Abstract
This paper conducts a legal analysis of the concept of nudity in the context of innovative technologies in selected Europeans jurisdictions. The laws of Poland, Ireland, and the European Union are examined and compared in terms of their approach to the protection of nudity. The research finds that while there are similarities in the criminal laws of Poland and Ireland, there are also notable differences in the understanding of nudity. Additionally, the proposed EU Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence is examined in relation to the non-consensual distribution of intimate and manipulated images. The study concludes by recommending further research to clarify the legal definition of nudity, and to address the concerns of different individuals and groups with varying sensitivity towards nudity.
1 Introduction
This paper embarks on an inquiry into how nudity is construed and protected within the domain of criminal law across the European Union. The research problem can be reframed as follows: Is there a pan-European comprehension of nudity within criminal law, and if so, how is nudity precisely delineated? While that problem may be discussed in various context, this investigation specifically focuses on situations in which people are unwillingly exposed as naked by the means of creation and dissemination of images, including videos. Thus, this paper does not concern exhibitionism nor unwanted exposure to pornography. Moreover, while crimes like child pornography, forced prostitution, or human trafficking may also involve nudity, they invariably encompass a multitude of distinct factors, which cannot be discussed in details in a short contribution. Therefore, this study confines its scope to the creation or dissemination of explicit content featuring nude individuals to unveil what nudity means in the criminal law.
By investigating the legal understanding of nudity, this paper aims to enhance legal clarity, potentially resolving ambiguities or identifying areas in need of clarification. Beyond its theoretical importance, this issue holds substantial practical relevance. A precise delineation of the concept of nudity would facilitate evaluating one of the elements of the criminal offence, increasing efficiency of law enforcement. Given the prevalent digital dissemination of naked images, they invariably transcend national borders.1 A harmonized interpretation of nudity plays a pivotal role in fostering international collaboration for prosecution, thereby fortifying the fight against this category of crime and preserving individual rights. Indeed, non-consensual creation and distribution of explicit images infringe upon the right to privacy. The notion of privacy encompasses a multifaceted range of elements, including intimacy and nudity. In this context, the establishment of a shared understanding of nudity and the institution of its effective protection become indispensable, especially within the context of innovative technologies, which frequently raise concerns about privacy. For instance, Active and Assisted Living (aal) technologies incorporate Information and Communication Technologies, sensors, and artificial intelligence into the living environments of elderly individuals to offer support and detect potential hazards, such as emergencies or falls.2 A prevailing concern among prospective users centres on their privacy, including the apprehension of potential leaks of naked images.3 Therefore, a more precise definition of nudity can also contribute to the broader adoption of innovative technologies.
To undertake this endeavour, a comparative legal methodology is employed, wherein relevant EU legal provisions are juxtaposed against the criminal laws of Ireland and Poland. These two countries embody diverse legal traditions, with Ireland adhering to the common-law tradition, while Poland adheres to civil law. Despite cultural similarities, primarily stemming from the historical influence of Catholicism,4 these nations exhibit divergent socio-economic contexts.5 Additionally, the familiarity of these legal frameworks to the authors and their linguistic accessibility informs this choice.
The paper proceeds by chronologically presenting the legal perspective on nudity within Poland, Ireland, and the EU, allowing for an examination of the evolution in the understanding of nudity. Subsequently, it critically scrutinizes the similarities and disparities between these legal frameworks. De lege lata conclusions aim to elucidate the divergences in the comprehension of nudity within the EU, albeit through the prism of only two member states. These disparities are of paramount significance for the effective prosecution of the discussed crimes, particularly in the digital landscape where international cooperation is often required, with the principle of double criminality being of utmost importance. Consequently, this paper unravels the extent to which criminal law protects nudity, a matter of significance for individuals in understanding their rights and for the developers or providers of new technologies in comprehending their obligations. Simultaneously, de lege ferenda conclusions explore how EU law can harmonize national regulations to enhance protection against the creation or dissemination of nude images, thus contributing to the preservation of privacy. In the final section, directions for further research are proposed.
