Abstract
According to the 2022 annual reports of the imo and regional piracy reporting centers in Southeast Asia, the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships (aras) in the Singapore Strait was the highest in the world. However, when these reports are examined in light of the definitions of piracy and aras, the number of incidents in the reports is greatly exaggerated. Consequently, changes should be made to the reports of incidents so that they more accurately reflect the legal definitions of piracy and aras. In addition, States bordering the Singapore Strait and ship owners and operators should take steps to reduce the number of incidents of unauthorized boarding of ships transiting the Singapore Strait.
1 Introduction
According to recent reports, there were more incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Singapore Strait than anywhere in the world.1 That contention is examined in this article. I first explain the relevant provisions in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 unclos)2 on jurisdiction over crimes committed against or on-board ships. I then examine the measures adopted by the International Maritime Organization (imo) in the early 2000s with respect to piracy and armed robbery against ships. I then examine the measures taken by States to address the threat of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia, especially in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. This includes the 2004 Regional Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)3 and the establishment of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP isc) in Singapore.4 I then examine the bodies which report on incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia, and the reports of such bodies on the incidents reported in the Singapore Strait. I conclude that commercial shipping in the Singapore Strait is much less dangerous than the reports suggest. Finally, I make some recommendations on measures that could be taken to enhance the security of ships transiting the Singapore Strait.
2 1982 unclos on Jurisdiction over Ships
The measures that have been taken by States and international organizations to combat attacks on commercial shipping cannot be understood unless they are viewed in light of the provisions in 1982 unclos on jurisdiction over ships. 1982 unclos is a universally accepted treaty that sets out the rights and obligations of States on all uses of the oceans, including jurisdiction over crimes on board ships. Under 1982 unclos, the question of which State has jurisdiction to arrest and try persons who attack a ship or persons who unlawfully board and commit theft on a ship is dependent on one critically important factor – where the incident took place.
2.1 High Seas
The first fundamental principle in 1982 unclos is that ships on the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State.5 The consent of the flag State is required for the boarding of a ship and the arrest of persons on board.6 One important exception to this principle is jurisdiction over a ship that has engaged in piracy. If persons on a ship have committed piracy, every State has the right to seize the pirate ship on the high seas and arrest the pirates.7
2.2 Maritime Zones Subject to Coastal State Sovereignty
The second fundamental principle in 1982 unclos is that a coastal State has the exclusive right to exercise police power over ships navigating in maritime zones subject to its sovereignty. The maritime zones subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State are its internal waters8 and territorial sea9; and in the case of archipelagic States like Indonesia and the Philippines, their archipelagic waters.10 Under 1982 unclos, a coastal State has the right to claim a territorial sea that extends to 12 nautical miles (nm) from the baselines along its coast.11 An archipelagic State has the right to draw straight archipelagic baselines connecting the outermost islands and drying reefs in its archipelago, and the waters inside the archipelagic baselines are its archipelagic waters.12 The archipelagic State can claim a territorial sea that extends to 12 nm seaward from its archipelagic baselines.13
2.3 Exclusive Economic Zone
Under 1982 unclos, a coastal State also has the right to claim an exclusive economic zone (eez) that extends from the outer limit of its 12 nm territorial sea out to 200 nm from the baselines from which it measures its territorial sea.14 In the eez, the coastal State has sovereign rights and jurisdiction to explore and exploit the living and non-living natural resources (including fisheries, minerals, and hydrocarbons) in the water column and in the seabed and subsoil.15 The coastal State has jurisdiction to arrest ships, such as foreign fishing vessels, that interfere with its rights to the natural resources in its eez.16 However, for non-economic matters, the high seas rules on jurisdiction over foreign ships apply in the eez.17 The high seas rules that apply in the eez include the rule that ships on the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, and the provisions on piracy, hot pursuit and right of visit18
In summary, the critical issue that determines jurisdiction over a suspect ship that has attacked or boarded another ship is where the suspect ship is located. If the suspect ship is in the internal waters, archipelagic waters, or territorial sea of a coastal State, the authorities of the coastal State have the exclusive right to exercise police power and arrest it. If the suspect ship is seaward of the territorial sea limit of any State, the high seas rules apply.
3 imo Measures to Combat Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
The imo is the specialized agency of the United Nations that is responsible for the regulation of international shipping. It traditionally focused on the safety of navigation and the prevention of ship-source pollution. The imo began to address the security of ships after an increase in attacks on ships in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in the late 1990s and early 2000s.19
The imo organized regional seminars on piracy and armed robbery against ships in Brasilia in October 1998 and in Singapore in February 1999. On the basis of the discussions in these seminars, the Maritime Safety Committee (msc) of the imo adopted the Recommendations to Governments on preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships on 16 June 1999.20 This circular recommended that neighboring countries establish co-operative agreements to suppress and combat piracy and armed robbery if they have common borders in areas that can be characterized as piracy and armed robbery threat areas.
any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences.
The imo Code of Practice makes no changes to the rules in 1982 unclos governing piracy. It merely asks States to cooperate to combat acts of piracy that meet the definition in article 101 in 1982 unclos and take place in areas seaward of the territorial sea of any State, which is in the eez or on the high seas. This is consistent with the principle that ships are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, except in the case of piracy.
