Abstract
Iran is a country with technological capability for nuclear fuel cycle. Mainstream theories of nuclear proliferation predict nuclear weaponization of Iran considering its structural, domestic and individual motivations. However, one fact remains that Iran has not yet developed its nuclear weapons. Officially, Iran argues that the Weapons of Mass Destruction, including nuclear weapons, are against principles of Islam. Even though the mainstream theories are sceptical about the influence of religion in security policies of the state, this paper concludes that religious principles have decisive role in nuclear decision-making of Iran. Iran would have gone for nuclear weapons unless it is constrained by religion.
Iran is a country with technological capability for nuclear fuel cycle. This technological development makes international community concerned about the potential nuclear weaponization of Iran and proliferation. Scholars belonging to different theoretical backgrounds have analyzed the motivations of Iran for nuclear weaponization. Some scholars start with the presumption that Iran already has decided to make a nuclear bomb and then try to explain why does Iran proliferate? For example, Michael L. Farmer (2005) titled his work “Why Iran Proliferate?”. Saira Khan (2010) analyzes multiples sources of security threats and protracted conflict as the motivation of Iran for weaponization. Michael Clarke (2013) forwards concepts of “status” and “security” along with isolation from existing international order (he uses the term ‘pariah state’) as the reasons behind acquiring nuclear weapons.
However, one fact remains that, as Christopher J. Bolan (2013) said and US National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 and 2011 and all reports of International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) confirmed, Iran has not yet developed its nuclear weapons, and during 13 years (2003–2017) of the most intrusive inspections ever made in the history of the iaea, the Agency did not find any evidence of diversion of the Iranian nuclear program toward weaponization. Officially, Iran argues that the Weapons of Mass Destruction, including nuclear weapons, are against principles of Islam, which is the state-religion of Iran, and prohibited by the fatwa of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The religious prohibition is presented as a constraining factor in nuclear weaponization. So, this paper investigates the role of religious principles in the nuclear decision-making of Iran. The first part summarizes the historical developments of the nuclear programme in Iran under the Shah and the Islamic Republic. The following section analyzes the motivating and demotivating factors for nuclear weaponization of Iran. This section reviews explanations of different theories regarding nuclear weapon programme of Iran. The next section examines the role of religion in its nuclear policies. The section goes through the position of the Supreme Leader and other religious scholars on a nuclear weapon and analyzes importance of their position in nuclear policies of the state.
1 Nuclear Development in Iran
The nuclear programme of Iran started in 1950s with support of the usa under Atom for Peace programme. Muhammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran from 1941 to 1979, was very much interested in modernizing Iran through nuclear technology. “The Western allies helped Iran under umbrella of Cold War alliance” (S. Khan 2010: 214–215). The declared goal of the Shah was peaceful use of nuclear energy. Patrikarakos (2012: 25) identifies three economic reasons for the nuclear programme of the Shah: benefit of resource diversification, energy competition, and technological advancement. It is expected that the nuclear energy would help Iran to increase national income by exporting more oil to international market. Along with these economic reasons, the Shah had other motivations such as prestige for his personality and nation. Shah considered nuclear technology as a symbol of modernization and westernization.
However, even though the door of weaponization was kept opened, the Shah had no intention to develop nuclear weapons. He realized that the weaponization would negatively affect Iran’s relationship with the usa and other western countries. Weaponization also would impact the trade of uranium from international market. At same time, he modernized the conventional weapons using financial advantage of oil boom in 17970s for being a great power in international politics. The Shah has realized the normative change in nuclear weapons as a symbol of prestige to as a symbol of ‘bad states’ (Patrikarakos 2012: 54). The Shah executed his policy of non-weaponization by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt) soon after it was opened for signature in 1968.
The nuclear policy of the Shah, both non-weaponization and use of it for civilian purpose, was not shaped by religion. Ideologically he was not against nuclear weapons. He restrained from weaponization due to his concern about its negative impact on the security of Iran and its relation with the Western states. The civilian nuclear programme was to modernize the country and bring back the prestige of Persian Empire. The nationalist feeling of the Shah was related to the Persian, not Muslim, identity.
