Abstract
While various dimensions of Chinese commercial achievement have gained longstanding attention in the literature, this article argues for the reconsideration of Chinese commercial performance in the Spanish Philippines based on the confluence of various factors, including the altered conditions of economic engagement in the islands, the character of political economy during the colonial period, and the gaps in provisioning the colony. Against the backdrop of the socio-political and economic dynamics of the Spanish empire, I analyze narratives that emanate from the interests of the colonial authorities, the clergy, and the Chinese traders themselves. I utilize sixteenth-to-eighteenth-century historical accounts and consider these narratives as frames of various motivations by the different actors. I examine these representations and underscore how the Chinese negotiated various parameters set against them that limited their access to commercial opportunities and settlement.
Introduction
The access of Chinese traders to economic opportunities in the Philippines during the Spanish colonial period is of considerable interest from the standpoint of economic history, Chinese studies, and development.1 Various works on the Chinese in the Spanish Philippines have resulted in a wealth of knowledge on their socio-political and economic lives. For instance, Guerrerro and Trechuelo respectively focus on the political and economic dimensions during the colonial period.2 Chan tackles the early years of colonization and provides insights on Philippines – China relations based on the experiences of Chinese traders.3 Chia makes an interesting study on the Chinese in the Philippines before the nineteenth century, who were known to work as butchers, bakers, and carpenters – designations that appear in various historical accounts.4 Given the important role of the Chinese in colonial life, Kueh looks into accommodation efforts.5 However, the need for the Chinese did not preclude tragic containment measures from taking place.6 Clemente analyzes eighteenth-century political-economy dynamics with a focus on expulsions and other containment policies toward the Chinese,7 while Chu provides deep insight into the nineteenth-century nuances of identity negotiations.8
These works and others feature insightful research that weaves historical accounts into a complex picture of colonial policy, settlement, and development. Within this burgeoning field of inquiry, the subject that has drawn significant attention in many historical narratives, as well as contemporary ones,9 is Chinese commercial success. The general impression is that the status of Chinese settlers has always been that of successful, elite traders, when in fact this is a more recent phenomenon in the colonial period. Dispelling this impression, Galang elucidates the circumstances of working-class Chinese in the nineteenth century.10
Problematizing the commercial position of the Chinese in the Philippines during the Spanish colonial period is difficult due to the challenges in measurement. Not only were tallies irregularly conducted by the Spanish to monitor the Chinese population, baptisms, trades, and, on occasion, sales and income, the tense relationship between the Spanish colonial authorities and the Chinese incentivized the latter’s secrecy regarding information on commercial outcomes. Tomas de Comyn confirms the difficulty of quantifying Chinese commerce in the colonial period.11 In the popular discourse, intrinsic traits or qualities along with a long tradition of commerce are often invoked as explanations for Chinese economic achievement. However, scholarship indicates more nuanced elucidations, including those from substantial contemporary works that theorize the economic circumstances of middlemen and entrepreneurial minorities.12 Focusing on the Chinese in the Philippines in the last half of the nineteenth century, Wickberg pointedly notes the interaction between political economy, in-group mobilization or organization, and the deft use of credit.13 Wong underscores particularized practices or processes of commercial engagement and looks beyond the Spanish colonial period.14 Kueh and Clemente point out how the Chinese capitalized on interconnectedness, relational contract enforcement, and the use of credit.15
Rather than attempting an exhaustive survey of constant Chinese transactions throughout different periods, this article contributes to the discourse by offering a perspective on the calculated contestation by Chinese traders in the Spanish Philippines against the multidimensional boundaries set against them by the colonial government. The Chinese sought to continue being traders in the colony and to access commercial opportunities in the domestic economy by challenging containment measures through strategies that reflected their understanding of their utility and how this could be magnified given internal and global socio-political and economic dynamics during the period. The analytical framework of Chinese traders’ strategies considers homeland conditions, the colonial opportunity structure, specific characteristics of the commercial setting in Manila, and Chinese networks. Entrepreneurial solidarity included both efficiency considerations and host hostility as factors.16 This article unpacks selected historical accounts, which feature the narratives of colonial authorities, the clergy, and Chinese traders, depicting the motivations of various actors in the Spanish Philippines. The scope is limited by the Manila-centrism of the narratives and the scant coverage of the voices of the indigenous, which merit a separate study.
This following section discusses the Chinese trade in the proto-Philippine period and the onset of the Spanish colonial administration, which demonstrates that colonialism not only meant a literal perturbation in maritime borders but an implementation of a myriad of boundaries that altered social, political, and economic processes in the islands. After that, the article examines the sixteenth century and how the Chinese started to generate attention for their commercial pursuits. The following section focuses on the seventeenth century and shows the traction that Chinese traders gained in embedding themselves in the economic life of the Spanish Philippines. As a poignant denouement, a final section features the failed attempt to wrest commercial control from the Chinese by supplanting them. The article ends with a few closing remarks.
From Pre-Colonial Trade to the Tenor of Commerce in the Spanish Philippines
The Philippines were once a group of autonomous pre-state polities among which a distinct political-economy dynamic existed. These polities had varying degrees of institutional maturity, and it was in this context that polities engaged with Southeast Asia and greater Asia, including China (see Fig. 1).
The Philippines’ geographical neighborhood and tenth-to-sixteenth-century trade routes
Citation: China and Asia 4, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/2589465X-04020002
source: historical atlas of the republic: charting the history of the philippines. manila: presidential communications development and strategic planning office (2016), 65.
