Abstract
Communication plays a vital role in diplomacy, especially in multilateral settings. Historians of World War ii diplomacy have long neglected the potential of the foreign-language print media originating with the Allied European exiles. Publicity helped the Norwegian government retain two assets of supreme importance to every exile representation – credibility and agency. Norwegian efforts in this realm manifest resourcefulness: several formats have been employed to generate visibility, reciprocity, and reputation, or to transmit positions on the international order in the making. Moreover, content analysis elucidates the transformation of Norwegian internationalism from inter-war liberal propositions towards a more “realist” understanding.
World War ii historians have shown little interest in the media affiliated with the London-based governments-in-exile,1 recognized by the Allies and by (some) neutrals as legitimate representatives of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia; one should append “Free French” to them.2 All together they formed a unique environment, replete with relationships. The exiles used English- or French-language publications, often if not exclusively periodicals,3 as information transmitters, to approach foreign policy-makers and the international public opinion within the United Nations (UN) coalition. With a new international order in the making, the print media would serve as a tool for diplomatic signaling. Allied governments-in-exile were, after all, minor partners in these discussions, urged to make the most of available resources, communication channels included. An examination of Norway’s efforts in this realm may deliver a blueprint for future studies of the governments’-in-exile media activities. Norwegian international publicity, I posit, has evolved from individual, awareness-generating initiatives to institutional ones, intended for communicating and promoting positions held by the government. In this chronologically organized article, I will introduce the palette of formats – selected books and articles in learned journals and, finally, the bi-monthly review the Norseman – as they were prompted by the exigencies of exile, and successively employed to articulate the country’s plight and desired future role. Yet my primary angle is content. It reflects the changing policy agenda, promotional strategies, in-group tensions, Inter-Allied relationships, and prospective post-war partnerships. It also chronicles the trajectory of Norwegian internationalism, from liberal premises of collaboration for common progress towards a more “realist” comprehension, recognizing that cooperation has become necessary, not optional, and that it must be regulated if it is to promote peace and last. I wish to demonstrate that print publications for international audience, my main source, offer a valuable perspective on small power foreign policy communication in a multilateral setting. To contextualize, I consider parallels to, and contacts with, other Allied representations, as they transpire from diplomatic archives, memoirs, and private papers, or in the press.
In Allied London
In World War ii liberal, law-driven internationalism was challenged by the organicist-hegemonic Nazi version of international relations; radical, racially exclusionary, conservative-nationalist “inter-nationalism” was contraposed the arguably failed “cosmopolitan” order.4 Yet, the founding documents of the UN coalition declared internationalism alive; the war, historians concur, saw its “apogee.”5 Norway featured in both stories, but only the latter – one that took place predominantly in London – enriched its diplomatic toolkit for the future.6
Britain stated its universalistic motivation for going to war clearly: If German foreign policy methods were tolerated, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain argued, “there will be no peace in Europe.” The outcome of the war, Foreign Secretary Halifax heralded, “will be made to correspond to the convictions of those who desire to create a new better world which may enlist the cooperation of all nations on the basis of equality, self-respect and mutual tolerance.” As the war was spreading, several refugee governments, and other groups making representative claims, such as the “Free French” or the Czechoslovak National Committee, arrived in Britain. They were noticed. Launching his Franco–British Union proposal, on June 18, 1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill said: “Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians, all who have joined their causes to our own, shall be restored.”7
These words outlined the immediate agenda for the exiles. There was a distinct possibility that the British perceived them primarily as a group. “We are fighting to save these little countries being oppressed,” Mass-Observation registered in Bolton in November 1940.8 The exiles considered this inopportune. Representing nation-states, they found themselves competing for goodwill, assistance – and status. To succeed, they aspired to present genuine causes, to show resolution, resourcefulness, and support for the British visions of the post-war – as independent entities.9 They understood the urgency of addressing the Allied audience, especially the elites. What they needed was publicity. Its significance was genuinely paramount when a small state was represented by a pro-Allied “free movement,” not a government-in-exile, as was the case of, for example, Denmark or Estonia. With scant resources, these groups relied on publicity as a critical, “soft power” tool, generating awareness and reciprocity.10
The Czechoslovak and the Polish information services had been launched soon after the defining national calamities – the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in mid-March and the outbreak of the war in September 1939.11 A journalist close to the Prague Castle, Hubert Ripka, utilized the dispersion of Czechoslovak exiles and international contacts to collect and disseminate information; his rich account of the Munich crisis and its aftermath appeared in Gollancz’s “Left Book Club,” popular with the political public, in May 1939.12 The Norwegians started organizing their own equally swiftly, in June – July 1940, following a sudden Allied evacuation.13 Although some “propaganda veterans,” such as Arnold Ræstad (foreign minister, 1921–22), journalist, later broadcaster Toralv Øksnevad, or foreign affairs commentator Finn Moe, left Norway with the King and the Government,14 a fully operational Royal Norwegian Government Information Office (rngio), built up from the minuscule press office at the Foreign Ministry, was not completed before late February 1941; its U.S. branch is said to have been still further delayed, yet its News of Norway newsletter was launched already in mid-January. Lengthy deliberations seem to have slowed down the process.15 Besides, in Britain, the Norwegians were overwhelmed with settling-in arrangements, setting up nothing short of what political geographer Fiona McConnell understands as a “state-in-exile.”16 Moreover, while the roots of institutional international promotion of Norway date back to the early inter-war period,17 the role that books, pamphlets, and journals played in it was rather modest – unlike in Central Europe where publicity was considered a potent tool. In Prague, for example, The Central European Observer was started in 1923, with editions in major European languages.18 Nothing similar existed in Norway. As late as in 1938, a trilingual Nordic quarterly Le Nord, appeared as a quasi-inter-governmental project, with Carl Joachim Hambro, a political heavyweight and a newspaperman with literary interests, as the Norwegian editor.19 Also, Central European press agencies had offices, and the papers their own resident correspondents, in major European capitals, readily available in the moment of crisis.20 The emergent Norwegian press corps in exile could not rely on comparable resources. Starting with a few evacuees, including a couple of Norwegian News Agency associates, it depended on arrivals from the occupied homeland, mostly via Sweden.21 The death of the seasoned director of the foreign ministry press office, Jacob Vidnes, in October 1940, certainly did not make the practicalities easier.22
“I Saw It Happen”
Norway is said to have been in disrepute in mid-1940.23 Credit for this was due to Leland Stowe, a Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent who witnessed the invasion, Vidkun Quisling’s coup and, as he argued, lukewarm opposition to it.24 Later, Oslo notables sought an arrangement with the enemy and, in asking the King to abdicate, inflicted further reputational damage.25 When the Norwegians arrived to London, royal ties played in their favor – the late Queen Maud was Edward’s vii youngest daughter. Still, they needed all the goodwill they could get; something had to be done to mitigate the toll of Stowe’s testimony.
