Abstract
This article analyses several authoritarian practices in Syria since 1971 and demonstrates that, since the 2011 uprising, its authoritarian regime has successfully remained resilient instead of collapsing. The post-2011 Syrian Government under Al-Assad is no longer the Ba`thist government of old, albeit still autocratic but adept at adapting to hostile changing political environments. Al-Assad’s regime no longer relies on Ba’ath Party loyalty and appearances of legitimacy but both during and post-war has depended more on social re-engineering to sustain its political, economic power. The Syria example demonstrates that, when threatened, authoritarian regimes may thicken the layers of their autocratic rule to sustain their grip on power, even changing the composition of its citizenry to create a new population to rule. We demonstrate how the Syrian Government has used urban planning, housing, and property laws to re-engineer its demographics so that friendly foreign nationals will receive permanent citizenship and displace indigenous citizens.
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1 Introduction: Third Wave of Autocratisation
The most relevant literature characterizes autocratic regimes as lacking free and fair elections, fair competition, freedom of expression, freedom of association, liberties, access to information, separation of powers, and many other characteristics of a democratic and free state. In sum, many scholars paint autocracy by primary reference to its opposite, which is democracy. We use the terms autocracy, autocratic, authoritarianism, authoritarian, and dictatorial interchangeably in this article. J. Linz, defined authoritarianism as a flaw in democracy.1 S.I. Lindberg adopts the concept of autocratisation, defining it as ‘any move away from democracy’,2 to mean the same thing as autocracy or authoritarianism. Similarly, P. Brooker suggested that the simplest way to define autocratic regimes are those that ‘rule by other means than democracy’.3 M. Svolik proposed that autocratic regimes ‘do not meet established criteria for democracy’,4 and further suggested that autocracy is a ‘democratic breakdown’.5 N. Bermeo, however, labels it as a ‘democratic backsliding’.6 A. Lührmann and S.I. Lindberg define autocratisation as a ‘substantial de-facto decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy’.7 Nonetheless, defining autocracy as opposed to democracy is not always useful, particularly in a case such as ours in this article — Syria — where democracy is not the starting point. Authoritarianism, as we will explain later, has been deeply rooted in Syria’s institutions since it became an independent sovereign state. Although we agree with the previous definitions of autocracy or authoritarianism, we prefer and adapt M. Glasius’s approach, which defines authoritarianism in terms of the citizens’ ability to hold their representative to account. Seen from this perspective, authoritarianism implies ‘practices as patterns of action that sabotage accountability to people over whom a political actor exerts control, or their representatives, by means of secrecy, disinformation and disabling voice’.8 We may add to this list that often authoritarian regimes grip power through autocratic means.9
Lührmann and Lindberg have identified three waves of autocratisation. The first wave began in 1926 until 1942, while the second wave took place from 1961 to 1977. Military coups, foreign invasions, and the abolishment of fundamental democratic institutions by a lawfully elected executive dominated the first and second waves.10
The third wave began in 1994 and lasted until 2017. The most significant distinguishing factor of this wave is its impact on democracies, rather than on ‘electoral autocracies’11 as was the case in the earlier waves. Reversals, i.e., reverting to dictatorships after experimenting with democracy, dominate this third epoch, where autocracies outnumber progressive democracies. Interestingly, during the third wave ‘fewer autocracies are affected by autocratisation, that is, transition from electoral to closed autocracy. This reflects the trend that, even in the authoritarian regime spectrum, multi-party elections have become the norm’.12 The ‘erosion model’,13 according to Lührmann and Lindberg, has emerged as a significant approach in the third wave of autocratisation.
