Abstract
Opium was one of the issues that had to be resolved by the Americans upon their colonization of the Philippines. The debate on the potentialities of opium dates back to the Spanish colonial period, when the colonial government framed the opium issue as both economic and moral in nature. In the end, the economic potentialities of opium outweighed its moral repercussions because the Spanish colonial government allowed its regulated use among the Chinese. In contrast, the American officials in Manila crafted a progressive prohibitionist policy based on the recommendation of the investigative Opium Committee in 1905. In terms of opium in the Philippines, the majority of research has focused on the American policies on opium and their international consequences. This study focuses on the aftermath and challenges of the American prohibitionist policy from 1910 to 1935, particularly as they related to smuggling. Using archival documents such as annual reports from the governor-general of the Philippines and other government records, the paper aims to demonstrate how and in what ways opium was smuggled in the Philippines and to analyze the various motivations, reasons, and methods used by smugglers. Furthermore, the paper explores the involvement of the Chinese in various notable opium-related cases in the Philippines. I also argue that an increase in the smuggling of opium was an unwanted aftermath of the American prohibitionist policy. The present study hopes to contribute to the growing body of literature on narcotics, drug policies, and empire building.
In December 1910 the Supreme Court of the Philippines indicted a Chinese man for illegal possession and sale of opium. The case pertained to an event that occurred almost a year earlier, when Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, the chief of the department of the port of Cebu and an internal revenue agent of Cebu respectively, found sacks of cans containing opium aboard the steamship Erroll.1 An agent of the Bureau of Customs Secret Service bought opium from the defendant and took it to the Office of the Governor to prove that the accused had opium in his possession to sell. The defendant in the case freely admitted that he bought the sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico and Vera Cruz.2 The case came to be known as The United States v. Look Chaw and it became one of the landmark rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with regards to opium law in the Philippines. This case raised questions as to the jurisdiction of the court, specifically its ability to try cases of illegal possession of opium involving foreign nationals, especially when aboard vessels in transit. The case also marked the start of a bigger problem faced by the Americans with regards to opium in the Philippines—smuggling.
The opium question in the Philippines dates back to the Spanish colonial period. During the nineteenth century, Spanish bureaucrats in Manila faced a dilemma regarding opium as a commodity. The Spanish bureaucrats in Manila, physicians, lay persons, and the religious alike debated the various potentials of opium. Some raised the moral and health repercussions of opium addiction while some argued for its economic value. Initially, the colonial government issued a blanket policy of opium prohibition. Eventually, however, Spain changed its initial prohibitionist policy into a policy of tolerance.
Wickberg notes opium use as an economic activity was mostly associated with Chinese, although he says that the opium monopoly contracts were not exclusively held by Chinese, since some influential Spanish also participated in them. Furthermore, the Spanish attitude toward opium was influenced by the economic discourse on opium and its potential revenue. In the end, the Spanish colonial government favored the legalization of the opium traffic in the Philippines in order to amass profit from the trade.3 Obviously, the economic value of opium greatly influenced the final form of Spanish-era opium farm system. The policy of farming off rights to the highest Chinese bidder would remain in place until the outbreak of the 1896 Philippine Revolution.4
The arrival of opium in the Philippines would continue despite the uncertainties posed by the 1896 revolution. With the eventual collapse of the First Philippine Republic, the American presence in the country greatly increased. Two commissions—collectively referred to the Philippine Commission5—were sent to the Philippines by the US government to survey the conditions in the islands and a part of the report of the Philippine Commission focused on opium. The Philippine Commission noted the increasing quantity of opium entering the Philippines. As the Americans took control over the Philippines they also inherited an issue dating back to the early nineteenth century, and they tried resolving it through a prohibitionist policy. Despite this, smuggling remained a persistent issue. This paper aims to demonstrate how and in what ways opium was smuggled in the Philippines and explore the Chinese participation in opium smuggling. It then grapples with the following questions: What were the various motivations for smuggling opium in the Philippines? In what ways was opium smuggled into the Philippines? What was the participation of the Chinese in opium smuggling in the Philippines?
Today, the growing discourse on substance abuse warrants the need to turn the pages of history and historicize the problem. Most works in the literature on the history of illegal narcotics focus on the American policies on opium from 1903 to 1908 and the international ramifications of these policies.