The Philippines’ geographical neighborhood and tenth-to-sixteenth-century trade routes
Citation: China and Asia 4, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/2589465X-04020002
source: historical atlas of the republic: charting the history of the philippines. manila: presidential communications development and strategic planning office (2016), 65.The Philippines’ geographical neighborhood and tenth-to-sixteenth-century trade routes
Citation: China and Asia 4, 2 (2023) ; 10.1163/2589465X-04020002
source: historical atlas of the republic: charting the history of the philippines. manila: presidential communications development and strategic planning office (2016), 65.The trading system included enforcement of contracts or agreements, procedures at the port, payment, and protection of goods. Port trade and rules enforcement were very much part of the prevailing system in Southeast Asia. For instance, in fifteenth-century Melaka (Malacca), there was rulership that was underpinned by a code of law.17 Features included merchant protection, rules, procedures, and the use of merchant-magistrates – prominent foreign traders appointed by Malay chiefs to manage trading rules at the port, including the collection of duties. Prices were coordinated by supply and demand and not determined by the chiefs. Trade, therefore, was market-determined to a great extent. The influence of trade on institutions and administration was underscored by the observation that the existence of the state conformed to what trade required and not the other way around.18
An example of how trade shaped administration is the appointment of syahbandars during Melaka’s zenith. Syahbandars, or magistrates, were prominent foreign traders who were tasked with dealing with the major traders, i.e., the Gujarati and those from the West, Malay speakers, and East Asians.19 Hall compares Melaka, Samudra-Pasai, and Banda. By the fifteenth century, the efforts of Melaka in the protection of foreign traders’ goods and a wealth distribution policy that disincentivized piracy were well observed. To a lesser extent, Samudra-Pasai exhibited a similar trajectory. In Banda, control over economic activities and the exchange environment was held by a merchant power, which in other polities complemented, but was subordinated to, political rule.20
Philippine ports were characterized as very decentralized, with tenuous ties to the region, while the exercise of political authority was based on a more flexible system of “alliance and clientage.”21 However, the development of the loosely connected Philippine polities fits the nature of the heterogeneous evolution of statecraft development in early Southeast Asia, which was not contrary to Antonio de Morga’s observation that there was no centralized authority over all polities.22 For instance, in characterizing to Miguel Lopez de Legazpi – who established Spanish rule in the Philippines – the state of authority in the polities, Raja Sulayman aptly described the situation as follows: “there is no king and no sole authority in this land; but everyone holds his own view and opinion, and does what he prefers.”23 Chiefs mobilized power by controlling ports through which international prestige goods were traded. Likewise, the control of internal networks and craft specialists was also part of the power locus as this facilitated the exchange of foreign foods with indigenous forest products24 and supported a manufacturing base.25 In all these, the Chinese ships traded by visiting the ports of the different polities. Clemente argues that the varied institutional conditions at the ports determined the kind of contract that facilitated barter trade, with stronger contract enforcement associated with more gains from trade.26
The vessels which come from the great land of China every year, are brought in great numbers by the Chinese, particularly to the City of Manila, in view of the large profits which they obtain from them in freight charges. Besides, inasmuch as China is overpopulated, and the wages and profits there are small, whatever profit or gain is obtained by them in the Philippine Islands, give them considerable pleasure.27
Unfortunately, opportunities came with a predatory colonial administration. While the Philippines seemed to be a land of promise, what the Chinese experienced in the islands was both a boon and a bane. The institutional environment in the Philippines was oppressive, but this notwithstanding, the economic opportunities in the Philippines seemed endless. Meanwhile, there was pressure from the Chinese mainland. China had begun to outlaw overseas commerce and travel. As a result, imperial disfavor was a factor that contributed to the urgency of Chinese immigrants to survive and thrive in the Philippines.
For instance, during the Ming’s (1368–1644) onset up to the mid-point of the dynasty, the government banned seagoing activities and overseas travel. Tributary trade was the government’s mode of external trade. Before the end of the fifteenth century, when the Qing took over in 1644, the government likewise imposed a maritime ban to firm up the defenses against anti-Qing forces. To exhibit muscle, the government in 1661 forced a massive coastal evacuation covering an area extending twelve kilometers inland along the length of the southern coastline so that the dissidents who retreated to the sea would not have communities to take advantage of, as the evacuees also had to destroy their properties. While the Qing attempted to open up in 1684, the policy of isolationism would quickly take hold once again. In the early eighteenth century, overseas Chinese were given three years to return to the empire. Those who went abroad again faced extradition and execution as punishment.28 Despite these measures, the provinces of southern China persisted in trade and emigration, responding to opportunities abroad.
After going overseas was outlawed, all those who still left China were considered ingrates – a “base people, ungrateful to China, their native country, to their parents, and to their relatives.” This statement comes from a letter by the inspector-general of Quanzhou to Governor-General of the Philippines Pedro Bravo de Acuña. The inspector-general sent the official reaction after more than twenty thousand Chinese perished in the Philippines in 1603. Although the letter expressed that China had the ability to retaliate against Spanish authority for atrocities done to the Chinese in the Philippines, it nevertheless revealed how the imperial court looked down on Chinese emigrants.29
The overseas Chinese became avid entrepreneurs, going throughout the islands, accessing commercial opportunities, and entrenching themselves in the Philippine economy to achieve a certain measure of indispensability. The Chinese not only survived and thrived, they became a commercial phenomenon in the Spanish Philippines. Spanish, mestizos, and indigenous were considered to have been crowded out of any commercial activity that the Chinese engaged in; the latter perceived to effectively dominate the trades they entered. Efforts from the Spanish colonial government to contain the Chinese resulted in institutional measures such as expulsions, the banning of trade, and attempts to replace Chinese traders with non-Chinese. Their commercial role created tensions with the Spanish, who felt politically threatened in the colony. Such sentiments clashed with the benevolent initiatives of the Catholic clergy toward the Chinese because of their missionary designs on mainland China. This was the challenging context in which commercial opportunities were accessed and limitations contested.
The Sixteenth Century: Early Accounts of Chinese Competition
Trading on Credit as a License to Remain in the Philippines
I posit that although there were grave abuses by the Spanish, the practice of trading on credit demonstrates how the Spanish needed Chinese commerce and how this situation created leverage for Chinese traders to remain in the Philippines. In 1583, Bishop Domingo de Salazar brought to light in his memorial the atrocities done to the Chinese. Salazar reported that officers confiscated Chinese merchandise for profit. Others took the merchandise in exchange for forced promissory notes, which were later repudiated.30 Given the liquidity issues of the colonial administration and the need for resources to encourage Spanish settlement in Manila, credit had a strategic role, which became an opportunity for the Chinese.