The imo Code of Practice also requests States to cooperate to facilitate the investigation of incidents of aras. This phrase is not contained in 1982 unclos. The imo Code of Practice defines aras as acts similar to piracy that take place within waters subject to a State’s sovereignty and jurisdiction, that is, in the territorial sea, archipelagic waters, or internal waters of a State. However, the offence of aras is broader than the offence of the piracy in two respects. First, piracy requires that the crew or passengers of one ship commit acts “against another ship”, whereas aras does not require two ships.24 Second, piracy requires an “act” of violence or detention, or depredation, whereas aras also includes a “threat” of violence or detention or depredation.
Consequently, although States have jurisdiction over all crimes committed against ships in waters subject to their sovereignty, the imo Code of Practice only requests that they take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent and combat incidents in their maritime zones that meet the definitions of piracy and aras. It also requests that they investigate all acts of piracy and aras under their jurisdiction, and report to the imo all pertinent information on all investigations and prosecutions concerning such acts. As will be explained later, the difficulty that arises in the Singapore Strait is that the majority of incidents appear to be unauthorized boardings and theft that do not meet the threshold of aras because there is no “unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof,” as is required by the definition of aras.
Since 2002, the imo has been publishing incident reports on incidents of piracy and aras. Its reports reflect data on incidents from piracy reporting centres around the world. The imo maintains a Piracy and Maritime Database in its Global Integrated Shipping Information System (gisis), which is available to member States, international organizations, and public users.25 Curiously, the imo seems to classify all incidents from Southeast Asia as having taken place in either the “Malacca Strait” or the “South China Sea”, even though there were no attacks in the Malacca Strait in either 2022 or 2023.26
The major efforts of the imo to combat piracy were subsequently focused on the so-called “Somali Piracy” off the Gulf of Aden, and then on, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea27 because the attacks on ships in those areas have been much more serious than those in Southeast Asia. Many of the attacks on ships in these areas would be serious enough to be piracy if they were committed on the high seas or the coastal State’s eez.
4 Subregional Cooperation on Maritime Security in Southeast Asia
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, at the same time that the imo began to take measures to address piracy and aras at the global level, the three States bordering the Straits of Malacca and Singapore – Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore – began to take cooperative measures at the subregional level to address threats to shipping in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.28 Such cooperation was natural given that they have had been cooperating for many years to manage the Malacca Strait and Singapore Strait as a single strait with respect to safety and ship-source pollution.
Cooperation to enhance the security of shipping in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was necessary because the number of attacks on ships in Southeast Asia had significantly increased as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.29 In response, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore took a series of measures to enhance the security of ships transiting the Straits, including the establishment of coordinated sea patrols and “Eyes in the Sky” aerial patrols.30 In addition, Indonesia and Singapore collaborated by sharing information in order to enhance surveillance and security along their maritime border in the Singapore Strait.
At the same time, the imo initiated discussions for enhanced cooperation in Southeast Asia at the regional level. Such cooperation was supported by Japan and the United States as well as several European States. Consequently, in 2004, the interested States entered into the ReCAAP.31 The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP isc) was established in Singapore in November 2006 pursuant to the 2004 Agreement.32 There are now 21 contracting parties to ReCAAP, including States from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Europe, Australia, and the United States. All ten asean member States are parties except Indonesia and Malaysia. Although they are not parties to the agreement, Indonesia and Malaysia often cooperate with the ReCAAP isc at an operational level.
The ReCAAP isc has had the next to impossible task of determining whether reports of unlawful boarding of ships were incidents of either piracy or aras. Rather than attempting to report only incidents that were aras as defined in its agreement, ReCAAP isc reported all incidents of unlawful boarding of ships that were reported to it by the authorities of the coastal States. It then developed a system for categorizing the incidents according to their level of seriousness. It also analysed the types of unauthorized boardings and issued guides to the shipping industry on steps that they could take to minimize the risk of an unauthorized boarding or attack. The ReCAAP isc has analysed and published annual reports on piracy and aras in Asia. It has also published best practice guides to assist States and the shipping industry to combat threats of piracy and aras.33 Some of the guides published by ReCAAP have been prepared together with its partner organizations. For example, the Regional Guide 2 to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia was prepared by a working group comprised of representatives from ReCAAP, Information Fusion Centre (ifc), Asian Ship Owners Association (asa), intertanko, Singapore Shipping Association (ssa), Oil Companies International Forum (ocmif), and the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (rsis).
The ReCAAP guides have assisted regional governments and the shipping community in their efforts to address particular types of threats to commercial shipping in Southeast Asia, including the hijacking of tugs and barges, the hijacking of tankers and the theft of cargo, and the abduction of crew members in the Sulu-Celebes Seas and Waters off Eastern Sabah. The ReCAAP guides were helpful to the shipping industry when these issues became serious problems in the region. In addition, when these categories of threats to shipping had emerged, the directly concerned coastal States cooperated at the subregional level to address the threats and arrest the perpetrators.34 As a result, many of the serious threats were largely eliminated.35 For example, the abduction of crew members in the Sulu-Celebes Sea effectively ended after the Governments of the Philippines and Malaysia took serious action against Abu Sayyaf militants who had been carrying out the abductions.36
5 Bodies Reporting Incidents of Piracy and aras
Because of its importance to international shipping, three different agencies in Southeast Asia report on incidents of actual or attempted boardings by unauthorized persons in the Singapore Strait and other parts of Asia.