If hardly officially commissioned, the first step was Hambro’s I Saw It Happen in Norway.26 Penned by a dynamic leader, presiding over the bedrock of Norway’s democratic sovereignty, the Storting, this book was an act of representation. Hambro had protested the country’s accession to the League of Nations, only to become an internationalist advocating small power agency in it. When the war came, Hambro was serving as the chairman of both the League Assembly and the League Supervisory Commission. Detached from constitutional powers in exile, he resided overseas, among the League’s “guardians.” Hambro’s international standing was an asset: The New York Times interviewed him upon arrival to New York in July 1940.27
An able Anglophone, Hambro was well suited to canvass Norwegian events. He opened the initial chapter with a “writing on the wall”: “You’ll See It Happen.” Its Norwegian title, “Det kan hende hvorsomhelst” (“It Can Happen Anywhere”), alluded yet more directly to Sinclair Lewis’s It Can’t Happen Here (1935), a caveat against populism threatening U.S. democracy.28 According to Hambro, the lack of vigilance caused Norway’s disaster – it allowed the Germans to abuse friendly bilateral relations and to stage an invasion without any “fifth column” present (not even the negotiating notables did he see as one).29 Hambro saluted the Allies – “the patient fortitude and the quiet dignity” of Poland’s minister to Norway, Władysław Neuman (who joined the King on his wartime journey), or the valor of the British, French and Polish soldiers.30
Overall, Hambro subscribed to the universalist appeal of the British proclamations. This war, he argued, was neither an act of Germany’s quest for a legitimate international standing, nor a bid for hegemony, but a Manichean duel between “two different systems of ethics … two opposite conceptions of conscience,” from which no-one was exempted.31 “[T]he whole structure of Christian civilization is threatened by the waves of moral leprosy,” Hambro warned and, choosing a trope popular in the United States regarding both the Nazi and the Communist menace, declared “every German consulate … the privileged stable of a Trojan horse.”32
Hambro set the practical standards for Norwegian international publicity. His book came out as an octavo (8vo) hardback from a trade publisher, Appleton–Century; a British edition followed, with Hodder & Stoughton, a renowned publishing house later to be commissioned by the rngio. One can discern two diplomatic points here. First, a book, as a physical object, is presentable, durable, promising far-reaching transmission and more credibility than a pamphlet. Second, the publicity value increased by “domestication”: To dilute the links to official places, an established publisher was contracted, and its catalogue used for promotion and distribution (often, if not in this case, a local personality would “donate” a preface).33 These publication attributes gave Hambro a good chance to resonate appeal to his audience. Other Allies too had stories to tell. Dutch foreign minister Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens published a successful war account, co-authored with his wife Margaret. Partly serialized in the Daily Telegraph throughout September 1940, The Rape of Netherlands soon sold 10,000 copies (a U.S. edition was under way in 1941) and boosted the reputation of the Dutch, a small ally with whom it was “safe to go tiger-hunting.”34 Some “domestication” was probably involved. Publisher Stanley Unwin, of Allen & Unwin, recalled that he had been cooperating with the Dutch (the Czechoslovaks and the Norwegians had at least informal contacts with him).35 Reputation and visibility counted in the multilateral Allied setting, and good books could help.
Talking to Strangers
Several bilateral relationships were being re-constituted in Allied London. Some, the protagonists did not hesitate to admit, had been more nominal than effective; such was the case of Czechoslovakia and Norway.36 Few exiles knew each other from international life – often they were mutual strangers, to be approached and addressed. With campaigns unfolding in far-away, little-known places, World War ii was spreading and getting complex. In occupied Europe, oppression incited resistance, pro-Axis forces were promoting their own views and versions of events. Consequently, for policy-makers, the reality became, from the media perspective, competitive, cacophonic, even “over-informed.”37 To ensure that one’s partners obtain all information one wished them to have – and to pay attention to it – was getting more and more difficult.