They are so accommodating that when one has no money to pay for the bread, they give him credit and mark it on a tally. It happens that many soldiers get food this way all through the year, and the bakers never fail to provide them with all the bread they need. This has been a great help for the poor of this city, for had they not found this refuge they would suffer want. The Sangleys sell meat of animals raised in this country, as swine, deer, and carabaos (a kind of Italian buffalo, whose flesh is equal to beef). They also sell many fowls and eggs; and if they did not sell them we all would suffer want.32
Morga’s 1598 report to the king noted the persistent difficulties experienced by the Chinese creditors in running after claims, as Chinese traders let the Spanish have the merchandise without assurance or enforcement of payment. While Morga admonished that the Chinese must be prevented from doing this for their protection, it was easier said than done, as enforcer and debtor were often the same.33 Regardless of Spanish predation, it cannot be denied that trading on credit mitigated the objections against Chinese traders and gave them a de facto position in the economic life of the islands.
Responding to Demand
In Salazar’s account, particular mention was made regarding the sale of certain commodities. Salazar reported “even split wood is sold in the Parian” and he attributed this to the urgency of Chinese traders to make a living. He injected an element of disbelief into the perception that the retail of the product was unusual. Salazar also described fish sold by the Chinese through some important details: it was largely the city’s source of sustenance, and the fish surplus was associated with its low cost. He notes that “for one real one can buy a sufficient quantity of fish to supply dinner and supper for one of the leading houses in the city.” I argue that the buyer’s market was not segmented, in the sense that everyone, including reputable houses, bought from the Chinese. Salazar also noted that vegetable growing was done on land that was not formerly used for planting, yielding harvests that matched those of Spain and Mexico while matching supply quantity as in Madrid and Salamanca. Akin to the comment on vegetables, bread sold by Chinese bakers was noted not only for the low price but also because the Philippines grew a lot of rice and yet now patronized bread. Apparently, their commerce was not contained in the domestic market, since the Chinese also made chairs, bridles, and stirrups of low cost and good workmanship, such that these products were considered worth including in the galleon shipments headed to Mexico. These valuable descriptions underscore Chinese responsiveness to demand, which, as implied, would not have been met prior to their efforts.34
Salazar’s interest was especially piqued by the Chinese involvement in stonemasonry since it involved the construction of houses and various buildings, which, as a major endeavor in itself, underscored the difficulties of colonial settlement in the Philippines vis-à-vis Spanish settlement in other colonies. Spanish colonial administrators in the Philippines were too few due to the insufficiency of domestic revenue to sustain a large bureaucracy.35 Whether or not the Philippines had a more favorable revenue position than has formerly been conceived,36 the colony’s need for more resources was a constant articulation by colonial actors.
Details in Salazar’s account on stonemasonry provide valuable insights into the Chinese traders’ understanding of how to capture the market. The account describes the costliness of stonemasonry in Spain compared to the Philippines, where the Chinese were able to drive down cost and production time, such that a house could be constructed and occupied in a year. This encouraged various building projects, such as churches, hospitals, and a fort. From Salazar’s account, I underscore Chinese innovations in the production of raw materials. Not only did the Chinese make and sell acceptable roof tiles and bricks at a low cost, but they also showed resourcefulness when they started making lime mortar from the abundant supply of white coral and oyster shells that they gathered from the coast and which proved to be a good substitute for stone. This kind of mortar used to be considered of low quality but eventually became superior. In fact, Salazar’s house was cheaply constructed using this kind of mortar, as one cahiz of lime mortar was purchased at four reals, and a thousand bricks were purchased at eight reals. Interestingly, what further accentuated the importance of the Chinese in stonemasonry was that the Marquis de Villa-Manrique blocked the supply of bricks to Manila, “thus causing no little injury and loss to this city,” based on a report that reached Salazar.37
While Salazar heralded Chinese diligence as the quality that underpinned their commercial viability, I argue that the details he documented actually describe demand responsiveness, which, in turn, incorporated product and service innovations. The Chinese were able to drive down labor costs by delivering the materials to the site of construction and becoming builders themselves. As builders, Chinese laborers would charge one real in daily wages when the payment scheme was not by the job; moreover, they brought their own food to the site, making it needless for the client to feed them. Salazar related these details with further amazement as he described the inclusion of stone-cutting and sand-carrying services. I argue that this demonstrates that the Chinese offered various services when they were hired as builders, reducing transaction costs for the client. Carpenters, masons, lime makers, stonecutters, stone dealers, stone workers, and sawyers were distinct occupations among the Chinese in the Philippines, as listed in various colonial rolls to monitor the distribution of Chinese traders across occupations. See excerpts of various rolls in Table 1. Salazar related, “If they are given the lime, they will furnish all the rest, and will thus deliver the house or work without any trouble to the owner.” Curiously, Salazar equated what seemed to him as diligent behavior with greediness, but this is qualified by his description that the Chinese “sell their goods dearer when they know that there is money to buy them, but they never raise the price so as to make it unreasonable.”38 This better indicates that the Chinese understood the interaction of supply and demand and the resulting price that the market would be willing to pay.
