Abstract
This article explores whether China’s political and economic relations with African countries constitute a factor in undermining Africa’s path to liberal democracy or not. It addresses the question of why democratic values like human rights could not be sustained in some African countries. Along this line, could China’s economic influence harm the democratisation of the African continent? The argument of this article is that differing perceptions of democracy coupled with China’s entry in Africa as an alternative to the West have provided a context for several African countries to elude the liberal democratic path. The article concludes that, in providing them with economic support, China has introduced concepts of an alternative model of government to several African countries that had initially embraced liberal democracy. China’s close relations with Africa thus have been a game-changer for the post-Cold War liberal order.
1 Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War two broad spectrums of views have emerged—one on the rise of China as an economic power and its role in international politics, particularly in Africa, and the other on the scope for democracy in Africa. Both have generated heated debates and controversies. As the facts indicate, the spread of liberal democracy and the inculcation of democratic values like human rights in the developing world, and more particularly in Africa, have not been very successful. This is because despite undertaking political reforms and conducting competitive elections the initial enthusiastic transition to democracy in Africa in the early 1990s has not been sustained. The question, hence, is what are the reasons for such reversals? Is there any flaw in the liberal democratic system that has not been appreciated thus far?
In this regard, is there a connection between China’s role in Africa and the latter’s failure to embrace the democratic path, or has the pressure by the international community on African governments to sustain democratic values been inadequate? In other words, could China’s economic influence have harmed the democratisation of the African continent? How else do we explain the lack of liberal democracy in this part of the world? The argument of this article is that differing perceptions of democracy, coupled with China’s entry as an aid partner in Africa offering an alternative to the West, have provided a context in which several African countries have been able to avoid the liberal democratic path. Prior to China’s entry in Africa, India had huge political and economic clout in sub-Saharan Africa. China has since overtaken India, gaining in influence and achieving greater penetration of African markets, and hence this situation demands scrutiny. Having said that, the aim here is not to dwell on how far democracy has been achieved in individual African countries, since there have been several versions of it under varieties of regime types. Instead, we aim to analyse the links, if any, between China’s role in Africa and African countries’ evasive attitude towards liberal democracy. By unravelling the connections this article aims to provide suggestions for peaceful options for African countries in achieving democracy.
The article proceeds by first clarifying the context of China’s potential influence on democracy in Africa, and thereafter describing the political and economic considerations that have contributed to China solidifying its relations with Africa. Later, the article analyses the rationale behind the lack of progress on democratic development. It concludes that there is indeed a connection between the political and economic role that China has played in Africa and an undermining of the establishment of a democratic framework in several African countries.
2 Gauging China’s Potential to Undermine Democracy in Africa
Since the onset of the twenty-first century, China’s image has been defined by two key aspects of global geopolitics. First, China’s unbridled rise as the global economic and manufacturing powerhouse has made it the conspicuous revisionist power to challenge Western hegemony. Second, China’s authoritarian political system is the perfect antithesis of Western democratic values. Against this backdrop, Africa continues to struggle with myriad socioeconomic challenges, from endemic poverty to political instability and armed conflicts. As a result, many African countries suffer from economic deprivation, despite being rich in natural resources. Ethnic fault lines and external interference have been key in exacerbating these enduring challenges on the continent.
Africa’s history has shown that authoritarianism has been the biggest bane for the continent and its people. The consolidation of power by African elites and the exclusion of African civil society from governance mechanisms has led to devastating outcomes, like human rights abuse, social strife, political persecution and genocide. Enduring examples of such precedents include infamous regimes, such as that of Idi Ami of Uganda, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the DRC), Hissène Habré of Chad and Muammar Gadaffi of Libya, and events such as the Rwandan genocide of 1993 and others.1 The fundamental antidote to Africa’s enduring sociopolitical challenges would be democratic governance and the economic empowerment of the African populace.
Throughout the nineties the US and European nations were key contributors of economic investment in Africa. However, Western economic aid packages have always been accompanied by caveats for upholding democracy and human rights. As a result, the ruling African elites often encountered stiff political opposition and condemnation from the West when their respective regimes disrupted the democratic process. It is here that China found an opportunity. Denis Tull (2008: 115) remarks that the West’s harsh reaction to the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Africa post-1989, and the subsequent International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) forced structural adjustment programme, which limited Western economic aid, provided the impetus for China to reorient its economic engagement with African nations and start making inroads into Africa’s political and economic landscape. Thus China opened the avenue for exporting its ideas of governance. Tull (2006) substantiates this claim by quoting an editorial that appeared in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) official newspaper:
Owing to the general failure in the West’s political and economic behaviour in Africa, the African Governments are now negating Western-style democracy and have reinitiated “Afro-Asianism, and proposed going towards the Orient”.