In this article, we neither take a specific position opposing the notion of autocratisation as a democratic collapse nor do we tend to provide a critique to Lührmann and Lindberg’s categorization of autocratisation in waves, as many have.14 Rather, we are proposing to discuss what we have entitled as a thickening autocracy. The suggested notion elaborates the frameworks of the previous analyses. We work with the understanding that Syria falls between Luhrmann and Lindberg’s second and third waves of autocratisation. We propose, however, that in already non-democratic states, autocracy is condensed more and more. We hope that the imagery of a thickening fat layer in a human body may convey this point: imagine a layer of the body’s fat that keeps thickening until it destroys the whole body. In Syria — our case study — the layer of autocracy (the fat), thickening year after year, is changing the characteristics of, and ultimately destroying, the Syrian State (the body). Our approach builds on C. Walke’s ‘authoritarian deepening’ in a country that is already non-democratic,15 and S. Heydemann and R. Leenders’ ‘authoritarian resilience’ and ‘recombinant authoritarianism’.16
This article explains authoritarianism in Syria and the practices the Syrian regime uses to maintain its autocratic rule in the country. We take an analytical approach as our methodology. We analyse authoritarian practices of the Syrian Government since 1971, the date when President Hafez al-Assad (the father of President Bashar al-Assad, and hereafter referred to as President Hafez) came to power. We demonstrate how the already authoritarian regime has sustained its resilience after the uprising in 2011. The regime has adopted a different approach, i.e., one that is not as reliant on the party, is less focused on the appearance of legitimacy, and is more reliant on social re-engineering to sustain its political and economic power not only during the war but also post-war. Thus the Syrian example suggests that an authoritarian regime often uses whatever means it can muster to thicken autocracy when it feels endangered. Authoritarian regimes like Syria’s are willing to do anything to sustain their grip on power, even if it involves acts or steps to displace those opposed to its rule and changes to the demography of its populations. In other words, autocracies like Syria will go the extra mile and change the composition of its citizenry in any part of the country considered hostile to the regime in order to create a new population which is loyal to its rule.
We begin by discussing ‘authoritarian learning’ in the Arab Spring, and we demonstrate that the governments of Arab Spring-affected countries have learnt from each other. We then turn to Syria and define a number of major characteristics of authoritarian governments and the factors that they have traditionally used to entrench their autocratic rule. Typically, these factors include creation of the pretence of legitimacy, repression, control of state political institutions, as well as other internal and external factors. We believe that these factors create the first layer of autocracy in Syria; however, we later show that the Syrian Government has thickened this layer using the law to entrench its dominance in the country. The third layer of autocracy started when the government began to change the composition and demography of the country to sustain its control.
2 Authoritarian Learning
There is increasing evidence of authoritarian learning — a process in which authoritarian regimes adopt survival strategies based upon the prior successes and failures of other governments faced with a revolution or an uprising.17 The year 2010 signifies the outbreak of what have been called the ‘Arab Spring’ protests that erupted in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. An upsurge of demands for democratization, which appeared to end a long historical era of authoritarian regimes, swept across the region: starting with the Tunisian Revolution in December 2010 that succeeded in overthrowing President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali (1936–2019) in January 2011, and Egyptian Revolution that toppled President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak (1928–2020) in February 2011, the Libyan Revolution that led to the overthrow of President Muammar Gaddafi (1942–2011) in October 2011, the Yemeni Revolution of Dignity which demanded that President Ali Abdullah Saleh (1990–2012) resign.
The Syrian Revolution, in contrast to the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan revolutions, for example, did not achieve even its short-term goals. The Syrian Government was quick to learn from the outcomes of the other revolutions, and the lessons learnt allowed Syria to bolster its authoritarian resiliency and weather the revolution. According to some scholars, ‘counter-revolutionary strategies have also been shaped by processes of learning and diffusion among regime elites, especially among those where protests began later in the sequence of events that constitute the Arab awakening’.18 The Syrian Government has found creative methods to extinguish Syrians’ optimism for democratization. It has increased its repression and used state political institutions, mainly the laws and the justice system in general, to ensure its grip on power and survival. In fact, democracy has never been available to Syrians since 1971 because the authoritarian regime in Syria has thickened its layer of authoritarianism over time.
3 Layers of Autocracy in Syria
In the following sub-sections we will demonstrate how authoritarianism, or the layers of authoritarianism, have thickened in Syria since 1971.
3.1 Traditional Characteristics of Autocratic Regimes
Authoritarian regimes employ several methods to entrench their autocratic rule and ensure their survival. These methods include creating the pretence of legitimacy, repression, control of state institutions, and taking advantage of other internal and external factors. With examples from Syria, we shall explain each of the above.
Creating the pretence of legitimacy has been one of the main methods autocratic regimes rely on to survive in power. Dictators seek to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of their people. President Hafez came to power as a result of a bloody military coup d’état in 1971 which overthrew another regime that also had taken power through a military coup d’état in 1966. The new Hafez regime, needing to create the illusion of legitimacy within the society, achieved this through a variety of techniques, such as demonstration of nationalistic zeal in order to show national pride that is associated with feelings of patriotism and nationalism; decreeing legislations or laws that serve the government’s own welfare and interests; and maintaining absolute control over state institutions.19
Repression, i.e., creating an atmosphere of fear, is another method authoritarian regimes typically deploy to hold onto power. Repression is usually depicted in the forms of cruel and aggressive practices against civilians, cracking down on their liberties, denying human rights, and restricting participation in political affairs. According to A. Escriba-Folch, repression ‘certainly increases the likelihood of dictators’ survival’.20 Repression was certainly routinized and became the hallmark of President Hafez’s government. President Hafez established a state security Apparatus composed of several security branches and granted them absolute power. The state security branches were not subject to State laws, their detention centres were removed from the supervision of the Ministry of Justice, and their personnel were immune from accountability.21 Each of these branches reported directly to the President. In this way, President Hafez was able to keep the country under his control.