Reproducing Spanish Goods
Salazar’s report to the king in 1590 expressed how the Chinese eased out Spanish competition in producing handicrafts as more people bought their clothes from the Chinese. The account revealed how quickly the Chinese overcame the learning curve involved in entering various trades such as gold and silver craftsmanship (excluding those requiring enamel), painting, sculpting, and embroidery, regardless of whether they had prior knowledge of that trade. Salazar also observed that the Chinese exhibited tenacity in attempting head-on competition with the Spanish by masterfully reproducing their crafts. The Chinese not only produced handicrafts that were on par with those of the Spanish craftsmen; they offered these at a lower cost and with improvements, as in the case of embroidery. The startling outcome was the replacement of Spanish competition. Salazar made a pointed observation on Chinese sculptures: “I think that nothing more perfect could be produced than some of their marble statues of the Child Jesus which I have seen.” Further, churches patronized Chinese religious sculptures. Salazar predicted that the Chinese would succeed in this to an even greater extent in the future, predicting that images made in Flanders would soon be reproduced by the Chinese in the Philippines.39
While there are varied accounts of crowding out the non-Chinese competition, the process is best illustrated through the story of a bookbinder and his Chinese worker. A bookbinder came to Manila from Mexico and set up shop. His Chinese worker quietly learned the process of binding. After a short period, he decided to end his employment to establish his own bindery. What occurred was an implicit apprenticeship – a learning opportunity for the Chinese whose motivations were actually strategic. The Chinese worker with his own enterprise then attracted all the business, rendering the business of the original binder unsustainable. Providing an eyewitness description of a book bound by the same Chinese binder, Salazar characterized the Chinese binder’s craftsmanship as follows: “His work is so good that there is no need of the Spanish tradesman. At the time I am writing, I have in my hand a Latin version of Nabarro bound by him; and, in my judgment, it could not be better bound, even in Sevilla.”40
Chinese expertise in printing resonates with the discourse on the first imprints in the Philippines. The Chinese were not only known for having experience in printing before Western printing became widespread but were also acknowledged to be the first printers in the colony. Totanes asserts that the first two books printed in the Philippines, the Doctrina Christiana, en lengua Espanola y Tagala (Christian Teachings in Spanish and Tagalog) and the Xinke sengshi Gaomu Xian zhuan Wuji tianzhu zhengjiao zhenchuan shilu (A Printed Edition of the Veritable Record of the Authentic Tradition of the True Faith in the Infinite God, by the Religious Master Gao Muxian) were printed in 1593 by Chinese individuals, while attributed to the Dominican order. The second book is also known as the Shilu by Juan Cobo. The Chinese version of the first book, the Doctrina Christiana en letra y lengua China, was printed in 1605 and is attributed to the Chinese Keng Yong. The books were printed using xylography, which utilized woodblocks. This was a method that the Chinese had been using before Gutenberg first introduced his printing press in Europe.41 Chia points out that the Shilu, which was a book in Chinese, shared similarities in appearance with the Chinese books of the same period.42
Reproducing Spanish goods, therefore, can be attributed to a host of factors that interacted with one another: exposure to the relevant trades in China, demand for various goods and services in the Spanish Philippines, non-engagement of the Spanish, and constraints in indigenous participation in commerce.
Finding a Role in a Contentious Colonial Dynamic
In March 1591, the city government of Manila released an ordinance that prohibited the indigenous population from wearing Chinese fabric. Due to Salazar’s objections to the ordinance, Governor-General Gomez Perez Dasmariñas in April 1591 ordered Juan de Alcega, the alcalde mayor of Pampanga, to investigate the costs and benefits of the restriction on the indigenous population and whether the suspension of the ordinance was warranted in certain exceptional circumstances. Dasmariñas’s order required that information be gathered from Spanish and indigenous witnesses.43 Alcega then facilitated the gathering of ten indigenous chiefs who gave their testimonies in May of the same year.44
The investigation sought to seek answers to the following questions. First, at the time of Spanish contact, did the indigenous wear clothing that was not native to the Philippines, and, did the merchandise of the one or two Chinese ships that came to the islands include cloth since such a good was not sold among the inhabitants? Second, after Spanish settlement, as the indigenous increasingly wore Chinese clothing, did this result in the abandonment of local garments, and, did the patronage of Chinese clothing amount to 200,000 cotton and silk robes annually, which is valued the same in pesos? Would this value double if nothing is done about it? Third, did the indigenous demand for Chinese clothing, which had previously been estimated at 30,000 pesos, balloon to 200,000 pesos? Fourth, did the indigenous give up their agricultural pursuits in cotton, rice, wine, and other commodities as a result of the availability of Chinese fabric, leading to idleness and vice? Fifth, would the negative implications of patronizing Chinese clothing cease with the compliance with the ordinance, resulting in the availability of low-cost fruits and goods, the cessation of monetary outflow for Chinese goods (i.e., flour, sugar, lard), the demand for local garments, leading to indigenous patronization and exports, and finally, the cessation of the purchasing of Chinese goods from China but made with local raw materials? Sixth, would the compliance with the ordinance result in the return of the indigenous to barter trade with the Chinese, akin to pre-Spanish times when money was not used in trade? Seventh, was the Philippines suitable for cultivating cotton? If the potential supply would be of high quality, would it be sufficient to accommodate exports in exchange for wares from Mexico and China? Would the outflow of money be the same?45 All respondents were reported to have provided answers that affirmed the administration’s position, which the latter used to justify the soundness of the ordinance. The witnesses were all indigenous chiefs, rather than what was supposed to be a mix of Spanish and indigenous.46
The events surrounding the ordinance reveal the extremely complicated predicament that the Spanish, the indigenous, and the Chinese traders were intertwined in, which indeed was a recurring theme during the colonial period. The undermanned Spanish were concerned with the security implications of what they considered a commercially valuable and numerous people within the colony, which they could not absolutely control. From an economic standpoint, the Spanish colonial administration was perennially in dire straits, and this exacerbated the mercantilist sensitivities about the exit of Spanish monies to China, resulting from the commerce of the Chinese in the Philippines. Furthermore, the Spanish frustration over their inability to maximize local economic potential (e.g., in agriculture) was magnified by the fact that the Chinese traders seemed to be able to enter commercial opportunities easily.
Chinese trade was then seen as an obstacle to the Spanish cultivation of local industries and foreign trade that would benefit the colonial economy. The letters reveal a lack of reflexive consideration on the part of the administrators regarding what was required to stimulate commercial progress in the colony. There was a lack of Spanish investments (e.g., physical infrastructure, networks) that were needed to turn raw potential into commercial strengths as well as the fact that the pre-colonial Philippines were part of an international trade network, which was disturbed by colonialism. The non-engagement of the indigenous in trade should have made the Spanish authorities consider the institutional character of the pre-colonial period’s economy and the path-dependent impact of colonialism on the Philippine development trajectory. Blaming the Chinese for economic usurpation was convenient as it also coincided with Spanish security anxieties and mercantilist sensitivities.
