Abstract
This paper revisits the literature on regional power-hood and its application to Africa with a view to answering two key questions: one, whether we can talk of regional hegemons in the continent in real terms, and two, whether group hegemonic leadership better explains regional hegemonic behavior in Africa. It uses Sandra Destradi conceptual framework and Miriam Prys’ typology of regional power-hood to answer these questions, with South Africa and Nigeria as case studies. Using Prys’ typology which distinguishes between regional detached powers, regional hegemons and regional dominators as an analytical framework, the paper confirms what already exists in the literature, viz. that neither South Africa nor Nigeria neatly fit the conception of regional hegemons in Africa. However, it uses both countries as empirical cases to argue that they already act as hegemonic leaders and in cooperative ways that suggest group or shared leadership, using specific Common African Positions they have led in Africa. The analysis concludes by laying out the normative basis for a Group Hegemony composed of not only South Africa and Nigeria, but also other sub-regional leaders in the continent. This is based on the hard power shortfalls and internal weaknesses of both our case studies including their relative soft power resources which have utility in an increasingly intersocial international system.
1 Introduction
It can be argued that the end of the Cold War saw the emergence of regional powers as key actors with important roles in regional and global governance. Also, with the emergence of new social issues, new actors and transnational human security challenges, and the seeming helplessness of great power states in solving global problems (Badie, 2020), there is increasing reliance on regional powers to, for instance, resolve conflicts, provide economic goods, and enable political stability in their regions (see Katzenstein, 2015). This paper therefore revisits the literature on regional power-hood and its application to Africa with a view to answering two key questions. The first is whether we can we talk of regional hegemons in Africa in the realist terms of the concept, and two, whether group hegemonic leadership better explains regional hegemonic behavior in the continent. The paper uses Sandra Destradi’s conceptual framework and Miriam Prys’ typology of regional power-hood to answer these questions with reference to South Africa and Nigeria as case studies.
The question of regional power-hood in Africa (whether in terms of hegemony or leadership) and its significance is well documented in studies such as Adebajo and Landsberg (2003), Schoeman (2003) Alden and Schoeman (2015) and Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2016). In sum, they argue that Africa needs a regional hegemon capable of addressing the political, economic and security challenges confronting the continent. Apart from providing regional public goods including order and stability, a regional hegemon in Africa that provides effective regional governance would help to restore respect for the continent in the international system (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). Implicitly, the absence of one has implications for regional stability, prosperity and security. Also, at a time when Africa is again becoming a theatre of super-power rivalry not just on account of its human and material resources1 but also on its agency as one of the largest regional voting groups in the United Nations (UN), the need for regional hegemonic leadership becomes more paramount. For instance, recognizing Africa’s agency in international relations, the US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa 2022 indicated that:
it is impossible to meet this era’s defining challenges without African contributions and leadership. The region will factor prominently in efforts to: end the COVID-19 pandemic; tackle the climate crisis; reverse the global tide of democratic backsliding; address global food insecurity; strengthen an open and stable international system; shape the rules of the world on vital issues like trade, cyber, and emerging technologies; and confront the threat of terrorism, conflict, and transnational crime.2
The caveat though is that Africa will be better served and placed to optimize its agency in the international system if it has a legitimate regional hegemonic leader(s) capable of articulating and advancing its collective interests. This is also a veritable way of resolving the fragmentation within the continent that great powers exploit for their national interests at the expense of the national and collective interests of states in Africa. So what is the state of regional hegemony in Africa today? Does the continent have a clear regional hegemon or a regional hegemonic leader that provides regional governance and is a source of regional public goods in the continent? If yes, who is this hegemon or leader and if not, how is regional hegemony playing out in Africa? Is there a possibility of reimagining regional power-hood in ways that better explain regional hegemonic behaviour in Africa? These sub-questions frame the two key questions this paper aims to address.
As Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) correctly noted, the focus on regional powers has provoked debates on the conceptualization and categorisation of what constitutes regional hegemony and this makes it an essentially contested concept. Some scholarly concepts used to differentiate between classifications of international power status include global superpowers, regional great powers (Osterud, 1992), regional leading powers (Nolte, 2010) middle powers (Alden and Schoeman, 2005) and pivotal powers (see Lemke, 2002). Relatedly, Destradi (2010) argued that the conceptual clarification of the notions of empire, hegemony, and leadership has enabled the identification of several dimensions according to which possible strategies of regional powers are comparable, and that these are all part of a continuum of regional power-hood. Her argument is rooted in the conceptual premise of a regional power as “a state which belongs to a region, disposes of superior power capabilities, and exercises an influence on regional neighbours, the hegemon adopts a combination of strategies in relating with its neighbours” (Destradi, 2010: 929).
Also, as Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) contend, there is considerable intellectual debate on the geographic context in which the concept of regional hegemon is used in the analysis of regional interactions and for any meaningful theorization. For example, Nolte (2010: 883) acknowledged the “general lack of analytical instruments to identify and to compare regional powers, and to differentiate regional powers from great powers and middle powers.” Overall, it is clear and well documented in literature that there is no consensus on what makes a regional hegemon, since there are numerous approaches to describing the empirical relationship between power and leadership. (Ogunnubi and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016).
However, Prys’ (2010) categorization of regional powers has analytical utility that is pertinent for our purpose in this paper. Using her typology which distinguishes between regional detached powers, regional hegemons and regional dominators as an analytical framework, this paper confirms what already exists in the literature, namely that neither South Africa nor Nigeria neatly fit the conception of regional hegemons in Africa. It does however use both countries as empirical cases to argue that they already act as hegemonic leaders as conceptualized by Destradi (2010), and in cooperative ways that suggest group or shared leadership with reference to specific Common African Positions South Africa and Nigeria have led in Africa. The paper concludes by laying out the normative basis for a Group Hegemony composed of not only South Africa and Nigeria but also other sub-regional leaders in the continent. This is based not only on their hard power shortfalls and internal weaknesses, but also on their relative soft power resources which have utility in an increasingly intersocial international system.3
2 Conceptual Distinctions in Regional Power-hood: Hegemonic Strategies and Typologies
The concept of hegemony (a form of domination to exercise influence and control) in IR has been difficult to define and analyse because of the diverse policy options and strategies that states labelled as ‘hegemonic’ can pursue (Destradi, 2010: 917). This conceptualisation dilemma in the usage of the term hegemony, as Prys (2010: 481–482) notes, offers little “indicators or distinctive criteria for when a state is a regional leader, a regional hegemon, or an anchor state, thereby largely preventing meaningful comparison.” This situation then informs the call for what Destradi (2010:917) refers to as “a further specification and differentiation of forms of hegemony that goes beyond the popular benevolent/coercive and material/ideational divides, and combines these analytical categories into new sub-types.” To realise such new analytical categories of hegemony requires a unique analysis of the nature and means of hegemonic manifestations in specific regions. For instance as Prys (2010:482) notes:
most authors propose taking into account any specificities of the regional level of analysis; yet, in practice, they apply analytical frameworks that were originally developed for scrutinizing global-level phenomena, which, admittedly, in absence of specifically regional theories, often seems to be the most straightforward way of proceeding.