Tull, 2006: 467
Figure 1
China’s foreign assistance from 2013 to 2018
Citation: Africa Review 15, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/09744061-tat00011
Source: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2021
Figure 1
China’s foreign assistance from 2013 to 2018
Citation: Africa Review 15, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/09744061-tat00011
Source: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2021Figure 1
China’s foreign assistance from 2013 to 2018
Citation: Africa Review 15, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/09744061-tat00011
Source: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2021As illustrated in Figure 1, since 2000 China has surpassed the US and other Western nations in extending economic assistance and investments to African countries. However, the most important question is: How does China’s overwhelming economic and political influence in Africa endanger the set-up of the continent’s democracies and embolden the authoritarian tendencies of its regimes? The answer can be derived from an analysis of the various aspects of political cooperation revealed in China’s 2021 White Paper on Africa (XinhuaNet, 2021). Several recent developments and studies written by Western scholars have indeed illustrated that there are trends that reflect China’s detrimental influence on the democratic set-up in Africa. The first indicator is the CCP’s influence on African political parties, which officially is non-interference in internal affairs. However, there are several markers in the White Paper which suggest that the CCP is seeking to export its governance system to Africa. For example, the White Paper states that China will support African nations to explore alternative paths for governance suited to their national conditions. It further states that China aims to provide this support by sharing its own governance experience for development and prosperity (Ibid.). Caitlin Dearing Scott labels this as China’s explicit efforts to impart lessons from its economic development achieved through an authoritarian political system. Scott points out that these party-to-party exchanges include sessions on influencing public opinion, government–media relations, Internet censorship and opposition monitoring (Scott, 2021). These are overt indications of how China may try to export its authoritarian model of governance into Africa’s political landscape.
There is also the issue of Chinese assistance to African political parties that support China particularly during election times (Tiffert and McPherson-Smith, 2022). Another issue is China’s support to African regimes for state surveillance. The White Paper underscores China’s commitment to supporting African governments in maintaining peace and stability. But China is known for its rigid and invasive surveillance of its citizens. There have already been several developments that have revealed that African regimes are seeking to adopt China’s excessive state surveillance practices under the pretext of maintaining internal security. In November 2019, Aisha Buhari, the wife of the Nigerian president, backed proposed legislation for the regulation of social media. She stated: “China has been able to control the use of social media for its 1.3 billion population, so there is no reason why the federal government cannot control 180 million Nigerian citizens” (The Cable, 2019).
It should be noted that China has already made massive inroads into Africa’s Internet infrastructure. For example, Chinese companies have laid more than 200,000 km of optical fibre and provided Internet access to 6 million African households (Xinhua Net, 2021). Scott writes that African nations are increasingly looking to China to frame laws for regulating the digital space. This sets another precedent where African regimes may try to emulate China’s regressive state surveillance practices that could critically impinge on democracy on the continent.
Yet another aspect of China’s influence relates to the media, which is often described as the fourth pillar of democracy. As is known, an independent media is a cornerstone of democracy. However, in an authoritarian state like China, that very media becomes an instrument of state suppression. Censorship and filtering of information have been the hallmark of China’s state-controlled media. Today there are several developments which indicate that China is attempting to export this practice to Africa. This is explicitly mentioned in the White Paper, which states that China seeks to strengthen its cooperation with African regimes on handling media relations (XinhuaNet, 2021). Kenyan investigative journalist, John-Allen Namu, opines that “China is being very deliberate about the kind of messaging it pushes on the continent” (DW Akademie, 2020). He views China’s media model as distinguished by its non-adherence to traditional journalistic standards. This media model often appeals to autocratic and semi-autocratic governments that have a strained relationship with international media (Ibid.). Monika Chansoria claims that Chinese ownership of African media companies has offered Beijing direct channels of influence over the content, tone and preference of the media. She states that this trend could create a media environment in Africa that predominately promotes and broadcasts China’s worldview and soft power (Chansoria, 2022). The intrusion of Chinese companies into the African media space is bound to be detrimental to democracy and promote authoritarianism.
These overt indicators clearly illustrate several nuances of China’s political and economic engagement in Africa and its effects on the progress of democracy in Africa. For a continent that has historically witnessed the ill-effects of authoritarianism, these indicators suggest that African regimes may once again move in this direction, influenced by the Chinese model of governance and state suppression. It is important to underline here the considered view of the authors that no such interference, overt and covert, can be found in the case of India.
