Abstract
In 2020, Melissa Williams proposed that Western democracy should undergo a process of deparochialization. This inquiry contributes to this effort by comparing different concepts of Shura from Islamic thought, deriving from a Quranic principle. Despite the extensive debate surrounding Islamic democracy, systematic comparisons of various concepts of Shura within the framework of Comparative Political Theory are scarce. To address this gap in the literature, this paper focuses on three Islamic authors with different backgrounds: Rachid Ghannouchi, Murad Hofmann, and Fathi Osman. The paper first reconstructs the Quranic tenets of Shura and their respective concepts. Secondly, it compares the three concepts by highlighting their similarities and differences. Finally, it evaluates how these comparative insights contribute to the deparochialization of democracy. The analysis concludes that deparochialization not only challenges parochial aspects of Western democracy but also highlights the enduring value of certain democratic principles in shaping a more inclusive, globalized understanding of democracy.
Research on the concept of democracy has produced a vast literature in the last decades, (Dean et al., 2019; Estlund, 2007; Gallie, 1955; Przeworski, 2024; Rosanvallon, 2008; Schmitter, 2019), albeit this literature has been largely confined to a “Western” context or perspective (Williams, 2020, pp. 203–205). David Graeber (2022, pp. 131–136), challenging the construct of the “West,” argues that such Westerncentric conceptualization constrains a global scientific debate on democracy. The necessity to overcome such scientific bias is evident in various fields such as Postcolonial Theory and Comparative Political Theory (cpt). In this regard, Melissa Williams (2020, p. 204), proposing the deparochialization of democratic theory, argues for the necessity to assert the Western perspective as only one among other perspectives and calls for “exploring resources in ‘non-Western’ thought and practice for enriching or disrupting contemporary theories of democracy under conditions of globalization.” In this way, such extended academic practice “serves as a testing ground for the validity of the generalized claims in our existing theoretical frameworks” (Williams, 2020, p. 202).
James Tully (2020, p. 42–46) argues that such a deparochialization of the mainstream Western understanding requires a dialogue between a researcher and texts, traditions or concepts from different contexts focusing on a common phenomenon or problem, i.e., the analysis of concepts aiming to deepen the understanding of the underlying phenomenon. In this article, I argue that collective decision-making is such a phenomenon linking Western democracy and the Quranic principle of Shura (شورى), a form of consultation or deliberation. By bringing together the global academic debate on the concept of democracy, i.e., democratic theory as understood and taught in the mainstream Western academic circles, and the intra-Islamic debate on the application of Quranic principles and thought, I demonstrate that the latter enriches the understanding of democracy by throwing light on important aspects that are often neglected in the mainstream Western perspectives. In this article, this will take place in two ways. First, the analysis and comparison of non-Western Islamic texts on Shura1 decenters the mainstream hegemonic Western conceptions of democracy. A dialogue with texts from different societies with different sociocultural and historical coordinates enriches the debate through its multi-perspectival potential. Second, such a dialogue recenters the debate on democracy, incorporating those new insights (Tully, 2020, p. 31; Williams, 2020, p. 202) through a comparative approach. However, deparochialization is an endeavor that needs a wider debate among scholars globally to include the different spatial-temporal arguments and thus might never be completed. This article is one brick-stone in the wall of a new global multi-perspectival understanding of democracy.
As proposed by Graeber (2022, pp. 129–130), the term “democracy” can be scrutinized from two different perspectives: (1) an analysis of the different uses of the term “democracy” and the associated meanings, or (2) an examination of the various practices perceived to be democratic or share some characteristics of democracy. These perspectives are anchored in the distinction between semasiological and onomasiological approaches to analyze the meaning of terms. The latter approach focuses on the “pratiques” and “meanings” that are described with the term “democratic,” whereas the former focuses on the term “democracy” linguistically. This article is primarily based on the second approach, as I examine various concepts of Islamic principles and thought, specifically Shura, and the associated practices and principles derived from the respective conceptualizations.
I argue that, with reference to Islamic principles and thought, Shura is a more suitable term to deparochialize democracy than Ijtihad (اجتهاد) or Musawa (مساؤاة), which are also linked to democracy (Altuntas-Akir, 2022; Badry, 1998). Ijtihad is a concept rooted in Islamic jurisprudence and refers to the possibility of deviating from the established principles set forth in the Quran. Musawa is somewhat more political in nature, as it is derived from the Arabic term for equality, and thus represents an argument for equality. While each of these concepts may be linked to and contribute to democracy, Shura is most explicitly related to democracy, whether as a familiar or different concept or as an Islamic form (Altuntas-Akir, 2022; Badry, 1998; Esposito & Voll, 1996, p. 27). The discussion is also linked to the term sovereignty (ḥukm حكم or sulṭa سلطة), which was previously addressed in the second issue of this journal (for example Ezzat, 2021; March, 2021). Concepts such as sovereignty have enjoyed a more extensive debate than Shura in the existing state-of-the-art. This is exemplified by the contribution of Andrew March (2019) and the aforementioned special issue of this journal.
While the terms Shura and democracy have been discussed in the existing literature (Al-Raysuni, 2011; Badry, 1998; Esposito, 1991; Esposito et al., 2015; Jawad, 2013; Rahman, 1981), a twofold gap can be identified. First, there is a lack of systematic comparisons in the contemporary conceptual debates. For instance, John L. Esposito (1991) in a seminal work in this area, discussed Shura as an Islamic form of democracy. However, he and his co-authors have not offered a systematic comparison of different conceptualizations of Shura yet (Esposito, 1991; Esposito & Piscatori, 1991; Esposito & Voll, 1996). Other researchers have concentrated on particular Muslim authors in their contributions, aiming at the reconstruction of their political thought (Berridge, 2017; March, 2019) or referring to other additional concepts for theorizing a Muslim democracy (Altuntas-Akir, 2022). Only one recent contribution by Uriya Shavit (2010) discusses different conceptualizations of Shura and their respective prospects for democratization in a Western liberal style (2010, pp. 349–350). Given the literature reviewed above, I see specific potential for a systematic review and comparison of the different concepts of Shura.