There are two major themes that emerge from the neorealist, neoliberal institutionalist and Gramscian approaches to the study of hegemony in the international system: Dominance and Leadership. While the former deals with coercion, the latter emphasises ideas as critical to the hegemonic project (Alden and Schoeman, 2015: 242). However, the use of dominance to exercise control remains common to both themes. The view of hegemony as a concept of interstate political relations with dominance as its central matrix, has come under increasing scrutiny. Burges’ (2008) criticism of the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to hegemony is that they seem to ignore ‘the intrinsic nature and importance of hegemony as a structure with an “ownership” that may embrace (only) a range of countries that agree on a particular vision of the system’ (Burges, 2008: 69). Therefore getting the buy-in of other states with different worldviews is critical to effective hegemony.
To address the sophistry of this global-level theorising of hegemony has necessitated its reconceptualization. As Burges (2008:70) captured it:
[Hegemony] is an all-embracing system ordering economic, political and social relations within and between countries. While this overarching structure dictates the behaviour of states, it does not necessarily express one state’s dominance at any particular given moment in time, but can instead be a structure created through a consensual agreement between multiple states led by a predominant state.
This conceptualisation is anchored on the Gramscian view of hegemony as a unique order that includes all actors and social groups within this system, without recourse to forceful impositions by any state. Redefining hegemony, as noted above, offered the pathway to the introduction of consensual hegemony as an analytical tool for the study of hegemony at a regional level. The concept of consensual hegemony, as coined by Burges, describes how a hegemonic structure can be realised and maintained without recourse to dominance to enlist the participation of other actors. The crux of this system is the development of a structural vision that necessarily includes nominally subordinate actors, with consistent engagement that influences the subordinate actors to absorb the bases of the hegemony as theirs (Burges, 2008: 65). Burges (2008) uses this conceptual framework to demonstrate how Brazil might pursue a consensual hegemony in the South American region through its post-Cold War foreign policy.
Another concept that offers a close meaning to consensual hegemony is cooperative hegemony. It is defined by Pedersen as a “grand strategy” adopted by regional actors – often those with low material capabilities yet play important economic and/or political roles in the international system – with both institutionalist and realist dimensions (Pedersen, 2012, cited in Ludwig, 2012: 2). In the light of Gramscian thought, Burges argues, Pedersen’s cooperative hegemony could transform into consensual hegemony (Ludwig, 2012: 3). Analysing further, Ludwig reveals that while cooperative hegemony promises long-term benefits, it nevertheless involves cost and is inversely related to “unilateral hegemony” where actors can expand their spheres of influence in pursuit of stabilisation. This resonates with the argument that even Gramsci’s idea of hegemony remains a form of dominance and control, even though it withholds from the use of force (Destradi, 2010: 913). The study of Mercosur in South America by Fernando Ludwig to determine whether it is a cooperative, shared, or consensual hegemony, indicates that despite the indices for Brazil’s consensual hegemony, as propagated by Burges, there is no consensus as to whether the economies of Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela, as South American powers, are competitive rather than complementary (Ludwig, 2012: 2).4
It is noteworthy that power-sharing, as suggested by consensual hegemony and cooperative hegemony, is relevant and critical in a region where power and influence are evenly spread amongst different regional leaders5 and as such there is there is no clear hegemon or dominant power capable of wielding hegemonic power. In this context, both consensual hegemony and cooperative hegemony provide a conceptual foundation, and, in the least, bears a relationship with group hegemonic leadership, which we define as consensual and cooperative sharing of leadership responsibilities between sub-regional leaders in a region aimed at providing regional governance, order and regional public goods based on commonly articulated regional interests. This entails a harmonization of the diverse interests of all the states within a region including those of its sub-regional leaders in intra-regional relations and the region’s relations with the rest of the world.
Alden and Schoeman (2015) adopt and apply Burges’ conceptualisation of consensual hegemony to analyse the varying degree of successes and failure in post-Apartheid South Africa’s long quest for consensual hegemonic status in Africa (2015: 243). They identify South Africa’s ‘articulation and implementation of a new continental vision for development and an economy driven by a robust private sector’ as the key factors to their claim to regional leadership (2015: 248). However, the findings of these authors show a record of uneven foreign policy and material weakness as challenges to South Africa’s realisation of its hegemonic aspirations. It is noteworthy that South Africa’s strategy to attain hegemonic status in Africa fails to realize the fundamentals of consensual hegemony which is the creative harmonisation of the diverse interests of actors towards a common regional goal. Rather, what is evident is a competitive approach that attracts criticisms from other regional powers such as Nigeria and Kenya with the aim of neutralising South Africa’s legitimacy as regional hegemon for fear of dominance (Schoeman & Alden, 2015: 251).
Within the above context, we round off this section with the contributions of Sandra Destradi and Miriam Prys which beyond providing excellent conceptual analysis of regional hegemons, also offer a framework of strategies hegemons adopt to realise their regional power-hood (Destradi) and how to categorize differences in regional power-hood (Prys, 2010). These can be applied to understanding regional power-hood in Africa in terms of distinguishing between regional hegemony and regional leadership and where dominant power states in Africa fall in these distinctions and categorizations.
2.1 Regional Hegemon vs Regional Leader
Destradi (2010) argues that regional powers can adopt different hegemonic strategies such as empire, hegemony, and leadership to pursue their relations with other regional actors. She points to a flaw in approaches to the conceptualisation of regional powers – cooperative regional leading power, cooperative hegemony, regional leading powers, and consensual hegemony. According to Destradi, these approaches “conceive of states as pursuing exclusively benevolent, leading, or integrating strategies,” and that they do not correspond to empirical reality, or that the cases to which these approaches are applied are too scarce to establish a concrete base for more theorising about regional powers (Destradi, 2010: 907).