Probably the most popular communication channels were interviews in major press outlets, such as the Times, or the bbc broadcasts – both were much likely to address broad audiences. Foreign minister Trygve Lie used them repeatedly to promote Norway’s views. Democracy and international cooperation featured prominently in these appearances. Norwegian policymakers recognized interdependence of nations as critical for the post-war order; they also agreed that this order would have to be managed. In November 1941, while marketing the idea of a North Atlantic community, Lie pleaded: “Steps should be taken now to extend the inter-allied machinery, pending the inclusion of other states after the war.”38 His predecessor and a stalwart advocate of neutrality, Halvdan Koht, touched the same chord in Norway – Neutral and Invaded, an account that the foreign ministry did not wish to see published (Koht’s position was precarious due to severe allegations that he had ignored warnings of German invasion).39 The rise of cooperation among nations was “perhaps a matter of a very long development,” Koht the historian noted; in any case, Norway was fighting for a reform of international security, so that “all nations may be able to develop ever more strongly their social organization in the national and international field.”40 This was a major innovation in Norwegian self-perception within international society. Not long ago, in 1937, British minister reported: “The general Norwegian attitude towards the League of Nations has … been to emphasize the necessity for collective action against aggressors, so long as Norway does not need to join in it herself.”41 Now, the Norwegians were promising participation in an internationalist project.
To raise the level of awareness on their country,42 to report local Axis oppression and home front resistance, and to present themselves as legitimate and democratic, Allied governments-in-exile were disseminating bulletins for international audiences. These sometimes circulated by diplomatic channels. For example, Czechoslovak chargé d´affaires (later minister) Ladislav Szathmáry was avidly forwarding Norwegian press coverage to his colleagues at the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, consisting mostly of The News of Norway, an overseas bulletin functioning as the major Norwegian media outlet for international audience;43 high meeting frequency in London allowed for the bulk of the information flow to unfold in person, especially since those in publicity were cooperating across the bbc national branches.44 The first-ever Czechoslovak representative accredited exclusively to Norway, Szathmáry was a “diplomat-explorer”:45 He had to learn about his new partners, at an accelerated pace; only thereafter could he develop what had been but a nominal relationship. Mediating Norwegian press to uninitiated colleagues counted for his tasks of an information agent. Mindful of reciprocity, Szathmáry prompted exchange between exile “internal” press outlets, Čechoslovák and Norsk Tidend. He also requested The Central European Observer to be sent regularly to the rngio elite, reportedly at its own behest.46
What New World?
Recurring declarations about the outcome of the war going to recast the European international society triggered endeavors of the Allied governments-in-exile. Even minor war effort inputs were incurring significant costs on them, yet they were keenly legitimizing themselves as belligerents. The vastly asymmetric military burden-sharing echoed in politics. However, according to the historian Dan Plesch, “merely bothering to include the smaller states [as signatories of the Declaration of the UN] sent a signal that they would also have their say after the war.”47 As President Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four Policeman” concept was evolving into an “International Organization,”48 governments-in-exile were registering the challenges on the horizon: The principle of sovereign equality was criticized, small states’ viability disputed.49 Norwegian policymakers grasped that internationalist persuasion might serve their country’s interests, and that the press media could help promote it.
Academics and intellectuals, many of whom had a long, multifaceted record as “architects” of international society, often got involved in post-war policy planning as bureaucrats or as non-governmental organizations affiliates; others still were contributing more informally. Paraphrasing the young Churchill, to them World War ii appeared a time of “countless and inestimable,” Heraclitan chances50 to transform international relations and, in the process, to re-animate some of the inter-war discussions, believed to pave the way to this end.51
A multilateral policy forum on its own right emerged in political science journals overseas. Exile policymakers used them as gateways to the agenda-setting debates, alongside with talks to diverse audiences.52 Here small power voices would negotiate with what they considered an international elite opinion. Strategies might have varied. When, in 1943, international lawyer and foreign ministry official Edvard Hambro (son of Carl J. Hambro) was articulating Norwegian views on international organization, he, unlike Belgium’s Frans van Caulwaerts, did not highlight small powers’ civilizational record. Thirty-two years young, Hambro Jr. was, by Norwegian standards, already a versed International Relations scholar, who most probably wished to avoid aggravating his great power readers by what some of them would perhaps receive as an undue hyperbole. UN topped the hierarchy of Norway’s prospective international roles, Hambro Jr. argued. Being the sole Nordic member of the association even fueled a sense of regional primacy (approved of by the Danish exile leader, the conservative parliamentarian John Christmas Møller).53 Equality of states, Hambro Jr. admitted, existed before the law only. Yet, he forewarned: If asymmetry reanimates “concert” ideas, Norwegian UN participation will be imperiled.54 It did not come to this, and Hambro served in the UN Organization in diverse prestigious capacities, at its creation and then again between 1966 and 1976.55
With these articles, Hambro Jr. echoed his father’s new book, How to Win the Peace (which he probably co-authored), where it read that “the world would not go back to anything to any form of international representation which was less democratic” than the League of Nations used to be.56 Unpopular in London, Hambro Sr. disliked the strong position that Lie had built up for himself.57 His policymaking impact was, therefore, limited for the most of the war. The book, however, became an international bestseller, translated into Danish, Swedish, Spanish, and Chinese. In it, he defended the League of Nations – a laboratory of internationalism that would have achieved more, had it not been for great power egoism. Indeed, according to Hambro, it were the small powers that made the League “a reality.” Regarding “World Organization” ideas, Hambro often agreed with leading U.S. internationalists yet did not hesitate to castigate them for disregard for small powers. He went, in fact, as far as to say that “every small country, whether neutral or allied, lives in fear of being selected as the pawn in the gambit by one of the Great powers.”58 Contempt for great power supremacy was the constant of Hambro’s international thought. It had earned him some reputation during the Great War, in the appeasement era, or at the early stage of World War ii. Thus, not even as an Allied exile was he in the Whitehall’s good books; How to Win the Peace was received accordingly, as a nuisance.59
