Abstract
This article asks what role does the official national identity discourse play in building authoritarian resilience in Azerbaijan, and how do alternative narratives of particular historical events impact such resilience-building efforts? The discourse of Azerbaijanism is a source of diffuse support legitimizing the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan. This is largely due to the role played by the ruling family in Azerbaijanism and the emphasis that is placed upon that family’s ability to resolve internal and external threats to the developing nation-state. Alternative narrations of historical memories – such as those regarding the establishment of the Talysh-Mughan (Autonomous) Republic during the summer of 1993 – act as ‘hidden transcripts’ that shed light upon the cracks in the regime’s façade, challenging its claims to historical and other ‘truths’. In so doing, ‘hidden’ alternative transcripts challenge the legitimacy of the governing regime, testing the first of Gerschewski’s (2013) three pillars of authoritarian regime stability (i.e., legitimation, repression, and co-optation).
Resilience in liberal democratic societies presents differently from resilience in authoritarian regimes. While resilience has tended to suffer from under- theorization irrespective of the regime type in question, calling to mind such terms as ‘adaptability’, ‘flexibility’, ‘longevity’, ‘resistance’, and/or ‘robustness’ (see, for example, Kakachia et al. 2021, Stollenwerk et al. 2021, Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013), resilience is achieved via different means depending on regime type. This is most likely because liberal democratic societies are said to have certain baseline attributes aiding in peaceful transfers of power from one government to the next, whereas these baseline attributes (e.g., rule of law, freedom of expression and assembly, free and fair elections, checks and balances, etc.) are frequently conspicuously absent in authoritarian regimes. That is, liberal democratic systems of governance are largely built to promote and withstand transfers of power, while authoritarian systems are largely structured to prevent them. The latter is true for Azerbaijan, an authoritarian state located in the South Caucasus. In this article, resilience under authoritarian regimes of governance refers to regime longevity, resistance to internal and external shocks, and adaptability.
Using Azerbaijan’s relationship with its Talysh minority as an illustrative example, this article seeks to answer the following questions: What role does the state’s national identity discourse of Azerbaijanism play in building authoritarian resilience in Azerbaijan, and how do alternative narratives of particular historical events – in this case, regarding the Talysh-Mughan (Autonomous) Republic (TM(A)R) – challenge this resilience? In addition to being of interest to those seeking to better understand how authoritarian governments engage in resilience-building, this article should be of interest for area studies specialists on Azerbaijan as well as general audiences with an interest in majority-minority relations in Eurasia.
The article is structured as follows: following an introduction to the literature on resilience in authoritarian contexts, a connection is made between this literature and the situation in contemporary Azerbaijan. The discourse on Azerbaijanism provides a segue into discussion of resilience-building in Azerbaijan and the role played by certain ‘Others’ in this discourse. Section 2 is comprised of alternative narratives of events that took place during the summer of 1993, during a key moment in the processes of nation- and state-building in independent Azerbaijan. It was during this time that a little-known, little-studied autonomous unit, the TM(A)R, was established in south-eastern Azerbaijan, along the Azerbaijani-Iranian border.1 Section 3 discusses the role played by Azerbaijanism in resilience-building in the country, while Section 4 concludes with how alternative narrations of historical memory challenge authoritarian regime resilience in contemporary Azerbaijan. The article concludes with a brief discussion of potential avenues for future research.
1 Introduction
According to Sinkkonen (2021, 1178), “authoritarian resilience depends on controlling society and maintaining a certain level of elite coherence, and these end states are reached by using different instruments.” These instruments, for Gerschewski (2013), include legitimation, repression, and co-optation as the three pillars of authoritarian regime stability. It is perhaps the legitimation function that is the most surprising of the three, for, as Sinkkonen (2021, 1178) notes, ‘authoritarian legitimation’ prima facie seems an oxymoron. Yet relying upon repression and co-optation to maintain the regime’s hold on power is neither an efficient, nor cost-effective way of ruling over the long term. Rampton (2011) and Lewis (2016) note that a ‘deeper hegemony’ is needed if the state wishes to go beyond frequent displays of violence against opponents to maintain its hold on power. One way to attain such deeper hegemony is through the spread of hegemonic discourses throughout society.
Lewis (2016, 421–22) states that the resilience of authoritarian regimes is due in part to the
ability of the regime to construct a convincing hegemonic discourse that is internalized by key social groups and contributes to regime legitimacy. The government relies on extensive state propaganda and repression of independent media to maintain this discursive dominance, but […] the state does not depend only on repression: official discourses also resonate in society in ways that contribute to regime robustness.
Discussion of ‘hegemonic discourse’ in this way relates to Gerschewski’s (2013, 18) pillar on legitimation, which rests on ‘specific’ or ‘diffuse’ sources of support for the regime and “seeks to guarantee active consent, compliance with the rules, passive obedience, or mere toleration within the population.” Gerschewski explains that legitimation is a necessary pillar of stability, for “Rousseau’s famous dictum that even the strongest needs to transform strength into right, as he would never be strong enough to be always the master, applies to the autocratic context as well” (2013, 18).
Legitimation’s ‘specific’ and ‘diffuse’ types of support are characterized in the following ways: specific support stems from the regime’s ability to fulfill socio-economic demands as well as demands for physical and social security, whereas diffuse support can stem from political ideologies or “religious, nationalistic, or traditional claims, from the charisma of autocratic leaders as well as from external threats that lead to domestic rally-around-the-flag effects” (Gerschewski 2013, 20; see also Sinkkonen 2021, 1178–79). It is diffuse support’s “domestic rally-around-the-flag effects” that are of particular interest in this article. Here Lewis’s (2016, 422) discussion of hegemonic discourses is quite fitting, as hegemonic discourses, or “the dominant ideas, tropes, narratives and syntax that circulate in a society in ways that constrain the possibility of articulating alternatives to the status quo”, aid in regime legitimization. Furthermore, authoritarian states maintain control over discourse “both through the promotion of official discourse through state media, commonly labeled ‘propaganda’, and by the constraint of alternative voices through legal controls, censorship, coercion and repression” (ibid).
The narratives that comprise hegemonic discourses carry meanings and elicit responses that frequently serve to reinforce systemic discrimination. It is for this reason that Hoskins (2010) writes about the recuperative potential of narrative to make room for the telling of lesser heard stories. For Hoskins (2010), it is important to include these narrations in the recounting of events related to national heritage, regardless of whether the veracity of each claim can be proven. For Hoskins,
Challenging the monopoly of an evidence-based approach in recuperative forms of heritage need not open the gates to a moral relativism that sees no distinction between what happened and what is said to have happened. Neither should it confine the past to an exclusively folkloric realm. Challenging such a monopoly does, however, establish a way forward for more open discussion about contested historiography (2010, 272).
The voicing of Talysh narratives surrounding the creation and demise of the TM(A)R is crucial to gaining a better understanding of the relationship between the Azerbaijani ruling elite and the Talysh minority.
Activists’ remembrances of the TM(A)R are based upon twenty interviews – nineteen of which were conducted by the author. Seventeen of the interviewees self-ascribe as ‘Talysh’, while two do not. The latter two non-Talysh individuals were included here for their knowledge of events taking place in the early 1990s and their familiarity with key actors mentioned in this study. The interviews have been coded as ‘T’ for ‘Talysh’ and ‘NT’ for ‘non-Talysh’. The interviews were conducted in the Azerbaijani, English, or Russian languages and, with the exception of the interview with Alikram Humbatov, which is available online, the remainder of the interviews have been anonymized for ethical purposes. Interviewees are based across the world, from North America to Western Europe and Eurasia. Interview materials have been analyzed via content and discourse analysis.