The Islamic revolution of 1979 and following events such as hostage crisis and the war with Iraq created dramatic change in foreign and security policies of Iran. The nuclear policy also was not exception from it. The new regime of Iran adopted non-aligned policy replacing the policy the Shah who allied with Western countries. Ayatollah Khomeini opposed all kind of Gharbzadegi (means west-struckness or westoxification (Patrikarakos 2012: 93)). Since the nuclear programme was considered as a part of moderation and westernization from the time the Shah, Khomeini opposed both military and civilian nuclear programmes.
However, the war with Iraq (1980–88) and the silence of international community on chemical attack of Iraq changed the attitude of Iran. During the war, Iraq got support from Gulf Arab countries, Soviet Union, China, France, Germany and the UK. The western countries supplied Iraq chemical and biological weapons (S. Khan 2010: 53). The Iranian leaders realized the importance the modern technology including nuclear technology for self-sufficiency. Even though Iranian leaders restarted the civilian programme, their motivation was different from that of the Shah. In contrast to the Shah’s motivation for westernization through nuclear programme, the new Islamic regime considered the nuclear technology as a counter to the West. Now, Iran is a technological capable country for nuclear fuel cycle and it maintain mining, milling, enrichment and fuel fabrication capabilities. In 2006, Ahmedinejad announced that “Iran has joined the club of nuclear countries” by successfully enriching uranium for the first time (S. Khan 2010: 14).
2 What Do Existing Theories Say?
It is clear that Iran has technological capability to develop nuclear weapons if it takes a political decision to do so (Clarke 2013: 494, Farmer 2005: 42, Schmidt 2008: 46). At same time it is also clear that Iran has not taken political decision for weaponization yet. According to the US National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 and 2011, Iran suspended its nuclear weapon programme in 2003, and Iranian leaders have not made any political decision to build nuclear weapons. Quoting this report, Christopher J. Bolan (2013: 80–81) calls the accusation of nuclear weaponization as a myth. The International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) has repeatedly confirmed the absence nuclear weaponization of Iran (Mousavian and Afrasiabi 2012: 2). Officially Iran refers to the religious prohibition of nuclear weapons and the fatwa of Khamenei as the reason of this non-weaponization. So, this section analyzes that how the different theories explain nuclear weaponization of Iran. It figures out the limitation of existing theories to explain the absence of nuclearization without considering the role of religion as an important factor.
Realism, which focuses on national security and external threat, definitely predicts nuclear weaponization of Iran. Iran is surrounded by many nuclear weapons states such as Israel, Pakistan, India, Russia and the usa. Iraq, which is another neighbouring country, possessed chemical weapons and used them against Iran. Iraq remained as a major threat for more than two decades until removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Gulf countries led by Saudi Arabia also have hostile relationship and ideological clash with Iran. Iran also has territorial disputes with Iraq and the uae. The support of the usa to Israel and the Gulf countries increases vulnerability of Iran. Considering all these security threats, scholars predict nuclear weaponization of Iran. For examples, scholars like Charles C. Mayer (2004), Michael L. Farmer (2005), Oliver Schmidt (2008), Saira Khan (2010), Peter Jones (2012) and Michael Clarke (2013) have predicted nuclear weaponization of Iran considering its security motivations.
International regime, which is proposed by neoliberal institutionalism, is another variable in explaining nuclear weaponization of Iran. This explanation expects “Iran to continue to comply with npt so long as there are benefits from holding into the treaty’s commitment” (Tagma and Uzun 2012: 243). Iran is a party to almost all international agreement restricting use of poison, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. However, one question arises that, why is Iran continuing in these regimes if it really wants to develop nuclear weapons. The silence of international institutions and community on chemical attack of Iraq against civilians in 1980s proved Iran that international regimes are not helpful at the time of emergency. Iran also accuses the npt regime that it is not getting fair treatment from the regime as Non-Nuclear Weapon State. It argues that western countries violate its right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purpose. So, the historical experience of Iran shows, at least its leaders feel, that it is not benefitting from international regimes. The neoliberal institutionalism fails to explain that why is Iran still continuing its membership in these regimes. Considering technological capability of Iran, regimes like iaea can only slowdown, cannot prevent completely, nuclear development of Iran if it really wants to develop them. So, the lack of nuclear weaponization is due to its unwillingness to the weapons. In short, the membership of Iran is the result of its desire for disarmament rather than the cause of it.