2 Nudity in Chosen Jurisdictions
2.1 Poland
In Poland, a person’s nudity is protected by criminal law. Since 2010, unconsented depicting or disseminating a “representation of a naked person” or “a person engaged in sexual activity” constitutes a criminal offence under Article 191a §1 of the Penal Code (Polish: Kodeks Karny, kk).6 The article is located in the part of the Code concerning offences against freedom, and the value protected by Article 191a §1 kk is a person’s freedom of deciding upon depicting and disseminating one’s representation.7 The norm of Article 191a §1 kk is overly complex. Firstly, there are two different actions by which the crime may be committed: depicting or disseminating. Secondly, each action may have as its object a representation of a naked person, or a representation of a person engaged in sexual activity. Thirdly, for the action of depiction, the law mentions three methods by which the action must be performed to constitute a crime: coercion, threat, or deception. Interestingly, both “representation” and “nudity” are two constituent and unclear elements of an offence.8 Therefore, two questions will be addressed in this section of the paper:
- 1)when is a person considered naked?
- 2)what is considered a representation of a person?
In Polish law, there is no legal definition of nudity or “naked person”. In such cases, a literal interpretation based on dictionaries and common understanding should be pursued.9 While doing so, legal principles of strict interpretation and in dubio pro reo in case of doubt the milder”) should be followed (Article 1§1 kk, Article 5§2 Code of Criminal Proceedings).10 A naked person would mean a person without any cover, not wearing any piece of clothing.11 Consequently, a person wearing anything, even just one sock or a hat, would not be considered naked.12 Such a literal interpretation of nudity leads to a situation in which depicting a person wearing just a glove would be legal, but the mere lack of this glove would make depicting a criminal offence.13 That interpretation of nudity could be considered illegitimate, unjust, and irrational in society, and would be against ratio legis.14
As a solution to the aforementioned problem, some scholars propose to distinguish between a completely naked and partially naked person, and accept that in both situations depicting a person would be forbidden.15 Królikowski presents what I propose to call “a quantitative approach”, in which it is essential whether a “considerable part” of the body is uncovered. For him, small items or technical means like pixelization or covering of parts of the body would not be considered a sufficient cover.16 However, Królikowski does not propose any criteria to distinguish a “considerable part” i.e., the percentage of the uncovered body.17 Other scholars represent an approach that could be called “qualitative”. Kłączyńska distinguishes parts of the body that must be revealed to consider a person as partially naked: genitals and, in the case of a female, her breasts.18 Following that idea, Filar underlines that genitals and female breast must be “clearly recognizable.”19 Other scholars adopt a more contextual interpretation, and believe that a person is partially naked also when they are not dressed in a manner considered appropriate for particular circumstances.20 Assessment of the nakedness of the person may depend on the personal beliefs of the victim, their social position, job, age, and marital status.21 As a result, nakedness would be highly contextual, and would have been defined separately for every case.22 To avoid legal uncertainty of that kind, Filek proposes to define a naked person as a person whose at least one intimate part of the body is recognizable.23 That interpretation still must be confirmed by the courts, as there is a lack of case law considering the definition of nudity.
The concept of nudity in Article 191a §1 kk is intricately connected with the concept of “representation”. Some authors believe that the connection is so close that it is not appropriate to discuss the meaning of nudity, but rather the representation of a naked person.24 Representation itself is understood in several ways in Polish jurisprudence and case law: as a physical image of a person, picture, or video, but sometimes also as voice, characteristic mimic or movements.25 While there are discussions about whether making a sculpture or a draft of a naked person would constitute a criminal offence under Article 199a §1 kk, there is no doubt that the norm covers pictures and videos.26 A crucial feature of a representation is the identifiability of a person.27 A depicted person may be identifiable directly, based on the picture only, or indirectly when identification requires also other sources. There is a consensus that if direct identification is possible, a picture is a representation of a person.28 A person is directly identifiable not only when their face but also when characteristic elements, such as features of a person, items, behaviours, places etc., are depicted. There is less clarity on whether indirect identifiability is a sufficient feature of a representation. Such indirect identifiability may occur in the context of innovative technologies if a person may be identified using information about when or where the picture was made (metadata). Although currently indirect identifiability is considered to be not sufficient to constitute a representation,29 it may change due to the development of the EU’s data protection law.30
To conclude, under Polish law, there is no legal definition of nudity as such. Analysis of Article 191a §1 kk shows that nudity protected by the law is a state in which an identifiable person has their intimate parts recognizable.
2.2 Ireland
Similarly to Polish law, Irish law also protects people’s nudity. In December 2020, the Harassment, Harmful Communications and Related Offences Act 2020 was passed by the Irish Parliament.31 The Act contains two offences related to nudity. The first one relates to recording or distributing an intimate image without consent (section 3). The second is an offence of “distributing, publishing, or threatening to distribute or publish an intimate image with intent to cause harm or being reckless as to whether harm is caused” (section 2). Notably, due to the relative novelty of that legislation, there is no well-established case law that can be used in the analysis.