1.1 Resilience-Building in Azerbaijan
In the case of Azerbaijan, a rentier-state whose natural resource wealth helps to provide sources of specific support (in the form of targeted economic reforms and/or simplified public ‘e-services’) to the population (Bedford 2023, 12), diffuse support comes from a variety of sources. The hegemonic discourse of Azerbaijanism is an amalgamation of these sources, as it is a political-territorial ideology that combines national identity discourse with a ‘First Family’ cult of personalities and considerable ‘Othering’ of external and internal actors (Akhundov 2016; see also Guliyev 2005, 414–18, on the personalization of power in Azerbaijan). Azerbaijanism is said to have been created by the third President of Azerbaijan, former Soviet apparatchik and KGB official, Heydar Aliyev, when he returned to the country in 1993 in the midst of considerable chaos. War in Nagorno-Karabagh was raging and newly independent Azerbaijan was at considerable risk of civil war and economic collapse. Azerbaijanism was one potential solution to the country’s problems, as it emphasized territorial affinities to the state and its constituent territories over birthright ties to any one ethno-national grouping (Tabachnik 2019). In practice, however, Azerbaijanism is reminiscent of Soviet practices of ethno-national institutionalization and, at times, contrarily displays pan-Turkic tendencies. Elements of both – post-1937 theorizations on the uniqueness of Azerbaijani nationhood and contradictory pan-Turkic sentiments – are found in Azerbaijanism as it is expressed in official documents, speeches, and history textbooks (cf. Tabachnik 2019; see also Goff 2021, 214–39; Huseynova 2012). This means that there is considerable disconnect between what Azerbaijanism professes to be and what it is in practice.
Perhaps the most notable feature of Azerbaijanism is its connection to Heydar Aliyev as the ‘great leader of the nation’ (Ümümmilli Lider) and to the First Family as both promoting and continuing his great legacy. Heydar Aliyev had served as President of independent Azerbaijan for ten years when, upon his death in 2003, his son, Ilham Aliyev, came to power in an election that international observers found to be marred with irregularities (OSCEPA 2003). Ilham Aliyev has since cracked down considerably upon civil society and independent news media in ways that have led to the ‘hardening’ or ‘consolidation’ of authoritarianism in the country (Welt 2014). In 2017, Aliyev Jr. established the position of Vice President and appointed his wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, to the post. Members and friends of the ruling family – which hail from the influential Nakhichevan, (Baku-based) Pashayev and Yeraz (from Armenia) clans – populate key government and business posts in the country, ensuring that power remains concentrated in the highest echelons of the government and in the hands of the ruling family (NT1; Sanamyan 2017; see also Tokluoglu 2005, 747–49; cf. Turan 2021). The First Lady’s clan, that of the Pashayevs, has grown in power in recent years, increasingly at the expense of the Nakhichevani and Yerazi clans (Kamilsoy 2024).2
Azerbaijanism is also comprised of considerable ‘Othering’ of internal and external actors deemed to pose a threat to the territorial and/or existential existence of the as-of-yet-developing Azerbaijani nation-state. These ‘Others’ include: the ‘opposition’ (a grouping together of all those deemed to oppose the policies of the ruling regime, including critically-minded journalists or civil society representatives and political opposition figures), the historical ‘frenemy’ states of Russia and Iran, and, most centrally, Armenia, which is framed as the historical enemy of the Azerbaijani and Turkish people (Meydan TV 2015, OC Media 2020a, Synovitz 2020, Trend 2020). These internal and external ‘Others’ are frequently interconnected, as members of the internal opposition are commonly indicted as agents of Armenia, Iran, Russia, or ‘the West’ in expressions of opposition to the Aliyev regime and/or its individual policies.3
Azerbaijanism as a hegemonic national identity discourse is one key source of diffuse support serving to legitimize the governing authoritarian regime. It is promoted, as Lewis (2016, 422) notes, “through state media, commonly labeled ‘propaganda’, and by the constraint of alternative voices through legal controls, censorship, coercion and repression.” State media (state-owned or affiliated broadcasting, publishing, and internet) is a public communications tool bringing hegemonic discourses like Azerbaijanism into educational institutions, workplaces, and private dwellings. It does this by publicizing official speeches, ceremonies and national holidays, court cases, and the like. The state media works as a public communications tool through its silences as well as its visual and auditory conveyances. It determines what is on the political agenda as well as how those events are ‘spun’ or portrayed to wider audiences. Azerbaijanism as a hegemonic discourse legitimizes the authoritarian regime by directly tying the success of the developing nation-state with the leadership of the ruling family. Furthermore, it is a source of diffuse support due to the selective scapegoating that it promotes of named ‘Others’ in official historiography and popular memory. At times, members of the country’s minority groups – including the Talysh – serve as ‘Others’ in official discourse, not least because of their alleged affinities with certain named ‘Others’ (e.g. between the Talysh and the Persian population of Iran).
1.2 Azerbaijanism and Threats to the Nation-State: The Talysh-Mughan (Autonomous) Republic
According to the 2009 Census, there are 112,000 Talysh living in Azerbaijan, comprising about 1.3 percent of the population (Population Statistics of Eastern Europe 2009). The country’s then-fourth largest minority group behind the Lezgins, Armenians4 and Russians, the Talysh predominantly reside in the south-east, along Azerbaijan’s border with Iran. The Talysh are concentrated in the Lenkoran, Astara, Masalli, Lerik, and Bilasuvar districts, and sizable Talysh populations are located in Baku and Sumqayit in the Absheron Peninsula as well. The Talysh are largely Shi’ia Muslims like titular Azerbaijanis, but there are marked differences between the Talysh and Azerbaijani languages – the former, related to Persian, is part of the Indo-European language family, while the latter is a Turkic language. Azerbaijani-Talysh bilingualism is the exception rather than the norm (Clifton 2009, 2). For much of the Soviet period, Talysh were actively encouraged to identify as ‘Azerbaijanis’, with the ethnic category of ‘Talysh’ disappearing from the All-Union Census altogether in 1959 and reappearing again in 1989. According to Goff (2021, 177–78), using tools like the census, the Talysh were seemingly made to ‘disappear’ from public life in the Soviet Union, although their continued existence was really something like a ‘public secret’ – something about which everyone knew, but never really discussed in the open. Although the government of Azerbaijan and its spokespeople assert that minority languages and cultures are welcomed and protected in the Republic, Talysh activists heartily disagree, alleging far-reaching assimilatory policies that echo those undertaken during much of the Soviet period (T1–10, T12–18). Activists have long taken issue with census-taking in the country as well, alleging that the numbers of Talysh living in Azerbaijan are deliberately and systematically underrepresented by the government. Activists place the current number of Talysh in Azerbaijan anywhere from between 200,000 to 2,000,000 (ibid). The exclusion of ethnicity from contemporary Azerbaijani censuses makes it exceedingly difficult to know the true number of Talysh living in the country as well as in which districts they are concentrated.