The domestic model approach of Scott Sagan “envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests” (Sagan, 1996: 55). Scholars like Charles C. Mayer (2004), Mustafa Kibaroglu (2006), Oliver Schmidt (2008), Ha lit Mustafa Tagma and Ezgi Uzun (2012) and Michael Clarke (2013) have used the domestic model approach to analyze nuclear policies of Iran and predicted its nuclear weaponization. However, any analysis without considering the power of the Supreme Leader over legislative assembly, executive and military cannot reach into right conclusion. According to Sagan, three actors usually argue for nuclear weaponization. They are nuclear energy establishment of state, military and politicians in states where individual parties or the mass public strongly favour nuclear weapons acquisition (Sagan, 1996: 64).
In contrast to the expectation of Sagan, Oliver Schmidt says that “it is nearly impossible to find any proof for domestic actors actively lobbying for a nuclear-armed Iran” (Schmidt 2008: 60–61). The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (irgc), the military of Iran, is subordinated to the Supreme Leader who has issued Fatwa against nuclear weapons. So, irgc cannot drive the country into weaponization. Among politicians, even Ahmedinejad, who is usually referred as a hardliner, has not argued for nuclear weaponization. The majority of people also do not support the weaponization (Maurer 2014: 64). Even if a hardliner politician takes decision for weaponization, it is difficult to override the stand of the Supreme Leader and the majority of people.
Out of individual level analyses, the psychological approach of Jacques E.C. Hymans and mythmaking approach of Peter R. Lavoy are widely used approaches in analyzing nuclear policies of Iran. According to Hymans, National Identity Conceptions (nic) of leaders determines nuclear policies of states. The leaders with oppositional nationalist conception will go for nuclear weapons if state has technological capability. However, this model fails to explain the non-weaponization of Iran even after it is ruled by leaders with oppositional nationalist nic. For example, Saira Khan has called Rafsanjani as an oppositional nationalist (S. Khan 2010: 16). Ahmedinejad was a hardliner with pride in his nation and “us against them” feeling (oppositional nic) regarding the relations with the western countries. However, they did not order for nuclear weaponization even though Iran has technological capability.
According to mythmaking model of Peter R. Lavoy, two kinds of myths, security and insecurity myths, are propagated by leaders. If security myth prevails over insecurity myth, the country is likely to develop nuclear weapons. If insecurity myth prevails, the country will restrain from nuclear weaponization. Charles C. Mayer (2004) has argued that Iran has successfully employed both of these oppositional myths successfully (Mayer 2004: 40). The security myth of Iran stresses the need for Iran’s self-reliance, the threat from Israel and the US, the absence of support or nuclear umbrella of a nuclear power and necessary of indigenous nuclear weapons for the security and to enhance the prestige of Iran. Nuclear insecurity mythmakers focus on the religious prohibition of nuclear weapons, impacts of weaponization on economic and foreign trade, possibility of external attacks and further regional proliferation as a consequence of weaponization. Out of these two myths, insecurity myth has larger follower since it is the formal position of Iran and “security myth makers are rarely heard outside of closed door” (Mayer 2004: 40, 42). However, these “rarely heard” voices are not enough for security mythmaking. So, the insecurity mythmaking is still dominant in Iran. As, Mayer (2004: 41) indicated, the ideology of Islam is a significant factor in this insecurity mythmaking.