Sustaining strong relationships and mutual interests with the elite — the influential actors and people in society — is another method that authoritarian regimes use to advance their autocratic political rule. According to J. Gandhi and A. Przeworski, ‘autocrats face two types of threats to their rule: those that emerge from within the ruling elite and those that come from outsiders within society’.22 President Hafez was certainly aware of those two threats and, as a result, he strengthened his regime’s relationship with business elites, particularly in Damascus, the state capital, and Aleppo, Syria’s commercial hub. He also strengthened relationships with influential leaders in the villages and heads of tribes, giving them freedom and supporting their positions. The regime also built strong ties with religious institutions; in fact, President Hafez used the religious aspect for his regime’s survival as Syria’s demographics show: 87% of Syrians are Muslims (74% are Sunnī, and 13% belong to other Islamic sects, including the Shīʿites, Druze, ʿAlawites, and Ismailīs). Syria is also home to a sizeable Christian and Jewish population (ca. 9%).23 The Al-Assad family belongs to the ʿAlawite minority sect. President Hafez used this to ignite the spark of sectarianism among Syrians. He claimed to be the guardian of minorities but indeed politicised religious identity in order to fragment Syrian society. Subsequently, his son would use that situation to fuel the civil war.24
In addition, authoritarian regimes manipulate and control state institutions to embed their dictatorship and control. Moreover, the institutions they seek to manipulate and control are not limited to political, economic, and legal institutions; they also include many other institutions involved in a myriad of activities and of varying sizes, such as military and religious institutions. G. Casper argues that ‘[u]nder authoritarianism, the church or military are pulled into an active political stance’.25 In Syria, the Al-Assad government controls all kinds of institutions: educational, financial, economic, health, religious, military, media, labour unions, and the justice system.26 Moreover, Al-Assad ensured that prominent people were in these institutions and that they were influential in every sensitive government position, thereby rewarding his allies.
Finally, authoritarian regimes maintain strong relationships with international allies to secure their rule. The Al-Assad government’s strong relationships with Russia and Iran typify this. Iran is the most populous Shīʿite Muslim nation in the world and has worked hard to consider ʿAlawites as part of Shīʿa Islam, which might partly explain why Iran claimed the responsibility to support Al-Assad.27 Russia, however, has different strategic, geopolitical and economic interests in Syria. Russia has had de facto alignment with the Syrian Government since 1960,28 establishing the only naval base in Syria that has direct access to the Mediterranean in the port of Tartus.29 Russia has secured a path into the Mediterranean gas market through Syria,30 and Syria is considered a good arms-export market for Russia.31
3.2 Using the Law to Sustain Autocracy
We will now demonstrate how the authoritarian regimes in Syria have used the legal system (and the law) in an ambitious and self-serving way to survive. In our analyses, we consider and apply the five legal components that authoritarian states have used to serve their interests as suggested by T. Ginsburg and T. Moustafa.32
The Syrian Constitution (in all its different versions since 1971) establishes Syria as a democratic state governed by the rule of law — one that protects freedoms, dignity, and liberties, guarantees equality, and respects international human rights agreements.33 The Constitution protects or safeguards the right to freedom of expression34 and the right to freedom of demonstration.35 It maintains the supremacy of law,36 guarantees free trials, and respect for the due process of law.37 In practice, however, the Syrian governments, since 1971, and especially the current Al-Assad government, have never hesitated to enact laws and regulations that violate constitutionally protected rights and freedoms of Syria to serve their own interests.
Since 1971, the Syrian Government’s first strategy in using the law to protect its interests was to deactivate the Constitution through the State Emergency Law (SEL). The SEL was enacted as an exceptional and temporary measure to defend the country after the war with Israel. Emergency laws are intended to be temporary measures for specific situations, but the SEL remained in force until it was revoked in 2011 (in response to the demands of the revolutionists).38 The government found the SEL greatly advantageous to nullify the power of the Constitution and consequently other laws that would otherwise oppose its interests. The SEL granted the Martial Law Governor, who must be appointed directly by the President, the right to adopt any exceptional measures in the country. The government frequently relied upon the SEL to justify its violations of citizens’ rights and to silence the opposition. One result of the SEL was the creation of the Supreme State Security Court (SSSC), which had unlimited power to deal with all kinds of cases ‘referred to it by the Martial Law Governor’.39 The SSSC secretly tried political prisoners, without regard to due process of the law.40 In fact, a body of laws existed to criminalise any genuine opposition in the country to the ruling regime. Yet, the regime also issued amnesties and pardons to privilege individuals who supported the government.
