Abstract
Can the management of transnational migration and asylum be used as an instrument of foreign policy? From labour market needs to legal issues, electoral pressure, and financial and commercial interests, the scholarly literature on the drivers of migration policy in both the North and the South has focused primarily on domestic factors. The case of Morocco offers a useful additional perspective. The security-orientated and restrictive policy toward transmigrants applied in the 2000s gave way, in 2013, to a new approach that was much more welcoming and mindful of migrant integration. Since Morocco’s independence in 1956, asylum management has been driven exclusively by security and political objectives. Although it has never had a national asylum system, Morocco has officially taken the initiative to establish a system that complies with its international commitments in asylum. By taking a Moroccan perspective on the situation, this article examines the management of migration and asylum by a country of the Global South with a multifaceted migration profile (as a country that is simultaneously one of emigration, transit, and immigration). It shows that Morocco’s change in migration policy is a reflection of its evolving foreign policy.
1 Introduction
Morocco’s launch in September 2013 of its national policy on immigration and asylum signalled a change in direction in its approach to migration. With this change, Morocco recast itself from being only a country of emigration and transit to one of immigration, also. Under the new policy, billed as ‘humanist, global, and coherent’,1 around 50,000 migrants and several hundreds of refugees recognised by UNHCR saw their legal status regularised. Through its National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum (SNIA), adopted in 2014, Morocco expressed its intention to grant immigrants and refugees the same rights as Moroccan citizens. For example, regularised immigrants gained the right to practice a profession without being opposed by the principle of national preference, put their children in school, access health services and create organisations or cooperatives under the same conditions as Moroccans.
The adoption of such a policy is noteworthy given that, up until that point, Morocco’s approach to migration management was to actively combat irregular migration and asylum. This is amply attested in its enactment in 2003 of Law 02–03 (relative to the entry and stay of foreigners in Morocco and to irregular emigration and immigration; BORM No. 5162, 11 November 2003), which prioritised security considerations over the guarantee of internationally recognised rights of foreigners. Furthermore, certain provisions of Law 02–03 applying to refugees and asylum seekers are in contradiction with international law and Morocco’s international commitments.
This major and rather sudden change of approach in Morocco to immigration and asylum is quite striking. An analysis of the process of the formation of the new policy, which is essentially a public policy, shows that the policy was not motivated by internal issues or concerns but rather by foreign policy objectives and, specifically, is concomitant with a change in the Morocco’s Africa policy.
This article aims to explain the different migration policies implemented by Morocco since its independence, while questioning the existing literature and contributing to the theoretical debate. It focusses on the role of states in the management of international migration and asylum. In particular, it re-examines Adamson and Tsourapas’ work on global South migration states2 in light of the Morocco example and suggests that it is too limited to material gains. Examining the case of Morocco shows that the development of Morocco’s migration and asylum policy over the past decades can only be understood if foreign policy is included in the analysis as an additional lens.
The methodology for this article is based on qualitative research that makes use of both oral and written sources. I conducted a field survey consisting of more than 200 semi-structured interviews from 2016 to 2022 with officials (Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Migration and Health; Police services; Intelligence agency), representatives of international organisations (IOM, UNHCR), civil society actors, field researchers and representatives of immigrants to have a comprehensive understanding of the implementation and evolution of Morocco’s migration policies. I completed this fieldwork with a comprehensive review of documents drawn from a wide variety of sources (including scholarly studies, official institutional documents, formal speeches, and media articles, among others). This article mobilises and analyses some of the data collected during the field survey.
2 The Role of States in the Management of International Migration
Scholars in international relations have paid little attention to migration policies, considering them as belonging to the realm of ‘low politics’.3 Social scientists who have focused on migration policies have not sufficiently considered the role of states in shaping international migration, considering it as ‘background noise’4 in relation to economic and demographic factors. Myron Weiner, in 1985, noted that ‘there is little systematic comparative and theoretical work on such issues as how and why states make their access rules [and] the interplay between domestic and international considerations’.5
Scholars in the social sciences began to take an interest in the formulation of policies to control migration in the mid-1970s. The first theoretical approaches emerged a few years later and mainly looked to economic factors to explain both the phenomenon of migration and the policies of destination states.6
It was not until the great migratory flows of the 1990s that the area of migration policy gained further ground in international relations. This unfolded gradually as the issues of security and state sovereignty gained prominence in migration debates. This security-based theoretical approach to migration policy is mainly used in analysing restrictive migration policies.