The norms model approach of Scott Sagan explains nuclear policies of states based on normative symbol of state’s modernity and identity. Focusing on Iran’s rejection of foreign intervention and domination, prestige over past civilization and greatness of a nation, scholars such as Mustafa Kibaroglu (2006), Oliver Schmidt (2008), David Patrikarakos (2012) and Michael Clarke (2013) predicted the possibility of nuclear weaponization. They exp lain the nuclear weapons as a symbol of prestige, modernization and greatness of Iran. Oliver Schmidt (2008) and Michael L. Farmer (2005) have pointed into motivations of Iran for weaponization due to the decline of international norms on nuclear proliferation. They cite recognition of India as a nuclear power through India- US nuclear deal, beneficial proposals to North Korea, which was one member in ‘Axis of Evils’ and lack of desire for disarmament from Nuclear weapon States as it is required by Article vi of the npt as reasons for decline of international norms on nuclear proliferation (Schmidt 2008: 66 and Farmer 2005: 39–40). The experience of the silence of international community over the chemical attack of Iraq has affected the trust of Iran on international norms negatively. So, traditional constructivist approach, which focuses on international norms, cannot explain non-weaponization of Iran.
At same time religious norms and fatwa of Khamenei against nuclear weapons are “important normative aspects to explain the absence of nuclear weaponization” (Schmidt 2008: 68). Schmidt argues that if an antinuclear fatwa exists, “it would provide a very strong norm against nuclear weapons procurement” (Schmidt 2008: 76). So, the following section will explore the existence of this fatwa and its impacts in detail.
3 Role of Religion in Nuclear Policies
The Supreme Leader has an ultimate say over Iran’s nuclear programme. All major decisions on the nuclear issue, whether signing the Additional Protocol or suspending uranium enrichment, would require his approval.
isis report 2013: 4
Based on article 176 of Iran’s Constitution, major foreign and security issues are the responsibility of the Supreme National Security Council (snsc), which plays very critical role in shaping Iran’s foreign and security policies. US-Iran relations, the nuclear dossier, regional issues, for example, are subjects that are part of the council’s authority. Members of the council are to consist of the heads of the government’s three branches, the chief of the Supreme Command Council of the armed forces, the chief commanders of the army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the head of the budget and planning, the ministers of foreign affairs, interior, intelligence and security, and another representative of the supreme leader. snsc send the decisions for the supreme leader’s confirmation. The decisions of snsc needs the approval of the Supreme Leader and fuqaha’ of the Guardian Council and he is the only one who can veto any decision made by snsc. However, when the Leader approves, the decisions are considered as a national decision and should be implemented.
This introductory paragraph on the significance of religion in the state and society levels of Iran and power of the Supreme Leader is important to understand the impacts of fatwas of the Supreme Leader on nuclear decision-making.
3.1 Ayatollah Khomeini and wmds
The first Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was an ideological critique of Weapons of Mass Destruction. It was reported that Khomeini had issued a fatwa against all kinds of Weapons of Mass Destruction during the time of War with Iraq (Sagan 2004: 87, Larssen 2011:50, Porter 2014). The strength of this religious position and its role in military policies were tested during the war with Iraq. The fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini is cited as a reason for the absence of retaliation of Iran against the chemical attack of Iraq (Sagan 2004: 87, Porter 2014, Habibzadeh 2014: 167, Mousavian 2012: 1, Mousavian 2013: 148, Mousavian and Afrasiabi 2012: 2, Collier 2003). Scott Sagan says that despite Iraq used chemical weapons Ayatollah Khomeini opposed acquisition or use of them by Iran considering it would be against principles of Qur’an against pollution of atmosphere even during a holy war (Sagan 2004: 87). This experience of the war shows that the religious judgement of guardian jurist against chemical weapons overrides all other political and military considerations. The fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini constrained Iranian force from developing wmds and retaliating against Iraqi chemical attacks even though it caused disadvantage to Iran in the war. The impact of the fatwa was not just cancellation of chemical weapon programme, but it made Iran impossible to continue with the war (Porter 2014). Gareth Porter (2014) has published the experience of Mohsen Rafighdoost, who served as minister of irgc throughout the wartime. Rafighdoost proposed to Ayatollah Khomeini in two separate meetings the Iran’s planning of chemical and nuclear weapons and necessity of them to retaliate against Iraqi chemical attack. However, Ayatollah Khomeini, who is also supreme commander of the military, rejected that plan since it is prohibited by Islam.