Second, the authoritarian regime controlled the judicial institutions, resulting in policing systems that were loyal to the government, and courts that enjoyed less autonomy. Indeed, courts are rendered tools to implement the regime’s policies41 or are mere pawns of the regime. According to Ginsburg & Moustafa, authoritarian regimes ‘attempt to make up for their questionable legitimacy by preserving judicial institutions that give the image, if not the full effect, of constraints on arbitrary rule’.42
Third, the Al-Assad government has further worked on ‘[S]trengthen[ing] the administrative compliances within the state’s own bureaucratic machinery and solve coordination problems among competing factions within the regime’.43 The Constitution maintains a separation of powers between the state’s three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. It establishes independence for the judiciary44 and autonomy for judges.45 Yet, the executive remains in control over the judicial and legislative branches.46 The Syrian president has the power, according to his authority as Head of the Supreme Judicial Council, to appoint and dismiss judges, notwithstanding the Lawyers’ Syndication, which is dominated and led by Ba’ath Party loyalists.47
Fourth, authoritarian governments need to establish the impression that the government is issuing laws to facilitate certain social activities, such as trade and investment activities. According to Ginsburg and Moustafa, authoritarian governments employ controversial laws and policies ‘to allow political distance from the core elements of the regime’.48
Fifth, authoritarian regimes employ controversial laws and policies ‘so as to allow political distance from the core elements of the regime’.49 The Al-Assad family has maintained its grip on Syria’s politics and its autocratic rule using various laws and regulations. Following the nationwide revolution that had begun in 2011, the authorities in Syria purported to take reformative steps. For example, they rescinded the SEL and abolished the SSSC.50 Furthermore, the regime implemented constitutional amendments, removed the leadership of the Ba’ath Party, and allowed for political pluralism.51 But these measures were disingenuous as they have not ended the regime’s autocratic rule, which has continued uninterrupted.52 Instead the government enacted the Counter-Terrorism Law in July 2012, which enabled it not only to entrench its grip on power but also vested it with more power than even before. The Counter-Terrorism Law gives judicial cover for the government’s security agencies to persecute opposition politicians and other persons opposed to authoritarian rule in Syria. It defines terrorism as: ‘every act that aims at creating a state of panic among the people, destabilizing public security and damaging the basic infrastructure of the country by using weapons, ammunition, explosives, flammable materials, toxic products, epidemiological or bacteriological factors or any method fulfilling the same purposes’.53 According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the law ‘provides a dangerously broad interpretation of what constitutes terrorism, and unfairly criminalizes a large segment of the population without any due process rights or fair trial’.54 It allows nearly any conduct to be labelled as a terrorist act.
3.3 Thickening the Layers of Autocracy
The Al-Assad regime was weak at the beginning of the uprising in 2011, but it quickly learned from the experiences of other Arab Spring-affected countries. Of course, the regime took many measures to sustain its survival and hold onto power, some of which are described above. We will discuss in this sub-section how authoritarian regimes in many cases will do anything to sustain their survival. This includes the changing or social re-engineering of the country’s demographics.
Near the beginning of the conflict, and while the country was under brutal airstrikes and military operations, the government adopted policies and enacted laws to re-build the country and called it ‘urban planning’. The significance of these ‘urban planning’ policies and laws is that they mostly targeted opposition-dominated areas. The government, having established laws to urbanise mostly opposition areas, displaced those people, built new houses, and sold them to their allies.
On 18 September 2012, the government enacted Law No. 66,55 to develop and redesign irregular areas and random housing (slums) in the southwestern city of Damascus, the capital of Syria. It aimed to re-establish two new organisational areas and to build a world-class real estate project. Some experts suggest that the designated areas subject to Law No. 66 were ‘a hugely lucrative real estate opportunity for years — undeveloped farmland and informal housing in some places within walking distance of central Damascus’.56 Law No. 66, however, includes measures to financially compensate the original owners of the lands taken for urban re-development so that they can buy new homes. While the government claimed that these developments were to the city’s advantage, its opponents owned many of the areas affected.57
Similar urban plans have been designed for several other cities. Homs, an old city in western Syria that is well known for its political opposition to the Syrian regime, has also announced a master plan to re-build the city. The inhabitants of Homs were displaced upon the uprising, and the government retook the city from opposition fighters and planed to re-build it.58 Similarly, the city of Aleppo, in northern Syria and its second largest city, has announced plans to urbanise the neighbourhoods of Eastern Aleppo, exactly where the government committed widespread attacks and shelling on opposition communities. The fight that displaced approximately 500 000 citizens appears to have ended and normalcy is gradually returning to the city.