Therefore, in the quest to formulate a single ‘generalisable conceptualization’ that encapsulates the diverse approaches a regional power can pursue in dealing with other actors in their region, Destradi identifies three key strategic approaches that states assume: empire, hegemony, and leadership. She considers the empire approach as a regional power’s adoption of force to attain regional dominance. Regarding hegemony, Destradi identifies two essential features that place the concept on a fragile balance between consensus and coercion: (a) hegemony seeks self-interest and goals, though these are presented to subordinate states as collective goals; and (b), hegemons employ a combination of material incentives and ideational power to gain consensus from subordinate states. On leadership, Destradi analyses two leadership models – leader-initiated and follower-initiated – which use normative persuasion and emulation to substantiate her claim that “the leader guides – ‘leads’ – a group of states in order to realise or facilitate the realisation of their common objectives” (Destradi, 2010: 921).
Destradi’s delineation of the distinctions between the features of these ideal-type approaches is to demonstrate that very rarely will a regional power adopt:
a ‘pure’ imperial, hard/intermediate/soft hegemonic, or leading strategy … [given that] regional powers can modify their strategies in the course of time, passing, for instance, from a hard to an intermediate hegemonic strategy or from a soft hegemonic strategy to a leading strategy in response to changes in reactions by subordinate states, to domestic factors redefining state priorities, or to pressures deriving from the external environment, for example, from global powers (Destradi, 2010: 929).
Although not much empirical research has been done to test Destradi’s ideal- typical conceptual framework to study the strategies regional powers pursue in different issue areas, it is useful for understanding and categorising regional hegemonic behaviour through the means/strategies regionally powerful states employ to enact imperial power, hegemony or leadership. For example as she contended, a regional power pursues a simultaneous policy mix of different strategies according to the policy area analysed. The conceptual framework also serves as a point of departure for future research including an examination of the leading strategies of regional leaders such as South Africa and Nigeria in the context of this study. This creates a leeway for rethinking regional power-hood in leadership terms especially in a context of no imperial power or regional hegemon. In this sense we can talk of regional hegemonic leadership where the regional leader “guides and ‘leads’ a group of states in order to realise or facilitate the realisation of their common objectives” (Destradi, 2010: 921).
The goals pursued by the dominant power state, the means of pursuing the goals, legitimation by subordinate states and their response to the power projection of dominant power states are critical distinguishing measures between a regional hegemon and a regional leader. For example, the regional hegemon seeks “to realise its own self-interested goals by presenting them as common with those of subordinate states” while the regional leader instead seeks to realise a common interest articulated by both the leader-state and its follower-states. Also, the regional hegemon uses a combination of hard, intermediate and soft power instruments to achieve its self-interested goals while the regional leader employs either cooperative normative persuasion or “common acceptance of directive or managerial function” depending on whether it is itself initiating or following the initiative of subordinate states. In terms of legitimacy, regional hegemons get partial recognition/acceptance from subordinate states depending on what power tools they employ while regional leaders get full recognition/acceptance and willing followership of subordinate states (Destradi, 2010: 921–928).
2.2 Categorizing Regional Power-hood
An important conceptual discussion of regional hegemony which is relevant to this paper is one by Miriam Prys (2010) (see Table 1). She did a critical and wide-ranging review of the literature on regional hegemony and articulates three ideal-types of regional power-hood that capture a fairly complete spectrum of different roles a regional power can play. These are Regional detached powers, Regional hegemons and Regional dominators. At one extreme of categorization, we have the “regional dominator” which is characterized mainly by one-sidedness. In this arrangement the regional dominator state commands and extracts involuntary tributes from the secondary states under a constant threat of force. A regional hegemon, in contrast, carries most of the burdens in the region and, at most, collects contributions from the secondary states, which are mostly used for the production of common goods. Furthermore, dominating or imperialistic states “directly infringe on the external and internal sovereignty of other states, whereas a hegemon, in the ideal case, refrains from doing so” (Doyle 1986:12). At the other end of the continuum of Prys (2010) categorization, there is the “detached regional powers,” induced either by insufficient resources or, for instance, by a lack of identification with the region (see also Notle and Schemoni, 2021). Such an actor will focus largely on domestic and/or on global politics, instead of on its regional role.
The elements of regional power-hood are self-perception (how the hegemonic state perceives itself), regional perception (how other states in the region perceive it), exercise of power (the projection of its values and interests onto secondary states) and the types of public goods it provides to other states in the region. According to Prys (2010:500):
what further stands out is that the openness of the region towards the international system, both with regard to the impact of external actors and structures and the global ambitions of the regional power, is considered as conditioning factor for the type of regional power a state becomes.
Typology of regional powers
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: PRYS (2010: 496)
Typology of regional powers
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: PRYS (2010: 496)Typology of regional powers
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: PRYS (2010: 496)
Extended typology of regional powers
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: Compiled by the Authors
Extended typology of regional powers
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: Compiled by the AuthorsExtended typology of regional powers
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: Compiled by the AuthorsFrom these elements, not only can we discern the roles regional hegemons play but we are also able to determine whether a region is stable, whether and how regional conflicts are solved or mediated and whether regional economic co-operation has been successful or not. In sum, this typology “captures a fairly complete spectrum of different roles a regional power can play” (Prys, 2010: 489). Drawing from it, Prys argues that for any regional dominant power to assume a hegemonic role, it must set its behaviour apart from domination and detachment. Clearly then, a regional dominant actor can be a regional power without been a hegemon, and in the same vein can also be a regional hegemonic leader by using hegemonic strategies of leadership6 to advance common goals (Destradi, 2010). In this context and in relation to our purpose in this paper, we can add regional hegemonic leader as a fourth ideal-type to Prys’ typology (see Table 2). This is a state with superior power advantages and capabilities relative to its regional sphere, which has considerable influence on its regional neighbours through a robust foreign policy. As a result, it enjoys a measure of acceptance, legitimacy and recognition based on its ideational leadership. This leadership also inspires a followership from subordinate states that confer a ‘managerial’ function on the leading state, and helping it to organize action to reach commonly articulated objectives. Power is exercised through soft power influence using normative persuasion and socialization processes that are accepted by both the leading state(s) and subordinate states. Although cooperative and disposed to the use of its soft power more often, a regional hegemonic leader can also be and self-interested and have some hard power capabilities to qualify it as a hegemon that leads not dominate.
Where do dominant powers in Africa such as South Africa and Nigeria fit in this schema? We shall try to answer this question in the next section where we apply Prys’ typology of regional power-hood and our extended version to Africa, using the specific cases of South Africa and Nigeria.