3.2 Ayatollah Khamenei on Nuclear Weapons
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini the Supreme Leader after his death in 1989, also has stated against nuclear weapons on various occasions. The first fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei on this issue is reported and publicized from 2004. However, Porter (2014) has argued that Ayatollah Khamenei has issued an anti-nuclear fatwa (religious edict) in the mid-1990s as a response to a question on his is a religious opinion on nuclear weapons. Gawdat Bahgat also says that “Khamenei issued a fatwa in 1995 that considered all weapons of mass destruction as a great and unforgivable sin and declared them forbidden (Haraam)” (Bahgat 2003: 69). A fatwa is a legal ruling of a qualified jurisprudent on given issue using recognized sources of Islamic jurisprudent and method of ijtihad (legal deduction) (Habibzadeh 2014: 154–155). Another definition of fatwa as per Shia jurisprudence is that “a fatwa is a religious legal opinion, ruling or decree concerning Islamic law issued, orally or in written form, by a prominent religious leader and expert in Islamic jurisprudence, based on four sources: the Koran, the practice of Prophet Muhammed and his successors, the power of reason and consensus” (Mousavian 2013: 147–148).
Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2013) Ayatollah Abolqasem Alidoost (2014) and Habibzadeh (2014) have quoted various statements of Ayatollah Khamenei against nuclear weapons. In 2004, Ayatollah Khamenei declared that “developing, producing or stockpiling nuclear weapons is forbidden under Islam” (Zakaria 2009). The official Iranian statement to iaea in 2005 mentioned the fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei against production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons as forbidden under Islam (Mousavian 2013: 148). In 2008 Ayatollah Khamenei stated that “Iran has repeatedly declared that it is opposed to the production and use of nuclear weapons on fundamental religious grounds”. In 2010 he declared that “According to our religious beliefs, use of these weapons of mass destruction is forbidden and ‘haram’” (Habibzadeh 2014: 152). Addressing military commanders after ship inauguration ceremony, he told them that, “Islam is opposed to nuclear weapons and that Tehran is not working to build them” (voa News, 18-02-2010, Islam Today 20-02-2010). Ayatollah Khamenei repeated his stand on nuclear weapons in February 2012 during the meeting with officials of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (aeoi) and nuclear scientists and August 2012 at 16th Non-Aligned Movement summit (Mousavian 2013: 148). Ayatollah Khamenei writes in his website that “The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the use of nuclear, chemical and similar weapons as a great and unforgivable sin” (Khamenei 2012). Referring to the fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei, Rolf Mowatt- Larssen (2011: 50) stated that “in light of various references, it would seem that Khamenei’s fatwa is legitimate and absolute’.”
3.3 Supporting and Opposing Views
There is complete consensus on this issue. It is self-evident in Islam that it is prohibited to have nuclear bombs. It is eternal law because the basic function of these weapons is to kill innocent people. This cannot be reversed. collier 2003
Until now, other jurisprudents have not issued a fatwa permitting the use of wmd, but all the jurists who expressed their opinion in this regard issued a fatwa banning the use of nuclear weapons.