Second, the current conceptualizations of Shura and the surrounding debates have been essentialized and othered as “Islamic forms and debates” (Esposito & Piscatori, 1991; Shavit, 2010). I see such essentialization as a form of othering hampering the deparochialization of democracy. In its place, I propose, in order to depart from the mainstream Western and hegemonic understanding of the concept of democracy, the inclusion of the concepts of Shura alongside other cultural understandings of democracy, of which Western democratic theory is but one. This I see as a key aspect for the deparochialization of political and democratic theory (Tully, 2020, p. 32; Williams, 2020, p. 202).
Taking into consideration the above elaborations, this article aims to make a substantial contribution to cpt by employing insights from the concepts of Shura (March, 2009, p. 552; Tully, 2020; Williams, 2020). Within cpt, my approach is situated at the intersection of normative-analytical, historical, and critical cpt (Ackerly & Bajpai, 2017, pp. 276–286). My contribution is a systematic comparison of three different Sunni conceptualizations of Shura, namely those by Rached Ghannouchi, Murad Hofmann, and Fathi Osman. I have selected the theoretical works of these authors for reasons of relevance to the objectives of this article, the backgrounds of these authors, and the accessibility of their works within the wider literature in this area. This facilitates comparability, which will be elaborated on further in the next section. I argue that their conceptualizations support deparochializing the mainstream Western understanding of the concept of democracy if these are treated not as exotic Islamic forms but serious contributions to democratic theory reflecting the diversity and interconnections of global political thought. Through a comparison of these conceptualizations, I will demonstrate that they highlight six different aspects. Three of these six aspects highlight certain often neglected viewpoints in the debates that emanate from Western academia. The other three aspects align with key understandings of Western democratic theory. While the former helps to decenter, the latter helps to recenter the current Western understanding. Thus, I argue that deparochialization does not imply that Western theorizations are absolutely wrong; rather, Western understandings can continue to fruitfully inform the global debate on democracy. In this way, this article facilitates insights for a global, deparochialized understanding of democracy.
The rest of the article is organized into three sections. The first section elaborates on the main tenets of Shura. In the second section, I analyze the various conceptualizations of Shura, as put forth by the three previously mentioned scholars: Ghannouchi, Hofmann, and Osman. Through a comparative analysis focusing on the relationship between Shura and democracy, the requirements of Shura, and its institutional arrangements, I demonstrate how their writings contribute to the deparochialization of the concept of democracy in mainstream Western academia. Lastly, I discuss the insights of the comparison for deparochialization and present a pathway for a more comprehensive and deparochialized concept of democracy.
The Tenets of Shura
The concept of Shura is first mentioned in the Quran in two different suras, namely Sura 3:159 and Sura 42. The latter is also known as the Ash-Shura (الشورى). Both texts establish the necessity for Muslims to “conduct their affairs by mutual consultation” (42:38).2 It is possible to distinguish the literature on Shura in to two distinct categories. The first category comprises works that focus on the historical and Quranic interpretations (Al-Raysuni, 2011; Crone, 2001; Ka Ka Khel, 1980). The second category comprises works that seek to adapt the concept of Shura for modern times (Ghannouchi, 1993; Hofmann, 2007; Najjar, 1958; Osman, 1996). This debate is of central importance for the analysis carried out in this article. The second category comprises secondary literature that analyzes the potential for democratization through the application of the concept of Shura, as well as national debates (Esposito & Piscatori, 1991; Esposito & Voll, 1996; Shavit, 2010).
In modern times, scholars, especially from Islamist groups, have referred to Shura as the authentic Islamic form of democracy. The intention to find its distinct roots of modernity emanates from the broader discourses in Arab countries during their colonization by Western countries (Esposito & Voll, 1996, p. 30; Scharabi, 2001, pp. 49–51). In the wake of the colonial experience, Arab intellectuals, beginning with Mohamed Abduh and Djamal Al-Afghani, sought to elucidate the underlying factors that facilitated the experience of being colonized and its concomitant sentiment of degradation of the colonized (Esposito & Voll, 1996, p. 5; Hendrich, 2004, pp. 64–83). Consequently, the concepts of authenticity (اصالة) and cultural heritage (تراث) became pivotal points of reference in the debate, serving to justify ideas and concepts or developing new ones (Adonis, 2001, p. 68; Djait, 2001, pp. 37–38; Hendrich, 2004, p. 153). Shura, as one such concept, was proposed as a means of substantiating an authentic form of political system, while simultaneously distinguishing it from the Western concept of democracy (Esposito & Voll, 1996, p. 30).