The legal definition of the term “intimate picture” is provided in section 1. Under that section, intimate image “means any visual representation made by any means, including any photographic, film, video or digital representation”. The law defines also the content of the intimate image, providing a closed list of representations:
- a)“of what is, or purports to be the person’s genitals, buttocks or anal region and, in the case of a female, her breasts;
- b)of the underwear covering the person’s genitals, buttocks or anal region and, in the case of a female, her breasts;
- c)in which the person is nude, or
- d)in which the person is engaged in sexual activity.”
There are a few vital consequences of the provided definition. Firstly, Irish law clearly distinguishes four distinct types of intimate images: depicting what seems to be a person’s intimate parts, depicting underwear covering intimate parts, depicting a nude person, or depicting a person engaged in sexual activity. While these conditions may occur simultaneously, the fact that they are distinguished suggests that there are seen as different by the law. Nudity is one of the listed conditions but is not defined in the law.
Secondly, as the Act lists depicting intimate areas or underwear covering them separately from depicting the nude person, it may suggest that having intimate areas uncovered or lightly covered is not enough to constitute nudity. But is such distinction rational? A person may be nude, but their intimate parts are covered by some items or even various parts of the body, i.e., hands. In that case, provisions of section 1 (a) or 1 (b) would not be applicable, but the image of a person would be protected under section 1 (c). That reasoning is supported by the notice of Bowie that one of the reasons behind the Act was to avoid situations like the tragic case of Dara Quigley. In April 2017 she was detained after walking naked on a Dublin street. Footage of her arrest from the cctv cameras circulated online. A few days later, Quigley took her own life.32
Thirdly, Irish law protects not only actual nudity but also artificial one. Section 1 (a) includes into the description of an intimate image representation of “what purports to be the person’s genitals, buttocks or anal region and, in the case of a female, her breasts.” That definition covers “sexualised Photoshopped images.”33 Also, other, more sophisticated technologies, including ai software may be used to create deepfake images.34 McGlynn and Rackley rightly notice that “while these generated images are not ‘real’, the harms are very real.”35 However, the Irish legislature limited the criminalisation of artificial images only to those presenting intimate parts of the body without any cover. Despite that, it should be noticed that in that matter Act is very modern and forward-looking.36
Both aforementioned criminal offences contain a reference to harm. An offence under section 3 requires harm to occur as a constitutive element of a crime, while an offence under section 2 must be committed “with intent to cause harm or being reckless as to whether harm is caused.” In both sections, harm means “serious interference with that other person’s peace and privacy, causing alarm, distress or harm to that other person.” Section 1 precises that for the Act, “harm” includes psychological harm. Bowie points out that these provisions “could potentially limit prosecutorial possibilities, especially in relation to the intent of the perpetrator.”37 The law requires to prove beyond reasonable doubt the harm and its connection with the action, or the intention of the perpetrator. McGlynn and Rackley identify two potential challenges. First, there is a risk these provisions “reify an ‘ideal victim’ by predetermining what is seen to be the ‘appropriate’ response from victims”.38 However, some victims may react more mildly, or not express themselves. In such a case, the prosecution would be hardly possible. Second, the prosecution may not be possible if a potential victim is not aware that they have been victimised, i.e., if there are multiple victims.
It should be noticed that Act separately criminalizes disseminating information that may be used to identify victims (section 5(1)). That dissemination may have a form of broadcasting or publishing, where publishing covers all forms, other than broadcast, of dissemination “to the public or a portion of the public” (section 1). Information, “that is likely to enable the identification of the alleged victim”, may have any form (section 5(1)(a-c)). While the purpose of section 5 is to protect victims, its norms may suggest that the intimate image does not have to represent an identifiable person.39 It could be argued that the identifiability of a person is necessary to cause harm which is a constitutive element of an offence. However, a victim may know that the image depicts them, and that fact results in distress, alarm, or other harm. Dissemination of information enabling the identification of the victim would be considered additional harm, and therefore is criminalized separately.
In conclusion, Irish law criminalises the creation and distribution of images of what is or purports to be intimate parts, underwear covering them, and in which the person is nude if there is actual or intended harm.