3 The Likelihood of Chinese Involvement in Democratisation in Africa
The dire necessity for democratising the socioeconomic landscape of African society brings the ever-expanding Chinese footprint in Africa under suspicion. The magnitude of Chinese economic investments in Africa over the last decade is certainly history in making. But this very trend also raises concerns about history repeating itself in Africa, the only difference this time being that the problem might arise from across the Indian Ocean rather than the Atlantic or Mediterranean, as in the past. China’s generous economic packages to Africa may appear benevolent but its potential to entrap Africa’s people and resources cannot go unnoticed. This aspect has been commented on by many scholars. While there is certainly no doubt about the effectiveness of Chinese economic outreach schemes in bringing economic development to Africa, the greater concern is the long-term implications of China’s economic investments on the African continent and their potential to steer African governments away from the path of democratisation.
At the core of this theoretical premise is the fact that China as a nation is governed by a political entity that abhors democracy. The ruling CCP government considers democracy an existential threat and as a result has reacted with enormous hostility to any call for democratisation from within its population. The historic Tiananmen Square Massacre and recent crackdown on Hong Kong’s freedoms are testaments to this irrefutable fact. The paramount question that arises is, what would be the overwhelming influence of such a nation, which as noted above despises democracy to the core, on a continent whose states have been struggling to embrace democracy? Hence, theoretically there certainly is a potential threat that China’s overarching influence could affect negatively the process of democratisation and the existing democratic institutions in Africa. This is based on the fact that a nation that has embraced authoritarianism and despised democracy will be the least concerned of all to impart democratic values, be it in Africa or elsewhere. In turn there is a probability that Chinese influence might entice incumbent African governments towards authoritarianism to emulate China’s governance strategy.
Recent political developments in Kenya may substantiate this theoretical premise. Kenya, which is the most powerful nation of East Africa, has embraced China’s economic outreach, like many other nations of the continent. In 2014, the democratically elected Kenyan president, Uhuru Kenyatta, signed a landmark USD 3.6 billion deal for a railway project with China. He stated in his speech, “Kenya has found an honourable partner in China as the new railway project will be built by consent and partnership unlike the old railway line which was built by colonists by force” (The Construction Index, 2014).
In 2018, Uhuru Kenyatta faced global criticism for imposing an unprecedented media blackout in Kenya and clamping down on opposition political parties. These developments were viewed by many global observers as warnings that the Kenyan government was slipping off its democratic path and sliding towards authoritarianism (Wadekar, 2018). So, could China be linked to or blamed for such a political change in Kenya? Perhaps not directly, but Kenyatta’s regime might have been tempted to emulate its biggest trading partner’s political philosophy on championing an authoritarian model of governance. Henceforth, theoretically, it could be stated that China’s influence over African nations may halt the progress of democratisation that is essential for African communities at grass-roots level to break away from the vicious circle of exploitation that they have endured for generations.
In the following section we discuss the crucial issue of how China has been able to strengthen its political and economic ties with Africa.
4 China’s Political Consolidation with Africa
Much political consideration has gone into cementing the China–Africa bilateral relationship. At the outset it should be mentioned that China’s success in Africa should be viewed primarily from the political angle owing largely to its successful foreign policy postures. In this respect, the norms and values that flow from the five principles of peaceful co-existence that have been declared by China to be the guide for the conduct of international relations have had a tremendous impact on China’s relations with Africa. Notable norms are “non-interference in internal affairs” and “equality and mutual benefit”, both of which have amply helped to solidify their bilateral relations. This is evident in the extent to which China has vigorously supported African causes at various international forums, starting from Africa’s struggle for independence from colonial rule to developing notions of common prosperity and togetherness with Africa. China has thereby created “international legitimacy” for itself as a great power (Hanauer and Morris, 2014: 5–6). Besides, strengthening relations with African countries (through FOCAC, for example)2 has helped to secure their support for China’s own political and other strategic objectives—be they issues concerning human rights, the One China Policy or even acting as a bulwark against the West. The strengthening of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations and thereafter the setting up of the BRICS bank, or the New Development Bank (NDB), in July 2014 as an alternative to the Western-dominated World Bank and IMF is another example.
Therefore, although it is uncertain whether China’s intention is to change or sustain the present global order, we can agree that besides commercial motivations, China’s Africa policy is also driven in large part by political interests. In China’s pursuit for political backing in the international order and the need to promote a political environment conducive to achieving its strategic goals, Africa stands as a bulwark against the West. What then are China’s strategic goals?