Different scholarly articles have tackled the history of opium in the Philippines; Arnold H. Taylor explores the initial reactions of the Americans when they encountered opium in the Philippines.6 Eric Tagliacozzo explores different motivations for cross-border smuggling in Southeast Asia during the nineteenth century. He shows how the movement of people and goods in Southeast Asia adjusted to the policy and administrative changes brought about by different colonial regimes; opium in particular was one of the main commodities transported across Southeast Asia during this period.7 Anne Foster uses a comparative approach in looking at the opium policies of the US in the Philippines vis-à-vis those of the other colonial powers in Southeast Asia. She also looks at the international position taken by the US in the crusade against opium.8 Furthermore, Foster explores how the US policy on drugs influenced the crusade against drugs in the later years, in the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and the in the mainland United States. She argues that the US’s insistence on promoting an international drug regime was self-serving; the US policy on opium focused on source control rather than rehabilitation.9 However, the years following the initial prohibition of opium are not given much attention in her discussion. Daniel J. P. Wertz also discusses the “international ramifications of a changing drug control regime.”10 He argues that behind the debate over the opium problem in the Philippines was a fundamental question of what an American-made colonial state should look like. Wertz, like Foster, focuses on the international political currents that shaped the local policies that were implemented in the Philippines. What remains absent throughout this discourse, however, is a discussion on the smuggling of opium in the Philippines.
The US policy on opium in the Philippines was an attempt to establish control over its colony as part of the larger “American civilizing mission” in the Philippines. McCoy explores America’s attempt to establish control over the Philippines through the use of modern policing, surveillance, and information sharing. He argues that the Philippines was an example of a surveillance state.11 The attempt to establish control was not limited to the natives but also involved the Chinese minority population in the Philippines. America’s dilemma with the Chinese in the Philippines was rooted in their own “Chinese question” in the mainland United States. Chu emphasizes that the US realized that the Chinese in the Philippines required a different approach since they have long played a pivotal role in the development of the Philippine economy.12 In another work, Chu explores the construction of Chinese-mestizo identity in the Philippines. He narrates various “border-crossing” and “flexible” strategies that the Manila-born Chinese employed in response to the changing political and social dynamics in the Philippines.13 Chu’s work is significant in understanding the nuances and evolution of Chinese-Mestizo identities in the Philippines.
I present the following discussion in three parts: The first part provides a background on the “progressive prohibitionist policy” of the Americans in the Philippines. It also explains the various debates and policies instituted by the Americans to curb opium consumption in the Philippines. Furthermore, it highlights the salient points and essence of US-era opium law. The second part discusses the different challenges to the prohibitionist policy of the Americans, particularly smuggling, including how and in what ways opium was smuggled into and within the Philippines. The annual reports of the governor-general of the Philippines and other archival documents are further explored to thresh out the complexities of opium smuggling in the archipelago. The last part demonstrates the role that the Chinese played in different opium smuggling attempts in the Philippines. The facts and contents of different notable cases of smuggling are highlighted. The article hopes to fill a gap in the literature and to deepen our understanding of opium smuggling in the Philippines in general, and the participation of the Amoy (Xiamen) Chinese, Canton (Guangzhou) Chinese, and Chinese in the Philippines in opium smuggling in particular.
“Progressive Prohibition”: American-Era Policy on Opium
The year 1898 marked significant and massive changes in the Philippines as independence was declared and the Americans entered the scenario as the new de facto colonizers. The hostilities brought about by the Philippine Revolution and the subsequent war between the US and Spain affected the government’s monopoly on the business of opium. Fighting between the US and the First Philippine Republic broke out days after the ratification of the Treaty of Paris in 1899. The Philippine—American War officially ended in 1902; however, as early as 1899 the US military government in the Philippines took control of the opium trade.14 As they controlled key areas in the Philippines, the Americans abandoned the Spanish-era opium farm system and they tried regulating opium by increasing its tariff. General Elwell Otis ordered the abolition of tax collection from cedula personal (registration tax certificate), gambling, and opium contract farming.15 Along with the abolition of the opium farm system, Otis ordered the regulation of opium through high tariffs or import duties, starting in 1902. The use of opium was allowed given that the Chinese paid licenses and import duties. On top of the implementation of high tariffs, towns and cities were also instructed to pass ordinances prohibiting the establishment of opium dens in their respective local government units.
A year after the implementation of higher tariffs, further changes to regulations regarding opium were introduced. In early 1903, the Philippine Commission presented a new bill which sought to reestablish an opium farm system in the Philippines. The main provisions of the proposed bill were adopted from the earlier Spanish opium farm system wherein the use and possession of opium was prohibited among the Filipinos. The system farmed out the right to import, sell, and use opium to Chinese males who were twenty-one years old and above.16 Three months were dedicated for the advertisement of the bill. It was heavily discussed by the public when it reached the Philippine Commission. Secretary of War William Howard Taft, in a letter sent to President Theodore Roosevelt, noted that the 1903 opium farm bill was vigorously opposed by the clergymen of Manila.17 Strong disapproval of the bill mainly came from the American Protestants (i.e., Episcopalian missionaries in the Philippines) and the Chinese. Reverend Homer Stuntz and Bishop Charles Henry Brent represented the Evangelical Union and their opposition to the bill was primarily on moral grounds. Opium was seen as destructive to society’s moral.18 The strong opposition coming from these groups halted the enactment of the bill into law. With the postponement of the opium bill, Governor William Howard Taft created the investigative Opium Committee whose main task was to investigate and recommend policy actions pertinent to the issue of opium.19 The committee’s journey across various neighboring territories took five months to complete. Government officials, physicians, lay persons, and religious leaders were interviewed in Formosa, Java, and Burma.