With this background, the term “Shura,” given its region-wide debate in the sociopolitical organization of societies in the Arab world, appears to be an appropriate term for further analysis, with a distinct potential to contribute to a broadening of the debate on the concept of democracy and its deparochialization. I will focus on a comparison of three different conceptualizations of Shura, namely those proposed by Ghannouchi, Osman, and Hofmann. I have selected these three authors for four reasons. First, all of them are Sunni scholars and contemporary to each other. Rached Ghannouchi (*1941) is from the Maghreb, while Fathi Osman (*1928–2010) is an Egyptian. Murad Hofmann (*1930–2020) is a Muslim convertite of German descent. This diversity in their origins contributes toward triangulation of the literature reviewed for this article. Alongside these background spatial and temporal coordinates, these authors have engaged extensively with Western debates on democracy, pluralism, and modernity. Moreover, I will demonstrate that they have different starting points regarding the relationship between Shura and democracy. I exclude Shia scholars as the Shia discourses are qualitatively distinct in their orientation. Indeed, an engagement with the literature of Shia scholars can fruitfully widen the debate further and can be of consideration in a separate article. Second, these authors are pivotal figures in this area of research and cited frequently in the wider literature (Altuntas-Akir, 2022; Donohue & Esposito, 2007). Third, they provide an excellent foundation for further comparisons given the accessibility of their contributions in Arabic as well as translations in other major world languages. Fourth, their contributions to the understanding of Shura have not been subjected to thorough analysis, as in the case of other scholars such as Hasan al-Turabi (Berridge, 2017; Moussalli, 1994). Therefore, this article is the first of its kind offering a systematic comparative analysis of the works of the three authors.
The various conceptualizations of the term Shura derive from the ambiguity of the religious sources, the Quran and Sunna, different texts relating to the life of the Prophet Muhammad. Despite the assertion by Islamic fundamentalist scholars that their interpretation of the Quran represents its sole, unambiguous meaning, the Quran and the Sunna have shown their ambiguity that led to the dominant Madhabs, i.e., legal schools (Bauer, 2021). The concept of Shura is explicitly mentioned only twice in the Quran. The majority of the respective sources are drawn from the Sunna and the hadiths, single reports from the Sunna, which are manifold and sometimes contradictory (Bauer, 2021; Esposito, 2003; Hughes, 2000, p. 655). Additionally, there are different methods for their interpretation, which can lead to different conclusions and conceptual arguments. Concomitantly, a particular interpretive position taken depends on the hadith and method used, albeit each of the three authors refers to the Quran (Lohlker, 2012, p. 117).
To gain a preliminary understanding of the concept of Shura, it is first necessary to reconstruct the basic assumptions that form the foundation of this concept. These can be found in Sura 42 and Sura 3:159. Lastly, many scholars include another Sura in their discussion, albeit it does not mention Shura explicitly (9:71).
- (1)It is intended by God that there are different communities (42:8 ;امّة).
- (2)Dissent is a natural phenomenon in human communities (42:10), whereas unity is compulsory only in issues among God and religion (42:13).
- (3)In certain cases, it is necessary to find a resolution to dissent. Any ultimate decision resides with God (42:10).
- (4)It is necessary for communities to be governed by people. However, there is dissent according to the interpretation, if the plural form refers to a group of people governing or to a successional order (42:15).
- (5)There are public affairs (أَمْر) in communities (42:38).
- (6)It is a duty to consult in public affairs. This duty is religiously of the same significance as prayer and charity (3:159, 42:38; وَأَمْرُهُمْ شُورَىٰ بَيْنَهُمْ).
- (7)Women and men have the same duties and capabilities to discern right and wrong (9:71).
Although the Quran does not stipulate any particular procedure for application of and adherence to Shura, several hadiths suggest the possibility of a majoritarian rule (Crone, 2001, pp. 5, 15, 22; Ka Ka Khel, 1980, p. 275). Therefore, the three authors cite a distinct hadith in which the Prophet Mohammad followed the majority of those participating in Shura despite his opposition to their decision (Ghannouchi, 1993; Hofmann, 2001; Osman, 1996). This observation leads to two additional assumptions:
- (1)Majority rule is legitimate.
- (2)The position of the majority is binding.
The Conceptualizations of Shura by Ghannouchi, Hofmann and Osman
To present the analysis of Shura, I will first discuss the different concepts of Ghannouchi, Hofmann, and Osman followed by a comparison of these concepts with each other. I begin with Ghannouchi, followed by Hofmann and Osman, whose arguments appear to oscillate between orthopraxis and ijtihad. To appreciate their thoughts and theories, I discuss them critically in the comparison section (March, 2009, pp. 545–546). Overall, the aim of this section is to present the distinct conceptualizations of Shura by the respective authors.
Rached Ghannouchi, a Tunisian politician and one of the co-founders of the Tunisian modern Islamist party Ennahda, employs a broad concept. The works of Ghannouchi, rather than elaborating and discussing the concept of Shura, engage in discussing freedoms and secular politics. From his discussion of strategy and an ideal Islamic system, however, some assumptions about his interpretation of Shura can be derived. Therefore, I use different texts authored by Ghannouchi to reconstruct his conceptualization of Shura. Some of the most important texts on this topic are Basic Freedoms in Islam (2023a), The Dialectic of Unity, Difference, and Political Pluralism in Islam (2023b), and The Participation of Islamists in a Non-Islamic Government (1993, 2007). In these texts, Ghannouchi argues that Shura and democracy are quite similar in that they fulfill the same purpose: “Can any Muslim community afford to hesitate in participating in the establishment of a secular democratic system if it is unable to establish an Islamic democratic one? The answer is no. It is the religious duty of the Muslims, as individuals and as communities, to contribute to the efforts to establish such a system” (2007, p. 273).
Accordingly, Ghannouchi distinguishes between democracy and an Islamic state governed by Shura, when he states that “These procedures and mechanisms, which are still evolving and improving, are the most advanced form of contemporary shura and of democracy in its contemporary expression” (2023a, p. 45). He posits that they are quite similar in that both aim at the implementation of justice. Although they have different sociocultural origins, the procedures of Western democracy are a suitable application for Shura in the present day (Ghannouchi, 2007, p. 273).