3 Applying Prys Typology of Regional Power-hood to Africa: the Cases of South Africa and Nigeria
Several states in Africa possess power capabilities that at the very least make them sub-regional dominant actors and leaders. For example, in terms of military capability, the 2020 Global Fire Power Index shows that Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola are the top five military powers in Africa (Global Fire Power, 2020), showing a spread of at least one sub-regional military power in North Africa, Southern Africa and West Africa. The 2022 Global Fire Power Index retained these countries in the top five, except Angola which was replaced by Morocco (Global Fire Power, 2022). In terms of economic capabilities, as shown in Table 3 below, these countries also top the ranking of the five largest economies in Africa, and three of them (South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria) are amongst the four African countries listed in Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index which is a comprehensive list of 60 soft power countries and indicators (Table 4). Relatedly, indicator of economic capability which span hard and soft power.
The five largest economies in Africa
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2020)
The five largest economies in Africa
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2020)The five largest economies in Africa
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2020)
Global soft power index
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: Adapted from Brand Finance (2020)
Global soft power index
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: Adapted from Brand Finance (2020)Global soft power index
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: Adapted from Brand Finance (2020)The two countries that feature consistently in all these measures of power capabilities are South Africa and Nigeria who, more than other states in Africa, have been touted as candidates for the status of regional hegemons in terms of both their soft and hard power capabilities (Ogunnubi et al. 2016: 4). Another factor that counted for why they were selected as case studies is their legitimated projection of power within their sub-regions. In some instances, they projected power in the continent at large and they have done so more than the other countries in these lists (viz. Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Angola). Third, both countries are perceived internationally as major African leaders given their robust Afrocentric foreign policies and involvement in Africa, as well as their demonstrated commitment to finding African solutions to African problems (Smith, 2012; Schoeman, 2007; Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003; Ogunnubi and Isike, 2015).
Top Six African countries with the highest Gross National Income Per capita, Purchasing Power Parity + Nigeria
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: World Bank (2021a)
Top Six African countries with the highest Gross National Income Per capita, Purchasing Power Parity + Nigeria
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: World Bank (2021a)Top Six African countries with the highest Gross National Income Per capita, Purchasing Power Parity + Nigeria
Citation: African and Asian Studies 22, 1-2 (2023) ; 10.1163/15692108-12341579
Source: World Bank (2021a)Relatedly, as indicated in Table 5, both countries are among the top 20 countries in Africa with the highest Gross National Income Per capita Purchasing Power Parity which gives a sense of their economies and their distributive institutional capabilities. Although Nigeria’s GNI per capita ($5,250) is much lower than South Africa ($14,140), it is important to note that emerging economies with large populations such as Nigeria usually have a relatively low GNP per capita PPP. For example, China’s GNP per capita, PPP in 2021 was $19,170, which is significantly lower than several small countries with less global influence than China.
However, both South Africa and Nigeria have domestic constrains7 added to geopolitical cleavages8 within the continent that compromise the capability of either one of them to act as a regional hegemon for Africa. For example, drawing from mainstream conceptualizations of hegemony, Ogunnubi and Akinola argue that South Africa does not fit into the categorisation of a hegemon in Africa, though they acknowledge that South Africa has demonstrated continental leadership capabilities in the areas of peace, security and development project (Ogunnubi and Akinola, 2017: 5). In many ways, this affirms Alden and Schoeman’s (2015: 249) view that “early expectations of South Africa as the gateway to Africa are overrated.” Similarly, Nigeria’s inability to match the firepower of Boko Haram which has weakened its profile as a military power in Africa, the spill over of insecurity into the West and Central African sub-regions and the increasing number of Nigerians seeking refuge in neighbouring countries have called Nigeria’s regional hegemon credential to question (Ogunnubi et al., 2016).
A comparative analysis of South Africa and Nigeria’s hard and soft power attributes and analysis of how they fit into Prys’ (2010) categorization of regional power-hood (see Table 1 above) indicates that neither country fits neatly into any of the three types of regional power-hood. They fit into parts of each of the three categories, but not sufficiently so in any or all of the categories to merit categorisation as either a regional detached power, regional hegemon or regional dominator. For example, under the regional detached power category, South Africa does not perceive itself as having hegemonic aspirations and as such focuses a lot more on its domestic priorities. It is also not perceived or accepted as such by its neighbors in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, nor by other states in the continent generally, especially given their perception of Pretoria as an outpost of Western imperialism, its claim of exceptionalism and the contradictory challenge posed by Afrophobia in South Africa (see Schoeman, Kefale and Alden, 2017). As a result, South Africa’s exercise of power in the sub-region and continent at large has little impact despite its soft power projections in Africa. On the other end, even though it has some acceptance both in the ECOWAS region and Africa at large, Nigeria is not readily accepted without contestation as a clear regional hegemon in Africa. Also, like South Africa, it does not have the hard power muscle to act as a regional hegemon or regional dominator. In addition, as mentioned earlier, Nigeria, like South Africa, has its own domestic challenges and contradictions that undercut any pretension or aspiration towards some form of regional dominance.
This assessment resonates with mainstream (realist) theorizing of hegemony which expects regional powers to “act hegemonically” through their material hard power preponderance in their region with an ultimate task of ‘taking care of their own backyard’ (Prys, 2010: 482). Nevertheless, to dismiss South Africa and Nigeria as African hegemons based on the set criteria for hegemony in mainstream IR literature is problematic. Their individual power capabilities and leadership roles in Africa, including their cooperative endeavours to advance African interests on the global stage, validates the need for what Destradi (2010:917) refers to as “sub-types” of a new form of regional hegemony discourse. Prys (2010:479) offers a pathway to addressing this conundrum thus:
in order to deal with this challenge, we need to move away from the implied assumption about the uniformity of these actors and, rather, that we should begin to deliberately think about the concept of a regional power as a variable that can take on different forms and values.
This social constructivist approach to conceptualizing and enacting regional power-hood allows for a shift in focus from absolute strength as a key indicator for hegemons to relative preponderance for two reasons: first, material capabilities vary significantly among regional powers across the globe, and second, what matters in regional relations is relative preponderance (Prys, 2010: 485). This has significance for constructing a group hegemonic leadership in a region where there is a preponderance of power capabilities of regional dominant actors that have limitations in terms of their individual capacities and resources. Ogunnubi and Akinola (2017:13) also take cognizance of this conceptual opportunity for reconstructing regional power-hood as it applies to Africa when they aver that:
any effort to apply the hegemonic theory to Africa would inevitably require fine-tuning to fit the peculiarity and nuances of the African context: a subservient economy. Such a conceptualization of (regional) hegemony in Africa should be one that acknowledges the distinctive socio-economic and political characteristics of the post-colonial African state, which is dependent in nature.