The committee’s main question was whether an absolute opium prohibition in the Philippines would be effective.20 In their final report, the opium situation in the Philippines was likened to that of Java; however, their final recommendation was heavily based on the Formosa model, where progressive prohibition was implemented.21 The committee suggested that a government monopoly be implemented for three years; after that, a prohibition must take effect. The committee also warned that opium smuggling must be addressed once the prohibition of opium was implemented. In the same year, the US Congress passed an act authorizing the Philippine Commission to enact laws prohibiting opium.22 The first Opium Law was enacted in 1906 and was repealed in favor of its final form in 1907. The Opium Law employed a policy of “progressive prohibition,” wherein the use of opium for recreational purposes among the Chinese would be gradually suppressed.
The first section of the Opium Law defined opium. The word opium as used throughout the law pertained to “every kind, class, and character of opium, whether crude, prepared, or refuse, and all narcotic preparations thereof or therefrom, and all morphine or alkaloids of opium and all preparations in which opium, morphine, or any alkaloid of opium enters as an ingredient, together with all opium leaves and wrappings of opium leaves, whether such leaves or wrappings are prepared for use or not.”23 The succeeding sections explained the operationalization of the progressive prohibition. Both the 1906 and 1907 Opium Laws allowed the continued use of opium among the Chinese provided that they presented and registered themselves as habitual opium users to the Collector of Internal Revenue or Treasurer. The officer was to issue the certificate in quadruplicate: one would be retained by the issuing officer; another copy would be sent to the treasurer of the province where the municipality or town was located; the third copy would be sent to the Collector of Internal Revenue in Manila; and the fourth copy would serve as the personal copy of the opium user. The opium user was to present this certificate whenever he bought opium from a licensed physician, druggist, or dispenser. The quantity of allowed opium for the individual was specified in the certificate. The quantity of allowed opium would then be lessened at 15 percent of the original allowed amount for the succeeding certificates. A certificate’s validity lasted for only a month and payment for a certificate varied per month. The law specified the amount to be paid per month. For certificates issued from October 17 up to the end of the month cost one Philippine peso (hereafter, peso). Certificates for the months of November, December, January, and February cost two pesos and 50 centavos, five pesos and 50 centavos, seven pesos and 50 centavos, and ten pesos, respectively. No certificates would be issued after February since March 1908 was designated as the month for the implementation of total prohibition. Anybody caught using fake or altered certificates faced a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos, imprisonment of two years, or both, based on the discretion of the court.24 If a person was apprehended for using opium without a duly issued certificate then he faced a fine amounting to six hundred pesos, imprisonment for six months, or both, based on the discretion of the court.
The progressive prohibitionist policy was crafted with the Chinese users in mind. The policymakers obviously did not tackle opium use involving native Filipinos or other nationalities in the Philippines.25 Another interesting question that might arise from this is why were they singling out the Chinese? This issue was already brought up by Reverend Charles Brent in the public session of the opium bill of 1903. The bone of contention was the confinement of the opium issue to the Chinese.
The Opium Law in its final form in 1907 served as a compromise between the views of two opposing side: the Chinese, who were against total prohibition of opium use, and the Evangelical Union, who were for total prohibition of opium. Furthermore, the final form of the Opium Law was clearly influenced by the ongoing debates and attitudes toward opium during the American era. The Opium Law was racialized and opium use was given racial meanings tied exclusively to the Chinese. These racist views toward the Chinese were transported from the metropole to the colony. The US’s confrontation with the “Chinese question” was not unique to the Philippines. Prior to the American conquest of the Philippines, the American public had already linked the Chinese with various societal problems (e.g., opium addiction). The US government’s solution to the “Chinese problem” in the mainland United States was to enforce the Chinese Exclusion Act to control the entry of Chinese to the metropole.26 Furthermore, the attachment of racist notions to opium use was not unique to the Philippines. The Opium Committee noted that some European officials in different Southeast Asian territories viewed opium from the vantage point of race and in some cases race influenced policies in place during the five-month sojourn of the committee. For example, in Burma there was a prevailing belief that “Burmese are [more] likely to go to excess than the Chinese or Indians who constitute the majority of non-Burman population addicted to its use.”27 Meanwhile, in the Straits Settlements only “adult male Chinese” were allowed to consume opium inside opium dens.28
Meanwhile, the problem of smuggling was not given attention in the early versions of the Opium Law. However, in 1913 an executive order of Governor-General W. Cameron Forbes created the Opium Board as the chief implementer of the Opium Law. In 1914 final amendments were introduced to the Opium Law. The amendments in 1914 transferred the enforcement of the law and all field operations on opium to the Philippine Constabulary.29 The Bureau of Customs, on the other hand, was to focus its operations on smuggling.