James Hollifield’s concept of migration state7 quickly became a key tool in the analysis of state management of international migration.8 It points to the management of international migration as central to the strategies and policies adopted by contemporary states. For Hollifield, the management of international migration flows has been a primary function of the nation state since the end of the Second World War, as important for states as the management of international commerce or of crime and terrorism.9 To the extent that the existence of a state depends on it having a monopoly on legitimate physical violence,10 the state’s ability to manage migratory flows is an important asset to its sovereignty.11
State policymaking is subject to the ‘liberal paradox’ and, as such, seeks to strike a balance between competing interests.12 On the one hand, the state must respond to the liberal logic of the market economy, which encourages open trade and the free movement of goods but also the adoption of immigration-friendly measures. On the other hand, the state must balance this out with the political logic of nation states, which in terms of immigration is traditionally restrictive. When designing its migration policy, the state takes into account both economic and internal political factors.
Adamson and Tsouparas offer a highly applicable critique of the concept of the migration state, in particular pointing to a set of inherent biases surrounding it (especially economic, liberal, and state capacity biases) whose effect is to restrict it to economic immigration in liberal democracies and thus render the concept difficult to apply to countries in the Global South.13 To overcome these limits, Adamson and Tsouparas propose three ideal types of migration states to better understand the various logics that might drive migration policies across a range of cases, and particularly, Global South countries.14 The notions of nationalising, developmental, and neoliberal migration states they propose are based as much on a domestic agenda as on international structural trends and on the powers of Northern states and international organisations. The nationalising migration state that mainly involves population exchanges, expulsions, and ethnic ‘return’ highlights the political and ideological roots of the state’s migration policy. This model is useful to understand migrations policies conducted during an imperial collapse or deriving from ideologies like Zionism, for example. The developmental migration state focusses on the important role of emigration in the economic development strategies of states in the Global South. For its part, the neoliberal migration model offers key tools to analyse the management of cross-border migration flows.
3 The Migration State and the Management of International Migration in Morocco
The ideal types of developmental and neoliberal migration offer useful tools for understanding the migration policies pursued since Morocco’s independence.
The developmental migration state can be applied to Morocco’s emigration policy under Hassan II, which was focused on the negotiation of labour agreements with European countries in need of labour in the golden sixties. This policy, ‘excessively emigrationist’,15 was conceived as an economic development strategy and as a catalyst for growth, with three aims: to generate foreign exchange earnings, to create jobs, and to provide a source of training and education for Moroccan nationals. These objectives were first made explicit in the 1968–1972 five-year plan, which was developed in the context of a rising balance of payments deficit.16
The neoliberal migration state model may be equally useful in understanding the different ways in which the Moroccan state has dealt with irregular migration since the early 2000s. According to this model, countries of the Global South adopt particular behaviours in order to convert the management of irregular migration into a resource. Capitalisation of irregular migration for material gain is linked to policies of externalisation held by countries of immigration. Previous studies on Morocco’s handling of migration flows have mainly viewed Morocco as simply accepting, for economic ends, to cooperate with Europe’s externalisation of its own migration policies.17
The geographic location of Morocco, only 14 km from the Spanish coast and sharing nearly 16 km of land borders with the only two territories of the EU in mainland Africa (Ceuta and Melilla) – means that the country is a route of choice for migrants trying to reach Europe by irregular means. Therefore, cooperation with Morocco is highly strategic and it is not surprising that it was one of the first countries approached by the EU from the start of the latter’s externalisation of its migration policies.
The security and antiimmigration policy adopted by Morocco in 2003 has been broadly seen in the scholarly literature as Morocco agreeing to act as ‘Europe’ police18 in exchange for significant financial rewards. Ali Bensaâd refers to this as ‘geographical rent’.19 These analyses, which see Europe as the dictating force of the agenda, do not take into account the autonomy of Morocco as a political actor20 or ask how Morocco itself uses the policy. They cannot explain, for example, Morocco’s capacity for action and resistance since 2000, to the signature of a readmission agreement with the EU.