First, the International Maritime Bureau (imb),37 a specialized agency of the International Chamber of Commerce, has a Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia that has reported incidents since it was established in 1992.38 imb only reports incidents if they receive an incident report directly from the operator of a cargo vessel.
Second, the ReCAAP isc, a regional center based in Singapore, conducts a detailed analysis of all incidents of unauthorized boarding of ships in Asia that are reported to it by the cooperating governments, including the authorities in non-member states in the region, namely Indonesia and Malaysia.
Third, the ifc is a regional maritime security centre established in 2009 and situated at the Command and Control Centre at the Changi Naval Base.39 Hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy, the ifc aims to facilitate information-sharing and collaboration among its partners to enhance maritime security. It reports all incidents of threats to maritime security, including what it describes as “Theft, Robbery and Piracy at Sea (traps)”. It releases daily, weekly, monthly, and annual reports of incidents. It also cooperates with the ReCAAP isc.
As explained earlier, at the global level, the International Maritime Organization (imo) has been addressing issues of maritime security and piracy since the late 1990s and early 2000s. At its 22nd session in November 2001, the imo Assembly adopted Resolution A.922 containing a Code of Practice for the investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships.40 Since 2002, the imo has been publishing reports on incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The imo also facilitated the establishment of the ReCAAP Agreement in 2004.41
6 Geography of the Singapore Strait
The remainder of this article will examine the issues relating to incidents in the Singapore Strait. It will be easier to understand the issues concerning the incidents in the Singapore Strait if we first understand the geography of the Singapore Strait.
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (soms) is the major sea lane between the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. It is managed by the three littoral States (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) as a single strait, but it is comprised of two separate straits – the Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait. Visual maps of the location of the Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait, together with the traffic separation scheme and mandatory ship reporting system, are available online.42
The Malacca Strait begins in the Indian Ocean and lies between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and peninsular Malaysia. It is about 800 km (435 nm) long. At its southern end, the Malacca Strait connects to the western end of the Singapore Strait. The Singapore Strait is approximately 113 km (61 nm) long and its average width is about 19 km (10 nm). At its eastern end, the Singapore Strait connects to the South China Sea. Most of the Singapore Strait lies south of Singapore and north of the Riau Islands of Indonesia; but at its western and eastern ends, it lies between the southern tip of the Malaysian State of Johor and the Riau Islands of Indonesia.
There is a maritime boundary agreement setting out the geographic coordinates of the maritime boundary in the Singapore Strait between Singapore and the Riau Islands of Indonesia. The boundary was first set out in an agreement in 1973 between Indonesia and Singapore.43 It has since been extended by subsequent agreements to the west in 200944 and to the east in 2014.45 The boundaries at the western end of the Singapore Strait, where it joins the southern end of the Malacca Strait, have not been finalized. This will require an additional agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia, and an additional agreement between Singapore and Malaysia, with a tripoint between the three States.
The boundaries at the eastern end of the Strait are also not delimited. In this area, there will have to be a bilateral agreement between Malaysia and Indonesia establishing the boundary between the southern coast of Johor and the Indonesian islands of Batam and Bintan, as well as tripoints with Singapore. In Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge,46 the icj was not asked to delimit the maritime boundary of Singapore and Malaysia in this area. As sensitive issues concerning sovereignty are involved, the boundaries in this area are likely to remain unresolved for some time.47
There is a traffic separation scheme (tss) in the Singapore Strait that was proposed by the three littoral States and adopted by the imo.48 All ships transiting the Singapore Strait are required to comply with the tss when navigating the Strait. The navigational charts used by mariners show the tss, but not the maritime boundaries.49 Therefore, the master of a ship transiting the Singapore Strait may not know whose waters his or her ship is in when transiting the Strait. When transiting in the eastbound lane toward the South China Sea, ships are always in waters subject to the sovereignty of Indonesia. When transiting the strait in the westbound lane toward the Malacca Strait or Indian Ocean, ships will be in waters subject to the sovereignty of either Malaysia or Singapore for most, if not all, of their passage.
7 Reports of Incidents of Piracy and aras in the Singapore Strait in 2022
If one reads the annual reports of the above bodies on incidents of piracy and aras, it appears that the Singapore Strait is one of the most dangerous places in the world for international shipping.