The Promise of Periodicity
Wartime European exiles were communicating with the Allied audience also through their own foreign language, “high-brow” journals. In London, Czechoslovakia’s The Central European Observer simply restarted; the versed Polish correspondent Kazimierz Smogorzewski had launched Free Europe already in 1939.60 These journals were intended as the respective government’s mouth-peace, published at regular intervals. Their editors wished to mold some part of the international debate. Thus, they regularly invited foreign writers to share views and support the given nation. The case of La France libre indicated that new creations might succeed. Started in November 1940, by André Labarthe, a scientist, and a couple of his fellow-activists from Rassemblement universel pour la Paix (soon-to-be-joined by the philosopher Raymond Aron), at its peak this weekly arguably attracted 76,000 subscribers. Many personalities of politics and culture were contributing to it at least occasionally, sustaining the momentum of this French yet Inter-Allied platform.61
In January 1943, The Norwegians launched their own review, the Norseman, recognizing the potential of a periodical to provide solid and representative communication channel in Allied London. The journal was also as an attempt to remedy overseas propaganda, only partly organized and controlled by the rngio. Some of its pillars – the deposed foreign minister Koht and the somewhat “rogue” and vocal Hambro Sr. – were patriots of international appeal, and with networks to draw support from, but did not fully harmonize with the key policymakers.62 The Norwegians involved were in good relations with Labarthe and the success of La France libre galvanized their own ideas, circulating loosely since early 1942.63 The Norseman was entrusted to Jacob S. Worm-Müller, a historian close to Lie, formerly the editor-in-chief of an elite politico-cultural review Samtiden, and an internationalist with League of Nations experience.64 A bi-monthly in 8° format would bring articles politics, history as well as the arts, or culture in the broader sense, book reviews, poetry but few illustrations, on approx. 75 pages per issue. Such composition was able to convey a personality-centered portrayal of “Free Norway,” deeply rooted in 19th century patriotic, altruistic narratives of the past, to the international audience. These representations of history were now being projected on the present and – since the pending cataclysm was perceived as a formative event – on the post-war future.65
Branding Norway “Realist”
Mr C.J. Hambro is a very outspoken man. I could wish that in these times he could have laid more stress on the magnitude of our debt to Great Britain and the other Great Powers …; and I could wish he had avoided unnecessary irritation. None of us are angels. This applies to men and nations, great and small.72
These words illustrate a significant transformation. Since the late 19th and early 20th centuries, one might have defined Norwegian internationalism as a belief in free trade and collaborative humanitarianism on the bedrock of respect for universal standards.73 During World War ii, this liberal variety transfigured into a one of necessity, in recognition of global interdependence that was to be regimented, and of small power economic and security constraints. In other words, mirroring wartime British developments, Norwegian internationalism traveled a trajectory from Phillip Noel-Baker to David Mitrany (or to Edward H. Carr), or, in one historian’s persuasive parlance, from “whig” to “muscular” internationalism.74
The Geography of Peace
Peace was to be maintained in a community, through relationships. With an array of authors representing Allied nations and, exceptionally, the neutral Sweden, the Norseman served, to a much greater degree than earlier Norwegian publications, as a compass of prospective partnerships. Thus, the spatial dimension of the country’s post-war foreign relations, a “work-in-progress” at the time, was being communicated both to the international audience and – as we have already seen, in a rather official, declaratory manner – to Norwegians abroad.
The primacy of the Anglo–Norwegian political and cultural relationship is paramount – Ambassador Laurence Collier’s greetings feature prominently in the inaugural issue.75 A plethora of articles followed, in which British authors either discussed subjects of Norwegian or common interest, regularly inspired by past contacts – Fridtjof Nansen’s legacy as explorer, internationalist and humanitarian actor stands out in this regard76 – or introduced facets of their own society and culture. In fact, there were more British than Norwegian contributors to the review. Thus, the Norseman appears to have functioned a space of international socialization through knowledge sharing. By contrast, other great powers were represented only occasionally, by the luminaries of the day.77 Walter Lippmann’s article “The Atlantic Community,” however, was significant inasmuch it sketched the future of the Anglo–American strategic partnership; while an echo of the author´s World War I ideas,78 it indirectly combined the notion of the universalistic UN with Norway’s original, later slightly convoluted Atlanticism.79 The Norseman was also a platform to showcase the country’s regional UN exclusivity, for example, covering (if not encouraging) the emancipation of Iceland, formally a kingdom in personal union with Denmark, Allied-occupied since May 1940. It appears to have been validated. When Reykjavík, for the first time managing its foreign relations, appointed diplomatic representatives, it sent ministers to the United States, Great Britain – and to Norway.80 Worm-Müller, however, cared to avoid the escalation of neighborly relations, not chastising Denmark or Sweden for policies accommodating Germany early in the war in the Norseman.81
The inaugural issue of the Norseman also presented an article by Czechoslovakia’s President, Edvard Beneš, himself an advocate of cooperation on the great power-dominated UN platform.82 The courtesy text integrated the writer’s desire to ingratiate himself by over-extending parallels and contacts between the two countries and to put his own statesman credentials, as well as thoughts on the post-war transition and on the Soviet Union as a rising great power on display. Beneš was the only Allied leader to contribute to the review, beside the Dutch Prime Minister Pieter S. Gerbrandy (theorizing domestic politics).83 Czechoslovakia was the continental ally most frequently represented on the pages of the Norseman, either by topic, or by author; the Czechoslovak–Norwegian Day, instituted in 1941 to commemorate the stellar writer Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson’s advocacy of Slovak minority rights in Austria-Hungary has contributed to this.84 At the same time, the review was rather silent about Poland or the Balkans, the “sore” objects of Allied international relations. It also only rarely focused on Norway’s traditional partners in international politics, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, two ex-neutral members of the inter-war “Oslo Group.”85 This might suggest that this “community of interests” has already been tested and materialized, that there were fewer incentives for socialization through knowledge sharing as in the case of the relationship with Britain or Czechoslovakia.