More recent work has moved away from this Eurocentric approach, instead viewing Morocco’s migration policy in light of both its relationships with the European Union and its repositioning within Africa.21 In fact, the relations and ambitions of the Kingdom in Africa must no longer be underestimated in the analyses of Morocco’s migration policy.22
Adamson and Tsouparas, in their extension of the concept of migration state, view migration management solely in terms of its potential to generate material gains.23 The various standard models of the migration state do not consider the possibility that migration management can be perceived and used as a foreign policy tool.
Few studies have approached migration management in countries of the Global South as a diplomatic tool. Those that have, have mainly focused on labour migration in the Arab countries. Delphine Perrin analysed Libya’s management of labour immigration since the 1960s.24 Her work shows how immigration management has been orientated around Gaddafi’s pan-Arab and pan-African ambitions and analyses how sub-Saharan migrants have been instrumentalised to lift embargoes. Gerasimos Tsouparas examined the emigration of highly skilled people under Gamal Abdel Nasser and found that this policy was used, on the one hand, as an instrument of cultural diplomacy for the dissemination of antiimperialist ideals and Arab unity among Arab countries,25 and, on the other, as a tool for development assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. Katharina Natter re-examined Hollifield’s liberal paradox and analysed the role of political systems in the development of immigration policies by taking a comparative approach to Moroccan and Tunisian migration policies.26
Despite growing interest in the study of migration dynamics in the Global South, there are still too few scholarly works that can help us understand the diversity of factors at play in the making of southern state migration policies.27 Through an analysis of the evolution of Moroccan migration and asylum policies, this piece aims to make a contribution to the study of the drivers of these policies. The argument is that diplomatic factors may also be key, or even predominant, in the development of policies for managing asylum and irregular migration in the Global South.
4 Evolution of Morocco’s Management of Irregular Migration and Asylum in Relation to its Foreign Policy
From being a classic emigration country28 to a transit country at the start of 2000, since 2013 Morocco has viewed itself as a host and destination country. Analysis of the actual migration situation at each change in the country’s approach to migration reveals that the state’s adoption of one approach over another is more a reflection of the perception of Morocco and its interests at a given time than a response to a change in situation.29 This section examines how the management of irregular migration and asylum has evolved in relation to Morocco’s foreign policy. It specifically aims to better understand the security-orientated approach adopted in 2003, the changes made after the events at Ceuta and Melilla in 2005, and finally the issues that led to the adoption of a humanist and welcoming approach in 2013.
4.1 A Security-Orientated Response to Irregular Migration and Asylum in 2003
The Eurocentric approach to understanding Morocco’s migration policy from the early 2000s until today as being only in the service of European externalisation ignores the geopolitical context in which the Moroccan authorities develop and adjust their migration policy. At the time of King Mohammed VI’s enthronement in 1999, Morocco was quite isolated, as it was not firmly integrated in the geographical area in which it is located. The Kingdom had withdrawn from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) after the latter recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1984.30 The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was completely inactive and its council of heads of state had not met since 1994, the same year the Morocco – Algeria land border closed, and it remains so.31 Morocco’s relations with European countries were weakening as the EU was expanding and consolidating eastward after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. Its foreign policy was focused on being as close to the EU as possible by actively participating in all EU initiatives aimed at its neighbours. However, it was also in the early 2000s that Morocco took its first steps toward a new Africa policy focused on reinvesting the continent.