One key event shaping the relationship between the Azerbaijani government and the country’s Talysh minority took place during the summer of 1993 and involved the temporary creation of an autonomous unit upon Azerbaijani territory. Just what this ‘autonomy’ meant at the time, however, is open to interpretation. According to official Azerbaijani historiography, Colonel Alikram Humbatov, a self-ascribed member of the Talysh community, took advantage of Azerbaijan’s preoccupation with conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh and Ganja in order to seize power in several districts in the southeast of the country and declare the existence of an independent Talysh-Mughan Republic (Aliyev 1993a, 1993b; Heydar Aliyev Heritage Research Center 2013). In so doing, he reportedly went against the wishes of the people of the region, Talysh and non-Talysh alike, in establishing said republic and interfered with the sending of troops and equipment to Nagorno-Karabagh, doing irreparable damage to the Azerbaijani military’s performance there. In these narratives, Colonel Alikram Humbatov and his followers are traitors to their country whose actions threatened to destroy the Azerbaijani state from within (Aliyev 1993a, 1993b, 1995; Aliyev 2013). They were threats that needed to be extinguished, marginal voices that needed to be silenced for the good of the developing nation-state. In the end, official accounts tell us that, after calls to action by Heydar Aliyev in late August of 1993, it was the local people themselves who brought down the Talysh-Mughan Republic, with some even losing their lives in the effort (Aliyev 1993a).
All of this is relevant because the telling of alternative accounts of what occurred in 1993 has been effectively banned in Azerbaijan. Talysh activists can attest to the fact that people have been jailed for far less (OC Media 2021, IRFS 2022). At present, the relationship between the state and the Talysh minority is one of mutual distrust and suspicion. Talysh activists note the role of the defunct TM(A)R of the summer of 1993 as continuing to play a part in structuring the relationship between governing authorities and the country’s Talysh minority; that is, said republic is considered to have constituted a threat to Azerbaijani territorial statehood, meaning that supporters of the republic are frequently viewed as separatists and traitors to their country. According to official accounts, “Historically, Azerbaijan’s ethnic landscape has been diverse, and national minorities have never been subjected to discrimination or ethno-religious biases in Azerbaijan at any point in history regardless of their number” (Baku International Multiculturalism Centre 2020). Being Talysh in Azerbaijan is acceptable when this identity is quietly expressed alongside support for the ruling regime and within the parameters set forth by the ideology of Azerbaijanism. Outside of this framework, however, to be Talysh is to be subjected to a combination of what Gerschewski deems high- and low-intensity repression (2013, 21), with physical violence and imprisonment representing the ‘high-intensity’ end of the spectrum and surveillance, harassment, intimidation, and constrained opportunities for employment and education representing the ‘low-intensity’ end.
Outspoken Talysh are ‘othered’ in Azerbaijani national identity discourse across a number of dimensions. First, because they are reminiscent of the threat posed by Talysh activists during the summer of 1993. They are ‘Others’ because they do not fit neatly into the discourse of Azerbaijanism, which downplays self-ascribed ethnic ties in favor of territorial affinities and support for the ruling regime. Second, they are ‘Others’ because elements of their culture have more in common with populations of neighboring Iran than Azerbaijan. Widespread pride in the country’s Turkic roots, another narrative of hegemonic national identity discourse (Huseynova 2012), often does not sit well with those who self-identify as Talysh, for, like interview participant T9 states, “The Talysh can call themselves ‘Azerbaijanis’, but the Talysh will not call themselves ‘Turks’.” Whereas strategic Talysh elites are frequently co-opted by the regime, others not pegged for co-optation are repressed (see, for example, Mamedov 2012; Storm 2023). Whether one is subjected to high- or low-intensity repression frequently depends on the reach or scale of projection of the individual/s in question.
2 Alternative Narratives
2.1 Nationalist Mobilization
From the mid-to-late 1930s up until Gorbachev’s glasnost’ in the late 1980s, the Talysh were actively discouraged from identifying as such and, instead, were encouraged to identify as Azerbaijanis (Goff 2021, 144–78). As was the case in many former Soviet republics, however, the late 1980s brought to the political fore popular front movements and other organizations concerned with reestablishing political, territorial, and/or socio-cultural autonomy of titular nations within their named homelands. This was true for Azerbaijan as well, and, initially, some key members of the Talysh intelligentsia took part in events aiming to break Moscow’s hold upon Azerbaijan. At the same time, however, a uniquely Talysh movement was gaining ground among the Talysh intelligentsia that would aim for an independent, federalized Azerbaijani state wherein the Talysh, like the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabagh, would have some measure of territorial and socio-cultural autonomy in the country. In the late 1980s, the Avesta organization, the Talysh National Revival Party,5 and the Popular Front for Reconstruction would all be established in or around Lenkoran in south-east Azerbaijan, and all would work to mobilize support for a Talysh national movement. The Popular Front for Reconstruction, established just before Azerbaijan’s Popular Front movement would be registered in 1989, existed independently for a time before joining forces with the latter, working simultaneously for the rights of the Talysh and the rights of Azerbaijanis to their own independent state. It was envisaged that the Talysh would have greater rights in an independent Azerbaijan than within Soviet Azerbaijan.
Alikram Humbatov’s first attempt to seize control in the south-east was not actually in June 1993, but January 1990, when Humbatov, heading the Lenkoran Branch of the Popular Front movement, attempted to oust Soviet authorities in the region. Following the events of Black January in 19906 and the arrival of the Soviet army in Lenkoran in late January 1990, the attempt proved to be unsuccessful and Humbatov was tried twice and released, eventually with a three-year suspended sentence, for his role in the uprising (T1). Already by this time disillusionment with the Popular Front was growing among members of the Talysh intelligentsia. As sentiments of Pan-Turkism grew louder within the movement’s ranks, there would be a break between key members of the developing Talysh national movement and that of the Popular Front. According to T9,
When they [representatives of the Popular Front] began calling themselves Turks, the Talysh began to understand that they are a separate ethnos. […] That is, as a result of their nationalism, our ethnic self-consciousness began to grow.
In October 1991, Humbatov gathered volunteers from his Lenkoran Popular Front followers, despite having officially broken with the Baku-based Popular Front movement some months prior, and pooled resources to purchase uniforms. Humbatov recalls,
On October 9, a group of us Talysh earned 2,000 rubles with the money of that time, and with that money we bought 20 sets of military uniforms, called afghals, and about 20 Talysh people decided to create [a military unit]. Our main goal was to destroy the 60th Division of Russian soldiers and officers of the 60th Division, the military personnel of the 60th Division and prevent the process of transportation of military cargo, weapons and ammunition [to Russia] (T1).
Now a member of the Social Democratic Party, Humbatov applied to then- President Ayaz Mutalibov7 for official permission to stop the looting of military equipment and its transferal to Russia by members of the 60th Division of the former Soviet armed forces. Although NT1 notes that Mutalibov gave his approval for Humbatov to act in service of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense, Humbatov’s haphazard paramilitary unit was not awarded official status until the Popular Front’s frontman, Abulfaz Aliyev, aka ‘Elchibey’,8 came to power (NT1). NT1 notes that the then Popular Front government was eager to make use of Humbatov’s unit, designated as Battalion N. 820 since May 1992, and bring Humbatov closer to the political centre.9 Similarly, T16 notes, “they tore him away from the Talysh region as though he was […] already thinking about separating the Talysh region from Azerbaijan. Therefore, they brought him to the center.”
There appears to have been some distrust of Humbatov’s influence behind the scenes, as Humbatov was unable to achieve the rank of General and he reportedly sensed a danger to his previously semi-coopted position with the government.10 According to Humbatov, “I was a colonel, and the Ministry of Defense allegedly wanted to give me a rank. Isa Gambar11 spoke there and said, ‘What, a general from [among] the Talysh?!’ Such a conversation reached me. It affected me badly” (T1).