2.3 European Union
There is no definition of nudity in the EU law. However, in March 2022, the European Commission proposed a new Directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence which includes measures on the non-consensual distribution of intimate and manipulated images.40 Although the overall objective of the Directive is to “effectively combat violence against women and domestic violence throughout the EU”, it does so by laying down minimum rules on the definition of relevant criminal offences, including “non-consensual sharing of intimate or manipulated material” (Article 7). Despite its name, the Directive understands the victim as “any person, regardless of sex or gender” (Article 4(c)).
The Directive distinguishes intimate and manipulated images, videos, and “other material”. Under Article 7(b), manipulation means “making it appear as though another person is engaged in sexual activities”. Therefore, provisions concerning manipulated materials would not cover deepfakes showing a person naked. Article 7(a) concerns dissemination through ict s “intimate images, or videos or other material depicting sexual activities, of another person.” The scope of the norm is unclear. It may be limited to only representations of sexual activities. Rigotti and McGlynn propose a broader interpretation and “include images which are deemed sexual and/or intimate.”41 They also point out that there are individuals and groups in Europe which may have sensitivity different from the majority of society.42 That lack of clarity constitutes a significant weakness of the Directive. It would be beneficial to define an intimate image, using the experience of Member States’ laws, and scholarship.
3 Comparison of Presented Legal Approaches
Analysis of the chosen legal systems allows us to compare them, and highlight similarities and differences in their approach to the protection of nudity. In this section, Polish and Irish legislation will be compared. Firstly, common features of regulations will be identified. Secondly, the main differences in understanding nudity will be discussed. Finally, both legal solutions will be evaluated, considering the clarity of the law and enforceability.
3.1 Similarities
There are four main similarities between the Polish and the Irish legislation concerning nudity:
- 1.There are two types of protected situations: engagement in sexual activity, and nudity. While they often occur simultaneously, they are distinguished. While this paper is focused on nudity, it is not without significance that the legislatures of the two countries combined these two situations. They both relate to intimacy and privacy.43
- 2.Two types of actions constitute a criminal offence: the production and dissemination of naked pictures. Each of these actions may cause harm. To commit a crime, it is not required to produce and disseminate naked pictures. It is enough to perform one of these actions, i.e., disseminate naked images obtained legally.
- 3.A key element of the crime is the lack of consent of a victim to the action. A person may agree to make naked pictures or to disseminate them. In such a case, there is no crime. However, it is crucial to notice, that consent for dissemination may be limited. For example, a user of aal technologies may agree that their pictures may be seen by employees of the aal service provider, personnel at a care facility, or family members. If pictures are distributed to anyone outside that group, it will constitute a criminal offence.
- 4.Nudity is understood as more than being completely undressed. At the same time, in examined legislation, it does not define what percentage of the body must be uncovered to consider a person nude. Moreover, in both regimes, there is no clarity if depicting a person that is nude but covered with some items or by technical means constitutes a crime. That question, vital in the context of innovative technologies like smart homes, aal, and possible privacy-enhancing technologies,44 cannot be answered definitively without court judgements in that matter.
3.2 Differences
Five major differences between the Polish and Irish approaches can be identified. Three of them concern connections between nudity and some parts of the body, one is related to harm, and one to the identifiability of a depicted person.
- 1.Direct protection of particular parts of the body. Irish law lists three areas of the body that are directly protected: a person’s genitals, buttocks or anal region and, in the case of a female, her breasts (section 1 Act). Any picture that does or purports to represent the aforementioned areas is considered an intimate image. Meanwhile, in Polish law, no body parts are directly protected by Article 191a §1 kk which covers only representations of naked people.
- 2.Connection between nudity of particular parts of the body and considering a person as being naked. Irish Act differentiates pictures of enlisted intimate parts from pictures of a naked person (section 1). Polish rules of Article 191a §1 kk do not mention any body parts explicitly. Nevertheless, there is a consensus among legal scholars that pictures depicting genitals or female breast meet the statutory criteria of a naked picture. Filar calls that approach to nudity “topographical and contextual”, as it focuses on which parts of the body are uncovered, and the social and cultural perception of these parts.45 It should be noticed that in Polish legal doctrine, only genitals and female breasts are considered intimate parts, while in Ireland also buttocks or anal region are included (section 1 Act).