Overall, the potpourri of strengths and weaknesses of specific regional dominant actors in Africa including the intervening factor of the international system necessitates a complimentary framework for explaining regional power- hood in the continent that looks at “major candidates for regional power status such as Nigeria and South Africa” (Ogunnubi et al., 2016: 4). This complimentary framework entails a shared or cooperative regional and subregional leadership between both countries rather than the resort to analysis that dilutes Pretoria or Abuja’s legitimacy’ as regional hegemons (see Alden and Schoeman, 2015; Ogunnubi et al., 2016). This is the basis for Group Hegemonic Leadership as an analytic framework for hegemonic discourse in Africa, and one that best describes the nature and means of hegemonic currency in Africa. It allows for a critical consideration of complementary power capabilities of regional dominant actors in Africa to develop a shared hegemonic leadership framework devoid of coercion and dominance from within and outside of the continent. However it is pertinent to first examine South Africa and Nigeria’s roles as regional leaders in Africa and how they have engaged in cooperative leadership to advance the continent’s collective interests.
3.1 South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Leaders in Africa
Although neither fits into strict realist conceptualizations and categorizations of regional hegemony, South Africa and Nigeria use their power capabilities to play leading roles in Africa.
3.1.1 South Africa
Since the historic end of the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994, the country has gained increasing influence in the African continent and at the global level. One of the main yardsticks that has been used to measure the status of South Africa in International politics has been its relatively stable economy. Apart from being an industrialized economy (Ogunnubi and Akinola, 2017:8), South African companies such as MTN, Multichoice and Standard Bank all have huge presence in African countries, including Nigeria. Moreso, it currently has a GDP of about $420 Billion (World Bank 2021b). South Africa is surrounded by countries in the SADC region that depend on its manufactured goods and its currency, the Rand, is also considered as stable compared to other African currencies serving as legal tender in Namibia, Lesotho and Eswatini as part of the Common Monetary Agreement within the Southern African Customs Union. The economy of South Africa and the strength of the Rand against other African currencies coupled with the relative security in the country has made it an attractive destination for migrants from other African countries.
When it comes to hard power capabilities, as the third strongest military in Africa (Global Fire Power, 2020; 2022), South Africa boasts of a formidable military, and has the capacity to defend itself and to maintain peace in the SADC region. It uses both its military power and soft power to prevent or contain conflict in SADC as a regional leader. For example, it has been successful in restoring peace in Burundi, and during the 1998 crisis in Lesotho it leveraged its military power and the instrumentality of SADC to assert its position (Kornegay, 2011:41). Some of the public goods it has provided the Southern African region and the continent at large in the last 25 years through a combination of its hard and soft power include conflict mediation and peacekeeping in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Comoros, the DRC, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. As part of SADC’s Mission Mozambique (SAMIM), South Africa has since 2021 been a major military player (SADC 2021), alongside others such as Rwanda in helping Mozambique to contain insurgency in its oil-rich Cabo Delgado province.
From its foreign policy approach rooted in the Ubuntu philosophy (Madise and Isike, 2020) to its cultural exports, South Africa’s soft power resources are profoundly important in shaping a positive international image for the country as it attempts to set the agenda for international discourse. The institutionalisation of a good number of its soft power capabilities has made South Africa to leverage these potentials and generally punch above its weight in the comity of nations. This has made it to move beyond potential to reality. It should be borne in mind that, like its other BRICS counterparts (Brazil, Russia, India and China) for example, South Africa can clearly be seen as a soft power state having the attributes to avoid the use of coercion and force in ensuring that the attractiveness of its own ideas and preferences is reflected in the choices of other states particularly within Africa. Examples include its democracy promotion in Angola, the Comoros, Eswatini, the DRC, Lesotho and Sudan, and through mediating between the conflicting parties, resulting in coalition governments in Zimbabwe, conflict resolution in Lesotho, and “quiet diplomacy” in Zimbabwe (Tella, 2021; Isike and Ogunnubi, 2018), technical aid support in Mali and the DRC as well as higher education provision and cooperation open to the continent as a whole9 (Tlhabye, 2022). Scholars such as Chiroro (2012) and Sidiropoulos (2014) agree that South Africa can confidently exercise increasing levels of geopolitical influence by carefully attracting other nations to want what it desires through extension of its values, culture, policies and institutions. In this way, South Africa stands to gain acceptance and voluntary compliance where force is not needed. For instance, South Africa has literally been able to transform itself from a hitherto pariah state under the apartheid rule underlined by racial discrimination to being a state widely accepted as Africa’s regional power on the strength of the soft power-modelled foreign policy (Smith, 2011; 2012).
South Africa has benefited from its hard and soft power projection and provision of public goods in Africa through recognition and acceptance into global multilateral forums that help to advance its leadership credentials in the continent. For example, according to van der Westhuizen (2016), within six years of its new democracy and readmission into the international community, South Africa was a signatory to 70 multilateral treaties and had joined over 40 intergovernmental organisations. In recognition of its regional clout, the United Nations General Assembly has voted South Africa thrice as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.
Pretoria is also currently Africa’s sole member of BRICS, IBSA, and the G20 (Ogunnubi and Akinola, 2017:6; Alden and Schoeman, 2015:241). It has actively participated in diverse multilateral platforms including the 1995 extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 1997 Ottawa Process on the banning of land mines, and the 1998 adoption of the Rome Statute that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC); and has hosted several important global conferences including the 2000 UN AIDS conference, the 2001 UN World Conference against Racism, Xenophobia and Related Discrimination, the 2002 UN World Summit on Sustainable Development, the 2002 inaugural summit of the AU, the 2011 UN Climate Change Conference, and the 2013 and 2018 BRICS summits (Tella, 2017; 2021). It will host its third BRICS summit in 2023, and in 2025 will chair the G20. These are good indications that the global community as well as the African continent validates the leadership of South Africa and its potential to provide regional public good and other constituents of a regional hegemon.
However, despite South Africa’s increasing influence and relative successes as one of the most stable economies, a peaceful country, and a stabilizer in the Southern Africa region and Africa as a whole, scholars have expressed skepticism whether the country qualifies as a hegemon. In the light of this debate, Ogunnubi and Akinola (2017:1) argue that South Africa’s subordination to international capital is a weak link in its aspiration to become a regional hegemon.10 Meanwhile, Alden and Schoeman (2015:241) argue that “South Africa’s declining economic preponderance on the continent, its limited ability to convert its economic, financial and military dominance over the rest of Africa into solid foreign and economic gains and its inability to manage the Mugabe case in Zimbabwe despite its economic advantage” are signs that its hegemonic credentials can be contested. These lapses aptly align with the refrain that a country does not become a hegemon simply because it wields economic dominance in a region (Alden and Soko, 2005; Prys, 2010).