Conclusions
It is commonplace to argue that World War ii and the operations of Norway’s government-in-exile integrated the country with the wider world in an unprecedented manner. Publicity for international audience was a part of this story.
The original task for the Norwegian print media was to inform about the situation in the Germany-occupied country, and to solicit goodwill for the government-in-exile. Both elements were important for the construction of Norway’s place in the multilateral Allied London, laying foundations for bilateral relationships that, in some cases, had been rather nominal. As time passed, Norwegian international publicity acquired a firmer organizational framework and further diplomatic functions. The Norwegians started posting signs of their perceptions of the international order in the making, and of the country’s place in it, on regular, not ad-hoc basis. Their own international review, the Norseman, played a crucial role in this. It was also essential for the forging of Norway’s desired international identity, crafted through the instrumental use of the long-established historical narratives that had formed Norwegian self-perceptions – and that, it has been pointed out, were bound to do so for decades to come.86 While the government-in-exile at no time enjoyed complete monopoly on what was being emitted to the international audience, it showed distinct ability to adapt to the changing environment. Rather substantial modifications of Norwegian internationalism, communicated primarily through the print media, are perhaps the principal proof here. Finally, the Norseman ventured beyond the horizon of the government’s representative mouthpiece. It was utilized as a platform to entertain and test relationships with prospective partners. Beside content, Allied print media, especially the “high-brow” reviews for international audience, mediated reciprocity and aided the built-up of “like-mindedness” among Allies. To measure their impact may not be feasible,87 however, they merit attention as indicators of a “community of interests,” or of the lack thereof, and as diplomatic tools in their own right.
Acknowledgements
I would like thank Mats Andrén, Martin Conway, Ettore Costa, Izabela Dahl, Anna Gustavsson, Norbert Götz, Andreas Mørkved Hellenes, Carl Holmberg, Haakon Andreas Ikonomou, Mariana Ivanova, Paweł Jaworski, Carl Marklund, Iver B. Neumann, Marsha Siefert, Bjørn Arne Steine, Rasmus Sinding Søndergaard, Iselin Theien, and Ken Weisbrode for comments and hints on various occasions and anonymous referees for constructive suggestions.
Cf. Stewart I. “The French Press in Wartime London, 1940–4: From the Politics of Exile to Inter-Allied Relations.” Journal of Contemporary History 58 (1) (2023), 50. The bbc gets “preferential treatment”; Seul, S., and N. Ribeiro, eds. Revisiting Transnational Broadcasting: The bbc’s Foreign Language Services during the Second World War (London: Routledge, 2018).
Eichenberg, J. “Macht auf der Flucht. Europäische Regierungen in London, 1940–1944.” Zeithistorische Forschungen 15 (3) (2018), 452–73; Jakubec, P. “Together and Alone in Allied London: Czechoslovak, Norwegian and Polish Governments-in-Exile, 1940–1945.” International History Review 42 (3) (2020), 466–67.
Bembaron, F.O. “Newspapers of the Allies in London.” International Affairs 19 (2) (1940), 104–6; Bembaron, F.O. “The Foreign Press in Great Britain.” International Affairs 19 (3-4) (1940), 182–84.
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Most recently, Plesch, D. America, Hitler and the UN: How the Allies Won World War ii and Forged the Peace (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 7–8; Sluga, G. Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 79–117.
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Todman, D. Britain’s War. 2 vols. (London: Allen Lane, 2016–19), 1:275.
Cf. “Instrukcja Rządu dla kierowników placówek zagranicznych.” [“Government Instructions for the Heads of Missions.”], October 10, 1939. In Protokoły z posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Minutes of the Meetings of the Council of Ministers of the Polish Republic] (=pprm). 8 vols., eds. M. Zgórniak and W. Rojek, (Cracow: Secesja, 1994–2008), 1:16.
Piirimäe, K. “Countering “The Obtuse Arguments of the Bolsheviks’: Estonian Information Work in Sweden, the United States and Britain, 1940–1944.” In Histories of Public Diplomacy, eds. L. Clerc, N. Glover, and P. Jordan, 60–78; Eiby Seidenfaden, E. “Mobilized for Propaganda: Danish Journalists in British Exile, 1940–1945.” In Nordic Media Histories of Propaganda and Persuasion, eds. F. Norén, E. Stjernholm, and C. Thomson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 141–58.
7th Conference, November 8, 1939. In pprm, 1:65–66; Hronek, J. Když se hroutil svět [When the World Was Falling Down] (Prague: Práce, 1946), 30; Leitgeber, W. W kwaterze prasowej. Dziennik z łat wojny 1939–1945. Od Coëtquidan do ‘Rubensaʼ [In the Press Headquarters: A Wartime Diary, 1939–1945 – From Coëtquidan to the Rubens] (London: Veritas, 1973), 8, 9 (August 29 & September 4, 1939); Pavlát, D. Novinář a politik Hubert Ripka. Člověk, který nemlčel [Journalist and Politician Hubert Ripka: A Man Who Did Not Keep Quiet] (Prague: Academia, 2019), 113–15, 124–32.
Ripka, H. Munich: Before and After (London: Gollancz, 1939); Pavlát, D. Novinář, 104–8.
E.g., Kiszely, J. Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940 (Cambridge, 2017), esp. 268–69, 271–72.