For Ghannouchi, Shura is one of the two integral aspects of an Islamic state. The supreme legal authority of an Islamic state is the Sharia, i.e., revealed law.3 Judges and scholars are obliged to deduce laws as guidelines, while the head of state oversees the implementation of such laws.4 The community holds the political power through the implementation of Shura (Ghannouchi, 2007, p. 273). To exert this power, it is necessary to implement a system of Shura, which involves a mandatory consultation, and which may have similarities to the procedures of Western democracy. The purpose of Shura is to reach a consensus on decisions in public policy. Further, Ghannouchi emphasizes that Islam is a pragmatic religion, and that therefore Muslims must adapt themselves and Shura to the current situation. Consequently, the concrete form of Shura is capable of undergoing evolution over time and within a given society (Ghannouchi, 2023b, p. 66).
Ghannouchi (2023a, pp. 42, 55) also emphasizes that an Islamic system with Shura prevents tyranny, which is an important consideration in Islam. It is therefore necessary to establish procedures, in case the need arises, for the removal of a leader, as well as procedures for subsequent elections to choose a new leader. Furthermore, an Islamic state and Shura must guarantee the rule of law and the separation of powers (Ghannouchi, 2023a, pp. 45, 132). Freedom of expression and other basic freedoms are a prerequisite for Shura, as they ensure the existence of an open debate and participation through the application of Shura. Moreover, pluralism is inherent to an Islamic political system (Ghannouchi, 2023b, pp. 67–68). While some topics are governed by religious law and judges, others pertaining to public affairs are decided through Shura (Ghannouchi, 2023a, pp. 37–39). The decisions carried out through the application of Shura and the politics of Islam should bring people closer to the Good and avoid the Wrong while maintaining consensus and unity within a pluralistic society (Ghannouchi, 2007, pp. 275–277, 2023b, p. 66).
Hofmann, a German diplomat serving in Morocco and Algeria and fluent in Arabic, converted to Islam after his experiences during the Algerian War and his critique of Western modernity. He discusses Shura more explicitly than Ghannouchi. After his conversion, he promoted Islamic societal discourse, presenting a critique of Western liberalism while advocating for democratic methods. In his seminal book, Religion on The Rise, Hofmann discusses the concept of Shura in depth in the chapter entitled “Democracy or Shuracracy” (2001, pp. 85–103).
Starting from the debate of sovereignty, Hofmann points out that the Arabic term hukm (حُكْم) is often translated as “sovereignty,” but hukm Allah (حُكْم اللَّـه) as “rule of God.” The common translation of democracy as “rule of the people” gave rise to difficulties in understanding the concept of people’s sovereignty, as this may be interpreted as placing human beings on the same level as God. Moreover, the “rule of God” (حُكْم اللَّـه) obviously cannot be understood to imply that God is engaged in the job of everyday politics, governing His people on earth (Hofmann, 2001, p. 91). As Hofmann puts it: “Sovereignty here rather refers to the sovereignty of God’s Word (Qur’ran) and Law. This being granted, the question remains, how Muslims can best implement the divine Revelation received” (2001, p. 91). Therefore, people must identify a method of governance that aligns with the principles of the Quran and Sharia.
For Islamic societies, this method can be found in the concept of Shura. While Western democracy and Shura share common characteristics with a broader concept of democracy, Hofmann argues for the differentiation between Western democracy and Shura, or Shuracracy, i.e., a true Islamic democracy. He posits eleven “cornerstones” for Shura:
- (1)The Quran represents the highest constitutional norm.
- (2)The constitution must be in accordance with the Quran and Sharia. Therefore, a constitutional court checking the accordance of any law is necessary.
- (3)A parliament (مجلس الشورى) is the implementation of Shura.
- (4)In modern mass societies a representative parliament is the best way for implementing Shura.
- (5)As long as rulers appoint members of the parliament themselves the government is controlling itself. This prevents the participation of all Muslims in Shura. Given that Shura is a duty, free and general elections are necessary. However, there is a hadith in which Mohammed rejected one candidate for becoming governor of a province because he had proposed himself and campaigned for the position. This poses a severe problem since it impedes any modern election campaign.5
- (6)The consultations of the parliament are binding. Thus, they represent decisions.
- (7)Dissent is part of everyday life. Unity is necessary only regarding belief, ritual, and morality. Debate is allowed in any other subject. Thus, differences are welcomed. Although the principles of Sharia are binding, codification of law by the parliament is necessary as modern societies need laws.
- (8)The separation of powers is part of Islamic democracy.
- (9)The head of state can be elected both directly and indirectly. However, he must be a male Muslim.
- (10)Although the head of state must be a male Muslim, this is not the case for the head of the executive, who can have any religion and sex.
- (11)There is no prescribed procedure for the election, but inheritance is forbidden. (Hofmann, 2001, pp. 92–96)
Although these cornerstones partially overlap, they provide fundamental guidelines for Shura. They also imply the existence of public affairs and a public sphere where fundamental rights must be accessible to everyone, leading to an Islamic form of pluralism. Additionally, Hofmann argues that any constitution refers to extra-constitutional precepts and values such as human rights, God, justice, and Sharia. Thus, states that have Islam as a fundamental extra-constitutional basis are not exceptional compared to other global democratic states (Hofmann, 2001, pp. 98–101).