The imo annual report for 2022 uses the category “Straits of Malacca and Singapore” for all incidents in Southeast Asia. It reported that there were 72 incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, as compared to 21 incidents in West Africa, and 14 incidents in South America.50 In reality, as will be shown later, the incidents in Southeast Asia were very minor, whereas some of the incidents in West Africa were very serious.51
The ReCAAP isc’s annual report for 2022 reported a total of 84 incidents in Asia, 55 of which were in the Singapore Strait.52 The ifc at Changi reported the same number in the Singapore Strait, whereas the imb Piracy Reporting Centre reported only 38 incidents in the Singapore Strait.53 The lower number reported by the imb is most likely because it only reports incidents if it receives an incident report directly from the operator of a cargo vessel. Further, the number of incidents reported by the imo for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore may be overstated because it includes reports of incidents from other areas in Southeast Asia. Both ReCAAP isc and the ifc reported 55 incidents,54 although they may not have been exactly the same incidents. In any case, the implication of all four reports is that one of the most dangerous places in the world for commercial ships is the Singapore Strait.
However, if we examine the reports more closely, the situation looks less dire. The following preliminary observations can be made. First, none of the incidents were piracy, since the entire Singapore Strait falls within waters under the territorial sovereignty of either Indonesia, Malaysia, or Singapore. Second, the vast majority of the incidents were very minor, and cannot be classified as aras. The most detailed report is by that of ReCAAP. ReCAAP reported that there were only 2 incidents in which the perpetrators committed acts of violence against the crew,55 and in the remaining 53 incidents, the crew suffered no injuries (with no reported incidents of the crew being “threatened” with violence).56 ReCAAP also highlighted that in one incident, the perpetrators carried a pistol; in 17 incidents, the perpetrators carried knives, machetes, and other weapons or weapon-like objects; and in 5 instances, the perpetrators were unarmed.57 It further reported that, in the remaining 32 of the 55 incidents, there was no information on whether the perpetrators carried weapons.58 The ifc Report stated that of the 55 incidents, only 4 involved confrontations with crew.59 In summary, it appears from the reports that, of the 55 reported incidents, only 4 could be clearly classified as aras. In some other cases there could have been a threat of violence without confrontations with the crew or injuries suffered, but it is not clear from the reports. Unfortunately, since the reporting criteria used do not correspond closely to the legal criteria for aras, it is not possible to determine exactly how many incidents met the legal criteria for aras. In any case, given that nearly 1,000 ships transit the Singapore Strait daily, it is difficult to conclude that passage through the Singapore Strait is a serious risk to the security of commercial ships.60
On the other hand, some observers from the shipping industry in Singapore maintain that the number of unauthorized boardings in the Singapore Strait may in fact be under-reported.61 They believe that some ship owners and ship operators advise their masters not to report incidents of aras in the Singapore Strait to the coastal authorities because the authorities may request that ship to come into port for an investigation. The investigation is not likely to result in the perpetrators being arrested and may instead seriously delay the schedule of the ship, which could result in substantial financial penalties.62 Therefore, the decision is taken not to report the incident.63
In the remainder of this article, I will examine the issues relating to the unauthorized boarding of ships in the Singapore Strait and explore potential steps to reduce the number of incidents of unauthorized boarding.
8 Combatting Unauthorized Boarding in Singapore Strait
In my view, there are several measures that the governments of the three littoral States – Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the piracy reporting centres, or the shipping industry could take to combat the unauthorized boarding of ships in the Singapore Strait.
8.1 Issue Navigation Charts Showing Maritime Boundaries and Maritime Zones
As explained earlier, under 1982 unclos, the location of an incident of unauthorized boarding is critically important because it determines which State has jurisdiction over the offence. Unfortunately, the navigation charts currently used in Southeast Asia do not indicate the maritime boundaries, territorial sea limits, archipelagic baselines, or areas where the boundaries are unresolved.64 If the navigational charts contained this information, it would arguably aid the master of a ship on who he/she should contact if there is an attack on or unauthorized boarding of his/her ship. It would also aid the piracy reporting centres in analyzing which State has jurisdiction when there is an incident. Therefore, the three littoral States should cooperate by taking the steps necessary to publish navigational charts indicating the agreed boundaries as well as the archipelagic baselines of Indonesia and the territorial sea claims of the three States, as well as the areas where the maritime claims have yet to be defined by boundary agreements.
8.2 Identifying Onshore Accomplices
The ReCAAP reports indicate that a significant number of incidents involve bulk carriers and tankers65 transiting the Singapore Strait in the early morning hours.66 Such ships are vulnerable because they move slowly and have low free board.67
The goods stolen from the bulk carriers normally include engine spares, stores, tools, fuel or lube fuel, and the personal effects of crew.68 This suggests that the stores and engine parts are sold on the black market to shipyards or related industries in the region, possibly in the Riau Islands.69 If this is indeed the case, it may be easier for the police and/or private investigators to identify the perpetrators through investigations on shore than it would be to catch the perpetrators in the act at sea.
In private conversations, industry sources have suggested that refined fuel oil products are stolen from tankers transiting the Strait in the early morning hours.70 This suggests that the tankers may be transiting in the early morning hours to avoid customs inspection by the authorities in the littoral States. Investigations on shore may also be useful in addressing this issue.