- 3.Poland and Ireland treat differently pictures presenting underwear covering intimate parts. Irish law mentions that pictures as a separate type of intimate pictures in section 1 (b) of the Act. In Poland, there is no general prohibition of depicting people in their underwear. However, there is a tendency in Polish jurisprudence to understand nudity contextually, and provide separate evaluations for each case. It was mentioned that one of the theories considers every picture depicting a recognisable intimate part as a picture of a naked person.46 Consequently, a picture of a person in underwear through which intimate parts are visible may be within the scope of Article 191a §1 kk.
- 4.The identifiability of a person is treated differently. In Poland, Article 191a §1 kk concerns the “representation of a person”. For a picture or any material to be a representation of a person, it is required that it be possible to recognise the depicted person. What is important, is that recognition may be possible also due to items in the picture, but also any additional information, such as where and when the picture was taken. It is also not relevant that only a closed group of people, for example, family or a doctor, were able to identify the depicted person.47 Therefore, if the material is properly anonymised, it is out of the scope of Article 191a §1 kk. In Ireland, the identifiability of a victim is not required to commit a crime under sections 2 or 3 of the Act. Dissemination of any information that would enable recognition of the victim is separated, and constitute an offence under section 5.
- 5.The connection between crime and harm. To commit a criminal offence under Irish law, the action in question must cause harm (section 3) or be undertaken with the intent to cause harm or by being reckless as to whether harm is caused (section 2). Polish law does not require any additional harm than that the picture was made or disseminated. Article 191a §kk protects personal freedom, and non-consensual depiction of a person in an intimate situation is understood as implicitly harmful.48 It is worth noticing that the Polish legislature attempts to balance the law, and does not prohibit making any non-consensual pictures, but limits restrictions to the situation of nudity or engagement in sexual activity.
3.3 Evaluation
Upon closer examination of the legal frameworks surrounding nudity, it becomes evident that the Irish regulation offers a more refined and intricate definition of an intimate image. The Irish Act explicitly outlines which specific body parts, even if concealed by underwear, are prohibited from being depicted. In contrast, Polish legislation takes a more lenient stance, enabling easier prosecution by not requiring evidence of harm, whether actual or intended, and considering the production or dissemination of intimate materials as a criminal act.
To enhance the protection of individuals and establish clarity for developers and providers of innovative technologies, it is proposed that a synthesis of these two approaches could be beneficial. This could be achieved through the integration of a precise and comprehensive definition of nudity and intimate imagery within the proposed EU Directive. Furthermore, recognizing that the mere act of capturing or sharing such images inherently inflicts harm would contribute to a more holistic approach.
By combining these elements, a more robust framework can be established, encompassing the nuances of depiction while addressing the detrimental effects resulting from the dissemination of intimate materials. This would not only afford individuals greater protection but also provide guidance and assurance to providers and users of innovative technologies.
4 Conclusions
The conducted study shows that legal perspectives on nudity may be different. Poland and Ireland both introduced crimes of making or disseminating intimate pictures. Researched regulations concern non-consensual depicting or disseminating representations of naked people or people engaged in sexual activities. In both systems, nudity is understood more broadly than not wearing any clothes.
However, it is important to note that there are significant differences among the countries examined. Irish law offers a more comprehensive and precise definition of “intimate pictures.” This definition encompasses not only images of completely unclothed individuals but also those depicting “what is, or purports to be” intimate body parts, even if they are covered with underwear. As a result, edited pictures and deepfake content fall within the scope of the Irish legislation.
In contrast, Polish regulations do not provide a specific definition of nudity, and legal scholars generally associate it with genitals and female breasts being “recognizable”. Furthermore, Polish law requires that a victim be identifiable for an offence to be established. Opposingly, Irish law does not impose such a requirement. Instead, causing or intending harm is a crucial element in determining the criminality of an act under Irish legislation. However, this emphasis on harm can potentially impede prosecution efforts and weaken the overall protection afforded to victims.
Conversely, Polish law operates under the assumption that the mere capture or dissemination of an intimate picture is inherently harmful, as it infringes upon an individual’s freedom and privacy. This perspective underscores the significance attributed to the act itself, independent of any specific harm caused.
The differences in these approaches highlight the complexity and nuanced nature of legislation surrounding intimate pictures in different jurisdictions. Legally relevant elements in the context of intimate pictures in both discussed countries may be presented in a form of a table with questions allowing one to evaluate if in a particular case, the image in question is protected by criminal law [Table 1].