Of the three authors whose works are analyzed, Osman presents the most comprehensive conceptualization of Shura. After graduating from Al-Azhar University in Egypt, the Egyptian scholar relocated to the United States of America. Below, I will outline three basic assertions from his seminal text, Shura and Democracy, and summarize his conceptualization of Shura.
First and foremost, Osman points out that Western democracy can be a form of Shura. This is evident in his assertion that “democratic mechanism can provide the practical ways for implementing Shura. Islam urges Muslims to adopt all human wisdom” (1996, p. 46). This reverses the relationship between the term democracy and Shura put forth by the first two authors. While Shura is generally perceived as a form of democracy, Osman asserts a vice-versa relationship, implying that the Western form is a special form of Shura which is the more universal concept (1996, pp. 47–49).
Second, for Osman, Shura is central for the reasoning of the political order of Muslim societies because it is more than a mere ritual as the foundation of Bai’a. The Bai’a is a reciprocal oath or pledge of allegiance between the ruler and the community. While the members of the community are obliged to obey, the ruler, in turn, is also obliged to satisfy the common interest. Most interestingly, Osman states that “ruler” can also be an organizational body, thus objecting the common claim that the ruler can only be an individual. This is because, in the Quran, the plural form of rulers is always used (Osman, 1996, pp. 47–48).
Third, central to Osman’s reasoning and argument is a statement derived from the Sunna, specifically a hadith, which suggests that if a pratique or concept fulfills an obligation set out in the Quran, then its use becomes obligatory (1996, p. 46). Starting from this point, he posits that, considering the current time, context, and technological possibilities, voting for parliament and the executive is crucial for determining the common interest and fulfilling the obligation of Shura (Osman, 1996, pp. 47–50).
Here, Osman links two aspects to unfold his main argument. First, one central Quranic assertion is that human beings are deficient, which is why they are prone to err and make wrong decisions. To circumvent fallacies and errors, Muslims should be open to arguments in order to enhance their own position. Concomitantly, they are urged to support their fellow citizens in this endeavor.
An important element of Osman’s arguments in relation to his concept of common interest is that he states that there is neither a justification nor guarantee that fewer people yield better decisions. In his words: “But the Quran never teaches that a reliance on a few persons necessarily yields perfect decisions. A majority can make mistakes, but their mistakes are most likely fewer than the mistakes of one or a few” (Osman, 1996, p. 48). Given that individuals hold unique positions, values, and interests, their perspectives are inherently biased. To avoid misperceptions or biases regarding the common interest, it is essential to ensure that the majority is involved in the decision-making process. There is no justifiable superior procedure because any procedure can potentially yield erroneous results. Additionally, there is no guarantee that a smaller group would necessarily make superior decisions in general. Thus, the best instrument to prevent errors regarding the common interest is to take everybody into account (Osman, 1996, pp. 48–52).
Accordingly, the casting of votes represents the optimal method for preventing misguided actions, either in the selection of those who are best suited to rule or in the determination of which decisions are most prudent. In Osman’s opinion, parliaments currently serve this purpose best, since they fulfil the requirements of representation. To represent the common interest, no one should be excluded, as the Quran asserts that every person, regardless of their sex, ethnicity, or religion (except for non-monotheistic religions and atheists), is capable of differentiating between right and wrong decisions. To protect the interests of minorities and circumvent their exclusion, the reservation of seats in parliament is a viable option. This serves as a mechanism to avoid fallacies according to the common interest (Osman, 1996, pp. 50–52).
As per Osman, the parliament addresses a second problem from the deduction of law from Sharia and the problem of human deficiencies. First, Sharia law is made by judges in their verdicts. As Sharia law is both ambiguous and flexible, this presents a significant challenge, as, on the one hand, individual judges may err, and, on the other, there will be legal inconsistency. This is an important consideration given that the lack of a guarantee in the equal consideration of similar cases can potentially result in jeopardization of justice. “It is essential that a certain interpretation or jurisprudential view should be adopted by the state as a law, and what this is to be has to be decided by the legislature, so that the courts are not left to enforce inconsistent rules, according to the discretion of each different judge, something about which the well-known writer Ibn al-Mugaffa’ complained in his time” (Osman, 1996, p. 55). Second, some legal fields are defined by Sharia, but societal change gives rise to new questions. While some guidelines and values can lead to conclusions and rules, many other questions remain unanswered by the Quran. It is therefore the responsibility of the parliament to ensure legal harmony within a society in the common interest (Osman, 1996, p. 55).
Osman further posits that a multi-party system is the optimal form of pluralism for his conception of Shura, which is a fundamental requirement for this entire system. First, the Quran intends the existence of different communities (Umma), each with their own values and perspectives. This is because dissent and differences are inherent to human life, and many decisions are based on the discretion of the individual. For instance, even early Muslims convened at Al-Saqifa to discuss their dissent and to reach a decision.6 Second, a multi-party system ensures the preservation of unity within a society where the possibility of conflict exists. Different parties can stand for different values and goals within a common framework. This pluralism thus provides the space for debate in striving for the best argument and decision (Osman, 1996, pp. 52–54).
In his discussion of political parties and society, Osman states that the concept of Shura comprise consultation not only within official political organizations but also at any subsection of society, including associations, parties, and other organizations (1996, p. 49). He further addresses briefly the issue of self-proclaimed candidacy, noting that the provisions on the exclusion of self-proclaimed candidates in the Islamic traditions serve primarily as warnings against potential corruption (Osman, 1996, pp. 50–51).