As the increasing demand for Chinese products was observed, the Spanish blamed the Chinese for hoarding and causing supply shortages. The Spanish felt that they had to drastically resort to excluding the Chinese in commerce, clear the way for the Spanish entry into the trades engaged in by the Chinese, and encourage Spanish “citizenship and settlement.” Prospective Spanish settlers would run into difficulty if there were no deliberate efforts to aid them in an enterprise. This became a repeated issue whenever resentment led to calls to subdue the Chinese traders. Even in this scenario, the Spanish could not totally do away with the Chinese. They were still deemed important enough to be kept within the city’s reach, where mechanics, carpenters, gardeners, and farmers were needed, together with those who gathered up village produce from the indigenous and transported them to the city.47
The Seventeenth Century: Chinese Trader Entrenchment
This period is distinctive in that Chinese entrepreneurship became more embedded in economic life despite the seventeenth century being notorious for uprisings and massacres. There were four uprisings that led to the death of many Chinese traders in the period: 1603, 1639, 1662, and 1686. (The last was in 1762 in the aftermath of the British occupation when Chinese were hanged for taking the side of the British48.) The value of the Chinese to the colony was evident, but the Spanish fear of a group of people that they could not seem to totally subjugate despite attempts at religious conversion, which was supposed to facilitate assimilation, and whose growing number they could not control, led to a series of attempts at containment and subsequent reversions.
Supplying the Colony
By the early seventeenth century, the seeming indispensability of the Chinese traders was already recognized. Even in the bloody aftermath of the 1603 Chinese uprising, the void that the Chinese traders left was exemplified. While Spanish sentiments against the Chinese were acrimonious, Morga recounts that the absence of Chinese commerce and the ensuing shortage of food and goods such as shoes could not go unnoticed. In juxtaposition, it was observed that the indigenous, in particular, did not take up the trades of the Chinese, and worse, seemed to have departed from the pursuits they used to have prior to colonization, i.e., “tilling their land, raising fowls, cattle and cotton and weaving blankets.”49 There were various attempts to limit Chinese trade but often with consequences that could not be remedied by attempts to bolster Spanish or indigenous participation in trade. What the Spanish pejoratively perceived as Chinese-controlled supply reflected the kind of investment that the Chinese put in building their business networks. But even this to some extent trivializes the work the Chinese poured into commercial intermediary functions and the ensuing costs that they internalized to carry out the necessary coordination with various actors in their supply networks.
In 1619, Procurator-General Hernando de Los Rios Coronel expressed in a letter to the king the need for benevolence toward the Chinese. Commerce depended on them, and the colony could not be sustained in their absence. He offered an approach to dealing with the Chinese, who were gaining economic headway as retailers – a situation causing tension because supply was believed to be controlled by them. The letter suggested that the Chinese be diverted into land cultivation from the retail trade. While this was a form of limiting the commercial influence of the Chinese, it offered a compromise and would allow the Chinese to make a living while letting them be of utility in developing the islands.50 Encouraging the Chinese to enter the agricultural sector failed, however, as the inducements vis-à-vis the challenges were insufficient. It must also be noted that in the nineteenth century, the twilight of Spanish rule, the colonial administration similarly wanted to divert Chinese migration into frontier colonization and plantation labor. Spanish intentions were not realized, especially since changes in the global economy presented a different set of opportunities for the Chinese.
Almost forty years into the seventeenth century, in 1638, Hieronimo de Bañuelos y Carrillo observed the visibility of the Chinese as peddlers. The Chinese traders were a fixture in Spanish houses, where one saw nine or ten of them selling their goods. The Chinese were also acknowledged for all commercial traffic, even the supplies that were used by the Spanish to sustain themselves.51
Pioneering Trade
The Chinese sought commercial opportunities all over the Philippines and eventually became pioneers of commerce in places where trade did not use to exist. In 1630, Juan de Medina pointed out that there was no place in the islands that the Chinese did not go. Neither location nor the seeming absence of profitability was an impediment. When there did not seem to be anything to be gathered, the Chinese were able to maximize what could be gathered, such as wood from small islands or material from coasts, from which lime could be made. This gave the impression of ingenuity and initiative.52 The flexibility of the Chinese in engaging in various trades was consistent with exploring the archipelago for economic opportunities. Morga noted that the Chinese visited the islands and gained a familiarity with the “entire country, rivers, canals and ports” that was greater than that of the Spanish.53 I argue that the observed traits of the Chinese indicate their investment in surveying and understanding the market. Rather than an intrinsic ethnic quality, exploring the islands came rationally from examining the islands’ commercial potential as well as possible challenges and competition. Also, it must be noted that the disruption and alteration of internal and external trade processes owing to colonization as well as Spanish control of the means of production opened a gap in provisioning the islands, which the Chinese traders addressed by peddling and retailing goods.
As the seventeenth century advanced, the economic advantage held by the Chinese remained. In 1686, following an uprising by the Chinese, another attempt to prevent Chinese involvement in commerce led to an unresolved supply shortage. For example, the people themselves petitioned for the return of Chinese bakers, since the Spanish who took over from them were unsuccessful in replacing them, even if they had worked in that profession in Spain. There was enough motivation to bring the Chinese back to Manila, where demand for bread was high. That the Chinese operated with more efficiency in trades that had long been held by the Spanish only reinforced the criticism that the Chinese employed “shrewdness” in their dealings. This implied the belief that the Chinese resorted to underhanded dealings, as only this could explain Chinese success in the trades that the Spanish had traditionally dominated. Hence the fact that the Spanish deemed it more efficient to hire Chinese to conduct and manage trade rather than engage in trade themselves was criticized as allowing the Chinese to take advantage in the guise of serving the needs of the colony.54 The reality, however, was simply that the Spanish were confounded by a more efficient competitor. While getting edged out by competition is not a new phenomenon, future research could delve into more local histories of commercial competition among the Spanish, mestizos, the indigenous, and the Chinese in the Philippines during the colonial period.
It is not surprising that such tensions over what was perceived to be the growing commercial influence of the Chinese motivated radical policies to subdue them. For instance, by a royal decree of November 1686, the Chinese were to be expelled unless they converted to Catholicism within two months. Fully appreciating their leverage, the non-Christian Chinese argued that supplies could not be brought in other than through them and that efforts to transfer their commerce to the Spanish, the indigenous, or Chinese mestizos would result in scarcity. They underscored that other efforts to deprive the Chinese of the trade in meat had resulted in scarcity. The same was true for bread. The Chinese also pointed out that the taxes they paid in the form of residence permits were a primary source of revenue for the government, whose liquidity in 1687 was sustained by their payments. The Chinese were bold enough to argue against expulsion by asserting the implications of the cessation of trade with the Philippines and that they would not lose out as other buyers would then go to China to make purchases.55 The colonial administration has always had liquidity issues and has been dependent on the situado (royal subsidy) sent from Acapulco. While what constitutes the situado is an unsettled issue, it has been posited to be largely based on duties levied on the Manila galleon trade.56 Also, regardless of how illiquidity is contested by the contention that other domestic sources such as tributes were collected but unrecorded, illiquidity was officially projected. In other words, the role of financing sourced from the Chinese was deemed important by colonial authorities regardless of the real state of finances in the archipelago.