Motivations and Reasons for Smuggling
In 1915, seven years after the implementation of the total prohibition on opium and one year after the change in administration and enforcement of the Opium Law, the annual report of the governor-general of the Philippines noted that the illicit trade in opium in the Philippines had been almost eradicated.30 The comment was made in response to the activity of and vigorous actions taken by the Bureau of Customs and reflects that the prohibitionist policy was working well according to the government’s plan. The Americans had to project their victory against opium in order for them to further their image as an exceptional colonizer relative to their European counterparts in the region. In 1915, there were 589 convictions of apprehended opium users, a considerable decline from the previous years, the culmination of the trend of recent years wherein the number of opium users and, consequently, the number of apprehensions had declined. However, in the succeeding years, the Philippine Constabulary reported an increase in opium-related activity. While the government had made the importation of opium illegal except for medical purposes, smuggling continued to undermine the prohibitionist policy. Hence, smuggling was an unintended consequence of the prohibition. The prohibitionist policy prompted opium users to rely heavily on the black market or smuggled opium. The expansion of the black market also provoked the government to implement stricter penalties for those found guilty of smuggling opium. The Bureau of Customs reported that the only sure method of ending this “nefarious business” was through imprisonment;31 because if no jail time was given to smugglers then they could easily evade the law by just paying the fine. The fines were tantamount to paying a license fee; as their profit outweighs the payment of fines if they were caught by the authorities.
The only drug found in my possession and which led to my conviction was about 35 grams of opium given to me in Kudat, British North Borneo, by a Chinese doctor named Chi Liong with instructions that should my sickness which he had treated, ever return, the drug in small quantities mixed with other Chinese medicine, “So Sen Hon,” should be taken internally.35
The Philippine Constabulary reported several instances of arrests made against Moro smugglers in Mindanao. These smugglers in each instance “alleged that the contraband came from Borneo.”36
Table 1 shows the number of apprehensions from 1910 to 1931. A section on opium was included in each Annual Report of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of War. For the year 1914, the aggregate numbers of opium apprehensions from the year 1909 up to 1913 were reported instead of the yearly report. Different methods were used by the Philippine Constabulary in apprehending individuals. The most common way of apprehending the alleged unlawful users of opium was through raiding of suspected opium resorts or dens.
It is noticeable that there were some years when the government did not provide any report or data regarding apprehensions; neither the Philippine Constabulary nor the Bureau of Customs provided a report on opium from 1915 to 1917, perhaps due to the lack of a significant number of apprehensions or convictions for these years. There was also no opium report for 1935, which is understandable because of the changes brought about by the transition to the Philippine Commonwealth in that year. The figures are slightly lower if one focuses on the number of convictions. It must be noted that under the Opium Law from 1906 to 1908, around 12,000 users were registered to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. If one is to compare the number of apprehensions from 1910 onwards with the number of registered users under the 1906–1908 Opium Law the decline is significant. Although the numbers declined, the most remarkable decline occurred in the year 1920. This can be optimistically read as a success on the part of the policymakers, however, there were still some problems encountered by both the Philippine Constabulary and the Bureau of Customs in trying to stamp out the illegal use and importation of opium in the Philippines.