2.2 The Establishment of the Talysh-Mughan Republic
Resigning from his Ministry of Defense post training troops in late-February– early-March 1992, Humbatov returned to what Talysh activists term the ‘Talysh region’ in the south-east and would remain somewhat apart from politics until summer 1993. By this time, Popular Front leadership in the region had become widely unpopular and Humbatov still had enough of a following to challenge Popular Front leadership there. Although an initial demand to concede power to Humbatov and the military unit backing him went unheeded by local Popular Front leadership, when Humbatov and his forces reemerged from a brief sojourn in the forests, they successfully took over governance of several districts, including Lenkoran, Lerik, Astara, Masalli, Yardimli, Jalilabad, and Bilasuvar, and declared the existence of the Talysh-Mughan Republic on 21 June 1993.
Meanwhile, an uprising was underway in Ganja, led by Col. Surat Huseynov,12 that led then-President Elchibey to abscond to his native Nakhichevan and Heydar Aliyev to return to power in Baku. Aliyev was brought back to Baku to negotiate with Huseynov to halt his March on the capital and to attempt to gain the upper hand in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. Aliyev would soon be negotiating with Humbatov as well. NT2 notes that Heydar Aliyev returned to Baku during a time when “war was going on, when there were official, unrecognized armed formations. Each had its own leader, each was armed, and the leaders had become powerful.” Alikram Humbatov would soon find himself up against Heydar Aliyev, attempting to negotiate terms for the regionally-based cultural autonomy of the Talysh people.
A couple of points are noteworthy here. Firstly, while Alikram Humbatov’s Battalion N. 820 might have initially been considered a paramilitary unit, it was formally brought under the Ministry of Defense in May of 1992 after formerly being given permission to act on the behalf of the Ministry in the renationalization of military equipment. Secondly, Battalion N. 820 was allegedly fighting in Nagorno-Karabagh at the time of the Talysh-Mughan Republic’s establishment. T9 insists, for example, that members of Battalion N. 820
were all issued, confirmed by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan […] these officers were officers of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan. They fought in Nagorno-Karabakh. And they received a salary from the Ministry of Defense. That is, they all carried weapons as officers of the Azerbaijani army.
Thirdly, while initially termed the ‘Talysh-Mughan Republic’ on 21 June 1993, Talysh activists assert that efforts began to be put into motion that would bring this Republic in line with domestic and international law. According to T5, Alikram Humbatov
stood at the origin of Azerbaijan’s gaining of independence. He was a member, a key member, of the Popular Front. He later came to see differences and left for Lenkoran and declared the TMAR there. […] Of course, the word ‘autonomous’ wasn’t [initially] there, but in his actions – there were never any intentions within his actions to separate from Azerbaijan. There wasn’t a single element.
In July 1993, Alikram Humbatov brought a fellow member of the Talysh intelligentsia, Fakhraddin Abbaszode (Abbasov), into the fray with a task to compose the republic’s founding constitutional law. Much discussion and deliberation reportedly went into the writing of said law and the framing of the republic within the territorial confines of the Azerbaijani state (Abbaszode 2003). Still more work went into putting together a body of formerly elected officials, currently elected officials, and influential members of the Talysh community who could vote on the constitutional law. In the end, some 217 of the 250 representatives of the People’s Assembly came together on 7 August 1993 and voted for the creation of the Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic (TMAR). The Constitutional Law was adopted, a constitutional drafting commission was elected, the “Temporary Regulations of the People’s Assembly of the TMAR” was adopted, and the flag was approved. Alikram Humbatov was elected the President of the TMAR, Fakhraddin Abbaszode was elected Speaker of the People’s Assembly, and candidates were put forward for the post of Prime Minister. It was not long after the events of 7 August that the Republic collapsed. T9 insists, however, that, “It did not collapse – it was forcibly disbanded. It did not collapse on its own.”
2.3 The Establishment of the Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic: Calm before the Storm
Soon after the Autonomous Republic was voted upon and documents were sent to Baku, Heydar Aliyev begun taking the Republic more seriously, undertaking to coopt key members of the Talysh intelligentsia and to discredit the Republic’s key figures, including Humbatov. According to T4, “all these documents were sent to the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan for approval. Well, of course, Aliyev came to power, then at the end of August he began to crush Alikram Humbatov and the movement […].” A special session of the Milli Mejlis, the National Assembly, was called on 16–17 August to discuss the handling of the TM(A)R and Heydar Aliyev began meeting in secret with members of the intelligentsia, offering them positions in the government in exchange for their obeisance. At one point during the middle of the month, Aliyev secretly recorded members of the Talysh intelligentsia speaking ill of Humbatov and praising Aliyev. This was then broadcast on national television, serving to undermine Humbatov and others’ efforts to legitimize the Autonomous Republic.
The final straw seemed to take place on 23 August 1993, when Heydar Aliyev made a televised speech addressing the people of the Talysh region and asking them to overthrow Humbatov and his followers. What occurred following this broadcast differs considerably in state-sanctioned accounts and those of Talysh activists. The former asserts that Humbatov and his men fired upon a crowd of locals having gathered to demand that Humbatov cede control over the region to Baku (Aliyev 1993a). The latter insists that the crowd that was gathered that day was not made up of locals, but, rather, a group assembled at the orders of Baku with the purpose of carrying out a provocation (T4, T5, T9, T13, T16, T18, also NT1). Talysh activists assert that it was not Humbatov and his men who fired into the crowd, but, rather, agents of the provocation that caused the bloodshed that day. Two non-Talysh activists pointed to the results of an independent investigation after the fact to call official accounts into suspicion, with the non-Talysh activists claiming that the bullets were fired from the wrong direction to have come from Humbatov and his men (NT1, NT2).
There may well be no way to know exactly what transpired on or around 23 August, 1993, but what is clear is that whatever occurred within that cloud of political intrigue and violence brought down the Autonomous Republic and forced its key representatives to flee. Alikram Humbatov was arrested for his role in the creation of the TM(A)R and was charged with treason, among other serious offenses. He was able to escape from his high-security prison before being recaptured in 1995 and being sentenced to death.13 Pressure from the Council of Europe led to Humbatov’s retrial in 2002, after which time he was found guilty yet again and his sentence was commuted to life in prison in 2003. Humbatov was formally pardoned in 2004, stripped of his Azerbaijani citizenship, and transported to the Netherlands, where he and his family lived in exile. Humbatov passed away in the Netherlands in December 2022 at the age of 74. While he is remembered in Azerbaijan as a separatist and traitor to his country, the majority of Talysh activists remember him much kindlier, as a man who, despite having made mistakes, did what he thought best at the time (T2–10, T13–18). The two non-Talysh activists interviewed for their proximity to events in 1993 remember him as a man who simply took the wrong path and went against the wrong rival, two events which sullied Humbatov’s reputation in an undeserved, yet irrevocable way. NT2 states that, “all the media have forgotten that this man fought against the separatists [in Nagorno-Karabagh] […] he was called a separatist. And what happened, in general, they did not try to figure it out. They did not try, but instead tried to create this negative image [of Alikram Humbatov].” Thus, thanks in large part to Azerbajiani mass media and the elites who operate it behind-the-scenes, Alikram Humbatov became “a man whose role in history has been confirmed” (T2), although not, generally, in positive terms.