The government continues to enact legislation under the guise of urbanisation and reconstruction to re-engineer the demographics of Syria, especially targeting those opposed to it. Law No. 23 of 2015, for example, set procedures for urban development, permitting the government to seize slums and irregular residences and urbanise any area of its choice.59 Law No. 10 of 2018, which amended Law No. 66 of 2012, seeks to reconstruct a certain war-torn area, but has some unrealistic conditions.
According to Law No. 10, the Administrative Unit will create a record of the names of the owners of all real estate within the urbanised area. Owners should present themselves to the Administrative Unit, along with relevant documentation to determine their property rights within 1 month’s time (later amended to 1 year). Law No. 10, however, allows owners to authorise their relatives (up to first cousins) to represent them and provide relevant documents on their behalf to the Administrative Unit, provided that they have a valid power of attorney. However, owners must provide suitable reasons why they are unable to present themselves personally before the Administrative Unit in their area. If owners fail to establish ownership, they will not be compensated and will lose all rights to their property.
Law No. 10, however, comes with some impracticable conditions. First, many of these areas are unregulated slums where families have often lived without ownership. Second, almost two-thirds of the Syrian population has been displaced internally or externally, fleeing, and seeking refuge in other countries around the world. They might not have documentation proving their ownership, and, even if they do, they might be hesitant to return to Syria. Moreover, if they do return, they face the risk of being arrested.60 Third, some land owners have lost their ownership documents. They can acquire a copy of their ownership from the registration unit, but, due to their opposition to the government, they cannot return to Syria. Even if they can prove ownership and want to appoint a relative to appear on their behalf, the law requires that they prove their power of attorney, which in itself is difficult to procure because it requires that the applicant obtain a certificate of security clearance from the government’s security branches. The government does not give security clearances to those who oppose it. Under such circumstances, people are left with the options of either losing their property or risking their lives if they decide to visit security branches.
Fourth, the law does not specify in which areas reconstruction will take place; the choice is left to the government, which merely notifies owners that they must prove their ownership. If owners are unsuccessful, ownership will be transferred to the governorate. Fifth, if the owners succeed in proving their ownership, the government will have a share in any future investments in the property or properties acquired because of investments in the original property. In a final analysis, the government — not the people — is the only beneficiary of these urban planning and redevelopment policies and laws.
Since 2011 the Syrian Government has issued several laws to seize citizens’ properties and transfer ownership to the government. Such laws include Law No. 39 of 2019, which regulates military service. This law stipulates that the government has the right to seize — without providing notification or warrants for confiscation — the funds of any citizen who fails to pay military compensation fees.61 In addition, Law No. 63 of 2012 permits the seizure of property and the transfer of ownership to the government, from people who are under investigation for charges related to crimes against the security of the state.62
In September 2018, the Justice for Life Organization issued a report on the Deir ez-Zor Governorate, a province located in Eastern Syria, explaining that the multiple property laws enacted by the Syrian Government since 2011 have helped the government and military personnel to carry out seizures of citizens’ properties. The property laws created the illusion of legitimacy to the government’s actions and threatened the voluntary return of people to their homes. While the Justice for Life Organization has asked the Syrian Government to return homes to their owners, according to several reports since 2011, there is no indication that the government has the intention to comply with that request. In fact, it is more likely that the government prefers to change the demographics of the country.63
Crucially, almost one-half of the Syrian population has been displaced, either internally as displaced persons or as refugees or other categories in foreign countries. Syrians fear that, when people eventually return to their properties, they will not be allowed to reside in them — assuming that they even can find their homes. Thus, the critical question is: Why is the government issuing all these laws and regulations when it is mired in a complicated conflict? Many writers adopt a position similar to ours, claiming that it is the intention of the authoritarian regime to change the demographic of the state to sustain the regime and keep it in power after the war. Others see retribution for some Syrians and rewards for loyal supporters in these urban planning laws. The Washington Institute, for example, had this to say in a recent report: ‘[m]any Syrians fear that the government intends to redistribute the properties of its Sunni citizens to Assad supporters and non-Syrian Shiite proxies, providing residences for Shiite forces and their families and thus making permanent their presence in the country’.64 The authoritarian government has direct interest in having his allies dominate the country and replace its original citizens.
