-language education in Siam/Thailand.
Chinese Schools in
Introduction: Beyond the Anglophone World
The Chinese government has doubled its budget for projecting softpower during Xi Jinping’s presidency, from US$4.75 billion in 2011 to $9.5 billion in 2018. 1 In contrast, US President Donald Trump’s administration has announced a 29 per cent
factors for reinforcing Korea’s aid to Africa. Although Korea recognizes the limits of searching for ways of furthering its ‘resource diplomacy’ based primarily on economic pragmatism, the Korean government has strived to utilize aid as a tool for softpower. Hence, Korea’s perspective is to play a bigger
democracy. The narrative also focuses on Turkey’s new multilateral and soft-power-oriented foreign policy in the Middle East ( Kirisci 2009 ; Oğuzlu 2010). The idea of softpower has recently emerged in international relations literature ( Nye 2004 , 2008). Accordingly, the resources that produce softpower
communications, but these efforts are significant nonetheless. ‘Softpower’, the ability to secure support for preferred outcomes based on attraction rather than coercion, is predicated on generating attention ( Nye, 2004 ): Attractive properties must be known and acknowledged as such to have an effect. This
As early as the 1920s, Japan had used auspicious historical events as a source of soft power to make itself attractive to the Philippines. However, toward the turn of the present century, an aspect of this strategy turned out to be problematic because Japan’s choice of February as the month to hold the cultural component of its soft power, packaged as the Philippines-Japan Festival, clashed with the commemoration of the Battle for the Liberation of Manila. This article traces how the annual Philippines- Japan Festival came to be celebrated in February; narrates how the Battle for the Liberation of Manila is celebrated and contrasts it with the grander annual celebration of national historical events; and recounts the criticisms hurled by Filipino elites against the holding of the Philippines-Japan Festival every February. Because of the criticisms, the word “festival” is no longer used, but cultural events have spread to other months, including February. The article concludes that in this particular case a World War II memory that is the Battle for the Liberation of Manila has not proved strong enough to radically challenge Japan’s soft power.
Since the late 1980s, there has been a resurgence of regionalism in world politics. Prospects for new alliances are opened up often on a regional basis. In East and Southeast Asia, regionalization is becoming evident in higher education, with both awareness and signs of a rising ASEAN+3 higher education community. The quest for regional influence in Southeast Asia, however, has not been immune from controversies. One fact has been China’s growing soft power. As a systematically planned soft power policy, China is projecting soft power actively through higher education in the region. Yet, China-ASEAN relations in higher education have been little documented. Unlike the mainstay of the practices of internationalization in higher education that focuses overwhelmingly on educational exchange and collaboration with affluent Western countries, China’s interactions with ASEAN member countries in higher education are fulfilled by “quiet achievers,” mainly seen at the regional institutions in relatively less developed provinces such as Guangxi and Yunnan. This article selects regional higher education institutions in China’s much disadvantaged provinces to depict a different picture to argue that regionalization could contribute substantially to internationalization, if a variety of factors are combined properly.