China’s history tells us that a large territory with a strong military and legitimate government will seek great power status. The objective of unifying China was first undertaken during the imperial rule of the Qin dynasty in 221 BC and was further solidified by later dynasties. Struggle for political power and legitimacy of rule continued, with victory over the Manchu dynasty under the rule of Chiang Kai Shek and the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949.
To achieve great power status, what is required are sustained economic growth and self-sufficiency. In this regard, Swaine and Tellis (2000: 15) state that, historically, China controlled vast resources and economic wealth compared with its neighbours and dominated the Asian region. But post-1949, China witnessed a different world and was confronted by several industrialised countries on its periphery and beyond. The emergence of such economically strong states drove China to compete, and it embarked on a new set of goals aimed at transforming its economy through modernisation programmes, both economic and military. Today, China’s military incorporates the latest technology. What should be stressed here is that China’s momentum in achieving great power status has been relentless. And it is here that Africa comes into the picture.
Africa has been a reliable and traditional ally of China. Without the support of the African group in international forums, such as the United Nations, China would not have been able to accomplish much—be it the case of taking over the UN Security Council seat from Taiwan in the 1970s or any other issue that China has proposed against the West. China’s affiliation to the developing world as part of its three worlds theory,3 and its strong opposition to the hegemony of the West, are testimony to China’s political and philosophical alignment with Africa.
Hence, China has embarked on developing economic and other partnership agreements with many African countries irrespective of the nature of the regime that exists. Besides economic and trade ties, which are discussed in some detail in the next section, Beijing has also been strengthening military ties with “certain regimes” in Africa, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, by supplying them with military hardware (Lynch, 2012). Criticisms apart, China has contributed to rationalising the policy of “no strings attached”4 in its political, economic and any other dealings with Africa.
5 The Economic Dimension
Many scholarly writings on China–Africa political relations point to the underlying economic considerations behind them. China has successfully captured the African market by providing Africa with much-needed infrastructural development and aid, thereby replacing many Western countries to the extent that it is now quite hard to displace China from Africa (see Table 1). The study by David Dollar (2016) commissioned by the Brookings Institution points out that China’s help with Africa’s infrastructural development has increased tremendously, particularly in sectors like transportation and telecommunications. The reasons for this involvement include the hardworking nature of the Chinese, cheap equipment and materials, and the “willingness to take a leap into the unknown because China’s economic reform created a frenzy of entrepreneurialism” (Zhao, 2014: 1036). Besides, as mentioned above, China’s identification with the developing world has given it easier access to Africa’s huge market.
China’s dire need for economic resources such as oil and natural gas has determined not only its engagement with Africa but also its trade arrangements. The latter have been controversial in recent times, as they have increased competition in internal markets, displacing domestic producers by bringing in cheap Chinese products, dumping goods, and the like. China is now Africa’s largest trading partner: bilateral trade grew from USD 126.9 billion in 2010 to USD 208 billion in 2019 (South China Morning Post, 2020). Despite the slowdown of China’s economy there has been a rapid growth in bilateral trade, which suggests that the ties are becoming stronger. The growth is noticeable in various sectors—manufacturing, industry, agriculture, textiles, etc. In fact, the impact of trade with China could vary because of the diversity of size, economic structures and quality of governance and institutions in African economies. China’s impact is probably greatest on resource-rich economies, which benefit from China’s demand for raw materials, and probably smallest on the more diverse African economies. For example, countries that primarily export oil (such as Angola, Gabon, Sudan, and new oil-producing countries such as Chad and Uganda) benefit from Chinese demand without facing competition from Chinese exports in global markets. On the other hand, African countries that export manufactured goods, such as tobacco products (Benin), refined oil products (Algeria, Egypt and Kenya), wood products (Cameroon) and processed food (Mauritius) face Chinese competition on the global market but little demand from China itself (Schiere, 2011: 33). Table 1 lists the top ten countries in Africa ranked by GDP (2019 figures) with whom China’s trade exceeds that of the US.