At present, it remains highly difficult to ascertain how Alikram Humbatov and the events of June-August 1993 are remembered within Talysh communities in Azerbaijan, as conducting research on such a subject would be dangerous for both the researcher and participants. Participants from this study assert that there is no one dominant opinion of Humbatov among Azerbaijan’s Talysh population; some consider him to be the leader of the Talysh people, while others blame him for making an already difficult situation – that of being Talysh in Azerbaijan – worse. While those like T12 will never forgive him for wasting what they saw as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to achieve some form of autonomy for the Talysh people, still others, including the majority of interview participants, view Humbatov as a man who, despite having made mistakes, simply did his best to cope with difficult and uncertain circumstances. Yet one must reconcile oneself with the knowledge that, try as one might, one might never fully know what occurred during the summer of 1993 because certain ‘powers that be’ do not desire for certain facts to come to light.
3 Discussion
Pride in the country’s colorful ethno-national mosaic is a key narrative in the national identity discourse of ‘Azerbaijanism’, an ideology associated with the third president of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev. Although this ideology was meant to counter the ethno-nationalism touted by his predecessor, Abulfaz Elchibey of the Azerbaijani Popular Front, some argue that pan-Turkic sentiment (as opposed to, for example, pride in the people’s religious and/or socio-cultural affinities with Persia and modern-day Iran) continues to play a key role in Azerbaijanism alongside an important territorial component of identity. That is, there continues to be a tension between identity narratives that emphasize jus soli vs. jus sanguinis in Azerbaijani national identity discourse, where the jus sanguinis narratives focus upon the legacy of the Azerbaijani people as a proud Turkic people. This creates difficulties for members of the country’s non-Turkic minority groups, including the Talysh. When to be Azerbaijani frequently calls to mind pride in the majority’s Turkic (over Persian or other) roots (Huseynova 2012), wearing the metaphorical hat of ‘Azerbaijani’ can be an uncomfortable – if not wholly unacceptable – fit for a self-ascribed Talysh individual. Furthermore, the relationship between Azerbaijan and its national minorities is highly securitized, which explains at least in part the dearth of critical research having been conducted within Azerbaijan on the subject of this relationship (Goff 2021, Siroky & Mahmudlu 2016, and Sayfutdinova 2021 are notable exceptions). T3 remarks that, “Government propaganda is this: the Talysh are our brothers, but if some of them want to speak their language, [or] write about their problems, [then] they are traitors, separatists, [or] they work for Iran, Armenia, or the West, and we must arrest or kill them.”
In Azerbaijan, the opposition is frequently framed as a destabilizing ‘fifth column’ working to undermine Azerbaijan’s national-ideological and territorial integrity. The ‘opposition’, in turn, can be anyone expressing ambivalence or outright disagreement with regime policies. Talysh activists are frequently framed as agents of Armenian, Iranian, or Russian interests (Mamedov 2012, Fatullayev 2014) and, as such, can be grouped together with opposition of the rumored ‘fifth column’ and viewed as a threat to Azerbaijani nation-statehood. Narratives of threats posed by external or internal ‘Others’, coupled with those of the savior complex of the ruling family, act as kinds of diffuse support that create “domestic rally-around-the-flag effects” (Gerschewski 2013, 20) that bolster regime resilience. Diffuse support, coupled with specific support such as socio-economic development and guarantees of physical and social security, helps to provide the regime with the legitimation it needs to stay in power. Relying upon repression and co-optation alone in the long run would be far too costly and inefficient to be sustainable, although both are also used in the Azerbaijani case as well, as accounts in Section 2 have demonstrated. Many members of the Talysh elite were co-opted by Heydar Aliyev directly after the former had voted upon the establishment of the TM(A)R in mid-August 1993.
The state-controlled media is one way that the regime goes about indoctrinating members of the populace with its hegemonic discourses, but there are myriad other ways to do this, some more obvious than others. Textbooks, national holidays and commemorative dates, parades, statuary, official state symbols, toponyms, and even banknotes can fulfil this function. More recently, the Azerbaijani political regime has taken an interest in countering alternative discourses on social media with its own (Bedford 2023, 14, 16) as well as treading a fine line between open internet access and more stringent internet governance. Crackdowns on independent media and civil society in 2013 and 2014 lead to doubts as to whether either sector will recover anytime soon. All of this means that the government attempts to restrict access to information and takes measures to ensure that its key discourses maintain their hegemonic status within society “in ways that constrain the possibility of articulating alternatives to the status quo” (Lewis 2016, 422). NT1 explains,
our population knows its history very poorly, and that includes events of those years. They are poorly remembered. […] Our population is fed these surrogate historical myths. […] And the authorities construct these different myths, feed these myths [to the population], and they [the people] love to believe in these myths. And later the government does with them what it wants.
The hegemonic discourse of Azerbaijanism, through its narratives espousing the Aliyev ‘great national leader’ complex and the posing of internal and external threats to territorial Azerbaijani nation-statehood, constrains others’ (and ‘Others”) abilities to articulate alternative narrations of the past. Talysh activists’ remembrances of 1993 have no place in contemporary historiography in Azerbaijan, because they go against official narratives of what occurred that summer. There is no dialogue, which means that self-ascribed Talysh in Azerbaijan have little control over how they are portrayed in official historiography or popular memory. Events of summer 1993 have led to the securitization of the country’s Talysh minority and have led to a situation wherein labels like ‘separatist’ and ‘traitor’ continue to be applied to those Talysh individuals who boldly profess a Talysh identity. For T5, events during the summer of 1993 constitute “an attempt to create an autonomous formation and this attempt, unfortunately, is used like a tool, an instrument over the past thirty years to assimilate the Talysh people. This reasoning is very disturbing.”
T18 feels that, while things are unlikely to change in Azerbaijan anytime soon, one day there will be a chance for others to explore the events of 1993 from a historical perspective. For now, however, it is next to impossible to access the kinds of archival documents that could change the nature of the conversation:
As long as [Ilham] Aliyev is sitting in power, as it was his father who fabricated everything, no one will be able to take out these archival documents. But he won’t be in power forever; at some point he will leave. Then Azerbaijani society can take out these archival documents, put them on the table, and see what actually happened.
Hoskins (2010) notes the recuperative potential of narrative in beginning to address historical silences and injustices, in that “the rhetorics, tropes and figures of speech characteristic of marginal pasts are praised precisely because of their capacity to disrupt the mainstream modernist historical accounts implicated in their exclusion” (2010, 270). Rather than viewing narrative accounts on the basis of historical accuracy, Hoskins says, “it is more helpful to understand them as records of negotiation with national history” (2010, 271). The inclusion of Talysh activists’ accounts of 1993 is meant to serve as one such ‘record of negotiation’.
4 Conclusion
This article set out to answer the following questions: What role does the national identity discourse of Azerbaijanism play in building authoritarian resilience in Azerbaijan, and how do alternative historical narratives challenge authoritarian regime resilience? The national identity discourse of Azerbaijanism is one source of diffuse support aiding in the legitimation of the Aliyev regime. This is largely due to the key role played by the ruling family in Azerbaijanism and the emphasis that is placed upon said family’s ability to tackle internal and external threats to the territorial and existential integrity of the Azerbaijani nation-state. In this sense, then, the hegemonic discourse of Azerbaijanism is a boon to resilience-building in authoritarian Azerbaijan, where resilience is taken to mean regime longevity, resistance to internal and external shocks, and adaptability. The hegemonic discourse has proven to be highly flexible, at times highlighting a territorial, civic identity for all Azerbaijanis (as citizens of Azerbaijan), irrespective of ascribed ethnic background, and, at other times, promoting the Turkic socio-cultural and linguistic ties of titular Azerbaijanis as anchors of Azerbaijani identity (cf. Tokluoglu 2005).