Dahl, H.F. “Toralv Øksnevad.” In Norsk biografisk leksikon [Norwegian Dictionary of Biography] (=nbl), 2nd ed., 10 vols. (Oslo: Kunnskapsforlaget, 1999–2005), 10:104–6; Eriksen, K.E. “Finn Moe.“ In nbl., 6:314–15; Pedersen Dahlen, Ø. “ud s hemmelige pressekontor.” [“The Foreign Ministry Secret Press Office.”] Mediehistorisk tidsskrift 14 (1) (2017), 23–24.
“Melding til Stortinget om Regjeringens informasjonskontors virksomhet.” [“Report to the Storting on the operations of the Government Information Office.”], February 1, 1946. In Den norske regjerings virksomhet fra 9. april 1940 til 22. juni 1945. Departmentenes meldinger [The Norwegian Government’s Operations, 9 April 1940 – 22 June 1945: Ministerial Reports]. 4 vols., ed. J. Nygaardsvold (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1948), 1:61–63; Kolsrud, O. En splintret stat. Regjeringskontorene, 1940–1945 [A State Divided: Government Agencies, 1940–1945] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2004), 61–63: Lie, T. Oslo–Moskva–London (Oslo: Tiden, 1968), 112–13; Neumann, I.B., and H. Leira. Aktiv og avventende. Utenrikstjenestens liv 1905–2005 [Active and Awaiting: Foreign Service, A Life, 1905–2005] (Oslo: Pax, 2005), 138–40; Sommerfelt, A. “I kamp for vår ære.” [“Fighting for Our Honor.”] In Norges krig 1940–1945 [Norway’s War, 1940–1945]. 3 vols., ed. S. Steen (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1947–1950), 2:75–76. See also The News of Norway 1 (1) (1941).
Debes, J. Sentraladministrasjonens historie 1940–1945 [History of Government, 1940–1945] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980), 155–59; McConnell F. “Governments-in-Exile: Statehood, Statelessness, and the Reconfiguration of Territory and Sovereignty.” Geography Compass 3 (5) (2009), 1903.
Omang, R. Norsk utenrikstjeneste [Norway’s Foreign Service]. 2 vols. (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1955–1959), 2:328–34.
E.g., Orzoff, A. Battle for the Castle: The Myth of Czechoslovakia in Europe, 1914–1948 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
Seip, H. “Le Nord, nordisk blad med stattsministerkvartett i støttegruppe.” [“Le Nord, Nordic Review with Four Prime Ministers as a Support Group.”] Nordisk tidsskrift för vetenskap, könst och industri, n.s., 69 (6) (1993), 533–42; Theien, I. Fra krig til krig. En biografi om C.J. Hambro [From One War to Another: A Biography of C.J. Hambro] (Oslo: Spartacus, 2015), 13, 36–40.
Cf. Hronek, J. Když se hroutil, 37–43; Leitgeber, W. W kwaterze, 9–10 (September 7, 1939).
Giverholt, H. Nyhetsformidling i Norge. Norsk telegrambyrå 1867–1967 [News Transmission in Norway: Norwegian News Agency, 1867–1967] (Oslo: n.d., 1967), 168, 175–76; Ottosen, R., et al. Parti, presse og publikum, 1880–1945 [Party, Press, Public, 1880–1945] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2010), 408–10.
Kolsrud, O. En splintret stat, 61.
“Melding,” 63; Sommerfelt, A. “I kamp,” 69, 99–102.
Stowe, L. No Other Road to Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1941), 64–101.
Riste, O. Norway’s Foreign Relations: A History (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1996), 154.
Hambro, C.J. I Saw It Happen in Norway (New York: Appleton–Century, 1940). On the circumstances, see idem, De første måneder [The First Months] (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1945), 7–8.
Gram-Skjoldager, K. “Taming the Bureaucrats: The Supervisory Commission and Political Control of the Secretariat.” In The League of Nations: Perspectives from the Present, eds. H.A. Ikonomou and K. Gram-Skjoldager (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2019), 40–50; Theien, I. Fra krig, 18–22, 67–86, 178–89.
Hambro, C.J. De første måneder, 11; Hambro, C.J. I Saw, 1; Theien I. Fra krig, 225–26.
Hambro, C.J. I Saw, 53.
Ibid., 36, 118.
Ibid., 6–7.
Ibid., 4–5; Dies, M. The Trojan Horse in America (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1940); Hall M., and W. Peck. “Wings for the Trojan Horse.” Foreign Affairs 19 (2) (1940/41), 347–69.
Rzepa, J. “Publishing ‘Paper Bullets’: Politics, Propaganda and Polish–English Translation in Wartime London.” Comparative Critical Studies 16 (2-3) (2019), 222–23.
van Kleffens, E.N. The Rape of Netherlands (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1940); Daily Telegraph, July 10, 1941, quoted in van Kleffens, E.N. Belevenissen [Experiences]. 2 vols. (Alphen an den Rijn: Sijthoff, 1980–83), 2:27–28; Erlandsson, S. “Off the Record: Margaret van Kleffens and the Gendered History of Dutch World War ii Diplomacy.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 21 (1) (2019), 38–39.
Unwin, S. The Truth about a Publisher (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), 262–63.
Szathmáry to Foreign Ministry, January 30, 1941, Londýnský archiv – důvěrný (=la-d), č.j. 267/dův/41, Box 92, Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí, Prague (=amzv).
Ducháček, I. Deníky 1939–1945 [Diaries 1939–1945], eds. P. Horák and R. Vašek (Prague: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, Masarykův ústav a Archiv av čr, 2022), 356 (September 24, 1942).