The non-Christian Chinese also invoked the cessation of trade with the Philippines should the expulsion proceed. Another tally of non-Christians was done in 1689 and the expulsion order was republished the following year. However, the citizens and the silk market governor argued in 1689 that expelling the Chinese would only lead to a dearth in supply. The Chinese were responsible for the city’s supplies and the practice of trade, for which finding replacements would be difficult. Even the Real Audiencia in Manila posited in 1695 that a total expulsion was not realistic.57 The Chinese argument was borne of two things. The first was the Chinese consciousness of their negotiating position with respect to the larger economic dynamic of the imperial finances. The second was the knowledge that by the later seventeenth century, Chinese commerce had achieved a high level of entrenchment in Philippine economic life.
Trading on Credit
Archbishop Miguel de Benavides wrote to King Felipe iii of Spain in 1603 and reported the state of the colony, including Spanish debts to the Chinese. Benavides then asked the king to allow the Spanish to retrieve their funds from Mexico. Benavides emphasized that the defaulting Spanish would not only commercially ruin the Chinese; the Chinese would also immediately be incarcerated when they could not settle payments to the Spanish, arising from they themselves not being able to collect on their Spanish debtors.58 At any rate, the Spanish maximized the financial levies on the Chinese as well as on Chinese credit.
The importance of trading on credit cannot be emphasized enough. The unwillingness of the Portuguese to trade on credit, along with selling at high prices, contrasted with Chinese practices. Chinese traders were favored not only for agreeable prices but also for the credit they extended.59 Credit was essential for the Spanish in Manila to profit from the Manila–Acapulco traffic. The Spanish in Manila could send merchandise, acquired from the Chinese on credit, to Acapulco.
In February 1640, the royal “Informatory Decree Regarding the Question to What Extent and on What Plan Shall the Commerce of the Islands with Nueva España Hereafter Proceed”60 acknowledged the crucial role of credit in merchandise trade and expressed the belief that Chinese credit was the lifeblood of commerce. Because of credit, 75 percent of the merchandise was committed to the Chinese. No payment was made for the goods purchased from the Chinese and sent to New Spain. These goods were acquired on credit with the expectation that payment from New Spain would eventually settle the credit.61
Trading on credit was an instrument for Chinese entry into and longevity in commerce. Given such difficulties in the socio-political and economic environment, credit was an instrument for building favor. In other words, trading on credit was used as a vehicle to establish the Chinese traders’ right to stay in the Philippines, enter a market, and engage in commercial transactions. Further, the extension of credit gave birth to relationships. Rather than mere adherence to credit terms, the Chinese held reciprocal favor and patronage as the more important elements of the credit relationship.
The Eighteenth Century: Failed Attempts at Spanish-Run Enterprises
Maintaining Supply Dominance
The year 1729 was eventful in terms of complaints against Chinese commerce. In June, Archbishop Carlos Bermudez de Castro wrote to the king to report that Chinese ownership of shops precluded the indigenous from practicing trades. In a similar objection, the chief citizens of Manila raised their opposition to the profits of Chinese middlemen in domestic trade and claimed that the Chinese controlled all the valuable food supplies such as meat and produce. The statement further related the unsuccessful attempt to acquire a bread supply contract for a Spanish trader and the failure to take the contract from the Chinese. They championed the transfer of operations of the meat shops, city supplies, and various trades to the Spanish, Chinese mestizos, the indigenous, and Creoles, but Chinese opposition allegedly stood in the way. Similar views were raised by the governor of Pampanga and the Real Audiencia. A report dated September 1729 stated that the Chinese in Pampanga operated a monopoly through which produce could be gathered in Pampanga and resold in Manila at a higher profit. In July 1736, the Real Audiencia acknowledged the enduring commercial influence of the Chinese, who engaged in buying and selling between the provinces and the city. As regards the supply of textiles, the Chinese began to imitate fabric production in Ilocos, Laguna, and Tondo. Their cheaper products were claimed to be forcing the indigenous out of the trade. Justice Pedro Calderon Henriquez then advocated the total removal of the Chinese in 1741.62
In 1741, Calderon Henriquez expressed that the indigenous were capable of accomplishing the task of provisioning the city. However, the process of approval and implementation was slow. The Chinese stronghold in trade had remained. Calderon Henriquez then proposed that the trade in various goods be transferred to the Spanish, the indigenous, and Chinese mestizos except for silk, porcelain, rattan, hats, blankets, wax, sari-sari stores, and India cloth. Strong opposing interests produced a stalemate in the expulsion proceedings. Licenses and permits for the Chinese to remain in the Philippines were easily secured. The clergy issued certificates declaring that the Chinese were construction workers for religious buildings, and the government itself patronized the Chinese. Table 2 shows an excerpt of a 1754 record of the colonial government’s purchases of different supplies for the provision of the royal warehouses, galleons, and ships of the king in the archipelago. The full record yields a wealth of information as it not only shows how Chinese trade was strongly patronized but also the range of commerce that the Chinese engaged in. Interesting details include the distinctions made for the trade and/or guild and the baptism status of each trader.63
The Commercial Company
Half a century before the onset of the nineteenth century, there was an interesting attempt by the colonial government to establish a Spanish-run commercial company that would take the place of expelled Chinese traders. Its establishment and failure offer insight into Chinese economic performance in the islands. Pedro Manuel de Arandia became Governor-General in 1754, and during his term of office (1754–1759) he was adamant about implementing the expulsion policy. The Spanish, who were at odds with expulsion, argued that internal trade would suffer as a result. In response, Arandia set up a commercial company.64 The capital raised amounted to 76,500 pesos, which was intended to acquire goods at wholesale, which were 16 percent cheaper compared to goods bought at retail. Two Spanish agents would run the shops in which these goods were to be sold. The markup on the wholesale price was 30 percent, which was intended to be distributed to the royal treasury (8 percent) to make up for the gap in revenue from residence permits owing to Chinese expulsion; shareholders (10 percent); employee salaries and the public fund in support of domestic industries (12 percent).65