8.3 Indicate “Last Port” and “Next Port” of Ships on Incident Reports
If the above suspicions from an industry source regarding bulk carriers and tankers are correct, it is likely that the majority of the tankers and bulk carriers that are boarded in the Singapore Strait are on regional routes in Southeast Asia, perhaps from one area of Indonesian or Malaysian waters to another. One way to confirm this is to require ships making reports of incidents to the ReCAAP isc or other reporting centres to indicate on the report their “last port” and “next port”.
If future incident reports on the boarding of tankers and bulk carriers indicate that most of the attacks on bulk carriers and small tankers are on ships on regional routes, the ReCAAP isc and the imo should report this fact. They should advise the international shipping community that the vast majority of incidents in the Singapore Strait are on particular types of ships on regional routes, and that consequently, there is little risk to larger ships transiting the Singapore Strait on voyages between Europe or the Middle East and East Asia.71 This would counter the false perception that the Singapore Strait is one of the most dangerous places in the world for international shipping.
8.4 Clearer Incident Reporting with Respect to Level of Violence
The data within existing reports on the use or threat of violence towards crew is confusing. From the law enforcement perspective, it might be useful to know if the perpetrators carried weapons or not. However, from a legal perspective, the critical issue is whether they used or threatened violence against the crew as such conduct is necessary for the incident to be aras. Therefore, the form for reporting incidents should ask: (a) whether the perpetrators carried weapons; (b) whether the perpetrators used violence against crew members; and (c) whether the perpetrators threatened to use violence against crew members (i.e., threat of physical force, either with or without a weapon).
Further, if navigation charts showing maritime boundaries and maritime zones were available (see Recommendation 1 above), the incident reports should also incorporate such charts by specifying whether the incidents occurred outside (where the laws on piracy would apply) or inside (where the domestic laws would apply) the territorial boundaries of a State. For incidents outside of territorial sovereignty, the key determination is whether the perpetrators used violence, detention, or depredation (making it piracy). For incidents inside territorial sovereignty, the key is whether violence, detention, or depredation was used or threatened (making it aras). This would thus align the reports more closely to the legal thresholds for aras and piracy.
8.5 Failure of Bulk Carriers to Comply with isps Code & Regional Guide 2
The International Ship and Port Facility Security (isps) Code was adopted by the imo in 2002 as an amendment to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea (solas) Convention, and it entered into force in 2004. Under the isps Code, every ship over 500 Gross Register Tonnage (grt) operating on international trade routes must have an International Ship Security Certificate (issc) issued by a Recognized Security Organization (rso) in order to operate. It must also appoint a Company Security Officer (cso) and a Ship Security Officer (sso). The cso is responsible for ensuring that ships have a Ship Security Plan (ssp). Further, the sso must maintain the ssp for the ship, ensure that the crew is trained for security purposes, and conduct regular security inspections.72
The cso is responsible for advising his/her ships on the level of threats likely to be encountered on their planned routes. Therefore, if bulk carriers operated by the company are going to transit the Singapore Strait, the cso should liaise with the piracy reporting centres to determine the level of risk. In the case of bulk carriers transiting the Singapore Strait, the cso should be aware that ReCAAP and its partner organizations have issued Regional Guide 2 (Guide) in March 2022, and that the Guide explains the threats and modus operandi of the perpetrators and provides clear guidance on what shipping companies should do to minimize the risk of their ships being boarded.73 In view of this, the following practices should be adopted. First, the cso should study the Guide to understand the threat. Second, the cso should conduct a risk assessment and identify ship protection measures that can be taken.74 Third, the sso should implement the ship protection measures by hardening the ship, briefing and training crew members, enhancing lookout in dangerous areas, and following the guidance set out by their flag State, their insurer, and the regional reporting centre.75
Some observers from the shipping industry have opined that the bulk carriers being boarded in the Singapore Strait are those that have not followed the measures recommended in the Regional Guide 2 and their obligations under the isps Code. The shipping industry and the ReCAAP isc should take steps to determine if that is indeed the case. The reporting forms for incidents now require (1) the ship’s name and imo number; (2) the type of ship; (3) the flag; and (4) the grt.76 For bulk carriers that have been boarded, the ReCAAP isc should follow-up by attempting to identify the ship operator as well as the rso that issued the issc for the ship. The ReCAAP isc should also request information from the ship operator on the protective measures that the ship had taken to prevent unauthorized boarding. If the ship operators concerned are not willing to provide such information, it may be because they did not follow the recommended measures. This information should be included in ReCAAP reports as it would be strong evidence that the majority of incidents against bulk carriers are cases in which the ships were “low, slow and unprepared” and not complying with international regulations.