Clearly, while South Africa has characteristics that makes it a potential hegemon, it has continuously found itself at the crossroad of making decisions that can either undermine or improve its acceptance as a hegemon.
3.1.2 Nigeria
Since it attained political independence in 1960, Nigeria has had Africa as the centrepiece of its foreign policy and this is not just an aspirational ideal as it has demonstrated the hard and soft power capabilities to realize its Afrocentric foreign policy goals. For example, it is a demographic power in Africa with a population of 280 million people (National Population Commission, 2022), which makes it the most populous Black Nation in the world. By the end of 2021, it had the highest GDP in Africa (World Bank 2021b), and it is Africa’s biggest economy with a GDP of $397, 270 million. Nigeria also has the fourth strongest military force behind third place South Africa (Nile Post 2021; Global Fire Power, 2020; 2022).
Abuja has effectively used its hard power (economic and military capabilities) to mediate or contain conflict, ensure order and stability, and keep peace not only the West African region as a regional leader, but also across Africa.11 For example, as documented by Tella (2021:53) Nigeria’s peacekeeping operations can be traced back to 1960 in the Congo, and this was followed by interventions in West New Guinea, Tanzania in the 1960s, Angola, Chad, Namibia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Western Sahara in the 1990s and in Sudan/Darfur, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Gambia since 2000. According to Tella (2018), Nigeria had contributed more than 200,000 troops to peacekeeping missions in Africa by 2010, and spent about $13 billion (80% of the troops and 90% of the funding) in restoring peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone alone (see Oluwafemi, 2021).
Nigeria has since its political independence in 1960 been able to also use its soft power resources to project a Big-Brother image in the continent and deliver public goods not just in the West African sub-region but the continent at large. Although it does not have a clear and formal soft power policy in its foreign policy approach and implementation as South Africa does, Nigeria benefits from the vast and colourful representation of its people through, for example, the Nollywood platform to project a cultural acceptance of its people and consequently the continental values it pursues. No doubt, the films, soaps and programmes from Nollywood paint an admirable image of the Nigerian societal standards, intrigues and moral values, which echoes the nuances of the African people. The global celebrities of its entertainment industry can serve as ambassadors for promoting the ‘Naija’12 brand and initiative in ways that will project its soft power stake on its hegemonic aspiration in Africa. Overall, Nigeria’s regional hegemonic status has often been advanced on the basis of its superior economic and comparatively advanced military capabilities within Africa. Indeed, by wielding its soft power, a state like Nigeria – with enormous soft power potential – is able to appropriate legitimacy and recognition as a regional leader among other possible contenders.
Apart from its peace-making and peace-keeping roles in Africa which has yielded soft power recognition and influence as a regional leader in Africa and the world, some of the public goods Nigeria has provided the West African region and the continent at large include democracy promotion in Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Also, through the Technical Aids Corps (TAC), Abuja has provided major aid donations in Africa broadly, including using other Africa support schemes to provide economic and financial assistance to other African states reflective of a regional leader in the least. To sum Nigeria’s soft power projection that is consistent with a regional dominant power, the quote below by Former US Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell is pertinent:
Nigeria’s culture rooted in fashion, film, music, and literature translates into enhanced international prestige. At the time of independence, many hoped that as a huge, democratic country, Nigeria would provide Africa with a “seat at the table” among the traditional international powers. Perhaps that is happening first with respect to art and culture, rather than by the more conventional political and security means (Campbell, 2018).
Indeed, the attraction and possible influence Nigeria wields from its soft power resources are enormous, and they can be maximized if Abuja is more intentional about using its soft power resources for providing leadership in Africa.
Like South Africa, Nigeria has also benefited from its soft power projection and provision of public goods in Africa through recognition and acceptance into global multilateral forums that help to advance its leadership credentials in the continent. For example, Nigeria has filled a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council five times. The country currently occupies key strategic positions in many international organisations through its citizens. Some of these include Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Director-General of the World Trade Organisation (WTO); Akinwumi Adesina, President of African Development Bank (AfDB) and Mohammad Barkindo, Secretary General of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). There is also Tijjani Muhammad-Bande, President of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and Amina Mohammed, a Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations (UN).
Overall, there is no doubt that Nigeria is a regional leader in West Africa and Africa, but its regional hegemonic status, like that of South Africa remains contested. For example, Ogunnubi et al (2016:15) argue that the Abuja’s inability to curtail Boko Haram terrorism and failure to provide security for its citizens from Fulani herders (Isike and Olasupo, 2022) challenge the hegemonic credentials of Nigeria. The increasing poverty rate in Nigeria is another factor that questions the credentials of Nigeria as a potential hegemon added to political corruption, poor governance and democracy deficit which contribute to its poor image problem in Africa and the world (Ogunnubi and Isike, 2017; Tella, 2021). These domestic challenges weaken the legitimacy of Nigeria amongst its citizens which in turn weaken its claim to regional leadership in Africa. For instance, when the state progressively fails to provide public goods (security from external aggression, law and order, social and infrastructural service delivery) to its citizens, its essence becomes questionable (Isike and Olasupo, 2022).