Table 1
Comparative assessment of top ten African countries’ trade with China and USA
|
Rank |
Country |
GDP |
China |
USA |
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
(USD |
Imports |
Exports |
Total |
Imports |
Exports |
Total |
||
|
billion) |
(%) |
(%) |
(Avg) |
(%) |
(%) |
(Avg %) |
||
|
1. |
Nigeria |
410 |
19.41 |
1.67 |
10.54 |
7.35 |
6.08 |
6.7 |
|
2. |
South Africa |
350 |
18.45 |
9.14 |
13.8 |
5.98 |
6.79 |
6.4 |
|
3. |
Egypt |
280 |
14.22 |
3.54 |
8.9 |
6.75 |
5.88 |
6.3 |
|
4. |
Algeria |
178 |
18.06 |
1.9 |
9.9 |
8.86 |
9.85 |
9.3 |
|
5. |
Angola |
100 |
14.11 |
58.9 |
36.5 |
4.82 |
1.73 |
3.27 |
|
6. |
Morocco |
120 |
9.83 |
0.92 |
5.37 |
49.43 |
4.7 |
27.06 |
|
7. |
Kenya |
89 |
21.07 |
1.82 |
11.45 |
3.04 |
7.72 |
5.38 |
|
8. |
Sudan |
55 |
22 |
17.32 |
19.66 |
0.78 |
0.57 |
0.67 |
|
9. |
Ethiopia |
94 |
31.88 |
5.14 |
18.51 |
8.8 |
9.83 |
9.31 |
|
10. |
Tanzania |
59 |
20.70 |
3.94 |
12.32 |
2.79 |
4.09 |
3.44 |
|
11. |
Ghana |
66 |
19.13 |
11.88 |
15.50 |
8.03 |
3.59 |
5.81 |
The sizeable advantage in bilateral trade that China has leveraged compared to the US demonstrates the extent to which it has captured African market. Notwithstanding this, the evidence of Africa’s export and investment potential for China can be seen from the more than 2,500 Chinese enterprises that are engaged in doing business in Africa, in areas such as finance, telecommunications, energy, manufacturing and agriculture. According to the China Global Investment Tracker,5 between 2005 and 2015 China’s total investments in sub-Saharan Africa amounted to USD 220 billion. It put China’s investment in Ethiopia as USD 17.62 billion; Sudan, USD 7.09 billion; Eritrea USD 400 million; Djibouti USD 1.72 billion; Kenya USD 10.44 billion; and South Africa USD 9.66 billion. And the pledging by President Xi Jinping of USD 60 billion aid twice, in 2015 and 2018, for infrastructural and soft loans, amply indicated the political and economic importance that China attaches to Africa.6
However, these strong trade relations have invited criticism from several quarters, particularly from Western countries and high-level political leaders from the US, who have accused China of practising “neocolonialism” in Africa. Even if the merits and demerits of such accusations need to be investigated, the important point is the implications this has for African democracies, which are discussed below.
6 Implications for African Democracy
As noted earlier, Africa’s democracy project underwent positive changes in the early 1990s when most African countries embraced liberal democracy and the peaceful transfer of political power through multiparty elections. Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle (1997) point out that the embrace of political liberalisation and opening up of economies as a basic foundation for political and economic stability occurred in sub-Saharan Africa as well. This was largely due to the weakening of African economies and the increasing control on economic policy by international financial institutions such as the IMF and the WB (Joseph, 1997: 368). However, this control could not be sustained owing to the failure of these international financial institutions to provide the requisite economic development for the African context (Healey and Robinson, 1992). Although these institutions strongly believed that their political and economic terms would help to alleviate Africa’s entrenched economic and political problems then (News24, 2014), in fact they led only to increasing impoverishment in Africa (see, for example, Ismi, 2004).
Africa’s internal factors, however, are peculiar to it. As rightly pointed out by Richard Joseph (1997: 363), most African countries constitute an “infertile terrain” for the conditions of democracy, meaning that African domestic economic and political conditions do not fit well into democratic situations. According to Joseph, African countries are fragmented culturally, poverty is endemic with insufficient capital and they lack the requisite civic culture (Ibid). Hence, understandably, the compulsion for Africa is to overcome these perennial internal problems before embarking on any project for political liberalisation. This variant of democracy is very similar to that of China as the “leaders [who] believe that economic development must precede democracy” (Barkan and Gordon, 1998) are most likely taking their cue from China.
Therefore, the rulers of many African countries embarked on changing constitutional provisions with no fixed-term limitations on staying in power. Among them were José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea (no elections have been held in that country since independence) and former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. In 2016 Freedom House opined that the democratisation project in Africa had slid backwards as many countries, including South Africa, were turning into flawed democracies (Freedom House, 2016). In fact Africa hosts failed states, like Somalia, and most other sub-Saharan countries are either a flawed democracy or authoritarian or a hybrid of the two (see The Economist, 2012).
That apart, China’s economic influence has contributed to the current state of political order in Africa. A comparative assessment of the economic data and democracy index of African nations reveals the links between the two factors. Although data pertaining to economy and trade is by nature quantitative, ascertaining democratic progress is more qualitative in that it encompasses various parameters to quantify the state of democracy in a nation. These parameters include factors like electoral pluralism, freedom of speech, political participation and civil liberties, among others. Taking these parameters into account, several international non-partisan and reputed international NGO s, like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Economist Group, have come up with an annual democracy index of nations. The statistical data from The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2019 can be taken as a point of reference to analyse the effects of Chinese economic investments on the democratisation of Africa (see Table 2).