Yet how do alternative narratives of particular historical events (i.e., regarding the establishment of the TM(A)R) challenge authoritarian regime resilience in Azerbaijan? In his book, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1990, 18), Scott distinguishes between “public” and “hidden transcripts”. Whereas the former is the readily discernable script, written by those in power and facilitating the exercise of said power over others, the latter occurs “Offstage, where the subordinated may gather outside the intimidating gaze of power”, where a “sharply dissonant political culture is possible”. Azerbaijanism, then, is the public transcript of national identity in Azerbaijan with which citizens must openly play along to avoid censure. Behind the scenes, however, there are alternative narrations or transcripts that challenge those of officialdom and whisper truth to power. Alternative narratives of the establishment of the TM(A)R challenge the diffuse, “rally around the flag effects” (Gerschewski 2013, 20) of power that support the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan; they do this by challenging the unquestioned veracity of the public transcript and offering up for consideration alternative versions of history and historical memory.
Gerschewski (2013, 25) notes that the three pillars of stability in autocratic, or authoritarian regimes, legitimation, repression, and co-optation, require constant inputs to remain standing, for:
If the political regime elites are no longer able, due to hard budget constraints and/or declining power resources, to foster legitimation within the population, to uphold a functioning repressive apparatus, or to distribute enough material benefits to co-opt strategic actors in a sufficient way, the institutionalization process within the pillars comes to a halt.
The less institutionalization – or normalized patterns of behavior that structure relations – that there is within the pillars, then the less stable that pillar becomes. The fewer normalized patterns of behavior there are, the less predictable the path becomes, meaning that path dependency is going to be difficult to maintain. Alternative narratives of historical memories such as those told by the interviewees for this research challenge regime resilience in Azerbaijan by challenging the legitimation of official ‘truths’ in the realm of nation-building, thereby challenging the institutionalization process within a key pillar of stability.
For as long as alternative narrations of historical memories continue to be told behind-the-scenes, out of public – and official – view, the disciplinary and punitive mechanisms of the authoritarian regime are more easily avoided – and their overall impact upon regime resilience is likely to be limited. Keeping the transcripts hidden, then, helps to keep one alive. This is something that Talysh interviewees understand very well. The majority of Talysh activists interviewed expressed having felt pressured to some extent by the government of Azerbaijan, from near as well as from afar, both within and outside of Azerbaijan (T2–10, T12–18). Over the past few years, three Talysh activists have been arrested and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Fakhraddin Abbaszode and Elvin Isayev were extradited to Azerbaijan in 2018 and 2019 from Ukraine and Russia, respectively, whereas Aslan Qurbanov was arrested within Azerbaijan in 2020 (Amnesty International 2020; OC Media 2021). While Abbaszode’s name may be familiar (as the Speaker of the TM(A)R’s National Council), the other two men, Elvin Isayev and Aslan Qurbanov, were social media users whose online activities negatively drew the attention of the Azerbaijani authorities (see Storm 2023). Talysh activists have found that expressing their views on the internet comes with certain risks, potentially even when operating from outside of the territorial confines of the Azerbaijani state. Talysh activists T1–10 and T12–18 look to the deaths of two prominent Talysh intellectuals, Novruzali Mamedov (in 2009) and Fakhraddin Abbaszode (in 2020), whilst in prison in Azerbaijan as cautionary tales of Talysh activism, however restrained (as in the case of Novruzali Mamedov) or controversial (as in the case of Fakhraddin Abbaszode) (RFERL 2009, OC Media 2020b; see also Storm 2023).
The alternative historical memories outlined in this article demonstrate instead the power of hidden transcripts to highlight the deficiencies and incompleteness of the public transcript that is Azerbaijanism. They demonstrate that, even under or in response to conditions of authoritarian governance, alternative conversations happen wherein people recognize their subjugation, express dissonance, and take active measures to avoid censure or punishment. As a result, individual agency is proven to be alive and well, even where, at first glance, it might appear to be ailing or absent. An interesting agenda for future research, however, would be to analyze how Azerbaijanism as a hegemonic discourse impacts other minorities’ abilities to visualize themselves as belonging within and to the Azerbaijani ‘nation’. Experiences involving the Sadval movement, a seemingly fringe movement linking Lezgins in Azerbaijan with those across the border in Russia in the late 1980s–early 1990s, similarly led to the securitization of the relationship between the Azerbaijani state and its Lezgin minority, for example (Sayfutdinova 2021). Additionally, developments in relations with Armenia over the status of Nagorno-Karabagh as well as Baku’s relationship with officials in Nakhichevan are going to prove interesting for those with an interest in the Talysh case. Whether or not Baku guarantees Nagorno-Karabagh’s heretofore majority Armenian population the right to return to the latter territory – and, if so, under what conditions – will set a precedent for what types of autonomy can credibly be sought in the future by groups like the Talysh.
Interviews
T1, Interview between Leyla Arif (Interviewer) and Alikram Humbatov (interviewee). 24.04.2022. Accessed June 2022: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jCPSEtYCPgY&t=911s and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-lt08RVg2M&t=1s
T2, Anonymous male. Email responses. Azerbaijani. 28.06.2022
T3, Anonymous male. Email responses. English. 21.03.2022
T4, Anonymous male. Zoom platform. Russian. 05.04.2022
T5, Anonymous male. Zoom platform. Russian. 03.02.2022
T6, Anonymous male. Zoom platform. English. 17.12.2021
T7, Anonymous male. Zoom platform. English. 13.04.2022
T8, Anonymous male. Skype. English. 17.03.2022
T9, Anonymous male. Whatsapp. Russian. 15.04.2022
T10, Anonymous female. Zoom. English. 08.04.2022
T11, Anonymous female. Whatsapp. Russian. 23.05.2022
T12, Anonymous male. Whatsapp. Russian. 06.04.2022
T13, Anonymous male. Whatsapp. Russian. 18.05.2022
T14, Anonymous male. Whatsapp. Russian. 24.05.2022
T15, Anonymous male. Skype. Russian. 29.05.2022
T16, Anonymous male. Whatsapp. Russian. 01.07.2022
T17, Anonymous female. Zoom. Russian. 21.03.2023
T18, Anonymous male. Zoom. Russian. 19.05.2022
NT1, Anonymous male. Zoom. Russian. 01.06.2022
NT1a, Anonymous male. Email correspondence. Russian. 20.04.2023
NT2, Anonymous female. Zoom. Russian. 10.06.2022
Acknowledgements
This undertaking was made possible by Grant 2020–00870 from the Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development as part of the InBorder project (2021–25) as well as a fellowship (2023–24) within the JENA-CAUC project, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions on this work. Any remaining errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the author. The Swedish Ethical Review Authority’s consent to conduct this research was obtained under decision No. 2021-05343-01.
Bibliography
Abbaszode, F.F. 2003. “ИСТОРИЯ НАШЕЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ [The History of Our Republic].” Atropat, 25 June, available at http://atropat.narod.ru/zavtra0261.html (accessed 5 July 2023).
Akhundov, Sabir. 2016. “Azerbaijanism.” Open Democracy, 2 August, available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/azerbaijanism/ (accessed 7 July 2023).