3.2 Cooperative Leadership between Nigeria and South Africa to Advance Common African Goals
African countries face a myriad of problems, often associated with human insecurity and global inequality. Decolonial scholars such as Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2015) and Zondi (2015; 2018) link this condition to its colonial experience which has placed Africa at the bottom of the world order. As a result, they advocate for ‘epistemological disobedience’ whereby Africans will examine geopolitics through an African lens. While a total delinking from the existing order seems impracticable, African countries have been united in demanding for a more inclusive international system. Also, they have tried to reach consensus on issues that they deem important to the continent. This strategy of cooperation and solidarity aligns with the vision of Haile Selassie I and Kwame Nkrumah who at the Organization for African Unity’s inaugural meeting, echoed the need for African unity (Organization of African Unity, 1963:11 & 44). As a result, the status of regional leadership has been and will continue to be determined by the alignment of an aspiring regional leader’s national interest to the common agenda of the African continent. Nigeria and South Africa have recognized this and have taken steps to advance a pan-African agenda as part of their foreign policies.13
The propensity of both South Africa and Nigeria to articulate and advance African interests in global affairs has been manifest in their post-apartheid relations. Over the years, they have become seasoned advocates for IMF, World Bank, and UN reform to accommodate the unique challenges of African countries. Recognizing the importance of continued collaboration, the two regional powers have established mechanisms to strengthen their relations in ways that advance Africa’s drive for common positions on key issues of interest to the continent. For example, early on in 1999, they formed the South-Africa-Nigeria Bi-National Commission to improve South African and Nigerian foreign and trade relations (Egbulum, 2013:37). This paved the way for cooperation between the two dominant sub-regional powers which yielded results almost immediately in the pivotal roles they both played in the formation of the African Union in 2000 and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)14 in 2002 (Ijeoma, 2008:157). Indeed, the early 2000 especially, saw tremendous partnership and unity of purpose between Nigeria and South Africa in their foreign policies. For instance, in 2000 President Obasanjo of Nigeria and Tambo Mbeki of South Africa jointly advocated for debt relief for African Countries at the G-8 meeting (G8 Research Group, 2005:9) and this yielded positive outcomes for several countries in Africa.
In terms of the agenda to reform the United Nations to allow more African participation, South Africa and Nigeria have played vital roles. Both countries were pivotal in the documentation and popularization of the Ezulwini consensus which African countries signed in 2005 to articulate the agenda for a reformed United Nations. While it has not yet yielded the desired results in terms of two permanent seats and two elected seats in the UNSC with veto power (Mbara et al., 2021:57), it has created an awareness amongst nations of the world about Africa’s preparedness to contribute to decision making at the UN. More so, Africa was able to get three revolving seats on the UNSC (Adebajo, 2021).
Nigeria and South Africa have also recently jointly opposed western discriminatory policies against Africa. In solidarity with other African countries, they were vocal in condemning vaccine apartheid15 and discriminatory travel bans imposed by Western countries on the continent during the peak period of the coronavirus pandemic. For instance, Nigeria and South Africa took a united stand against the travel ban slammed by Western countries on Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zambia after the omicron variant was discovered in South Africa (Sippy, 2021). In the heat of events, President Ramaphosa and President Buhari held consultative meetings in Abuja. While it was not clear whether the travel ban was the main reason for the meeting, Nigeria and South Africa took decisive measures thereafter by issuing unequivocal statements to condemn the travel ban on African countries which persuaded the United Kingdom to reconsider its position and to eventually remove the ban (ENCA, 2022).
On the climate change front, Africa has been one of the epicentres of the global climate crisis which has severely impacted livelihoods, especially in rural communities. This existential threat has necessitated sustained advocacy for global climate justice. South Africa and Nigeria and the larger community of African countries have taken common positions to advance climate advocacy in this regard. Part of the common positions (African Union 2022) which were presented in the COP27 are listed below:
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Call for the implementation of the National Determined Contributions (NDCs), focusing on adaptation and mitigation efforts
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Mobilisation and delivery of finance to enhance implementation of the NDCs.
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Implementation of the remaining guidance of the Paris agreement on climate actions
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A concrete decision on the global goal for adaptation.
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Adaptation financing between $140 Billion and $300 Billion by 2030 in developing countries.
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Delivery of $100 Billion a year by developed countries for climate change adaptation.
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Debriefing of the African Group Position after the decisions of Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC).
However, despite the solidarity that appears to exist between African countries, they are still divided due to conflict of interest. For instance, the push by some stakeholders and negotiators for Africa to be allowed to explore its gas reserve for development contradicts aspects of the continent’s common position on the issue. The argument is basically that African countries deserve to explore their gas reserves to provide much needed electricity for its population. African leaders and negotiators at the COP27 (2022) in Egypt have also cited the return to coal by European countries due to the Russian-Ukrainian war as a dirtier option to natural gas. They argue that Africa should be allowed to explore its gas resources to benefit their population and to supply Europe that is currently suffering an energy crisis due to the Russian-Ukraine war (Khadka, 2022). This shows that the individual interest of African countries significantly affects the role they play in Africa’s climate agenda and the broader sense of a common African agenda. While South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria may be contemplating energy transition, other countries such as Congo who are discovering new oil fields will naturally want to benefit from these resources. Also, African countries’ membership in various multilateral organizations, some of which have a special interest in climate issues (Naidoo & Gulati, 2022: 17) is a barrier to a common African position on climate change. For example, OPEC countries, particularly Congo, have been arguing for the continued use of natural gas in place of fossil fuel, whereas members of the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) such as Seychelles, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, which face severe consequences of climate change, have always stood firmly for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Thomas et al., 2020:17).
Despite these challenges, the African Union has considerably managed to galvanise countries to pursue a common agenda. As aforementioned, it established bodies like the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), African Ministerial Council on the Environment (AMCEN), African Group of Negotiators (AGN), and Department of Infrastructure and Energy (DIE) to advance the climate agenda of the continent although these bodies face technical challenges (Naidoo & Gulati, 2022: 17). Thus, it can be argued that Africa’s climate agenda is not only promoted at the global level but has been backed with continental initiatives. For example, it initiated the African Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022–2032, the Africa Adaptation Initiative, the African Green Stimulus Programme, as well as the African Union Green Recovery Action Plan (African Union 2022). These initiatives provide a common ground for African countries to commit to reducing carbon emissions and increasing adaptation to the crisis. The African Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan 2022–2032 is considered inclusive because it recognises women and youth as critical to climate adaptation and project implementation. The role of Nigeria and South Africa in the climate change agenda of Africa has been to amplify the AU’s position. For instance, at the COP 27 in Egypt, Nigeria’s President Buhari actively called on Western countries to increase their commitment and become more accountable in achieving a carbon emission free world (Obiezu, 2022). Similarly, President Ramaphosa as the former chair of the Committee of African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) and coordinator of the African Ministerial Council on the Environment (AMCEN) has also made similar calls to Western nations to be more committed and comply with financial responsibilities. The arguments of both countries have often highlighted the fact that the African continent contribute less than 4% of global carbon emission. Hence, developed countries owe it as a responsibility to finance climate change adaptation.