The Philippine Constabulary in 1919 requested an increase in salaries due to their campaign against the violations of the Opium Law. They argued that the present salary system did not encourage their officers to campaign vigorously against the unlawful use of opium in the Philippines. They asked the Philippine Legislature to consider the merits of their request for a 10 percent increase in their salary for every five years of service.37 The problem of low wages was tied to the illegal smuggling of opium; low wages caused some junior officers and customs officials to accept bribes.38 Owing to the low wages among the officers of the Bureau of Customs Secret Service Division (hereafter the Secret Service), dishonesty among these officers became another roadblock in thwarting any attempts to introduce illegal opium to the country. In 1924, the Bureau of Customs reported that around twenty-four personnel from the Secret Service had been relieved from service due to dishonest conduct. An editorial cartoon published by The Independent newspaper mirrored this reality. Published in 1919, the cartoon, with the caption “Porque Hay Opio en Filipinas” (Why is There Opium in the Philippines?), depicts the Chinese as the chief smugglers of opium in the Philippines. The Chinese in the cartoon is supposedly introducing opium into the country by concealing it in drums used for legal goods. The customs officer on the other hand is turning a blind eye on the situation due to the fact that he was bribed. The cartoon can be seen as a criticism of the prohibitionist policy of the Americans.39 It points outs the inefficiency of the system and how the Chinese opium den owners circumvented the law just by smuggling opium into the country. The cartoon also suggests that the Chinese were both considered the chief “victims” and the principal smugglers of opium. Most of the opium den owners escaped prosecution while the Chinese belonging to the lower classes could not escape the wrath of the American prohibitionist law.
The smuggling of opium carried out by different groups continued even after the total prohibition in the Philippines. A large quantity of opium was still being smuggled and circulated in Manila, Cebu, Iloilo, Jolo, Bohol, Samar, and Leyte.40 As noted with the previous reports, the biggest factor causing the inflow of large quantities of opium was the geographical proximity of these places to some Southeast Asian countries where opium was freely sold and sanctioned by their respective governments. Subsequent reports on the illicit trade in opium in the Philippines pointed out Hong Kong, Amoy, and the Straits Settlements as main sources of opium smuggled into the country.41
The insular government maintained that when opium entered the Philippine market, it was sold at many times its cost price. The high price of smuggled opium in the Philippines lured businessmen to illegally export prepared opium into the archipelago. Illicit opium traffic also led to the corruption of minor public officials. In addition to the corruption of public officials, the Moros also posed problems to the Philippine Constabulary. Most of them engaged in the business of smuggling opium. The lack of swift vessels in the insular service added to the difficulty of pursuing Moro vintas that were engaged in opium smuggling in the southern islands. Some United States Navy destroyers were also withdrawn from the islands in order to return to the front during the first world war, further decreasing the capability of the insular government to pursue smugglers. In order to partially help in the campaign against opium smuggling, the Bureau of Customs requested for construction of two swift launches to be used in Jolo. In addition, the Bureau of Customs also borrowed from the Bureau of Commerce the coastguard cutter-class vessel Basilan. The Philippine Constabulary also cooperated with Secret Service agents to detect smuggled opium.42
All in all, there were three main reasons why the smuggling of opium persisted in the archipelago despite a fervent campaign against it. First, opium smuggling was seen as a lucrative business since the possible profits outweighed the consequences. Second, the geographical location of the Philippines contributed greatly to the persistence of opium smuggling. Owing to the proximity of the Philippines to territories where opium was sanctioned by their respective governments, opium could easily be transported to the major ports of the islands. In addition to that, the archipelagic nature of the country was also an added burden to the officers tasked with keeping illegal opium at bay. Third, the low wages given to officials also added to the persistence of opium smuggling. Most junior officers would accept bribes and allow some businessmen to export illegal opium and evade the law. Interestingly, the Secret Service reports from 1919 to 1926 noted that they were constantly on the lookout for other violations such as illegal immigration and violation of customs all throughout the year in major ports all over the archipelago.43 Although the reports on Philippine ports focused mainly on opium, one can conclude that these ports were also utilized for other violations such as smuggling of migrants and contraband goods such as pistols, ammunition, dynamite, morphine, etc.44 However, opium received the most attention compared to other contraband goods because of the quantity smuggled in the country. For example, in the year 1924, 78,262 kilograms of prepared opium were seized in Manila alone while there were only four contraband pistols seized during the same period.45 Meanwhile, in 1926 the Secret Service seized 718.869 kilograms of prepared opium in Manila compared to only 0.378 kilogram of morphine in the same year and port.46
Methods of Opium Smuggling
The Philippine Constabulary and the Bureau of Customs in their annual report on the traffic of opium in the Philippines noted three major methods by which the smuggling of opium was carried out in the archipelago. First, smugglers hired vessels to bring opium into the Philippines. Several shipments were usually loaded into these hired vessels and most of the time their cargos were dropped into the water near some coastal areas.47 Small packages, on the other hand, were loaded into Chinese boats and then transferred to smaller boats in the Philippine ports.