Aliyev, H. 1993a. “Azərbaycan Respublikasının Lənkəran, Astara, Masallı, Lerik, Yardımlı, Cəlilabad və Biləsuvar rayonlarında yaranmış vəziyyət haqqında [About the situation in Lankaran, Astara, Masalli, Lerik, Yardimli, Jalilabad and Bilasuvar regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan]. E-Qanun.az, available at https://e-qanun.az/framework/8527 (accessed 31 October 2023).
Aliyev, H. 1993b. “Speech of the Acting President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Heydar Aliyev at the Republican Conference in Baku – August 24, 1993”. “Heydar Aliyev Heritage” International Online Library, available at https://lib.aliyev-heritage.org/en/4546255.html (accessed 5 July 2023).
Aliyev, H. 1995. “Speech of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijcan [sic] Heydar Aliyev at the Meeting of the Commission That Elaborates the Draft of the New Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic – November 10, 1995”. “Heydar Aliyev Heritage” International Online Library, available at https://lib.aliyev-heritage.org/en/7322284.html (accessed 31 October 2023).
Aliyev, T. 2013. “Tarixin ibrət dərsləri [Lessons from History]”. Xalq Qazeti, 30 September, available at http://old.xalqqazeti.com/az/news/analytics/38381 (accessed 31 October).
Amnesty International. 2020. “Amnesty International Public Statement: Azerbaijani Authorities Must Release Talysh Activists.” 8 June, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur55/2492/2020/en/ (accessed 31 October 2023).
Baku International Multiculturalism Centre (BIMC). 2020. “ABOUT THE MEASURES IMPLEMENTED IN THE FIELD OF THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR LANGUAGES AND CULTURES IN THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN: Report on the Protection of National Minorities.” BIMC, 3 December, available at http://multikulturalizm.gov.az/en/post/1768/about-the-measures-implemented-in-the-field-of-the-protection-of-national-minorities-and-development-of-their-languages-and-cultures-in-the-republic-of-azerbaijan.html (accessed 3 July 2023).
Bedford, S. 2023. “Ring Out the Old and Ring in the Young: Upgrading Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan.” Baltic Worlds 16, 3: 8–23.
Brown, C.S. 2004. “Wanting to Have Their Cake and Their Neighbor’s Too: Azerbaijani attitudes towards Karabakh and Iranian Azerbaijan.” The Middle East Journal 58, 4: 576–596.
Clifton, J. 2009. “Do the Talysh and Tat Languages Have a Future in Azerbaijan?” Work Papers of the Summer Institute of Linguistics, University of North Dakota Session: Vol. 49, Article 2: 1–5.
Fatullayev, E. 2014. “Брюссель собирает талышских стрелков (наше расследование) [Brussels gathers Talysh separatists (our investigation)].” Haqqin.az, 20 March, available at http://haqqin.az/news/18933 (accessed 31 October 2023).
Freedom House (n.d.). Freedom on the Net: Azerbaijan. available at https://freedomhouse.org/country/azerbaijan/freedom-net/2022 (accessed 23 June 2023).
Goff, K.A. 2021. Nested Nationalism: Making and Unmaking Nations in the Soviet Caucasus. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gerschewski, J. 2013. “The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes”. Democratization 20, 1: 13–38.
Guliyev, F. 2005. “Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An Attempt at Conceptualization.” Demokratizatsiya 13, 3: 393–435.
Heydar Aliyev Heritage Research Center (2013). 90 Instants [sic] of the Great Leader. Baku: Sharq-Qarb. P. 13. available at https://lib.aliyev-heritage.org/en/97067189.html (accessed 31 October 2023).
Hoskins, G. 2010. “A Secret Reservoir of Values: The Narrative Economy of Angel Island Immigration Station”. Cultural Geographies 17, 2: 259–275.
Huseynova, S. 2012. “Azerbaijan in the Late 20th-Early 21st Centuries: Ethnic Boundaries in the Context of Relations with “Neighbours”,” in The South Caucasus and Turkey: History Lessons of the 20th Century, edited by Rumyantsev, S., 120–144. Tbilisi: Heinrich Boell Foundation.
IRFS. 2022. “The Supreme Court Partially Satisfied the Complaint of Blogger Aslan Gurbanov.” Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, 23 June, available at https://www.irfs.org/news-feed/the-supreme-court-partially-satisfied-the-complaint-of-blogger-aslan-gurbanov/ (accessed 7 July 2023).
Kakachia, K., Legucka, A. and Lebanidze, B. 2021. “Can the EU’s New Global Strategy Make a Difference? Strengthening Resilience in the Eastern Partnership Countries.” Democratization 28, 7: 1338–1356.
Kamilsoy, N. 2024. “Cut the Branches, Strengthen the Roots: Evolution of the Political Structure in Azerbaijan”. ISPI, 6 February, available at https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/cut-the-branches-strengthen-the-roots-evolution-of-the-political-structure-in-azerbaijan-162641 (accessed 12 February 2024).
Keck, M. and Sakdapolrak, P. 2013. “What is Social Resilience? Lessons Learned and Ways Forward.” Erdkunde 67, 1: 5–19.
Lewis, D. 2016. “Blogging Zhanaozen: Hegemonic Discourse and Authoritarian Resilience in Kazakhstan”. Central Asian Survey 35, 3: 421–438.
Mamedov, E. 2012. “Baku Keeps Lid on Ethnic Minorities”. Eurasianet, 5 September, available at https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-baku-keeps-lid-on-ethnic-minorities (accessed 31 October 2023).
Meydan TV. 2015. “Ilham Aliyev Accuses the West of Trying to Destabilize Azerbaijan”. Meydan TV, 9 September, available at https://www.meydan.tv/en/article/ilham-aliyev-accuses-the-west-of-trying-to-destabilize-azerbaijan/ (accessed 7 July 2023).
OC Media. 2020a. “Azerbaijani Opposition Hit with New Arrests Following Aliyev Speech.” OC Media, 17 July, available at https://oc-media.org/azerbaijani-opposition-hit-with-new-arrests-following-aliyev-speech/ (accessed 7 July 2023).
OC Media. 2020b. “Prominent Talysh Activist Dies in Prison in Azerbaijan.” OC Media, 12 November, available at https://oc-media.org/prominent-talysh-activist-dies-in-prison-in-azerbaijan/ (accessed 31 October 2023).
OC Media. 2021. “Talysh Blogger Sentenced to 7 Years in Azerbaijan.” OC Media, 20 April, available at https://oc-media.org/talysh-blogger-sentenced-to-7-years-in-azerbaijan/ (accessed 7 July 2023).
OSCEPA (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Parliamentary Assembly). 2003. International Election Observation Mission: Presidential Election, Republic of Azerbaijan – 15 October 2003. Council of Europe, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 16 October, available at https://www.oscepa.org/ru/dokumenty/election-observation/election-observation-statements/azerbaijan/statements-3/1377-2003-presidential/file (accessed 5 July 2023).
Population Statistics of Eastern Europe. 2009. Ethnic composition of Azerbaijan. available at http://pop-stat.mashke.org/azerbaijan-ethnic2009.htm (accessed 5 July 2023).
Rampton, D. 2011. “‘Deeper Hegemony’: The Politics of Sinhala Nationalist Authenticity and the Failures of Power-Sharing in Sri Lanka.” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 49, 2: 245–273.