Others have avoided addressing the government’s intention, focusing instead on the formal legality of such laws. Though a separate point, it is important to note that legality can be challenged in this instance. Some have maintained, for example, that the Al-Assad regime has no legitimacy in the first place to decree laws, having lost its legitimacy to do so since the uprising in 2011.65 Moreover, these laws are arguably unconstitutional. Article 15 of the current Syrian Constitution stipulates that:
Collective and individual private ownership shall be protected in accordance with the following basis:
General confiscation of funds shall be prohibited;
Private ownership shall not be removed except in the public interest by a decree and against fair compensation according to the law;
Confiscation of private property shall not be imposed without a final court ruling;
Private property may be confiscated for necessities of war and disasters by a law and against fair compensation.
Compensation shall be equivalent to the real value of the property.66
The various laws that the Al-Assad regime promulgated for urban planning, which we reviewed in the preceding sections, were neither issued for the purpose of public interest nor for reasons of necessity. Law No. 10, for example, does not guarantee any compensation, and its measures, at best, do not maintain fair compensation that is equivalent to the real value of the property as Article 15(2) of the Constitution requires.67
In addition, the Al-Assad regime’s urban planning laws are in violation of all known international norms on the right to own property. First, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which representatives from different cultural and legal backgrounds drafted after World War II, ‘as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations’, protects the right to property. Article 17(2) stipulates that, ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property’.68 Second, the 2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights also guarantees the right to property. Article 31 provides that: ‘No person shall under any circumstances be divested of all or any part of his property in an arbitrary or unlawful manner’.69 Accordingly, the conduct of eviction and displacement of citizens is surely against the Syrian Constitution as well as other agreements to which Syria is a party.
In any event, it is clear that the Assad regime’s efforts to change the country’s demographics to guarantee that pre-war occupants cannot return is difficult to reverse. In the words of one analyst: ‘Mr. Assad has survived. His government has put in place measures to ensure the population balance of pre-war Syria — so nearly fatal to his family and clan — cannot be recreated’.70
4 Conclusion
The main conclusion to our discussion is that, since the beginning of the revolution in Syria in 2011, the Al-Assad regime has thickened the layers of its autocratic rule in Syria instead of collapsing. It used several methods to achieve this, but two interrelated methods stand out.
First, it has decreed new laws, in addition to old laws, such as the SEL, which suspend constitutional protections for Syrians. The urban planning laws and military services laws provided the regime with the means to destroy its opponents, without appearing illegitimate to its supporters, both national and international.
Second, the Al-Assad regime focuses on social re-engineering of the demographics of Syrian urban centres, instead of relying, as in the past, on Baath Party loyalty and appearances of legitimacy, to thicken the layers of its autocratic rule in Syria. By re-engineering the demographics of Syrian urban centres, especially those that the Al-Assad regime considers hostile to its continued grip on power in Syria, new loyalties are created that sustain its political and economic power, not only during the war but also post-war.
J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), first published in 1975.
S.I. Lindberg, Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 12.
P. Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes, 3rd edn. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 1.
M. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 20.
M. Svolik, ‘Which Democracies will Last? Coups, Incumbent Takeovers and the Dynamic of Democratic Consolidation’, British Journal of Political Science 45(4) (2015): 715–738.
N. Bermeo, ‘On Democratic Backsliding’, Journal of Democracy 27(1) (2016): 5–19.
A. Lührmann & S.I. Lindberg, ‘A third wave of autocratization is here: What is new about it?’, Democratization 26(7) (2019): 1095–1113; DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029.
Marlies Glasius, ‘What Authoritarianism Is … and Is Not: A Practice Perspective’, International Affairs (London) 94(3) (2018): 517.
B. Geddes, J. Wright & E. Frantz, ‘Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set’, Perspectives on Politics 12(2) (2014): 313–331. Geddes et al. suggest that: ‘an executive [in authoritarian regimes] achieved power through undemocratic means’.
Lührmann & Lindberg, supra note 7 at 1095–1113.
Ibid., pp. 1104–1105.
Ibid., p. 1103.
Ibid., p. 1105.
S. Skaaning, ‘Waves of autocratization and democratization: A critical note on conceptualization and measurement’, Democratization 27(8) (2020): 1533–1542, available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1799194.
C. Walker, ‘The Hijacking of “Soft Power”’, Journal of Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy 27(1) (2016): 49–63, available online at https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0007.
S. Heydemann & R. Leenders, ‘Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the “Arab Awakening”’, Globalizations 8(5) (2011): 647–653, available online at https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2011.621274.
Walker, supra note 15 at 49–63.