Second, the concealing of a considerable amount of opium into baggage or merchandise was also used to illegally ship opium into the Philippines. A joint force of the Secret Service and the Philippine Constabulary usually separated the luggage of people entering the Philippines from opium-producing countries and those from non-opium-producing countries. The separated luggage of those arriving from opium-producing countries was transported to the customs house for a thorough inspection. The transportation services for these purposes were contracted to a private contractor.48 This was one of the ways to deter and detect the entrance of smuggled opium in the Philippines. Although not identified as a major method of smuggling opium, bribery of junior officials was also prevalent in various ports of the country. Smugglers usually paid considerable amounts in bribe to these poorly paid officials for the entry of their goods to the ports. In one of the annual reports of the Secret Service, it was mentioned that the prosecution of customs, immigration, and opium law violators was delicate in nature and its execution depended entirely on the honesty of the men in charge. As mentioned above, in 1924 alone, the Secret Service force relived around twenty-four personnel from service for dishonest conduct.49
Third, some boats from China or Formosa, on the other hand, claimed to have been forced to anchor in Philippine ports because of bad weather.50 This method was also effective in evading authorities pursuing opium smugglers. In addition to the three major methods identified by the authorities, various cases of attempted smuggling that reached the Supreme Court of the Philippines also noted that cans of opium were being kept in the ashes below the boiler of steamships to evade authorities searching for contraband goods.
Now if the Chinese vendor wishes to smuggle opium, he offers the Resident Excise Office twice of thrice his salary and buys him. These officers are generally Burmese. The Chief Magistrate of Rangoon said that he had some honest Burmese Excise Officers. But even in that case, and when the vendor himself is honest, opium is smuggled from many points into the province of region blessed with the presence of at least two honest men, and its consumption increases.52
Notable Cases of Chinese Involvement in Opium Smuggling
That smuggling remained ongoing after the start of the implementation of the Opium Law caught both the government’s and the public’s attention. Since administrative and implementation power was given to the Opium Board, the Bureau of Customs focused on thwarting any attempt to introduce illegal opium. Notable cases of failed smuggling attempts dominated the records of different government bureaus and the reports of the Opium Board. From 1908 until 1919, the law enforcers’ focus was the illegal opium users in the country. In 1913, an executive order from Governor Forbes asked the Opium Board to direct their attention to smuggling issues. The government campaign against opium can be divided into two phases; the first phase from 1906 to 1919 was directed against illegal users of opium in the Philippines; the second phase from 1920 to 1932 was directed against opium smugglers. The strategy was to eliminate the demand and for the supply to decrease. As shown in Table 1, individual apprehensions dramatically dropped in 1920. With the drop in the overall market, the next thing that they had to eradicate was smuggling.
Unlawful use and smuggling of opium continued to undermine the American colonial government’s prohibitionist policy. As the years passed, several changes, particularly in the implementation and administration of the Opium Law, were introduced. The year 1919 and the following years, for example, were considered by the Philippine Constabulary as the year of the “renewed campaign” against the opium evil.53 A decrease in the use of opium in the Philippines was noted; nevertheless, an increase in the amount of smuggled opium was also remarkable. Hence, the Philippine Constabulary vigorously renewed its campaign against opium. This renewed campaign was evident in the increased number of high-profile cases thwarted by the joint forces of the Secret Service and the Philippine Constabulary.
The Philippine Constabulary reported 333 opium smugglers and turned over opium to the Bureau of Internal Revenue worth 1,384,513.95 pesos for the year 1920. A total of forty-three vessels was seized by the Customs Bureau that year, most of them involved in the illegal opium trade.54 The following year recorded almost the same number of opium smugglers. By this time, it was clear that the government had shifted its campaign against opium smuggling. The succeeding years saw a steady increase in the quantity of opium smuggled into the Philippines. In 1925, the Secret Service recorded a whopping 796,862 kilograms of prepared opium seized from the ports of Manila, Cebu, Iloilo, and Jolo. Cebu’s seaport logged five opium-related seizures while Jolo recorded thirteen.55 The trend continued in 1926, when 718,869 kilograms of prepared opium were seized.56 In Mindanao, various ports were also surveyed due to their proximity to Borneo and the Straits Settlements. It was noted that Moros smuggled opium allegedly produced from those territories.
Interestingly, in 1927 smuggling by small Moro crafts had significantly decreased. No single seizure from Borneo and the Straits Settlements was recorded that year. With smuggling being practically eliminated in the southern part of the country, a stark decrease in the quantity of opium smuggled into the Philippines was recorded, at 73,847 kilograms, while only twenty were prosecuted.57
The Customs Bureau’s initial success in eliminating attempted smuggling in Mindanao was also reflected in various ports in the country. The new decade was characterized by a steady decrease in seizures and attempted smuggling cases in the Philippines. From 1930 onwards, a detailed log of “important seizures” was included in the annual report of the governor-general of the Philippines. Most of these seizures involved British mercantile houses and steamships from the ports of China. These seizures tend to reflect the international extent of the problem.