Unfortunately, the company needed more capital to do business. The company resorted to approaching charitable institutions – the Hermandad de la Misericordia (Confraternity of Mercy) and Obras Pias (Pious Works) – for a loan. The Obras Pias declined the loan request at first, which led Calderon Henriquez to challenge this position, arguing two things. First, the Obras Pias benefitted from the generosity and sacrifices of their donors and should therefore do the same “for the public good.” Second, the colonial government tolerated the “business transactions of the confraternities, which are not carried on in other regions” all because the colonial government recognized the utility of available funds for traders. The company benefitted from a capital infusion of 100,000 pesos from the Misericordia and 30,000 pesos from the Order of St. Francis.66
Through these funds, the company set out to sell goods at lower prices than those of the Chinese, charge a constant price throughout the year, keep profits within the colony, and finance the twenty-one families employed by the company. However, the company only lasted for a year. It was only able to save the invested capital and nothing beyond that.67 Despite the outcome, Arandia continued to argue that Chinese traders were not only superfluous to Philippine commerce but had also made it worse off. He argued that since the Chinese traders operated on meager capital, they were driven by large profits to sustain their trade. He explained that Chinese goods were priced high due to many intermediaries, placing the buying public at a disadvantage. As a result of these arguments, Arandia earned the ire of the community. Arandia’s charge against the Chinese curiously conflicted with the general narrative that the Chinese priced competitors out of the market, maintained low fixed and variable costs, and drew on their networks in effecting an efficient supply and distribution system. To save face, it was reasoned that the company closed after a year because there was no need for such an enterprise, which ran counter to the reality that the Chinese traders – even with some unsuccessful ones – had a steady and decent level of commerce, clearly showing that a need was being filled.68 Akin to previous efforts, expulsion was weakly enforced, and Arandia’s initial plan of totally ridding the Philippines of the Chinese was thwarted.
Closing Remarks
The discussion elucidates that the economic achievements of Chinese traders in the Spanish Philippines is necessarily multidimensional owing to the interplay among the motivations of the colonial authorities, the clergy, and the Chinese traders against the backdrop of complex dynamics involving the political economy in the Philippine colony as well as in the Spanish empire and beyond. Within this picture, this article underscores that the perceived economic success of the Chinese should be reconsidered as outcomes of negotiation and contestation of the boundaries set against them.
The Spanish valued Chinese goods and services, but the colonial government felt wary and resorted to various containment measures as the Chinese grew in number. Mercantilist sensitivities exacerbated the tension over what they saw as commercial dominance by a group of people that was not easily assimilated. Tensions increased, reaching their extreme in uprisings and massacres of Chinese. On the other hand, due to their value to the economic life of the colony and oscillating policies of expulsion and subsequent accommodation, the Chinese would find their back in their trades. Spanish attempts to replace Chinese commerce failed, including the effort to formally set up a rival company, which only survived for a year. Throughout the different periods, the Chinese contested containment by trading on credit, responding to demand, reproducing Spanish trade goods, and finding a role in a contentious colonial dynamic. They entrenched themselves in supplying the colony and pioneered trade in new places and maintained their position in its economic life despite attempts to supplant them.
Studies on the Chinese in the Spanish Philippines can be enriched further with more research on local economic histories involving qualitative and quantitative information on Chinese trades, commodities, and guilds. On the other hand, discussions in contemporary perspectives on Chinese economic success can benefit from more scholarly attention to the configuration of historical structures that shaped economic engagement. The exploration of how these structures affect current economic development due to path dependence would be a fruitful avenue for further interrogation.
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In this paper, “Chinese traders” broadly refer to traders, artisans, and service providers regardless of the size of the commercial pursuit.
Milagros Guerrero, “The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570–1770,” in The Chinese in the Philippines, vol. 1, 1570–1770, ed. Alfonso Felix, Jr. (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1966), 15–39; Milagros Guerrero, “The Political Background,” in The Chinese in the Philippines, vol. 2, 1770–1898, ed. Alfonso Felix, Jr. (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1969), 1–17; Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo, “The Role of the Chinese in the Philippine Domestic Economy,” in Felix, The Chinese in the Philippines, vol. 1, 175–210; Maria Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo, “The Economic Background,” in Felix, The Chinese in the Philippines, vol. 2, 18–44.
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Edgar Wickberg, The Chinese in the Philippine Life, 1850–1898 (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1965).
Kwok-Chu Wong, The Chinese in the Philippine Economy, 1898–1941 (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999).
Kueh, “Adaptive Strategies of Parián Chinese”; Tina S. Clemente, “Guanxi in Chinese Commerce: Informal Enforcement in Spanish Philippines,” Seoul Journal of Economics 26, no. 2 (2013): 203–37.
Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities”; Volery, “Ethnic Entrepreneurship.”
Undang-undang Melaka: The Laws of Malacca, ed. Liaw Yock Fang (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), as cited in Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis Thomaz, “The Malay Sultanate of Melaka,” in Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief, ed. Anthony Reid (New York: Cornell University), 70–72; Reid, Southeast Asia, 70.
Thomaz, “The Malay Sultanate,” 19.
Reid, Southeast Asia, 120.
Kenneth Hall, A History of Early Southeast Asia: Maritime Trade and Societal Development, 100–1500 (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), 287–99, 308–18.
Laura Lee Junker, Raiding, Trading, and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 83.
Junker, Raiding, Trading, and Feasting, 57–84; Hall, A History, 287–341; Reid, Southeast Asia, 208, 252; For Antonio de Morga’s observations, see Jose Rizal, Historical Events of the Philippine Islands by Dr. Antonio de Morga, Published in Mexico in 1609 (Manila: Jose Rizal National Centennial Commission, 1962), 274–76, 278; For Jose Rizal’s insights, see Rizal, Historical Events, 276n4, 278n3.