Proposed European legislation concerning intimate pictures could combine the best elements of two investigated approaches. The Directive shall clearly define intimate pictures, possibly with a list of parts of the body considered intimate. Such a definition may also include “what appears to be an intimate part of the body” to cover technically rendered pictures, especially constantly more popular deepfakes. In the Directive, it should be no requirement of additional harm to not hinder possible prosecution for the crime.
Further research is warranted to delve into the issues that arise from this contribution. Firstly, it would be advantageous to conduct additional comparative studies encompassing more EU Member States’ legislations to determine whether these countries define nudity in a manner akin to Ireland or Poland, or employ alternative approaches. In practical terms, such research would investigate whether an image deemed as naked remains consistent across all EU countries. These studies should encompass countries that represent diverse legal traditions and social norms, including Scandinavian, Mediterranean, Balkan, and Western European nations. This more comprehensive perspective would significantly augment our comprehension of the concept of nudity within European criminal law, gauge the extent of convergence, and explore the existence of any European consensus on this term. Moreover, the findings of this research could serve as valuable inputs for the EU legislative bodies in crafting a precise definition of nudity or intimate images, thus facilitating effective cross-border cooperation in crime prevention and prosecution. Secondly, it is essential to investigate the effectiveness of various privacy-enhancing technologies, like avatar filters in videos,49 in mitigating the risk of engaging in criminal activities related to the creation or dissemination of intimate images. Understanding the extent to which these technologies successfully address such risks is crucial for developing appropriate preventive measures. Thus, conducting further research in these areas will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter, and provide valuable insights for legal and technological advancements, ultimately contributing to protection of fundamental rights.
Acknowledgements
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. CRP 861091. This document reflects the views only of the authors, and the European Union cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. The author thanks Luca Love (Karolinska Institutet) and Siddharth Ravi (University of Alicante) for discussing this paper, and their valuable comments and suggestions.
References
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Act of June 6, 1997 – Kodeks karny (Penal Code), Dz.U. 1997 nr 88 poz. 553, https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu19970880553.
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Ibid. Cf. Morawski, L. (2002). Wykładnia W Orzecznictwie sądów: Komentarz [Interpretation in Judicial Decisions: Commentary]. Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe Organizacji i Kierownictwa “Dom Organizatora.”
Act of June 6, 1997 – Kodeks postępowania karnego (Code of Criminal Procedure), Dz.U. 1997 nr 89 poz. 555, https://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?id=wdu19970890555.
Jacek Kosonoga. 2011. Karnoprawna ochrona intymnego wizerunku osoby. In Studia i Analizy Sądu Najwyższeg. Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer, 220–224.
Ibid. Cf. Filek, op. cit.
Filek, op. cit.
Morawski, op. cit.
Królikowski Michał et al. 2017. Przestępstwa przeciwko wolności. In Kodeks Karny – część szczególna. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo C. H. Beck. Cf. Marek Mozgawa. 2020. Przestępstwa Przeciwko wolności, Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, and Marek Mozgawa. 2021. Kodeks Karny. Komentarz, Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer.
Michał Krolikowski. 2010. Przestępstwa przeciwko wolności. In Wąsek Andrzej, Marian Flemming, & Robert Zawłocki, eds. Kodeks Karny: Część Szczególna. Warszawa: C. H. Beck.
Cf. Polińska, A. (2020). Nudity: A legal study with a special perspective of Polish criminal law [Doctoral dissertation, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn]. Olsztyn, Poland.
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Marian Filar. 2014. Przestępstwa przeciwko wolności. In Marian Filar, ed. Kodeks karny. Komentarz. Warszawa.
Jerzy Lachowski. 2016. Przestępstwa przeciwko wolności. In Violetta Konarska-Wrzosek, Arkadiusz Lach, Jerzy Lachowski, Tomasz Oczkowski, & Zgoliński Igor, eds. Kodeks Karny: Komentarz. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer, Andrzej Zoll. 2013. Przestępstwa przeciwko wolności. In Andrzej Zoll & Agnieszka Barczak-Oplustil, eds. Kodeks Karny: Część szczególna: Komentarz. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer Polska, and Kosonoga, op. cit.
Radosław Krajewski. 2012. Przestępstwo utrwalania i rozpowszechniania wizerunku nagiej osoby lub osoby w trakcie czynności seksualnej. Prokuratura i Prawo 5 (2012), 20–40. doi: http://dx.doi.org/https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fpk.gov.pl%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2013%2F12%2Fbef3d46d7d764bf91e5b193fcb1cd833.doc&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK.