RFE/RL (Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty). 2009. “Journalist, Rights Activist Dies in Azerbaijani Jail.” 18 August, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/Journalist_Rights_Activist_Dies_In_Azerbaijani_Jail/1802552.html (accessed 31 October 2023).
Sanamyan, E. 2017. “Azerbaijan’s new Vice President(s) and its House of Clans.” Eurasianet, 23 February, available at https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijans-new-vice-presidents-and-its-house-clans (accessed 23 June 2023).
Sayfutdinova, L. 2022. “Ethnic Boundaries and Territorial Borders: On the Place of Lezgin Irredentism in the Construction of National Identity in Azerbaijan”. Nations and Nationalism 50, 4: 794–812.
Scott, J.C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sinkkonen, E. 2021. “Dynamic Dictators: Improving the Research Agenda on Autocratization and Authoritarian Resilience”. Democratization 28, 6: 1172–1190.
Siroky, D.S. and Mahmudlu, C. 2016. “E Pluribus Unum?: Ethnicity, Islam, and the Construction of Identity in Azerbaijan.” Problems of Post-Communism 63, 2: 94–107.
Stollenwerk, E., Börzel, T.A. and Risse, T. 2021. “Theorizing Resilience-Building in the EU’s Neighbourhood: Introduction to the Special Issue.” Democratization 28, 7: 1219–1238.
Storm, K.J.T. 2023. “ Discursive-Technical Landscaping and Policing the Body (Politic) in Azerbaijan: A Case Study of Talysh Activists.” Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography. DOI: 10.1080/04353684.2023.2284428.
Synovitz, R. 2020. “Azerbaijan’s Despotic Ruler Throws ‘Tantrum’ in Unprecedented Crackdown on Pro-Democracy Rivals.” Radio Free Europe: Radio Liberty, 30 July, available at https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-s-despotic-ruler-throws-tantrum-in-unprecedented-crackdown-on-pro-democracy-rivals/30757480.html (accessed 7 July 2023).
Tabachnik, M. 2019. “Defining the Nation in Russia’s Buffer Zone: The Politics of Citizenship by Birth on Territory (Jus Soli) in Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, 3: 223–239.
Tokluoglu, C. 2005. “Definitions of National Identity, Nationalism and Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan in the 1990s.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 28, 4: 722–758.
Trend 2010. “Trial Begins in Azerbaijan Over Former Police Chief Accused of Committing Serious Crimes”. Trend.az, 8 January, available at https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/1614722.html (accessed 31 October 2023).
Trend 2020. “President Ilham Aliyev: We Cannot Allow Anti-Azerbaijani Forces, Fifth column, National Traitors to Commit Various Provocations.” Trend.az, 19 March, available at https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3210746.html (accessed 7 July 2023).
Turan. 2012. “Disbandment [of] the Clan in Azerbaijan.” Turan, 12 March, available at https://www.turan.az/ext/news/2021/3/free/analytics/en/2148.htm (accessed July 2023).
UN News 2023. “UN Karabakh Mission Told ‘Sudden’ Exodus Means as Few as 50 Ethnic Armenians May Remain.” UN News, 2 October, available at https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/10/1141782 (accessed 31 October 2023).
Welt, C. 2014. “In the Shadow of Revolution: A Decade of Authoritarian Hardening in Azerbaijan.” Working paper, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
The word ‘autonomous’ appears in parentheses – as in ‘Talysh-Mughan (Autonomous) Republic’ – due to its different official titles over the period June–August 1993. When the Republic was initially established in June 1993, its name was the ‘Talysh-Mughan Republic’. After a narodniy mejlis (people’s congress) convened to vote on its establishment in August 1993, it was proclaimed as the ‘Talysh Mughan Autonomous Republic’. These issues are discussed in more detail in the following sections.
The three most influential clans in Azerbaijan are the Nakhichevan, Baku-based Pashayev, and Yeraz clans (meaning ‘Yerevan Azerbaijanis’). Ilham Aliyev is presently the most powerful member of the Nakhichevan clan, although his wife, Mehriban, is the most visible member of the Pashayev family, which is growing in prominence by the year and is beginning to reduce the power and influence of the Nakhichevan clan. Although Heydar Aliyev was born in Nakhichevan, his family was also represented in the Yeraz clan. The Yeraz clan has been steadily weakening in recent years in favour of the Pashayevs.
Complicating matters, however, is the existence of a some 20-million strong grouping of ethnic Azerbaijanis across the border in Iran. Whereas Iran has long been an ‘Other’ for Azerbaijan, its ethnic Azerbaijani population and the lands upon which they reside have been the focus of nationalist rhetoric since the late 1980s as components of a long-lost “South Azerbaijan”. Whereas the leader of the Azerbaijan Popular Front, Abulfaz ‘Elchibey’ Aliyev, frequently spoke of uniting the North and the South by virtue of what he saw as the inevitable collapse of the Iranian territorial state, Heydar Aliyev took a much more pragmatic approach to the issue. Heydar Aliyev preferred to minimize the role of South Azerbaijan in public discourse and to shift the focus from individual populations of ethnic Azerbaijanis (such as those in Iran) to discussions of a worldwide Azerbaijani Diaspora (Brown 2004).
The 2009 Census included the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabagh. Given the recent and dramatic demographic shift undergone within Nagorno Karabagh since September 2023 (when Azerbaijan regained control over the breakaway region), the UN reports that as few as 50–1,000 Armenians remain in the region (UN News 2023).
Later renamed the Talysh People’s Party in 1991 and the National Equality Party in 1993. Following events surrounding the TM(A)R, the party was banned in 1993.
Events that became known as ‘Black January’ took place in Baku 19–20 January 1990, as the Soviet armed forces violently cracked down on protests in Baku over the status of Nagorno- Karabagh. Communal violence against Armenians occurred at this time as well.
Former First Security of the Azerbaijan Communist Party (1990–91) and first President of independent Azerbaijan (1991–92).
The second President of independent Azerbaijan (June 1992–June 1993) and former head of Azerbaijan’s Popular Front Movement.
All but two interview participants volunteered that Humbatov and men at his command fought valiantly in battles for Nagorno-Karabagh, although the timing is difficult to determine (for example, whether this fighting occurred prior to or after the battalion was given official status as Battalion N. 820).
‘Semi-coopted’ because Humbatov had quit the ranks of Popular Front leadership for a position in the Social Democratic Party prior to his induction into the Ministry of Defense as of May 1992, after which time it was necessary to eschew party affiliations.
Former Acting President of Azerbaijan (May–June 1992) and Speaker of the Azerbaijani National Assembly (Milli Mejlis, 1992–93).
Colonel of the Azerbaijani military who, following Popular Front claims of purposeful sabotage of Azerbaijan’s military performance in Nagorno-Karabagh, went against then-President Elchibey’s forces and proceeded to march on Baku. NT1 and NT2 allege that Col. Humbatov was in cahoots with Surat Huseynov against Abulfaz ‘Elchibey’ Aliyev. Huseynov was successfully coopted by Heydar Aliyev during the summer of 1993, with Aliyev having offered Huseynov the post of Prime Minister in exchange for halting his military activities. Huseynov served as Prime Minister of Azerbaijan from 1993–94 before being arrested for allegedly taking part in the failed coup of October 1994.
Although it is alleged that Humbatov and those imprisoned with him (including Surat Huseynov and Rahim Gaziyev) had supporters within the state security services helping to orchestrate this escape (see Trend.az 2010), interview participants professed to having no knowledge of how this escape occurred.