Hernando Riquel, “News from the Western Islands, 1573,” in The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, ed. Emma Blair and James A. Robertson (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1903–1909), 3:235.
Zhao Rugua’s 1225 list of indigenous goods included yellow wax, cotton, pearls, tortoise shells, medicinal betel nuts, and uta (or Yu-ta) cloth. Wang Dayuan’s 1349 list included kapok, yellow beeswax, tortoise shell, betel nuts, and cloth of various pattern. See Ching-Hong Wu, A Study of References to the Philippines in Chinese Sources from Earliest Times to the Ming Dynasty (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1959).
Junker, Raiding; Karl L. Hutterer, “Basey Archaeology: Prehistoric Trade and Social Evolution in the Philippines” (PhD dissertation, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1973); Henry Otley Beyer “Philippine Pre-historic Contacts with Foreigners,” in Chinese Participation in Philippine Culture and Economy, ed. Shubert S. C. Liao (Manila: Bookman, 1964), 19–33; Timothy Earle, How Chiefs Come to Power: The Political Economy in Prehistory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
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Luis Alonso, “Financing the Empire: The Nature of the Tax System in the Philippines, 1565–1804,” Philippine Studies 51, no. 1 (2003): 63–95.
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Salazar, “The Chinese,” 7:229.
Salazar, “The Chinese,” 7:226.
Salazar, “The Chinese,” 7:226–27; 7:227 for the quoted text.
Lucille Chia, “Chinese Books and Printing in the Early Spanish Philippines,” in Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Wen-Chin Chang (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 260–65; Vernon R. Totanes, “What Was the First Book Printed in the Philippines?,” Journal of Philippine Librarianship 28, no. 1 (2008): 24–27; Rosa M. Vallejo, “Books and Bookmaking in the Philippines,” National Commission for Culture and the Arts, Philippines, https://ncca.gov.ph/about-ncca-3/subcommissions/subcommission-on-cultural-heritagesch/libraries-and-information-services/books-and-bookmaking-in-the-philippines/ (accessed May 12, 2022). Edwin Wolf, ii, “Introductory Essay,” in Doctrina Christiana. The First Book Printed in the Philippines, Manila, 1593. A Facsimile of the Copy in the Lessing J. Rosenwald Collection, Library of Congress, ed. Edwin Wolf, ii (Project Gutenberg, 1947), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/16119/16119-h/16119-h.htm; See Wenceslao Retana, “La Imprenta en Filipinas: Noticia de dos Libros, 1593,” La Politica de España en Filipinas 4, no. 97 (October 23, 1894): 283–84, https://ustdigitallibrary.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/lapoesenfil/id/1149.
Chia, “Chinese Books,” 261.
Gomez Perez Dasmariñas, “Ordinance Forbidding the Indians to Wear Chinese Stuffs, April 9,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 8:78–79.
Juan de Alcega, “Untitled, May 20, 1591,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 8:95.
Juan de Alcega, “Untitled, 1591,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 8:79–83; The values in the third question presumably refers to an annual reckoning in relation to the second question.
Juan de Alcega, “Evidence, May 14, 1591,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 8:84–89; Juan de Alcega, “Untitled, May 1591,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 8:90–95.
Santiago de Vera et al., “Memorial to the Council by Citizens of the Filipinas Islands, July 26, 1586,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 6:168.
Clemente, “Spanish Colonial Policy,” 130.
Rizal, Historical Events, 216.
Hernando de los Rios Coronel, “Reforms Needed in the Filipinas, 1619,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 18:306, 308.
Hieronimo de Bañuelos y Carrillo, “Relation of the Filipinas Islands, 1638,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 29:70.
Juan de Medina, “History of the Augustinian Order in the Filipinas Islands, 1630,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 23:282.
Rizal, Historical Events, 343–44. See p. 344 for the quoted text.
Casimiro Diaz, “The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1670–1694” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 42:247–52. See p. 42:251 for quoted text.
Diaz-Trechuelo, “The Role of the Chinese,” 1:187–90.
William Lytle Schurz, “The Philippine Situado,” Hispanic American Historical Review 1, no. 4 (November 1918): 461–79; Carl C. Plehn, “Taxation in the Philippines,” Political Science Quarterly 17, no. 1 (March 1902): 125–14; Alonso, “Financing the Empire.”
Diaz-Trechuelo, “The Role of the Chinese,” 1:187–90.
Miguel de Benavides, “Letter from Benavides to Felipe iii, July 6, 1603,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 12:123–24.
Juan Grau y Monfalcon, “Letter to the King, 1636,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 25:135–36.
King Felipe iv, “Informatory Decree Regarding the Question to What Extent and on What Plan Shall the Commerce of the Islands with Nueva España Hereafter Proceed, February 14, 1640,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 30:81.
King Felipe iv, “Informatory Decree,” 30:86.
Diaz-Trechuelo, “The Role of the Chinese,” 1:192–97.
Diaz-Trechuelo, “The Role of the Chinese,” 1:197–206.
Joaquin Martinez de Zuñiga, “Events in Filipinas, 1739–1762,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 48:183.
Juan de la Concepcion, “Events in Filipinas, 1739–1762,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 48:183–84n105.
Concepcion, “Events in Filipinas, 1739–1762,” 48:184n105. Among the charity institutions in Manila, the Misericordia is known to have been the pioneer. It was the first to invest donations in high-interest loans associated with the maritime trade. Succeeding pious works by religious orders and the city council followed its example. The Misericordia also had the biggest capitalization. See Juan O. Mesquida, “Pious Funds across the Pacific (1668–1823): Charitable Bequests or Credit Source?” The Americas 75, no. 4 (2018): 661–62; John N. Crossley, Hernando de Los Ríos Coronel and the Spanish Philippines in the Golden Age (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 42; Luis Perez Dasmariñas, “Letter to the Felipe ii, June 15, 1594,” in Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898, 9:138–40.
Concepcion also posits that another obstacle for the Spanish company “was found in the general practice of using clipped money in this trade, which caused great losses.” Concepcion, “Events in Filipinas, 1739–1762,” 48:184n105.
Zuñiga, “Events in Filipinas, 1739–1762,” 48:184–85.