Heydemann & Leenders, supra note 16 at 647–653.
Brooker, supra note 3 at 109.
A. Escriba-Folch, ‘Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy’, International Political Science Review 34(5) (2013): 543–560.
Law for Protecting the Revolution, Legislative Decree No. 6, dated 17 Jan. 1965. See, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Torture Archipelago: Arbitrary Arrests, Torture and Enforced Disappearances in Syria’s Underground Prisons since March 2011, p. 9, available online at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria0712webwcover.pdf (accessed 31 January 2020); and Legislative Decree No. 69, dated 30 September 2008, which ‘confers immunity against prosecution to political security, police and customs officials for crimes committed while on duty’. See: Amnesty International, ‘Syria: Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, 12th Session of the UPR Working Group, Oct. 2011’ (14 March 2011), p. 1, available online at http://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/syrian_arab_republic/session_12_-_october_2011/ai-amnestyinternational-eng.pdf (accessed 31 January 2020).
J. Gandhi & A. Przeworski, ‘Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats’, Comparative Politics Studies 40(11) (2007): 1279–1301, at 1280.
World Population Review, Syria Population 2020, available online at http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population/ (accessed 31 January 2020).
Joseph Holliday, ‘The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War’, Institute for the Study of War: Middle East Security Report 8 (March 2013), p. 18, available online at http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/TheAssadRegime-web.pdf (accessed 31 January 2020).
C. Gretchen, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995), p. 4.
UNHRC, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, 18th Session, UN Doc A/HRC/18/53 (15 September 2011), para 20, available online at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/countries/SY/Syria_Report_2011–08–17.pdf (accessed 31 January 2020).
W. Fulton, J. Holliday & S. Wyer, ‘Iranian Strategy in Syria: A Joint Report by AEI’s Critical Threats Project & Institute for the Study of War’, Institute for the Study of War (May 2013): 21–23, available online at http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf (accessed 31 January 2020).
R. Allison, ‘Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis’, International Affairs 4(89) (2013): 795–823.
R. Weitz, Global Security Watch — Russia: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010).
C. Coats, ‘Russia finds path into Mediterranean gas through Syria’, Forbes (16 Jan. 2014), available online at http://www.forbes.com/sites/christophercoats/2014/01/16/russia-finds-path-into-mediterranean-gas-through-syria/ (accessed 31 January 2020).
R. Novosti, No-Warplanes-for-Syria-Says-Russian-Arms-Sales-Boss (13 Feb. 2013), available online at http://en.ria.ru/world/20130213/179443688/No-Warplanes-for-Syria-Says-Russian-Arms-Sales-Boss.html (accessed 31 January 2020).
T. Ginsburg & T. Moustafa, ‘Introduction: The Function of Courts in Authoritarian Polices’, in T. Ginsburg & T. Moustafa (eds.), Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic, adopted on 13 March 1973, available online at http://www.refworld.org/docid/44d8a4e84.html (accessed 31 January 2020).
Ibid., Article 38 provides that: ‘Every citizen has the right to freely and openly express his views in words, in writing, and through all other means of expression. He also has the right to participate in supervision and constructive criticism in a manner that safeguards the soundness of the domestic and nationalist structure and strengthens the socialist system. The state guarantees the freedom of the press, of printing, and publication in accordance with the law’.
Ibid., Article 39 provides that: ‘Citizens have the right to meet and demonstrate peacefully within the principles of the Constitution. The law regulates the exercise of this right’.
Ibid., Article 25 provides that: ‘(1) Freedom is a sacred right. The state protects the personal freedom of the citizens and safeguards their dignity and security. (2) The supremacy of law is a fundamental principle in the society and the state. (3) The citizens are equal before the law in their rights and duties. (4) The state insures the principle of equal opportunities for citizens’. Article 27 provides that: ‘Citizens exercise their rights and enjoy their freedoms in accordance with the law’.
Ibid., Article 28 provides that: ‘(1) Every defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty by a final judicial decision. (2) No one may be kept under surveillance or detained except in accordance with the law. (3) No one may be tortured physically or mentally or be treated in a humiliating manner. The law defines the punishment of whoever commits such an act. (4) The right of litigation, contest, and defence before the judiciary is safeguarded by the law’.
Emergency Law, Legislative Act No. 15, dated 22 December 1962, available online at http://www.shrc.org/en/?p=19812 (accessed 31 January 2020).
Legislative Decree No. 47, dated 1968, Article 5.
HRW, Far from Justice, Syria’s Supreme State Security Court (24 Feb. 2009), available online at https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/02/24/far-justice/syrias-supreme-state-security-court (accessed 31 January 2020).