It seems odd for a regime that derives its legitimacy from its fidelity to Islam to declare constantly that these weapons are un-Islamic if it intends to develop them. It would be far shrewder to stop reminding people of Khomeini’s statements and stop issuing new fatwas against nukes zakaria, 2009
The pessimists of Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa and nuclear programme of Iran raise various doubts on influence and role of this fatwa in actual nuclear decision-making. One argument is that Islam is a flexible normative foundation and can be interpreted any point of time for legitimizing and for opposing nuclear weapons. Therefore, radical leaders could reinterpret it for supporting nuclear programme (S. Khan 2010: 18, 19). The proponents of this argument cite opinions of scholars legitimizing nuclear weapons. However, all Shia Grand Ayatollas seating in Qom and Najaf, past and present, athorized to issue Fatwa have unanimously confirmed that from the Shia Islamic point of view, all wmds are haram. Apart from that, the number of supporters among other Shia scholars, who are not Grand Ayatollah nor Majra al-Taqlid, for nuclear weapons is very small, and opinion of such scholars is not relevant if it is contrary to the opinions of the Supreme Leader, other Grand Ayatollahs and Guardian Council. The change in the position of the Supreme Leader, snsc, Parliament, administration and Guardian Council is necessary to shift in nuclear policies of Iran. The change in the Islamic interpretation is not as easy as amending a secular law against nuclear weapons. The repeated statements of Ayatollah Khamenei and other Grand Ayatollahs also have produced a strong domestic consensus against nuclear weapons, and it makes any reverse in this position hard to ruling religious leaders (Collier 2003). The radical political leaders cannot legislate against the Islamic principles proposed by Guardian Council. According to Article 4 of the Iranian constitution, such laws are null and void.
The context of the fatwa and its durable relevance even out of that context is another concern for sceptics. Michael Eisenstadt says that “Fatwas are not immutable, and no religious principle would prevent Khamenei from modifying or supplanting his initial fatwa if circumstances were to change” (Eisenstadt 2013: 2). This argument is the outcome of misunderstanding of the role of context and basic principles in determining the fatwa. The fatwas which are based on some basic principles, such as the prohibition of indiscriminative mass killing, will not change since these basic principles are everlasting. Since the fatwa on nuclear weapons is based on such basic principles, its significance is also long lasting (Mousavian 2013). Habibzadeh (2014: 156) pointed that the “nuclear fatwa is timeless, everlasting and having roots in centuries-old religious sources”. In addition to that, the legitimacy of a Shia Marja is based on the credibility of his Fatwas. Changing Fatwa means losing legitimacy as a religious leader.
One criticism is that “the religious fatwa has no legislative basis and leaves significant room for manoeuvre” (Bowen and Moran 2014: 40). Such criticism arises due to the misunderstanding of Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa as equal to the fatwa of any other qualified Muslim scholar. Fatwa of normal qualified Muslim scholar binds only to those who follow him (muqallideen). At the same time, fatwa of the Supreme Leader binds state as a whole, and it has a legal status above mere legislation. (Porter 2014: 9). The fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei overrides all other laws passed by legislators. If the legislative laws contradict with the fatwa of the Supreme Leader, the religious decree of the Supreme Leader will be prevailed. However, even though the fatwa is more powerful in Iranian legal system, Seyed Hossein Mousavian suggests that Iran could adopt legislation to outlaw development of any Weapons of Mass Destruction. According to Mousavian, this secularization of religious fatwa would help to remove ambiguity among the international community about the legitimacy of the fatwa. (Mousavian 2013: 157).
At present, such a fatwa – in any meaningful form – does not appear to exist. The concept of an “oral fatwa,” in the context of Iran’s nuclear programme, is meaningless and for any such ruling to have any weight it should be detailed and substantiated, and ideally supported by a broad range of the senior clerical hierarchy in Iran today.
ansari 2013
However, this concern is not significant considering the position of Ayatollah Khamenei and publicity of his statements. As far as the legitimacy of a fatwa concerned it is not necessary to be issued in written form. It is practicable from early times to issue fatwa orally, and it may be written down by those have heard it. The statements of Ayatollah Khamenei also has been reported by those have heard it. His statements against nuclear weapons also have been published on his personal website (Khamenei 2012).
Honourable audience, international peace and security are among the critical issues of today’s world and the elimination of catastrophic weapons of mass destruction is an urgent necessity and a universal demand. In today’s world, security is a shared need where there is no room for discrimination. Those who stockpile their anti-human weapons in their arsenals do not have the right to declare themselves as standard-bearers of global security. Undoubtedly, this will not bring about security for themselves either. It is most unfortunate to see that countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals have no serious and genuine intention of removing these deadly weapons from their military doctrines and they still consider such weapons as an instrument that dispels threats and as an important standard that defines their political and international position. This conception needs to be completely rejected and condemned.