Lie, T. “The Community of Nations.” Times, November 14, 1941, 5. See also “The Small Nations.” Times, December 16, 1940, 5; “Norway Firm to the End.” Sunday Times, June 29, 1941, 5; Heywood, V. “The Alternatives to ‘Neutrality.’” Sunday Times, February 5, 1942, 5.
Koht, H. Norway – Neutral and Invaded, 1939–1940 (London, Melbourne: Hutchinson, 1941). Excerpts were serialized in the Daily Telegraph, starting mid-March 1941. See also Svendsen, Å. Halvdan Koht – veien mot framtiden. En biografi [Halvdan Koht, The Road to Future: A Biography] (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2013), 354–60.
Koht, H. Norway, 195, 196.
Dormer, C. “Norway. Annual Report, 1937,” §43, fo 491/31, National Archives, Kew.
Cf. Sommerfelt, A. “I kamp,” 98.
Londýnský archiv (=la), Boxes 186-7, amzv.
Webster, W. Mixing It: Diversity in World War Two Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 60–61, 155–56.
Segeš, D. “Ladislav Szathmáry. Vyslanec, ktorý sa nebál povedať ‘nie’” [“Ladislav Szathmáry, A Minister Not Afraid of Saying ‘No’”]. In Michálek, S., et al. Muži diplomacie. Slováci na vysokých postoch československej zahraničnej služby [Men of Diplomacy: High-Ranking Slovaks in Czechoslovak Foreign Service] (Liptovský Mikuláš: Spolok Martina Rázusa, 2018), 285–316. See also Sharp, P. Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 79–81.
Szathmáry to Foreign Ministry, February 18, February 25, February 26, and March 7, 1941, č.j. 1171/41 & 1411/41 & 1413/41 & 1831/41, la, Box 186, amzv.
Plesch, D. America, 38, 62–63.
E.g., Notter, H. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), 110–12, 125–30, 247–69, 274–338.
[Carr, E.H.] “Great and Small Nations.” Times, March 10, 1943, 5, rang alarm bells, cf. van Kleffens, E.N. Belevenissen, 2:29–31 (incl. his rejoinder of March 25). For the roots of these debates, see Douglas, R.M. The Labour Party, Nationalism and Internationalism, 1939–1951 (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), 73, 77–80.
Churchill, W.S. The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan. 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1899), 1:235. Cf. Heraclitus, frag. B53: “War is father of all, and king of all”; Robinson, T.M. Heraclitus: Fragments. A Text and Translation with a Commentary (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 37.
Notter, H. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 56, 97, 108; Parmar, I. Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939–1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Rosenboim, O. The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Stöckmann, J. The Architects of International Relations: Building the Discipline, Designing the World, 1914–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022).
E.g., Beneš E. “The Organization of Postwar Europe.” Foreign Affairs 20 (2) (1941/42), 226–42; van Kleffens, E.N. “The Democratic Future of the Netherlands Indies.” Foreign Affairs 21 (1) (1942/43), 87–102; Masaryk, J. “After Chaos Back to Political Science.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 222 (1942), 103–8.
Thostrup Jacobsen E., ed. … Gør jer pligt – gør jert værk. John Christmas Møllers dagbøger 1941–45 [… Do Your Duty – Get to Work; John Christmas Møller Diaries, 1941–1945] (Copenhagen: Selskab for Udgivelse af Kilder til Dansk Historie, 1995), 138–39 (July 5–6, 1942). See also Götz, N. “The Absent-Minded Founder: Norway and the Establishment of the United Nations.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20 (4) (2009), 623–24.
van Caulwelaert F. “The Small European States after the War.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 234 (1944), 61–62; Hambro, E. “Small States and a New League – from a Viewpoint of Norway.” American Political Science Review 37 (5) (1943), 903–9; Hambro, E. “The Northern European Countries after This War.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 228 (1943), 62–63.
Ikonomou, H.A. “Edvard Hambro and the Academic Networks of International Politics,” https://projects.au.dk/inventingbureaucracy/blog/show/artikel/edvard-hambro-and-the-academic-networks-of-international-politics/.
Hambro, C.J. How to Win the Peace (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1942), 194. See also the book’s dedication.
Theien, I. Fra krig, 238–41.
Hambro, C.J. How to Win, 143–44, 150–51, 154. See also Theien, I. Fra krig, 243–46.
Theien, I. Fra krig, 15–16, 167, 197–98, 248–49, 256.
Latawski, P. “Smogorzewski Kazimierz Maciej (1894–1992).” In Polski Słownik Biograficzny [Polish Dictionary of Biography]. 54 vols. (Wroclaw, Warsaw, Cracow: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1935–), 39:225–28; Orzoff, A. Battle, 71.
The review was a private initiative, however, Charles de Gaulle, it is claimed, was initially subsidizing it. Links to Secret Intelligence Service were revealed yet, unlike Labarthe’s ties to Soviet intelligence, not specified; Belot, R. La Résistance sans de Gaulle. Politique et gaullisme de guerre (Paris: Fayard, 2006), 52–55; Drake, D. “Raymond Aron and La France libre (June 1940 – September 1941).” In A History of the French in London: Liberty, Equality, Opportunity, eds. D. Kelly and M. Cornick (London: Institute of Historical Research, 2013), 376, 378–90; Stewart, I. “French Press,” 62–65.
Skard S. Norsk Utefront i USA, 1940–1945 [Norwegian External Resistance in the US, 1940–1945] (Oslo: Samlaget, 1987), 25–33.