Ibid.
Ginsburg & Moustafa, supra note 32 at 5.
Ibid., p. 4.
Constitution 1973, supra note 19: Article 131 stipulates that: ‘The judicial authority is independent. The President of the Republic guarantees this independence with the assistance of the Higher Council of the Judiciary’.
Ibid., Article 133 provides that: ‘(1) Judges are independent. They are subject to no authority except that of the law. (2) The honor, conscience, and impartiality of judges are guarantees of public rights and freedoms’.
Ibid., Article 132 provides that: ‘The President of the Republic presides over the Higher Council of the Judiciary. The law defines the method of its formulation, its powers, as well as its internal operating procedures’.
For more information, see House, Syrian Expert, Syria Transition Roadmap (Washington, DC: Syrian Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, 2013), pp. 119–155.
Ginsburg & Moustafa, supra note 32 at 4.
Ibid.
UNHRC, Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on Syria pursuant to Human Rights Council, Resolution S-16/1 (August 2011), p. 18, available online at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e4e2ba72.html (accessed 31 January 2020).
BBC News, ‘Syria to hold referendum on new constitution’ (12 February 2011), available online at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17040392 (accessed 31 January 2020).
The Guardian, ‘Assad blames conspirators for Syrian protests’ (30 March 2011), available online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/30/syrian-protests-assad-blames-conspirators (accessed 31 January 2020).
HRW, ‘Syria: Counterterrorism Court Used to Stifle Dissent’, available online at https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/25/syria-counterterrorism-court-used-stifle-dissent.
HRW, Q&A: Syria’s New Property Law (29 May 2018), available online at https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/qa-syrias-new-property-law#_What_is_Law (accessed 31 January 2020).
Law No. 66, dated 18 September 2012, available online at http://parliament.gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=5588&cat=4300& (accessed 31 January 2020).
Tom Rollins, ‘Decree 66: The blueprint for Al-Assad’s reconstruction of Syria? Critics say the president is seeking to engineer demographic change through urban planning even as the bombs still fall’, The New Humanitarian (20 January 2017), available online at https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/259390 (accessed 31 January 2020).
Ibid.
Sana Arab News Agency, ‘Homs Governorate discusses reconstruction of Baba Amro neighborhood’ (1 July 2014), available online at https://sana.sy/en/?p=5006 (accessed 31 January 2020). See also: The New Humanitarian, available online at https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigations/2017/04/20/decree-66-blueprint-al-assad-s-reconstruction-syria (accessed 31 January 2020).
Law No. 23, dated 11 December 2015, available online at http://parliament.gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=5588&nid=15732&First=0&Last=41&CurrentPage=0&mid=&refBack= (accessed 31 January 2020).
L. Cunia, Briefing Note: Housing Land and Property (HLP) in the Syrian Arab Republic (May 2016), The Norwegian Refugee Council, available online at https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/housing-land-and-property-hlp-in-the-syrian-arab-republic.pdf (accessed 31 January 2020).
Law No. 39, dated 17 December 2019, available online at http://www.pministry.gov.sy/contents/15576 (accessed 31 January 2020).
Law No. 63, dated 16 September 2012, available online at http://www.parliament.gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=201&nid=16218&ref=tree& (accessed 31 January 2020).
Justice for Life Organisation, Seizure of Property in Deir Ezzor, Violations under a Governmental Umbrella (6 January 2020), available online at https://jfl.ngo/seizure-of-property-in-deir-ezzor/ (accessed 31 January 2020).
Ibrahim Abu Ahmad, ‘Assad’s Law 10: Reshaping Syria’s Demographics’, Fikra Forum, Washington Institute for Near East Policy (17 September 2018), available online at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/assads-law-10-reshaping-syrias-demographics (accessed 31 January 2020).
Papers on Decree No. 10/2018, the Day After, available online at https://tda-sy.org/2018/03/25/papers-on-decree-no-10–2018/.
Constitution of the Syria Arab Republic, dated 27 February 2012, available online at https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Syria_2012.pdf?lang=en.
HRW, ‘Q&A: Syria’s New Property Law’ (27 May 2018), available online at https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/29/qa-syrias-new-property-law#_What_is_Law.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, dated 10 December 1948.
Arab Charter on Human Rights, dated 22 May 2004.
D. Gardner, ‘Syria is witnessing a violent demographic re-engineering. The Assad regime is trying to ensure a Sunni-majority population cannot be recreated’, Financial Times (2 October 2019), available online at https://www.ft.com/content/e40cb754-e456–11e9-b112–9624ec9edc59 (accessed 31 January 2020).