8.6 Investigate Boarding of Tugboats and Supply Vessels Towing Barges
The ReCAAP reports indicate that there have also been numerous incidents involving tugboats and supply vessels towing barges77 in which the perpetrators in small boats stole materials from the barges, especially scrap metal.78 These incidents are not confined to hours of darkness79 and involved a larger number of perpetrators.80 ReCAAP has recommended that the crew on board the tugboats maximize vigilance and increase watchkeeping to look out for such small boats.81 The authorities should also investigate whether it is feasible to ask other vessels to report suspicious activities by small boats near tugboats or supply vessels towing barges. In addition, if the perpetrators are stealing scrap metal from the barges and loading it onto their small boats,82 they are likely to be selling the scrap metal to scrap yards in the region, most likely in the Riau Islands. Therefore, this is another issue that requires the cooperation of the authorities in the States bordering the Strait. Incentives should be provided to encourage investigations on shore by the police and/or private investigators to identify the gangs of the perpetrators as well as the companies that are purchasing the stolen property.83
8.7 Publish Information on Perpetrators that Have Been Arrested
The Code of Practice for Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships urged Governments to report to the imo pertinent information on all investigations and prosecutions relating to acts of piracy and aras. However, there appears to be no information available about perpetrators being arrested, tried, or convicted. This may give the impression to the public (and to potential perpetrators) that ships in the Singapore Strait can be boarded with little risk of arrest and punishment. The three littoral States should be encouraged to provide information to ReCAAP or the ifc on the arrest and conviction of perpetrators, and this information should be included in the annual reports of these reporting bodies.
8.8 Action To Alleviate Poverty in the Areas Where Perpetrators Reside
Studies of have shown that there is clear correlation between incidents of piracy, aras and unauthorized boardings, and the level of poverty and unemployment in the coastal areas bordering the areas where the incidents take place.84 It was not a coincidence that incidents in Southeast Asia increased dramatically after the 1997 financial crisis.85 Observers have also predicted an increase in the number of boardings in the Singapore Strait if there is an economic downturn that impacts the local communities in the Riau Islands.86 Therefore, it would be in the interests of shipping industry in Singapore to consider ways and means of alleviating poverty87 in the villages in the Riau Islands. Assistance to the poorer communities bordering the Singapore Strait could also be linked to action by the authorities in these communities to crack down on gangs that are boarding ships and on the companies that are purchasing the scrap metal, engine parts, and other goods taken from bulk carriers and barges transiting the Singapore Strait.
9 Conclusions
The security of commercial shipping in Southeast Asia was a serious problem in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As a result, measures were taken by the imo as well as by States in the region. The establishment of the Information Sharing Centre in Singapore in 2006 under the 2004 ReCAAP agreement was a milestone that has contributed to the safety and security of shipping in the region. However, the definition of “armed robbery against ships” in the imo documents and the ReCAAP agreement has given rise to some difficulties in practice in Southeast Asia because many of the unauthorized boardings of ships are not serious enough to be classified as aras. Consequently, ship owners and operators are encouraged to report all unauthorized boardings to ReCAAP and the other reporting centres. The cooperation among States and other stakeholders under the ReCAAP Agreement has accomplished much to make the seas in Southeast Asia safe from the scourge of piracy. The authorities in affected States in Southeast Asia have also cooperated to combat threats to the security of international shipping in Southeast Asia.
Although there are very few serious threats to commercial shipping in Southeast Asia and almost no incidents of piracy, the reports of the imo and the reporting centres in Southeast Asia have suggested that piracy and aras is a very serious problem in Southeast Asia, especially in the Singapore Strait. In this paper, I have examined these assertions and have argued that there are no incidents of piracy and very few incidents of aras. However, there has been a significant number of incidents involving the unauthorized boarding of ships in the Singapore Strait involving the theft of property. I have analyzed the ReCAAP reports on these incidents, and have made some suggestions on how these incidents could be reduced.
The author would also like to thank Mr. Ong Jie Hao (Joel), Research Assistant at cil, for his assistance in researching and proof-reading the paper.
united nations convention on the law of the sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 u.n.t.s. 397, 21 i.l.m. 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994).
regional cooperation agreement on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in asia, 11 November 2004, 2398 u.n.t.s. 199, 44 i.l.m. 839 (2005) (entered into force 4 September 2006) [hereinafter ReCAAP].
See ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia, available at https://www.recaap.org/.
1982 unclos, Art. 92.
ibid., Art. 92. The power of arrest extends to the contiguous zone and e.e.z. for offenses mentioned in Arts. 33 and 73 respectively.
Ibid., Art. 105.
Ibid., Art. 8.
Ibid., Art. 2.
Ibid., Art. 49.
Ibid., Art. 3.
Ibid., Arts. 47 and 49(1).
Ibid., Art. 48.
Ibid., Art. 57.
Ibid., Art. 56(1).
Ibid., Art. 73.
Ibid., Arts. 58(1) and (2).
Ibid., Arts. 100–107, 110.
G.G. Ong-Webb, ‘3. Piracy in Maritime Asia: Current Trends’ in P. Lehr (Ed.), Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (Routledge, New York, 2011), at pp. 49–50; N. Passas & A. Twyman-Ghoshal, ‘Controlling Piracy in Southeast Asia – Thinking Outside the Box’ in R.C. Beckman & J.A. Roach (Eds.), Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in asean: Prospects for Cooperation (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012), at pp. 64, 66–7.
International Maritime Organization, Recommendations to Governments for Preventing and Suppressing Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, imo Doc. msc/Circ.622/Rev.1 (June 16, 1999).
imo, Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, imo Res. A.922(22) (Nov. 29, 2001) [hereinafter imo Code of Practice].