It can be observed from the incidents that the most common form of opium smuggled in the Philippines was opium manufactured for smoking. Raw opium or crude opium was rarely smuggled into the country. That is understandable since opium for recreational purposes was prohibited. The most common brands were “Lion” and “Tongee.” Table 2 shows that the most common sources of opium were China’s ports, especially that of Amoy. The majority of the steamships which were found with prepared opium had recently visited or were in transit from Amoy. Furthermore, some records also state the owners of the packages or sacks of opium confiscated in these steamships. For example, the opium confiscated from the steamships Susana ii and the ss Jolo were consigned to Chinese men by the names Tan Say Ching and Go Cong respectively.58 Both Tan Say Chin and Go Cong were Amoy Chinese. The Philippine Commission noted in 1903 that the majority of the Chinese in the Philippines were Amoy Chinese. Meanwhile, it was also noted that around 25 percent of the Chinese in the Philippines were from Canton in Guangdong.59
Conversely, there were also cases, especially in 1931, where local ships and local ports were involved in smuggling cases. It was difficult to point out who owned the opium or even the possible source or place of origin of said opium in such cases. For example, the steamship Tanda visited several ports in Australia and New Zealand prior to Sandakan and the Philippines. The authorities could not pinpoint the exact port of origin in this particular instance. In the case of local ports, there is a possibility that opium entered the Philippines via the ports in Visayas and Mindanao and was being redistributed using local steamships all over the Philippines.60 Aside from the prominence of Amoy as a port of origin, another interesting factor in the opium smuggling recorded during the period was merchant houses’ involvement, specifically that of Smith, Bell, and Company, which had its roots in the Spanish colonial period. The case of Smith, Bell, and Company is worth noting because a number of opium seizures occurred in various ships owned by the merchant house or consigned to it. The merchant house was founded in 1858 when Robert Wood partnered with an American named Lawrence Bell. It was primarily engaged in the trading of abaca (hemp) and eventually expanded into the insurance industry. Soon it launched and managed different British steamships that were used for inter-island and local transportation and shipping. The year 1866 saw the expansion of Smith, Bell, and Company as it opened its first branch in Cebu. During the American colonial period, the company also acquired the Compania Maritima.61 It must be noted that there were ships under the Compania Maritima involved in opium smuggling.
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does no [sic] apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.64
From the above-mentioned court cases and opium seizures at border controls, one can see the involvement of Chinese men in the opium trade as dealers and consignees of opium products entering the Philippine jurisdiction. On the other hand, the cases of Look Chaw and Ah Sing show the wider extent of the opium trade network. The opium products seized from Look Chaw and Ah Sing were not meant for the Philippines but were seized in the country since their ships were in transit. We can see that there is a strong correlation between the products seized, the port of origin, and the nationality of the supposed owners of these products, who were mainly Chinese.
The Manila Barricades of 1920
One incident that made it to the report of the governor-general was the so-called Manila Incident of 1920. It caught the public’s attention and attracted the scrutiny of the local officials in Manila. During that year, Mayor Ramon J. Fernandez of Manila received reports about the unlawful use of opium by the Chinese in different buildings in Manila. It was reported that in most of these buildings barricades were being constructed. Various contrivances were being placed in front of the buildings to prevent the officers from entering. This method of forming barriers in front of a building became common among illegal opium joints to ward off the authorities.65 Doing so elicited a response contrary to what they wanted to achieve; the authorities began suspecting and condemning the activities happening inside such buildings. The reaction of Mayor Fernandez to these reports was a recommendation to the Municipal Board to enact an ordinance prohibiting the construction of barricades or any other obstacles in front of buildings in Manila. The mayor argued that illegal opium users were using these barricades to fend off the authorities from raiding and inspecting the building for any unlawful activities. He also added that in case of emergency (i.e., fire), the barricades and obstructions would handicap the firemen and rescuers in the performance of their duties. The Municipal Board heeded the mayor’s recommendation. It adopted an ordinance prohibiting the construction of barricades in front of Manila’s buildings, especially those judicially declared as gambling houses or opium dens. It was subsequently signed by the mayor. To confirm the reports coming to them, the Manila police force, accompanied by the mayor, raided these suspected opium joints. They discovered that illegal activities were indeed happening inside the edifices. The Philippine Constabulary then instructed Manila’s police force to make their crusade against opium “vigorous and relentless”; furthermore, the chief of police was required to make daily reports on the subject of the opium campaign.66
The involvement of the Chinese in the opium cases in the Philippines was not confined in smuggling. The Manila Incident of 1920 demonstrates the continuing resistance to the total prohibition of opium in the country. Although there was a noticeable decrease in the apprehensions of opium users especially after the implementation of the total prohibition, the use opium among the Chinese in Manila and other parts of the country persisted.