Polińska, op. cit.
Filek, op. cit.
Marek Mozgawa and Katarzyna Nazar-Gutowska. 2014. Utrwalanie lub rozpowszechniania wizerunku nagiej osoby – art. 191a k.k. (analiza prawnokarna i praktyka ścigania). Prawo w Działaniu. Sprawy Karne 19 (2014), 7–40. doi:http://dx.doi.org/https://iws.gov.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/Marek-Mozgawa-Katarzyna-Nazar-Gutowska-Utrwalenie-lubrozpowszechnianie-wizerunku-nagiej-osoby-art.-191a-k.k.-analiza-prawnokarna-ipraktyka-%C5%9Bcigania-7.pdf.
Karolina Witczak. 2018. Comperative aspect of terms „image”, „recording” and „dissemination” in view of art. 23 of civil code and art. 81 of act of 4 February 1994 on copyright and related rights and art. 191A of the Criminal Code. Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna 6, 2 (2018), 81–108. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/fped.2017.6.2.16.
Filar, op. cit.
Judgment of the Supreme Court (of Poland) dated October 15, 2009, case no. I csk 72/09, osnc 2010, no. A, item 29. Cf. Janusz Barta. 2005. Prawo autorskie i Prawa Pokrewne: Komentarz, Kraków: Zakamycze, and Kosonoga, op. cit.
Judgment of the Supreme Court (of Poland) dated February 27, 2003, case no. iv ckn 1819/00. Cf. Kosonoga, op. cit., Mozgawa and Nazar-Gutowska, op. cit., and Krajewski, op. cit.
Judgment of the Supreme Court (of Poland) dated February 27, 2003, case no. iv ckn 1819/00. Cf. Polińska, op. cit., and Jakub Bleszynski. 2004. Glosa do wyroku Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna z dnia 27 lutego 2003 r. iv ckn 1819/00. Orzecznictwo Sąsów Polskich 6 (2004), 320–323. doi:http://dx.doi.org/http://www.sn.pl/orzecznictwo/Biuletyn_IC_SN/Biuletyn_IC_SN_07-08_2004.pdf.
Judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 1 August 2022, Case C184/20, https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=263721&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=22153.
Harassment, Harmful Communications and Related Offences Act 2020, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/bills/bill/2017/63/.
Emma Bowie. 2021. Image-Based Sexual Offences and Irish Law: Does the Harassment, Harmful Communications and Related Offences Bill 2017 Provide Adequate Legal Protection for Victims? Trinity Women’s Review 4, 1 (2021), 140–155. doi:http://dx.doi.org/https://www.esr.ie/index.php/TrinityWomensReview/article/view/20 54/621.
Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley. 2017. More than ‘Revenge Porn’: Image-Based Sexual Abuse and the Reform of Irish Law. Irish probation journal 14 (2017), 38–51. doi:http://dx.doi.org/http://www.probation.ie/EN/PB/0/12D6F4D1961C4695802581D0003D92D9/$File/ClareMcGlynn_ErikaRackley_IPJ.pdf.
Brooke Gladston and Charlotte Laws. 2013. Why One mom’s investigation might actually stop revenge porn: On the media. (December 2013). Retrieved January 26, 2023 from https://www.wnyc.org/story/why-one-moms-investigation-might-actually-stop-revengeporn/#transcript, and Bowie, op. cit..
McGlynn and Rackley, op. cit.
Bowie, op. cit.
Ibid.
McGlynn and Rackley, op. cit.
Maidhof et al., op. cit.
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating violence against women and domestic violence, com/2022/105 final.
Carlotta Rigotti and Clare McGlynn. 2022. Towards an EU criminal law on violence against women: The ambitions and limitations of the Commission’s proposal to criminalise imagebased sexual abuse. New Journal of European Criminal Law 13, 4 (2022), 452–477. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/20322844221140713.
Ibid, and Erika Rackley et al. 2021. Seeking justice and redress for victim-survivors of image-based sexual abuse. Feminist Legal Studies 29, 3 (2021), 293–322. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10691-021-09460-8.
Daniel J. Solove. 2002. Conceptualizing privacy. California Law Review 90, 4 (2002), 1087. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3481326.
Maidhof et al., op. cit.
Filar, op. cit.
Ibid, and Filek, op. cit.
Królikowski Michał et al., op. cit.
Polińska, op. cit., and Hypś, op. cit.