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1 Introduction In this paper, we consider two Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox that arises from the principle of epistemic closure under known entailment. We assume that perceptual evidence is propositional   1 and we formulate an instance of the paradox as follows

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Giorgio Volpe

‘liberal’ accounts. Extended Rationality is full of insightful ideas not only on the structure of epistemic warrant, but on related subjects such as epistemic closure, transmission of warrant and easy knowledge, and these ideas are woven together in a comprehensive account of the nature of epistemic

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Antonia Barke
This book investigates whether knowledge is closed under known entailment. Traditionally it has been assumed that if a person knows some proposition p and also knows that this proposition entails another proposition q, then by inferring q from p that person would gain knowledge of q. This so-called ‚Principle of Deductive Closure‘ is of intrinsic interest because, if true, it expresses an important structural characteristic of knowledge. Challenges to this principle of deductive closure have been formulated by Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick, among others. Most replies to these challenges, as well as the challenges themselves, make explicit or implicit use of the idea that our knowledge claims are not invariant, but relative to a context. Therefore, a substantial part of the book is devoted to an analysis of contextualism and a criticism of the current contextualistic accounts. Once developed, the account is then used to answer the challenge to the principle of deductive closure. Epistemic contextualism results in a limited closure principle.
Modal Epistemology and Scepticism
Scepticism, the view that knowledge is impossible, threatens our conception of ourselves as epistemic subjects as much as it endangers our conception of the external world. The book develops a modal account of knowledge and provides an answer to scepticism based on a detailed examination of the main sceptical argument. It discusses prominent contemporary theories of knowledge, in particular safety and sensitivity theories, and shows that they cannot handle Gettier-type examples of a new kind. An alternative analysis of knowledge in terms of relevantly normal possibilities is developed. The sceptical argument addressed aims to show that we cannot know ordinary things because we cannot rule out that we are in a sceptical scenario. Classical responses, like dogmatism, non-closure theories, and epistemic contextualism, are explored and rejected as unnecessary for a refutation of the sceptical argument. A detailed investigation reveals, first, that the failure to know that we are not in a sceptical scenario does not conflict with ordinary knowledge, but only with knowledge that we know, and, second, that we can indeed know that we are not in a sceptical scenario. It is therefore claimed not only that we know, but also that we know that we know.
Author: Annalisa Coliva

as the very history of epistemology—epitomized by “Agrippa’s trilemma”—concerns the epistemic status of these assumptions. In the quest for justification, each horn of this trilemma is thought to be problematical: either we end up providing circular justifications; or we embark on an infinite regress

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

My book, The Illusion of Doubt , shows that radical scepticism is an illusion generated by a Cartesian picture of our evidential situation—the view that my epistemic grounds in both the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ cases must be the same, and consists in information about an inner mental realm of

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Author: Krista Lawlor

Epistemic closure, the idea that knowledge is closed under known implication, plays a central role in current discussions of skepticism and the semantics of knowledge reports. Contextualists in particular rely heavily on the truth of epistemic closure in staking out their distinctive response to the so-called "skeptical paradox." I argue that contextualists should re-think their commitment to closure. Closure principles strong enough to force the skeptical paradox on us are too strong, and closure principles weak enough to express unobjectionable epistemic principles are too weak to generate the skeptical paradox. I briefly consider how the contextualist might live without (strong) closure.

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: Peter Murphy

states is used to argue that we have no knowledge of other minds; and a scenario in which you came into existence moments ago with implanted memories is used to show that you lack knowledge of the past. Exactly what epistemic defect has to show up in a skeptical scenario if it is to effectively target

In: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism

an analytical category; rather, it is to highlight the theoretical or epistemic closure that the over-reliance on conversion as the only way of reading Black African Muslim presence in South African Islam performs. 22 Diagne, “Toward an intellectual History of West Africa,” p. 21. 23

In: Islamic Africa
In Hinge Epistemology, eminent epistemologists investigate Wittgenstein's concept of basic certainty or 'hinge certainty'. The volume begins by examining the salient features of 'hinges': Are they propositions that enjoy a special kind of non-evidential justification? Are they objects of knowledge or ways of acting mistaken for known propositions? Various attempts are then made to integrate hinges in the development of a viable epistemology: Can they shed light on the conditions of satisfaction for knowledge and justification? Do they offer a solution to scepticism? Finally, the application of hinges is explored in such areas as common knowledge and intellectual loyalty. The volume attests to the importance of hinge certainty and Wittgenstein's On Certainty for mainstream epistemology.