Ibid., at Provision 1 of Annex.
Ibid., at Provision 2.2 of Annex.
Judge T. Treves, ‘Piracy and the international law of the sea’ in D. Guilfoyle (Ed.), Modern Piracy: Legal Challenges and Responses, at pp. 124–5.
See Global Integrated Shipping Information System, available at https://gisis.imo.org/Public/Default.aspx.
imo, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report – 2022, imo Doc. msc.4/Circ.267 (19 April 2023), at pp. 1 & 4 (Annex 1) and p. 1 (Annex 2) [hereinafter imo 2022 Annual Report].
United Nations, General Assembly, First report on prevention and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea, by Yacouba Cissé, Special Rapporteur, a/cn.4/758 (22 March 2023), available at https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.4/758, at p. 5/103 (para 6) [hereinafter UN Piracy Report]; D. Guilfoyle, International Piracy, American Society of International Law (July 31 2014), available at https://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ERG_PIRACY.pdf, at pp. 4–5.
H. Djalal, ‘7. Combating Piracy: Co-operation Needs, Efforts, and Challenges’ in D. Johnson & M. Valencia (Eds.), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses, (iseas Publishing, Singapore, 2005), at pp. 149–50; T. Chalermpalanupap & M. Ibanez, ‘asean measures in combating piracy and other maritime crimes’ in R.C. Beckman & J.A. Roach (Eds.), Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in asean: Prospects for Cooperation (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012), at pp. 155–6.
K. von Hoesslin, ‘Piracy and armed robbery against ships in the asean region: incidents and trends’ in R.C. Beckman & J.A. Roach (Eds.), Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in asean: Prospects for Cooperation (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012), at p. 121 (footnote 8).
See Passas, supra note 19, at pp. 76–7; C. Bueger, ‘Responses to contemporary piracy: disentangling the organizational field’ in D. Guilfoyle (Ed.), Modern Piracy: Legal Challenges and Responses, at p. 100; Ong-Webb, supra note 19, at p. 88.
ReCAAP, supra note 3.
ReCAAP isc, supra note 4.
See Recaap, Guidebook, available at https://www.recaap.org/guidebook.
See, for e.g., P. Parameswaran, What’s Next for the Sulu Sea Trilateral Patrols?, available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/whats-next-for-the-sulu-sea-trilateral-patrols/, at pp. 2–3; J.N. Mak, ‘9. Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen: The Politics of “Sustainable” Piracy in the Strait of Malacca’ in P. Lehr (Ed.), Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (Routledge, New York, 2011), at pp. 194–5.
See I. Storey, Piracy and the Pandemic: Maritime Crime in Southeast Asia, 2020–22, available at https://www.iseas.edu.sg/articles-commentaries/iseas-perspective/2022-76-piracy-and-the-pandemic-maritime-crime-in-southeast-asia-2020-22-by-ian-storey/, at p. 7; S. Axbard, Income Opportunities and Sea Piracy in Indonesia: Evidence from Satellite Data, 8(2) American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 154–94 (2016), doi: 10.1257/app.20140404, at p. 182.
ReCAAP, Regional Guide 2 to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (March 2022), available at https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/guide/Regional%20Guide%202%20to%20Counter%20Piracy%20%20Armed%20Robbery%20against%20Ships%20in%20Asia%20(HR)%20v1.pdf, at p. 8 [hereinafter ReCAAP Regional Guide 2]; ReCAAP, Executive Director’s Report 2022, available at https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/ED%20Report/ED’s%20Report%202022.pdf, at pp. 4, 7 [hereinafter ReCAAP Executive Director’s Report].
See icc Commercial Crime Services, International Maritime Bureau, available at https://www.icc-ccs.org/icc/imb.
For more information, see icc Commercial Crime Services, imb Piracy Reporting Center, available at https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre.
See Information Fusion Centre, About ifc, available at https://www.ifc.org.sg/ifc2web/app_pages/User/commonv2/aboutus.cshtml.
imo Code of Practice, supra note 21.
ReCAAP, supra note 3.
See Maritime and Port Authority Of Singapore (mpa), Operational Areas, available at https://www.mpa.gov.sg/port-marine-ops/operations/vessel-traffic-information-system/operational-areas.
Treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore relating to the delimitation of the territorial seas of the two countries in the Strait of Singapore, 25 May 1973 (entry into force: 29 August 1974); registration #: 45144; registration date: 5 August 2008.
Treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore relating to the delimitation of the territorial seas of the two countries in the western part of the Strait of Singapore (Western Boundary Treaty), 10 March 2009 (entry into force: 10 March 2009); registration #: 48026; registration date: 16 December 2010.
Treaty between the Republic of Indonesia and the Republic of Singapore relating to the delimitation of the territorial seas of the two countries in the eastern part of the Strait of Singapore, 3 September 2014 (entry into force: 10 February 2017; registration # 54672; registration date: 25 September 2017.
sovereignty over pedra branca/pulau batu puteh, middle rocks and south ledge (malaysia v. singapore), Judgment of 23 May 2008, i.c.j. Reports 2008, 12.