Overall, despite their contention for hegemonic dominance in Africa, South Africa and Nigeria have also demonstrated commitment to a cooperative hegemonic leadership. However, this has often faced challenges. First, as mentioned earlier, different African countries, for good reasons, belong to other alliances and multilateral organizations that serve their interests that sometimes contrast with the AU position. This complexity makes it challenging for South Africa or Nigeria to advance continental interests as leaders and poses a challenge for a cooperative or group hegemony in the continent. Second, both countries have tended to disagree on critical issues thereby hampering chances for group hegemonic leadership. For example, South Africa supported the government of Lauren Gbagbo of Cote D’Ivoire in 2011 against Nigeria’s position on the issue (Nagar and Paterson 2012:3). Also, Nigeria has constantly frowned at the xenophobic attacks of its citizens in South Africa and the unfriendly visa policy of the South African government. Third, their hard and soft power weaknesses including the internal contradictions that make them marginal players in the international system also constrain both their individual and group leadership potentials and hegemony aspirations. Therefore, if Nigeria or South Africa are both equipped and constrained to become regional hegemons, what pathway exist towards regional hegemony in Africa? We contend that formalizing the existing cooperative leadership between Nigeria and South Africa and other regional leaders in Africa can give birth to a group hegemony where they are able to behave collectively like a hegemon by leveraging each other’s unique advantages. Indeed, as Prys (2010) and Ogunnubi and Akinola (2017) contended, the Eurocentric approach to defining and exerting regional power-hood is not applicable to every region. For Africa, opportunities exist to construct a contextual regional hegemony based on its cooperative behaviour and power-sharing if its leaders will muster and show the political will to do so.
4 Conclusion: Towards Group Hegemony in Africa
This paper sought to examine the state of regional hegemony in Africa by attempting to answer two key questions; whether we can we talk of regional hegemons in the continent in realist terms, and two, whether group hegemonic leadership better explains regional hegemonic behaviour in Africa. Using South Africa and Nigeria as case studies, our analysis show that neither of these two top economic, military and soft powers in Africa neatly fit a realist conception of a regional hegemon. However, a critical examination of their dominant power roles at the sub-regional and continental level show that they are regional leaders with capabilities to play hegemonic leadership roles if they cooperate and share leadership given their internal limitations. South Africa and Nigeria are already cooperating on several fronts to advance common African goals but this is constrained by conflicting national interests that to disagree on critical issues thereby hampering chances for group hegemonic leadership. Also, their hard and soft power weaknesses including the internal contradictions that make them marginal players in the international system also constrain both their individual and group leadership potentials and hegemony aspirations. The key question then is if Nigeria or South Africa are both equipped and constrained to become regional hegemons, what pathway towards hegemony exist in Africa? We contend that formalizing the existing cooperative leadership between Nigeria and South Africa and other regional leaders in Africa can give birth to a group hegemony where they are able to behave like a hegemon leveraging each other’s unique advantages.
The group hegemonic leadership is our refinement of the constituent elements of a regional hegemon in Prys’ typology of regional powers and regional leadership in Destradi’s conceptual framework of ideal-type strategies regional powers pursue. In this context, states with relative superior power advantages and capabilities within a region can cooperate to exert influence on their regional neighbours through a robust foreign policy that enjoys a measure of acceptance, legitimacy and recognition based on the ideational leadership they initiate and implement. Whether leader or follower-initiated, the pursuit of common goals accepted as such by all member states of the region which are implemented by a group of leading states in the region is the defining characteristic of group hegemonic leadership. Africa already has candidates (South Africa and Nigeria) playing regional leadership roles. They are also already cooperating to provide hegemonic leadership that drives and achieves common African goals for the continent. This can be improved on and expanded to include other regional dominant actors such as Egypt (North Africa), Kenya (East Africa) and Rwanda (Central Africa). It is a plausible analytical lens for explaining Africa’s international relations behaviour and for understanding the enactment of regional hegemony in the continent.
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Home to nearly 18% of the world’s population and as one of the world’s fastest growing populations, Africa is a geographically vast and resource-rich continent. It is approximately ten times the size of India, three times the size of China, and is blessed with roughly 30% of the world’s mineral resources, the largest free trade areas, and most diverse ecosystems.
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According to Badie (2020), the 9/11 attacks on the US, the new international conflicts, the development of a new kind of international violence (terrorism), as well as the new threats to environmental security and other forms of human security including the crisis of national, regional, or international institutions should not be considered as elements of a new world chaos, but as social facts which can be easily explained provided that we look in the right direction. He argues that this “socialization” of the international system is the first outcome of the transformation of the international order with implications for how power is conceived and used.
We note Ludwig’s study also reveals that Brazil, despite being considered as the ‘natural leader’ is reluctant to pay the necessary price to deepen its regional integration.
This is based on the idea that a regional leader is a state which belongs to a region, disposes of superior power capabilities, and exercises an influence on regional neighbours (Destradi, 2010).
Initiating common goals and socializing subordinate states in the region to accept and pursue them as collective interests.
Some of these are discussed in other sections below but both countries struggle with serious socio-economic challenges including high levels of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. They also rank poorly (Nigeria at 154 and South Africa at 70 both out of 180 countries) in the global corruption perception index 2021 although they are not among the top 10 most corrupt countries https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/most-corrupt-countries. Citing specific instances, incessant incidents of xenophobia targeted at only Africans in South Africa dent the country’s reputation as an Afrocentric Big-Brother of Africa. Also, Nigeria’s seeming inability to contain the Boko Haram terrorist threat within its borders and the West African sub-region as well as widespread insecurity caused by Fulani herders attacks on Nigerians across the country challenge her claim to any kind of regional power-hood.
According to Zondi (2015: 31), although there are five geographical regions in Africa, the continent has eight recognised regional intergovernmental organisations, with each making its own demands on member states for collective identity and action. Added to these are geo-linguistic regions, characterized by group identities (Francophone, Anglophone, Lusophone and Swahili areas) that complicate the pan-African identity.
Its top 5 universities rank amongst the top 500 universities in the world with some of them such as the Universities of Pretoria and Cape Town offering fully-funded scholarships to African scholars from indigent backgrounds to pursue higher education studies in South Africa.
For example, while explaining why there is no regional hegemon in Central Africa Nkumbe and Njie (2021) argue that a country must have full sovereignty to be considered eligible for a hegemonic status.
Nigeria is also a major contributor to UN peacekeeping missions globally even though its profile in this regard has progressively declined over the past few years from fifth to forty-third position (Tella, 2021:53).
Shorthand name for Nigeria.
We note this foreign policy behavior of African countries is at variance with the realist understanding of the international system where rational actors pursue nothing less than their interest, however, social constructivist view of international relations supports this cooperative approach to international power politics (see Wendt, 1992; Acharya, 2011).
NEPAD was established by the African Union to advance economic prosperity for African economies.
African countries openly condemned the low covid-19 vaccine supply to Africa at the United Nations General Assembly (UN 2021).