Table 2 reveals that, except for South Africa and Ghana, the performance of other countries in Africa has not been very encouraging. Improvement over the ten-year period is marginal, if not stagnant, in the case of Egypt, Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania (see Figure 2). And these countries are the largest trading partners of China in Africa.
From the data above, the point of concern is the fact that in the so-called major African economies, like Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan, democratisation has remained stagnant or improved only marginally over the time span of nearly fifteen years. According to recent data from Human Rights Watch (2019), the progress of democratisation in nations like Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan has consistently been undermined by factors like poor freedom of expression ratings, the severe clampdown of opposition and the perpetration of abuses by security forces. Under the new regime of Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia did embark on democratic, political and economic reforms, which were widely acclaimed all over the continent. However, the recent conflict between the Tigray forces and the Government of Ethiopia, and controversies over human rights abuses and the like, have brought all those achievements into question (Democracy Digest, 2020). Interestingly, and importantly, it is also necessary to look at China’s Democratic Index itself in order to ascertain the plausibility of that country’s ill-effects on the already struggling African democracies.
Table 2
Democracy index of largest trade partners with China
|
Countries |
Democracy Index (on a 0–10 scale) |
|||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2006 |
2008 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
|
|
Nigeria |
3.52 |
3.53 |
3.47 |
3.83 |
3.77 |
3.77 |
3.76 |
4.62 |
4.5 |
4.44 |
4.44 |
4.12 |
|
South Africa |
7.91 |
7.91 |
7.79 |
7.79 |
7.79 |
7.9 |
7.82 |
7.56 |
7.41 |
7.24 |
7.24 |
7.24 |
|
Egypt |
3.9 |
3.89 |
3.07 |
3.95 |
4.56 |
3.27 |
3.16 |
3.18 |
3.31 |
3.36 |
3.36 |
3.06 |
|
Algeria |
3.17 |
3.32 |
3.44 |
3.44 |
3.83 |
3.83 |
3.83 |
3.95 |
3.56 |
3.56 |
3.5 |
4.01 |
|
Angola |
2.41 |
3.35 |
3.32 |
3.32 |
3.35 |
3.35 |
3.35 |
3.35 |
3.4 |
3.62 |
3.62 |
3.72 |
|
Morocco |
3.9 |
3.88 |
3.79 |
3.83 |
4.07 |
4.07 |
4 |
4.66 |
4.77 |
4.87 |
4.99 |
5.1 |
|
Kenya |
5.08 |
4.79 |
4.71 |
4.71 |
4.71 |
5.13 |
5.13 |
5.33 |
5.33 |
5.11 |
5.11 |
5.18 |
|
Sudan |
2.9 |
2.81 |
2.42 |
2.38 |
2.38 |
2.54 |
2.54 |
2.37 |
2.37 |
2.15 |
2.15 |
2.7 |
|
Ethiopia |
4.72 |
4.52 |
3.68 |
3.79 |
3.72 |
3.83 |
3.72 |
3.83 |
3.6 |
3.42 |
3.35 |
3.44 |
|
Tanzania |
5.18 |
5.28 |
5.64 |
5.64 |
5.88 |
5.77 |
5.77 |
5.58 |
5.76 |
5.47 |
5.41 |
5.16 |
|
Ghana |
5.35 |
5.35 |
6.02 |
6.02 |
6.02 |
6.33 |
6.33 |
6.86 |
6.75 |
6.69 |
6.63 |
6.63 |
Figure 2
Democratic index of China’s biggest African trading partners (on a scale of 0-10)
Citation: Africa Review 15, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/09744061-tat00011
Source: Derived from Table 2
Figure 2
Democratic index of China’s biggest African trading partners (on a scale of 0-10)
Citation: Africa Review 15, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/09744061-tat00011
Source: Derived from Table 2Figure 2
Democratic index of China’s biggest African trading partners (on a scale of 0-10)
Citation: Africa Review 15, 1 (2023) ; 10.1163/09744061-tat00011
Source: Derived from Table 2Table 3
China’s democracy index 2006–2019
|
China’s Democracy Index (on a 0–10 scale) |
|||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2006 |
2008 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
|
2.97 |
3.04 |
3.14 |
3.14 |
3.00 |
3.00 |
3.00 |
3.14 |
3.14 |
3.10 |
3.32 |
2.26 |
Table 3 reveals how the world’s second-largest economy ranks lowest in terms of democratic values. It is not an exaggeration to say that this makes China the epitome of authoritarianism. And one can attribute China’s meteoric rise as a global economic power to its authoritarian governing style. It is under these circumstances that China’s ever-growing economic influence over African nations has the potential to transcend into their political realms by way of tempting African regimes to embrace a style of government devoid of any democratic values.