A.J. Young, ‘1. Roots of Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’ in D. Johnson & M. Valencia (Eds.), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses, (iseas Publishing, Singapore, 2005), at p. 22.
imo Assembly Resolution, Navigation through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, A.375(X) (14 November 1977).
mpa, supra note 42.
imo 2022 Annual Report, supra note 26, at p. 2 (para 7).
Ong-Webb, supra note 19, at pp. 53–4.
ReCAAP Executive Director’s Report, supra note 36, at p. 4.
icc International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January – 31 December 2022, available at https://www.icc-ccs.org/reports/2022%20Annual%20IMB%20Piracy%20and%20Armed%20Robbery%20Report.pdf, at p. 6 Table 1.
ReCAAP Executive Director’s Report, supra note 36, at p. 4; ifc, Annual Report 2022, available at https://www.ifc.org.sg/ifc2web/Publications/Annual%20Report/2022/Annual%20Report%202022.pdf, at p. 8 [hereinafter ifc Annual Report 2022].
ReCAAP isc, Annual Report 2022: Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (January – December 2022), available at https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/reports/annual/ReCAAP%20ISC%20Annual%20Report%202022.pdf, at pp. 19 & 30 [hereinafter ReCAAP isc Annual Report 2022].
Ibid., at p. 29 (Chart 14 – Treatment of Crew – Singapore Strait).
Ibid., at pp. 19 & 27 (Chart 13 – Type of weapons carried – Singapore Strait).
Ibid., at pp. 19 & 27 (Chart 13 – Type of weapons carried – Singapore Strait).
ifc Annual Report 2022, supra note 54, at p. 10.
See Ong-Webb, supra note 19, at p. 80.
Storey, supra note 35, at p. 4.
S. Bateman, ‘11. Outlook: The New Threat of Maritime Terrorism’ in P. Lehr (Ed.), Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (Routledge, New York, 2011), at p. 245.
ReCAAP isc Annual Report 2022, supra note 55, at p. 21.
See mpa, Singaporean Nautical Charts, available at https://www.mpa.gov.sg/port-marine-ops/marine-services/charts-tidal-info-atons-and-hydrography/singaporean-nautical-charts.
ReCAAP isc Annual Report 2022, supra note 55, at pp. 18–9. See further, ReCAAP Executive Director’s Report, supra note 36, at p. 8 (Map 2 and Chart 3); ifc Annual Report 2022, supra note 54, at p. 10.
Of the 41 incidents in 2022 involving bulk carriers and tankers, all incidents occurred during hours of darkness except one during daylight hours: ReCAAP isc Annual Report 2022, supra note 55, at pp. 18–9. See further, from imb statistics from 1997–2004: Ong-Webb, supra note 19, at pp. 76–7 (Figure 3.38).
ReCAAP isc Annual Report 2022, supra note 55, at p. 21, Observation 3; ifc Annual Report 2022, supra note 54, at p. 10; Bateman, supra note 62, at pp. 246–7.
ReCAAP isc Annual Report 2022, supra note 55, at pp. 18 (Items Stolen) & 31 (Chart 15). See also, Hoesslin, supra note 29, at p. 122.
Storey, supra note 35, at pp. 4–5.
ifc Annual Report 2022, supra note 54, at p. 36; Storey, supra note 35, at pp. 4–5.
Bateman, supra note 62, at pp. 245–6.
The bimco Pocket Guide also outlines the same duties of the cso and sso, see Bimco-Recaap-Imb, Tips On Avoiding Piracy, Robbery and Theft, available at https://www.recaap.org/resources/ck/files/guide/BIMCO%20ReCAAP%20IMB%20%20Pocket%20Guide.pdf, at pp. 20 & 21.
ReCAAP Regional Guide 2, supra note 36, at pp. 9–11.
Ibid., at pp. 12–3.
Ibid., at p. 53; imo, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmaster and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, imo Doc. msc.1/Circ 1334 (23 June 2009), at Appendix 6.
ReCAAP isc Annual Report 2022, supra note 55, at p. 19.
See ibid., at p. 18; ReCAAP Regional Guide 2, supra note 36, at p. 35.
ReCAAP isc Annual Report 2022, supra note 55, at p. 19.
Ibid.
See ibid., “Recommendations” of the third bullet point at p. 42.
For an example of loading of scrap metal on small boats and sampans, see ibid., at pp. 48–9.
Young, supra note 47, at p. 24; Ong-Webb, supra note 19, at p. 90.
See UN Piracy Report, supra note 27, at p. 3/103 (para 2); Storey, supra note 35, at p. 3; Young, supra note 47, at p. 21; Axbard, supra note 35, at pp. 156–7 (repeated on pp. 170–2); Passas, supra note 19, at p. 63; Hoesslin, supra note 29, at p. 121.
Young, supra note 47, at pp. 18 & 20; Ong-Webb, supra note 19, at p. 79; Mak, supra note 34, at p. 200; Hoesslin, supra note 29, at pp. 121–2.
Storey, supra note 35, at p. 8; Axbard, supra note 35, at p. 180; Hoesslin, supra note 29, at p. 133.
Young, supra note 47, at p. 26.