Nuclear weapons neither ensure security, nor do they consolidate political power, rather they are a threat to both security and political power. The events that took place in the 1990s showed that the possession of such weapons could not even safeguard a regime like the former Soviet Union. And today we see certain countries which are exposed to waves of deadly insecurity despite possessing atomic bombs.
The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the use of nuclear, chemical and similar weapons as a great and unforgivable sin. We proposed the idea of “Middle East free of nuclear weapons” and we are committed to it. This does not mean forgoing our right to peaceful use of nuclear power and production of nuclear fuel. On the basis of international laws, peaceful use of nuclear energy is a right of every country. All should be able to employ this wholesome source of energy for various vital uses for the benefit of their country and people, without having to depend on others for exercising this right. Some Western countries, themselves possessing nuclear weapons and guilty of this illegal action, want to monopolize the production of nuclear fuel. Surreptitious moves are under way to consolidate a permanent monopoly over production and sale of nuclear fuel in centres carrying an international label but in fact within the control of a few Western countries.
khamenei 2012a
In addition to that, declaration of Ayatollah Khomeini regarding wmds was considered by Mohsen Rafighdoost, who was a minister of the irgc throughout the war with Iraq, as a fatwa even though it was never written down or formalized because it was issued by “guardian jurist” whose statement will bind the entire government. (Porter 2014: 6–7). Unlike declaration of Ayatollah Khomeini, the fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei on nuclear weapons have been formally written down by the government of Iran. For example, in a letter to iaea Iranian government quoted fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei stating that “the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these Weapons” (Habibzadeh 2013: 164). Mohammad Khazaee, the Iranian Ambassador to the UN, told Mousavian, one of the co-author of this book, that he submitted the Fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei though an official note to UN Secretary-General during 2nd term of Ahmadinejad’s presidency to be registered at the UN as official and religious position of Iran on ban of all wmds.
Another worry comes from Mehdi Khalaji (2013: 14) when he argues that Ayatollah Khamenei’s prohibition has shifted gradually from “from a denial of the practical utility of nuclear weapons to a focus on Islamic prohibitions against their use”. Khalaji says that the statement of the Supreme Leader in recent years focused only on the use of weapons, and it may be due to the Leader’s view that “creating and storing such weapons will be sufficient to change the power equation in the region” (Khalaji 2013: 14). However, such criticism is baseless since Ayatollah Khamenei stated against possession of nuclear weapons also in 2012 in his statement during the meeting with officials of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (aeoi) and nuclear scientists. (Mousavian 2013: 149)
3.4 Importance of the Fatwa and Religion in Nuclear Policies
Considering the power of the Supreme Leader in the hierarchy of power structure, his religious decree has a decisive influence in the nuclear decision-making of Iran. His position as ‘guardian jurist’ strengthens the religious and political importance of his fatwa. Religiously, his fatwa is binding not only his followers (Muqallideen) but also to all people. Even if any other mujtahids have any different fatwa regarding this issue that would not be valid (Habibzadeh 2014: 169). Therefore, the position and power of Ayatollah Khamenei ensure the long-lasting of this religious position of Iran without being challenged by other scholars, though most of the scholars are in support of Ayatollah Khamenei.
Politically, “according to article 57 of the constitution, the Supreme Leader has ultimate authority over three branches of government, and his command is binding” (Mousavian 2013: 154). His fatwa binds whole state mechanism and overrides all other military and political considerations. According to Iranian constitution (Article 4), any law contrary to Islamic principles is null and void. So, even if the assembly or executive gives permission for developing nuclear weapons, that decision would not be constitutionally valid. In addition to that, all legislation adopted by the assembly must be referred to Guardian Council and that council has the power to veto any law if it contradicts with Islamic principles. It means that the religious decree and principles are stronger than mere law.
The fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei and other Shia Grand Ayatollah sitting in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan…could create not only a strong domestic public opinion and norms against nuclear weapons inside Iran but beyond. Even the sceptics about the existence of such fatwa agree that “if an ant-nuclear fatwa really exists, it would provide a very strong norm against nuclear weapons procurement” (Schmidt 2008: 76). Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli Larijani, head of the Iranian judiciary, stated that “the fatwa that the Supreme Leader has issued is the best guarantee that Iran will never seek to produce nuclear weapons” (Bowen and Moran 2014: 40). Nevertheless, Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi has declared willingness of Iran to transform the fatwa into a legally binding official document in the UN (Mousavian 2013: 147).
4 Conclusion
The Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran has affected the nature and motivation of its nuclear programme. Islamic and anti-colonialist ideologies became shaping factors in post-revolutionary Iran’s nuclear programme. The theocratic political system provides the religion and the Supreme Leader decisive power. Therefore, the religious principles and views of the Supreme Leader and Guardian Council are significant factors in determining nuclear policies of Iran especially when all Shia Grand Ayatollahs have the same Fatwa. The religious principles override other material interests of states. The constitution of Iran strengthens the power of these religious authorities by providing them veto power over legislations and decisions passed by the legislators and executives. Since the Supreme Leader is the commander in chief, his opinion is binding the military also. In short, as a theocratic state, the views of religious authorities have a significant role in military and security policies, including nuclear weapons, of the state.
As far as nuclear weapons concerned, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly issued his statements at many national and international venues, against nuclear weapons. According to him and many other Ayatollahs, the possession and use of nuclear weapons are prohibited by Islam. The position of the Supreme Leader as guardian jurist strengthens his fatwa and makes it binding on all state departments and all people. Though very few Islamic scholars have criticized Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa, his power ensures that these fatwas are left unchallenged. Since the legitimacy of the government among people is rooted in religious identity and the norms against nuclear weapons are popularized through the repeated statements of authorities, it hard to Iran to reverse its position. Therefore, the development of nuclear weapons by Iran is unlikely in near future as long as the theocratic regime continues.
Theoretically, this influence of religion can be analyzed by using different theories. However, rationalist approaches are not sufficient to explain Iranian security and nuclear behaviour. Since domestic politics and power structure are significant factors, Iran cannot be considered as a “black-box”. Even though the approaches those focus on the domestic political structure can deal with it, its framework is to be broadened to include theocratic government rather than binaries democratic and autocratic governments. It is necessary to understand the influence of religious principles on government policies. Even though mainstream constructivist theories, which consider norms as a significant factor, have not given much attention to the role of religion in shaping these norms, the norm model of Scott Sagan also can explain the influence of the religion. Individual-level analyses have to take into account ideological and normative motivations of the individual also. The mythmaking theory of Lavoy can accommodate this religious influence in nuclear policies of Iran. However, it has to consider religion as a source of motivation to the leaders and mythmakers rather than a tool to spreading their myths.
The US President Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (jcpoa) agreed between Iran and five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, is a severe blow to nonproliferation. Iranian compliance has been verified in 12 meticulous iaea reports since the deal went into effect in January 2016 as well as by the UN secretary general. Since the Iran nuclear deal is the most comprehensive agreement during the history of nonproliferation and the fact that Iran is the only country issued religious fatwa banning nuclear and other weapon of mass destruction, it is time for the international community to build on the Iran Nuclear Deal (jcpoa) together with novel religious fatwa banning nuclear weapon as a major step towards making the world and the Middle East nuclear weapons free zone a reality.
The finding of this paper rises questions for further research on role of religious norms, Islamic and others, in the security policies of other countries and in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons at global level. Considering the growing popularity of religion in the recent decades, religious norms can be a powerful motivation or instrument in the global campaign for nuclear disarmament. Transcending the conventional narration of seeing public role of religion as a security threat, this paper shows how religion and theocratic regime can contribute to the world peace.
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The author’s recent publications include “Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia” (Defense & Security Analysis) and power maximization and state security (World Affairs).
The author’s nuclear book, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, was published in 2012 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His latest book, Iran and the United States: An Insider’s view on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, was released in May 2014.