Osman posits that an independent judiciary is a necessary component of a functioning democracy, as it serves as a check on the power of the legislature. This is because a system of checks and balances is essential to prevent the tyranny of the majority. Additionally, a supreme court safeguards the rights of individuals and ensures the alignment of any law with Islamic principles. He argues that all societies and constitutions are founded upon shared values and fundamental principles, like human rights, which serve as the bedrock of Western societies and political systems. Therefore, there is no justification for repudiating this possibility for states where Islam is the state religion, whose common foundation is the Quran and Sharia, which aim to promote justice (Osman, 1996, pp. 54–56).
Although Osman does not further elaborate on his conceptualization of the executive, he asserts that their work should also be supervised by the Supreme Court. In discussing the executive or ruler of a state, he introduces the last important characteristic of Shura. In the Quran, the rulers have to justify themselves before the people, while the latter must ask for justification. This implements the idea of a public sphere, as Osman further emphasizes the necessity to protect the independence of the media. Such protection is crucial to prevent the media from being usurped and reduced to a mere propaganda tool (Osman, 1996, pp. 56–57).
Comparison
The comprehensive reconstruction of the various conceptualizations of Shura by the three authors in the previous section allows us to derive insights that contribute to the deparochialization of the mainstream Western conceptions of democracy. In this section, informed by the analysis in the previous section, I elaborate on one pivotal distinction and five shared elements that emerge from an examination of the various conceptualizations of Shura.
In light of the question of democracy, the three different conceptualizations contribute to key insights: the asserted relationship between Shura and democracy (Figure 1). Hofmann posits that Shura is the Islamic form of democracy, i.e., that Shura features aspects of a universal concept of democracy. In contrast, Osman states the opposite relationship, namely that democracy can be a form of Shura, i.e., democracy is subsumed by the philosophical contours of Shura. Lastly, Ghannouchi suggests that the two concepts share certain similarities, but that differences also exist between the two.
The relations of Shura and democracy
Citation: Comparative Political Theory 2025; 10.1163/26669773-bja10075
I see the disparate relationships tracing back to a single, underlying source: Each author has a distinct conceptualization of democracy. Osman perceives the term ”democracy” as a denominator for mainstream Western debates and concepts, whereas Shura represents the fundamental and transcendental principle. In comparison, Hofmann acknowledges that the term “democracy” is multifaceted, encompassing different configurations, while also establishing fundamental tenets. Finally, Ghannouchi’s assertion that both concepts are similar and that Western democratic institutions may provide a framework for a modern application of Shura indicates an assumption that the concepts of Shura and democracy are normatively equal in status.
The different perspectives on the relationship between democracy and Shura are crucial in the context of this article. While there is disagreement regarding the precise nature of the relationship between democracy and Shura, there is a consensus in the works of the three authors that the mainstream Western understanding of democracy as it manifests in Shura is parochial. In Osman’s view, the Western concept of democracy represents a narrow particular interpretation of the broader Islamic concept of Shura. Hofmann posits that there exist disparate forms of democracy, whether rooted in Western or Islamic traditions. Lastly, Ghannouchi asserts that, both Western democracy and Shura are in many ways similar, e.g., in that they share some common values, such as the avoidance of tyranny. He notes further that they represent applications of a universal concept of democracy. Overall, all the three authors concur with Melissa Williams’s critique of and call to deparochialize democratic theory, albeit a few years earlier.
The shared elements between the three concepts are of equal scientific interest. First, all sources concur that Shura is a principle that alters in accordance with the temporal context and the characteristics of the society under consideration. The political order and the organization of a society may vary, as there is no eternally applicable organizational framework. Although they differ regarding their concrete arguments, they all assert that Shura was historically operationalized differently in the Sunni traditions. Therefore, there is no prescribed procedure or definition aside from its nature as a duty for Muslims, in general, to conduct their affairs in “consultation.” However, basic principles must be upheld, such as the goal of implementing justice (Sharia) and the necessity of consultation. The specific measures may change due to social, technological, or any other developments. This is crucial for their reasoning, as it allows them to reformulate the concrete form of Shura and additionally serves as a religiously rooted justification for their concept.
Second, all the different conceptualizations, whether from Osman, Hofmann, or Ghannouchi, postulate the existence of a public interest derived from the principles of Shura, Bai’a, and the respective Ummah. The concept of public interest is also addressed in discussions on Sharia under the term Maslaha (مصلحة), although they are not entirely analogous. The concept first distinguishes between affairs that are subject to consultation and those that are not. Second, the three authors eschew the assumption that a distinct group is either more eligible or more capable of defining the public interest than the entire society. Although they cite different hadiths to substantiate their assertions, the inclusion of the entire society aims to circumvent fallacies. While it was historically justifiable to rely on a small group for the consultation on the public interest due to the technological and social capabilities of the times, today, public interest must be defined by the entire society. As Shura is a duty for every Muslim, namely to be open to consultation and to participate in it, a true Muslim society cannot exclude the majority of the society from this process.
The public sphere of debate is the arena for the consultative or public deliberation process, which is necessary for democracy and for Shura. Historically, the public sphere was constrained by factors such as the early Muslim Saqifa or the Greek Agora. However, the development of mass media and communication technologies has paved the way for novel forms of public engagement (Habermas, 1990). Hence, the concept of Shura underscores the significance of the public dimension in democratic processes. Nevertheless, from a critical perspective, the evaluation of the democratic character of Shura depends on the delineation of the boundaries between private (or religious) and public affairs, which is contingent upon the respective interpretation of Sharia. In the case of an expansive, or integralist, understanding of Sharia, the possibilities of public discourse are confined to a limited number of issues.