Memo of Conversation Ording–Labarthe (August 20, 1942), Ording mss, Mss. 4°3060, Nasjonalbiblioteket, Oslo (=nb); “Dagbøker” [“Diaries”], 8:14–15, 24, 191, 192, 193, 197, 198, 200 (January 29–30, February 10, November 14, November 19, November 24, December 9, and December 22, 1942, January 13, 1943), Worm-Müller mss, Ms.fol. 2653; Arne Ordings dagbøker [Arne Ording’s Diaries]. 2 vols. (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 2000-2003), 1:55–56 (July 27, 1942).
Kirkhusmo A. “Jacob S. Worm-Müller” In nbl, 10:58–59.
Angell, S.I. “Imagining Norway by Using the Past.” Scandinavian Journal of History 47 (5) (2022), 670–71.
Cf. Nygaardsvold, J. “Cultural Continuity.” Norseman 1 (1) (1943), 7–8.
Ording, A. “Norway and International Co-operation.” Norseman 1 (1) (1943), 14–15.
Colban, E. “Why the League of Nations Failed – How to Start Again.” Norseman 1 (4), 253–58, at 255; Thowsen, A. “Erik Colban.” In nbl, 2:222–23.
Jakubec, P. “Together,” 471–73. See also The Editor. “Norway’s Path.” Norseman 1 (3) (1943), 170.
Knutsen T.B., H. Leira, and I.B. Neumann. Norsk utenrikspolitisk idéhistorie, 1880–1940 [The History of Norwegian Foreign Policy Thought, 1880–1940] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2016), 98–99, 104–6, 125–26, 142–43; Riste, O. Norway’s Foreign Relations, 47, 65, 75–77, 86–87, 136–37.
Ordings dagbøker, 1:137, 141 (January 17 and January 31, 1943); The Editor. “Organizing for the Peace.” Norseman 1 (4) (1943), 252.
Øksnevad, T. “Lessons of Two Lives: Vansittart and Hambro.” Norseman 1 (1943), 316–20. See also … Gør jer pligt, 181 (December 17, 1942).
Knutsen, T.B., H. Leira, and I. Neumann. Norsk utenrikspolitisk idéhistorie.
See Douglas, R.M. Labour Party, 5–8 for definitions and 50–140 for evolution.
Collier, L. “Norway and Britain.” Norseman 1 (1) (1943), 9–11. See also Angell, S.I. “Imagining Norway,” 671.
Lodge T. “Fritjof Nansen.” Norseman 1 (1) (1943), 30–34; Noel-Baker, P. “I Knew a Man – Nansen.” Norseman 1 (2) (1943), 93–98; Saunders, H.St.G. “Nansen as I Knew Him.” Norseman 3 (2) (1945), 86–93. See also Cabanes, B. The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918–1924 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 133–88.
Ehrenburg, I. “Norway is Not for Sale.” Norseman 1 (1) (1943), 45–46; Lippmann, W. “The Atlantic Community.” Norseman 1 (5) (1943), 348–57.
Lippmann, W. “The Defence of the Atlantic World.” New Republic, February 17, 1917. In Lippmann, W. Force and Ideas: The Early Writings, ed. A. Schlesinger, Jr. (New York: Liveright, 1970), 69–74, esp. 72–73, 75.
Ordings dagbøker, 1:113, 243 (November 19, 1942 and September 1, 1943); Ræstad, A. “The Myth of Europe.” Norseman 1 (1) (1943), 40, 43–44; Götz, N. “Absent-Minded Founder,” 622–23.
“An Icelander” [pseud.]. “Iceland and the War.” Norseman 1 (3) (1943), 205–11; Benediktsson, P. “Independent Iceland.” Norseman 1 (6) (1943), 409–16; Worm-Müller, J.S. “Norway’s Foreign Relations,” 160. See also Whitehead, Þ. “Stórveldin og lýðveldið 1941–1944.” [“The Great Powers and the Republic, 1941–1944.”] Skírnir 147 (2) (1973), 202–41, esp. 215–16.
The Editor. “The Northern States and the Turning Point in the War.” Norseman 1 (5) (1943), 324, 326.
Beneš, E. “Some Thoughts on the Peace.” Norseman 1 (1943), 316–20.
Gerbrandy, P.S. “Democracy.” Norseman 2 (2) (1944), 86–93.
Hodin, J.P. “Panslavism.” Norseman 3 (3) (1945), 162–70; Hodin, J.P. “Masaryk, T.G. the Philosopher of Democracy.” The Norseman 2 (5) (1944), 357–70; Kodicek, J. “Björnstjerne Björnson and Czechoslovakia” Norseman 3 (4) (1945), 165–67; Odložilík, O. “On a Threshold of a New Era.” Norseman 3 (1) (1945), 26–33; Osusky, S. “Double Standard of Morality.” Norseman 2 (1) (1944), 19–28; Rytter, O. “Björnson and Czechoslovakia.” Norseman 2 (1) (1944), 63–67.
Rolin, H. “The Belgian Experiences with Neutrality.” Norseman 1 (2) (1943), 129–39; van Loon, H.W. “How the People of the Netherlands has Learned to Hate.” Norseman 2 (1) (1944), 55–62. On the “Oslo Group,” see van Roon, G. Small States in Years of Depression: The Oslo Alliance 1930–1940 (Assen, Maastricht: Van Gorcum, 1989).
Angell, S.I. “Imagining Norway,” 671–80. See also Leira, H., et al. Norske selvbilder og norsk utenrikspolitikk [Norwegian Auto-Images and Norwegian Foreign Policy] (Oslo: Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt, 2007), 9–16.
Cf. Stewart, I. “French Press,” 67.