7 Conclusion
To conclude, it is clear that the “China factor” has given many African countries an alternative on which to fall back for economic, military and political support. Africa has now found a new “strategic partner”, a dependable alternative to the West (Zhao, 2014: 1036). The predicament for the West now is to play along with the rules of the game—insist on democracy but simultaneously build economic relations with Africa. It would be worthy to note here that the West, led by the US, has also taken steps to pull Africa on to its side. The initiative by the US to host the first-ever US–Africa Leaders Meeting at Washington in 2014, to which about fifty African leaders of “good standing” were invited principally to build relations with the US, could be seen as a move to rebalance the order and counter China’s influence in Africa. Many more such initiatives have been made by the West subsequently. On 20 July 2022, the Biden Administration announced that the upcoming US–Africa Leaders Summit scheduled for 13–15 December 2022 would demonstrate the US’s enduring commitment to Africa.7 Will these initiatives continue and will the West give up on the liberal democratic order that it has been projecting to the outside world so far? These are questions that remain to be seen. However, the compromise that the West seems to be making of late vis-à-vis Africa, in regard to propagating democratic values, can be seen as an indication that the West is slowly but surely acclimatising to the Chinese rules. As things stand, it is clear therefore that the notion of democracy that African countries follow will not necessarily be the Western notion unless and until the Africans themselves feel and realise the necessity to adopt the same. In other words, differing perceptions of democracy will dominate the African context owing largely to the China factor, which this article has highlighted both theoretically and practically. Learning by experience will be more sustainable than by imposition, and the slogan “African Solutions to African Problems” is worth keeping in mind.
For a good discussion on the role of elites in African politics and how democracy has taken a back seat in the hands of the ruling elites who have largely exploited their own citizens, see Baba (2014).
See for details, “Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China—Africa Cooperation”
According to this theory first put forward by Mao Tse Tung during the Cold War era, China distanced itself from the first and second worlds and affiliated itself with the third world countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. See for example, An (2013).
However, China’s policy of non-interference is not without controversy as it has changed in line with some geopolitical changes on the continent. For example, China intervened in the Sudan by pressuring Sudan to allow the deployment of UN Peacekeeping Forces in the Darfur region. For more such interventions, see Alessi and Xu, 2015.
China Global Investment Tracker,
China pledges $ 60bn to develop Africa,
Statement by President Biden on the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, The White House, 20.07.2022.
References
Albert, A. 2017. “China in Africa”, Council on Foreign Relations, 12.07.2017. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa. Accessed 02.10.2022.
Alessi, C. and B. Xu. 2015. “China in Africa”, Council on Foreign Relations. https://china.usc.edu/council-foreign-relations-cfr-backgrounders-china-africa-april-27-2015. Accessed 02.10.2022.
An, J. 2013. “Mao Zedong’s ‘Three Worlds’ Theory: Political Considerations and Value for the Times”, Social Sciences in China, 34 (1): 35–57. DOI: 10.1080/02529203.2013.760715
Anshan, L. 2007. “China and Africa: Policy and Challenges”, China Security Review, 3 (3): 69–93.
Baba, E. 2014, “Elites and Exclusive Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa”, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 8 (8): 271–274.
Barkan, J.D. and D.F. Gordon. 1998. “Democracy in Africa: No time to forsake it”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/1998-07-01/democracy-africa-no-timeforsake-it. Accessed 11.03.2016.
BBC News. 04.12.2015. “China pledges $60bn to develop Africa”, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35005048. Accessed 09.01.2016.
Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle. 1997. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective, London, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 2015. “China-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Starts a New Chapter” http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zt_businessreview/news/201503/20150300908034.shtml. Accessed 9.01.2016.
Democracy Digest, 09.03.2020. “Could Ethiopia’s Transitions be ‘derailed’?”. https://www.demdigest.org/could-ethiopias-transition-be-derailed/. Accessed 01.10.2022.
Dollar, D. 2016. China’s Engagement with Africa: From Natural Resources to Human Resources. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
DW Akademie. 03.12.2020. “China’s media strategy in Africa and its impact on the continent”. https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-media-strategy-in-africa-and-its-impact-on-the-continent/a-55799873.