A third similarity between the three authors is the claim that Shura intends a form of majoritarian rule with binding decisions in the current context. Although in previous contexts there were alternative possibilities, for example, a ruler with a high council, today an election for a legislative body represents a compromise between the participation of all and applicability of the procedures. All the concepts assume that a representative parliament is the most effective means of implementing Shura in the modern era, although Hofmann suggests that referenda may be possible. This is because the common parliamentary work also implements procedures to prevent fallacies. Moreover, they argue that a consultation or debate without binding results for rulers or the executive undermines the process itself. Two lines of reasoning emerge from this analysis. The first asserts that binding decisions can prevent the rise of tyranny by the ruler or executive (Ghannouchi, Hofmann). The second maintains that if the executive is permitted to act independently, equality will be undermined. Osman, for instance, asserts that according to the Quran, all humans are Khalifas, i.e., deputies of God, which is why rulers are restricted to the role of Wazir or Emir.
The three concepts contribute to the deparochialization of Western democracy. They highlight the conundrum of representation and its precarity, as they openly acknowledge a provisional solution. They do not claim that representative democracy or binding majoritarian elections are the definitive true form of democracy or Shura. Consequently, the different authors recognize that the optimal solution is contingent upon the specific circumstances and capabilities of the given society. Therefore, Shura and/or democracy, rather than once-and-for-all defined, allow the possibility of modified paths to sociopolitical organization and development.
Fourth, Osman, Ghannouchi, and Hofmann recognize the necessity of a form of pluralism for the conduct of meaningful debates. The concept of pluralism is predicated on the understanding that there exist multiple communities within a community, each on its own representing an Ummah. In other words, a community comprises several sub-groups. Accordingly, the affirmation of equality among the members of a community is closely related to the question of pluralism. This equality is crucial for defining the participants of the Shura or consultative process. While the authors’ interpretations differ on the degree of equality among different sections of the society (based upon constructs such as sex or religion), all authors agree on the equality of individuals and that public debate requires civil liberties such as the freedom of expression. Osman affirms the most fundamental equality, while Ghannouchi’s position is a bit more restricted. Hofmann, however, reserves certain rights for male Muslims. Nevertheless, the authors do not discuss the role of atheists, and how to treat them in an Islamic society.7
The question of equality and pluralism leads us to the final point. The three authors assume that a common moral foundation is a prerequisite for the preservation of societal unity and pluralism in a democratic context. For all authors, the common ground for an Islamic society is the Sharia and the Quran. They argue that any democratic constitution is typically combined with other common values or foundations. The three authors cite Western liberal-democratic setups, which are based on values like human rights, the Christian religion, a civil religion, or a social contract of the republic. They even claim that no community or society exists without an indisputable, consensual core. Therefore, the Sharia and the Quran are as legitimate as human rights, insofar as both ensure equality and justice.
Despite their assertion of Sharia and the Quran as the common moral foundation, there is a difference between the three authors in the nature of the common moral foundation, which depends on their interpretation of Sharia and the Quran. For Osman, the common principle for society espoused by Sharia and the Quran is limited to the objectives of implementing justice and welfare. Nevertheless, he does posit the establishment of a high court to ensure the implementation of Sharia, a proposition that is contingent upon the specific interpretation. As the interpretation becomes more substantial, pluralism is increasingly restricted. Ghannouchi’s position is situated between those of Osman and Hofmann. His interpretation of Sharia is more open to differences than Hofmann’s since it does not restrict minorities. For Hofmann, the common ground is more substantial as it also comprises unity of belief, morality, and ritual. Although these are highly contextual terms, they can affect society substantially depending on their concrete definition.
At this point, the three authors’ concept of Shura entangles with one of the most intricate issues of societies: the relationship between pluralism and unity in societies. Although, for example, Juan J. Linz used pluralism as a yardstick for differentiating between democracies and autocratic regimes, the precise nature of this distinction remains opaque (2000). Many democratic theories assume a common ground in democracies, although with varying degrees of scope. The minimalist theories have only reduced common values (Przeworski, 2024, pp. 5–6). For instance, Chantal Mouffe asserts that only the acceptance of the other as a competitor rather than an enemy represents a common ground (2013, p. 7). Moreover, there are theoretical perspectives that rely on a more complex common foundation for a democracy, like the debate about a deficient democracy, or democracies with adjectives (Merkel, 2004).
The issue of a common foundation becomes more complex when, alongside the theoretical debates, the practical realities of certain Western liberal-democratic societies are taken into consideration. For instance, in Germany, the Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution), i.e., the German domestic intelligence agency, is responsible for monitoring and observing political groups that may pose a threat to democracy, including right- and left-wing groups. Since the end of the Second World War there has been an ongoing debate about who may pose such a threat. In certain cases, these organizations may be prohibited, and their members may be removed from civil service (Leggewie & Meier, 2016, pp. 11–16). To take another example, the United States of America exhibits a distinct anti-communist consensus (Lipset, 2019; Sombart et al., 2019). From this perspective, determining the extent to which such a common ground can be defined represents a complex question.
Consequently, one of the primary factors contributing to the perception of Shura as a democratic concept is as follows. With regard to the primacy of Sharia, the democratic nature of Shura thus depends on its distinct interpretation. While Ghannouchi and Osman appear to adhere to a minimalist definition of Sharia (March, 2023, p. 18), Hofmann promotes a more expansive understanding of Sharia that might prove insufficient for arriving at a conclusive democratic standard as conceptualized by mainstream Western understanding of democracy. Nevertheless, the authors’ conceptualizations contribute to the deparochialization of democracy, as the concomitant critique reveals one crucial point: The democratic nature of a common foundation is contingent upon its interpretation. It is evident that Sharia and the Quran can be subjected to restrictive tendencies in their interpretation. However, any common foundation that is overstated and defined too strictly can have similar results. Furthermore, their comparison and critique contribute to a sounder understanding of democracy by indicating that although any society (including Western societies) needs a common ground, its democratic nature is always precarious and volatile given its openness to reformulation based upon historical contextual circumstances.