Conclusion
The American-era “progressive prohibitionist” policy on opium was meant to end the use of opium in the Philippines. It targeted Chinese opium users and was intended to “save” the Filipinos from being infected with the vice. It allowed for a gradual withdrawal of opium use among the Chinese from 1906 to 1908, provided that they registered themselves as opium users. In the process it created a racialized notion of opium smoking and criminality. Through the prohibitionist policy the American tried to consolidate their control over Philippine society and project their ideal “modern” and “civilized” state free from the debauching effects of the “medieval” and “backward” habit of opium addiction. However, the decline in apprehensions among the users of opium from 1908 to 1920 was coupled with the perennial problem of smuggling. Smuggling was both an inadvertent consequence of imposing a total prohibition on opium and the major challenge in maintaining an opium-free society. As early as 1905 the Opium Committee noted that smuggling was the only constant problem present among all the policies they had studied. Although it was noted to be a problem early on, it was only in 1913 that the Governor-General ordered officials to secure the major ports of the country.
With the prohibitionist policy in full gear, the underground market for opium found a new life. Illegal opium traffic in the Philippines was seen as a lucrative venture by different businessmen. Meanwhile, opium addicts had no other choice but to rely on the black market. The American officials in Manila had no other choice but to reinvigorate their campaign against opium by 1920, this time focusing on opium smugglers. Additional security measures and protocols in ports and customs offices were employed to curb the entry of illicit opium in the country.
The proximity of the Philippines to opium-producing countries, its geography, and the politics on the ground became some of the major reasons that opium smuggling continued in the Philippines. Opium smugglers also used different methods in trying to evade authorities in the country. Several cases of attempts to smuggle illicit opium into and through the country involved both local and international steamships. Local steamships were used by smugglers to distribute smuggled opium from one local port to another. However, many of the smuggling attempts did not result in convictions since identification of the smuggler or owner of the seized opium was another problem. The involvement of some Chinese from Amoy, Hong Kong, and the Philippines is also apparent in various cases. Most of them are noted as dealers, owners, or consignees of the products seized. However, the narratives provided in this paper are but a fraction of the whole story, since most of the sources are government reports and there is a possibility that the situation on the ground was more complex.
The succeeding decade marked a pivotal change in the government’s implementation of opium law. The Philippines was granted a ten-year transitory period under the Philippine Commonwealth government and the US High Commission. Manuel L. Quezon was inaugurated as the first Philippine Commonwealth President in 1935. Apart from the different matters relating to national independence, the issue on opium was one of the major concerns that Quezon inherited upon assuming the presidency. In the first two years of his administration, he did not change any laws or orders pertinent to opium. However, in 1937 an important change happened in the administration of data collection pertinent to opium. Quezon issued Executive Order No. 107, “Designating the Commissioner of Health and Welfare to Take Charge of Collecting the Information and Furnishing the Reports Required by the Permanent Central Opium Board.”67 The designation of the health commissioner with regards to collection of information on opium can be seen as a shift to a public health approach in dealing with opium. Years later, as a result of the Second World War, opium trading routes were blocked which resulted in so-called “Opium Crisis” in the 1940s. The advent of synthetic narcotics and new methods of administering narcotics into the body also contributed to the decline in opium use.
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The Philippine Revolution was an independence war fought by the Filipino people against the Spanish Empire during the latter part of the nineteenth century. It was the culmination of the nationalist movement that started in the call for reforms by the educated Filipinos in Spain. Hostilities broke out between the revolutionaries and the Spanish forces on August 30, 1896, after the premature discovery of the underground secret society called Kataas-taasan Kagalang galang na Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan. See Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots of Filipino Nation, vol. 2 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2006), 266–300.
Immediately after the ratification of the Treaty of Paris between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of America, the United States President sent two subsequent commissions in the Philippines in 1899 and 1900, called the Schurman Commission and the Taft Commission respectively. The Schurman Commission was tasked with assessing the Philippine condition and recommending actions pertinent to its governance. Meanwhile, the Taft Commission was authorized to exercise executive and legislative powers while a Civil Government and an independent Legislature was being established in the Philippines. See Corpuz, Roots of the Filipino Nation, vol. 2, 570–72.
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Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865–1915 (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2008).
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Anne Foster, “The Philippines, the United States and the Origins of Global Narcotics Prohibition,” The Social History of Alcohol and Drugs 33, no. 1 (2019): 24.
Daniel J. P. Wertz, “Idealism, Imperialism, and Internationalism: Opium Politics in the Colonial Philippines, 1898–1925,” Modern Asian Studies 47, no. 2 (2013): 467–99.
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