Freedom House. 2016. “Freedom in the World 2016: Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies: Global Freedom under Pressure”, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf. Accessed 30.09.2022.
Hampshire Record Office. 2007. The Transatlantic Slave Trade and Abolition. New Hampshire: Hampshire Record Office: 6.
Hanauer, L. and L.J. Morris. 2014. “Chinese Engagement in Africa Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy”, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Report http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR500/RR521/RAND_RR521.pdf. Accessed 08.01.2016.
Healey, J. and Robinson, M. 1992. “Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy: Sub-Saharan Africa in Comparative Perspective”, London: Overseas Development Institute.
Human Rights Watch. 2019. “World Report 2019”. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/kenya. Accessed 02.08.2020.
Ismi, A. 2004. “Impoverishing a Continent: The World Bank and the IMF in Africa”. Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/ImpoverishingAContinent.pdf. Accessed 11.03.2016.
Joseph. R. 1997. “Democratization in Africa after 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives”, Comparative Politics, 29 (3): 363–382.
Kriesi, H. 2013. Challenges to Democracy in 21stCentury. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan: 1.
Lipset, S.M. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. Washington DC: American Political Science Association: 75.
Lynch, C. 2012. “China’s arms exports flooding sub-Saharan Africa”, Washington Post, 25.08.2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinas-arms-exports-flooding-sub-saharan-africa/2012/08/25/16267b68-e7f1-11e1-936a-b801f1abab19_story.html. Accessed 08.01.2016.
Michalopoulos, S. and E. Papaioannou. 2016. “The Scramble For Africa And Its Legacy”, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_3041-1. Accessed 31.07.2022.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2009. “Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation” https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/201809/t20180910_679540.html
Muhammad, P.M. 2003. “The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Forgotten Crime Against Humanity as Defined International Law”, American University International Law Review, 19 (4): 946.
Nehru, J. 1958. Prasar Bharati Archives. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdkRwYkkSxk. Accessed 08.05.2020.
News24. 05.08.2014. “US calls for political tolerance in Africa”. http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/US-calls-for-political-tolerance-in-Africa-20140805. Accessed 21.01.2016.
Schiere, R. 2011. “China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development? An overview of issues”. Africa Development Bank Group. Working Paper Series.
Scott, C.D. 2021. “Does China’s Involvement in African Elections and politics hurt democracy?”, Democracy in Africa, 27.09.2021, http://democracyinafrica.org/does-chinas-involvement-in-african-elections-and-politics-hurt-democracy/. Accessed 05.08.2022.
South China Morning Post. 18.01.2020. “China’s trade with Africa grows 2.2 per cent in 2019 to US$208 billion”. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3046621/chinas-trade-africa-grows-22-cent-2019-us208-billion. Accessed 04.08.2020.
Swaine, M.D. and A.J. Tellis. 2000. “Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future”. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1121.html. Accessed 25.01.2016.
The Cable. 30.11.2019. “China controls its 1.3bn people—Aisha Buhari backs regulations of social media”.
The Construction Index. 2014. “China and Kenya Ink $3.6 bn Rail Deal”. https://www.theconstructionindex.co.uk/news/view/china-and-kenya-ink-36bn-rail-deal. Accessed 08.05.2020.
The Economist. 31.03.2012. “A Glass Half Full”. http://www.economist.com/node/21551494. Accessed 18.01.2016.
The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2019. “Democracy Index 2019”. https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index. Accessed 02.08.2020.
Tiffert, G. and O. McPherson-Smith. 2022. China’s Sharp Power in Africa: A Handbook for Building National Resilience, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, Stanford University. https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/tiffert-mcpherson_chinasharppower_webreadypdf_220406.pdf. Accessed 05.08.2022.
Tull, D.M. 2006. “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences”, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 44 (3).
Tull, D.M. 2008. “China in Africa: European Perceptions and Responses to the China Challenge”, SAIS Working Paper Series, Johns Hopkins University. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/fachpublikationen/Tull_China_Africa_SAIS_WP.ks.pdf. Accessed 01.10.2022.
United Nations (UN). 1996. An Agenda for Democratisation. New York: United Nations Publications: 1.
Wadekar, N. 2018. “Kenya’s Dangerous Path Towards Authoritarianism”, The New Yorker, 09.03.2018.
XinhuaNet. 26.11.2021. “China and Africa in the New Era: A Partnership of Equals”, http://www.news.cn/english/2021-11/26/c_1310333813.htm. Accessed 05.08.2022.
Zhao, S. 2014. “A Neo-Colonist Predator of Development Partner? China’s engagement and rebalance in Africa”, Journal of Contemporary China, 23 (90): 1033–1052.