Shura and Deparochializing Democracy
Although some contributions to a deparochialization of our understanding of democracy were already outlined, they need to be elaborated on, especially as the comparison between the different concepts and several Western debates contributes to both aspects, decentering the mainstream Western understanding and recentering a new more comprehensive one. In this section, I will demonstrate that deparochialization does not necessarily mean a nullification of the mainstream Western conceptualization of democracy, but rather, that some aspects of the Western conceptualization can be affirmed and included, or as Williams puts it, the study of “political thought from diverse cultural contexts” is “testing […] the validity of our” theories (2020, p. 202).
My first argument is that the comparison proves the central point of the idea of deparochialization: Our current (hegemonic) Western concept is parochial. This is most obviously demonstrated by the most central difference between the different concepts: the outlined relationships between Shura and democracy. In summary, this finding reasserts what is already discussed: We need to differentiate between, on the one hand, Western democracy (which has a liberal character and distinct contextual roots) and democracy as an umbrella term, i.e., a global principle or concept.
Furthermore, two more aspects can contribute to the decentering of the hegemonic mainstream Western understanding and enrich the global debates on the concept of democracy by highlighting a blind spot in Western debates or to be more precise, opting for a strand within the Western debates. First, the different historical applications of democracy are temporally bounded and are operationalizations in a given sociocultural context. Thus, democracy is a dynamic, historical concept. Second, different manifestations of democracies have distinct normative common grounds. Increased debate on such aspects is required to facilitate a broader and more complex understanding of democratic theory in order to deparochialize it. This should not be neglected like minimalist democratic theories do (Przeworski, 2024). Concrete applications of democracy call for more substantial definitions. What are the necessary and allowed characteristics of such a common ground in a democracy? Islam and Sharia cannot be straightforwardly denied, as mainstream Western theory does, as a legitimate foundation of a democratic system, since it is a more complex issue. Or more relevant for the Western academia and practitioners, the formulation by E.-W. Boeckenförde in the last century needs to be acknowledged: “The liberal, secularized state lives on preconditions that it cannot guarantee itself” (Mangold, 2019).
Lastly, I argue that deparochialization can affirm different aspects of mainstream Western understanding of democracy, by bringing to the fore that many different conceptualizations of democracy, with similar conclusive arguments, exist. The comparative analysis carried out in this article demonstrates the existence of shared conceptualizations of ideas such as public interest, the public sphere, and pluralism. At the same time, a continued debate is required in the concrete application of diverse conceptualizations of democracy in political praxis. As democracy is an essentially contested concept, this is not surprising at all (Gallie, 1955).
Conclusion
The comparative analysis in this article on the three concepts of Shura and the umbrella concept of democracy contribute to the deparochialization of democracy by elucidating disparate aspects and underscoring certain blind spots in Western debate. At the same time, the analysis also validates certain former insights. While the necessity of a common ground and the historicity and contextuality of democracy are often neglected in the West, the idea of a public sphere, public interest, and pluralism are validated as a part of a more global concept of democracy. Most interestingly, regarding deparochialization, the concept of Shura and a Western understanding of democracy intersect on the rationale for organizing society democratically, although they employ different sources, reasons, and arguments. Regarding the recentered concept of democracy, one might contend that these insights are not novel, as many of them were previously discussed in the history of Western thought. Indeed, I have no reason to deny this fact. But the findings nonetheless reveal the merit of the deparochialization of our understanding of democracy. The common conclusions or aspects of democracy make the debate less parochial and reinforce the initial argument, as they represent a triangulation of the concept of democracy. When we deparochialize the concept of democracy, not every effort will lead to contradictions. As I argued, deparochialization does not mean that any particular understanding of democracy must be repudiated but rather adjusted. In this way, some of the ideas of Western democratic theory can or should be affirmed – especially if we hope that our Western understanding is relevant for all humankind. Lastly, the similarities in concepts on collective decision making do not imply a hierarchical relationship justified by their chronology or context. Instead, the different concepts suggest that there are different starting points and arguments that may lead to similar of different aspects, procedures, or possibilities of democracy.
Acknowledgement
I thank Joshua Folkerts, Nitin Arya and my Reviewers for their helpful comments as well as my fellow colleagues for their fruitful and positive feedback at the ecpr General Conference in Dublin in the Panel “Towards and Inductive Universalism”.
Data Availability Statement
The used data comprised no special data except the cited literature.
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By no means are they seen as “authentic,” exotic Islamic forms of democracy but as perspectives deriving from a different context and cultural exchange. Rather they are treated as a contribution to a common problem.
Sura 3:159 alludes to Shura slightly differently: “consult with them in conducting matters” (3:159). For this paper I used different translation and the “original” text of Quran. Rudi Parets translation is suitable as it also offers the different possibilities of translation (2014).
There is no distinct sharia. It refers more to the system of lawmaking using the Quran, hadith, and distinct methods of interpretation and inference. See Lohlker (2012, pp. 14–17).
Hofmann offers a possible solution: While a candidate must be nominated by others, this does not preclude that he speaks for himself in a campaign.
In the Arabic language, for instance in the Tunisian vernacular form, different verbs are used for discussing to find a decision (نقاش) or to merely exchange arguments (تعارك, جدل).
