Neues Jahrbuch. Band 44 – 2018
New Perspectives on Composition, Dating, and Authorship
Contributors: Mark Csikszentmihalyi, Paul van Els, Robert Eno, Joachim Gentz, Paul R. Goldin, Michael Hunter, Martin Kern, Esther Klein, John Makeham, Matthias L. Richter.
Buddhistische Wissenstheorien und Transzendentalphilosophie
Beitragende sind Kogaku Arifuko, Martin Bunte, Luis Fellipe Garcia, Lutz Geldsetzer, Helmut Girndt, Katsuki Hayashi, Saša Josifović, Michael Lewin, Hitoshi Minobe, Kunihiko Nagasawa, Akira Omine, Valentin Pluder, Raji C. Steineck, Johannes Stoffers und Fabian Völker.
Thirty years of friendly connections between the Japanese Fichte Association and the International Fichte Society have found expression in volume 46 of Fichte Studien. It contains a collection of comparative studies between European and Japanese philosophy centered on transcendental philosophy (of Kant, Fichte and Husserl) and classical Mahayana Buddhism (plus Japan´s Kyoto school). Without denying irreconcilable differences between western and eastern thinking these essays demonstrate that western as well as eastern thinking is based on the universal ground of pre-reflexive cognition.
The question of the origin of badness is a core problematic in New Confucian philosopher Xiong Shili’s 熊十力 (1885–1968) Ming Xin Pian 明心 篇 (Explaining the Mind; 1959), a work representative of his thought towards the end of his life. In this essay, I examine how Xiong uses the concepts of the nature (xing 性) and the mind (xin 心) to explain the origin of moral badness. Xiong asserts that the Buddhists never concerned themselves with the problem of the origin of ignorance and delusion, afflictions that in turn lead to suffering and wrongdoing. Xiong sets out to redress what he claims the Buddhists had failed to do. I argue that the conceptual structure of both Xiong Shili’s and Zhu Xi’s 朱 熹 (1130–1200) theoretical approaches to this problem are isomorphic. The isomorphism is significant because it suggests that Xiong consciously drew on Zhu Xi and/or the Buddhist models that Zhu in turn drew on. I provide evidence to show that even as late as 1959, and despite his increasingly entrenched criticisms of Buddhism, Xiong continued to draw on key concepts and models drawn from Buddhist philosophy of mind.
Ady Van Den Stock
In this article, I offer a provisional analysis of the philosophical semantics of “wisdom” in the thought of the New Confucian thinker Tang Junyi. I begin by providing some pointers concerning the concept of wisdom in general and situating the discourse on wisdom in comparative philosophy in the context of the later Foucault’s and Pierre Hadot’s historical investigations into ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy as a mode of spiritual self-cultivation and self-transformation. In the remainder of the paper, I try to describe and think through what Foucault identifies as a “Cartesian moment,” in which self-knowledge becomes the ultimate precondition for the ethico-spiritual project of “caring for the self,” in Tang’s approach of wisdom. In the course of my argument, I outline the complex relation between his vision of a renewed Confucian mode of religious practice on the one hand and his philosophical presuppositions concerning the transcendental status of subjectivity and the reflexivity of consciousness on the other.
Editors Frontiers of Philosophy in China
In this paper I investigate differences and similarities in the definitions of human being and human essence as proposed by two of the most influential thinkers of 20th-century world philosophy, namely Mou Zongsan and Martin Heidegger. I first examine a number of interpretations put forth by scholars that assess the philosophical compatibility of the thought of the two philosophers. Each of these assessments tend to agree that they are incompatible with each other based on what they perceive as an absolute distance between Mou’s and Heidegger’s ways of thinking. Although these studies are pioneering and show an in-depth understanding of Mou’s thought, none demonstrate a correct understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy. Therefore, I will attempt to demonstrate that, despite their differences, the ontological and ethical theses of Mou and Heidegger have several striking points of contact. I will also put forth the claim that Heidegger’s post-turn philosophy is more compatible with Mou’s philosophy than Kant’s system.