Aware of Europe’s obsessional security fears, made much worse after the 11 September attacks,32 Morocco took the opportunity to position itself as a key player in European security. Although it was not part of any government programme, Law 02–03 on the entry and stay of foreigners and on irregular emigration and immigration was prepared and adopted in 2003 in record time, at the same time as Law 03–03 on the fight against terrorism. By adopting these ‘antitransit’ and ‘antiterrorist laws’, Morocco laid the foundation for the cooperation between Morocco and the EU on migration and security issues. This cooperation is widely considered a success story that can serve as a model for other countries in the region.33
Law no. 02–03 contains anti-asylum provisions which add to the extremely limited national legal framework governing asylum, which until now has included only a short royal decree dating from 1957 (royal decree no. 2-57-1256 BORM no. 2341, 06/09/1957) setting out the application of the Geneva Convention ratified by Morocco a year earlier. The antiasylum nature of the law is particularly apparent in article 17 paragraph 5, which makes the issue of residence permits to refugees conditional on legal entry into Moroccan territory. This article of the law is in contradiction with the 1951 Geneva Convention and in particular with article 31, paragraph 1, under which refugees enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution for irregular entry into the territory of the state in which they apply for asylum.
Morocco’s adoption of a restrictive migration policy in 2003 was in response to a change not in Morocco’s migration landscape but rather in the political model of the countries of the North since 2001.34 Thus, Morocco’s position as a ‘transit country’ allowed it to work toward a dual objective: deepening economic cooperation with Europe but also, and above all, restoring the Kingdom as a key regional actor.
4.2 A Change in Approach after the Events of Autumn 2005
The events of autumn 2005, during which more than a dozen migrants died after participating in a collective attempt to forcibly breach the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, showed that Morocco’s use of migration policy to reinforce state diplomacy had, in fact, a negative effect on Morocco’s image abroad, especially in Central and West Africa. An ambassador posted at the time in one of the European capitals explained: ‘After the events of 2005, Morocco found itself between the anvil of governments and the hammer of NGOs … in spite of itself, it was a victim of its geography. It was imperative that a rapid solution be found to restore Morocco’s image and essential role among the various actors.’ This situation led the Moroccan authorities to readjust their approach to get it more in line with their new policy and their interests in Africa.
The migration policy thus began to shift toward a less security-conscious and more open approach to Central and West African countries. This was reflected in the replacement of the 2003 global strategy for combating irregular migration with a national strategy against human trafficking in 2007. This new strategy introduced for the first time the figure of the migrant as a potential victim of trafficking networks, even as the law in force considered the migrant as delinquent. Along with this change came a shift in discourse and the guarantee of certain protections.
The launch of the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, known as the Rabat Process, in 2006 allowed Morocco to step into the role of mediator between Africa and Europe with a discourse that emphasises shared responsibility and the need for a more balanced approach. Indeed, since then Morocco has advocated for a ‘global approach to the management of migration issues based on shared responsibility between countries of origin, transit and destination’ as well as for ‘the triptych […]: combating irregular migration, promoting regular migration, and taking into account the link between migration and development’. By positioning itself as mediator, Morocco sought to satisfy both European demands (the stand against irregular migration) and African ones (issues of development, free movement and brain drain) as well as its own internal and external policy interests (especially the rehabilitation of Morocco’s image abroad). Although the Kingdom’s Africa strategy reflects its new geostrategic position, it does not call into question the privileged relationship of Morocco with the EU (in particular through its Advanced Status) or the close relations it maintains with some of its Member States, despite numerous diplomatic disputes.
In this context, a headquarters agreement was signed in Geneva between the UNHCR and the Moroccan authorities in 2007. Since the signing of this agreement, the UNHCR’s main official objective has been to strengthen protection mechanisms for asylum seekers and refugees as part of a global approach to managing migratory flows. The UNHCR is responsible for the determination of refugee status and refugee protection activities, notably through the issuance of documents attesting to the identity of persons under its jurisdiction, who are therefore entitled to the associated rights. These documents are all the more important as the Moroccan authorities do not recognise asylum, nor do they issue residence permits to refugees recognised by the UNHCR following the suspension of the activities of the office for refugees and stateless persons (“Bureau des réfugiés et des apatrides”) in 2004. A reflection process has been launched to outline the future asylum system and several events along these lines have been financed by European donors.
From the adoption of the strategy in 2007, Morocco’s policy on irregular migration remained relatively unchanged. Until 2013, Morocco’s focus on the issue – in a more or less sustained way depending on the period – was primarily on combating irregular migration (blocking migration attempts, destroying makeshift camps built in forests, and removing migrants). Through these types of public actions, the Moroccan authorities signaled their focus on Morocco as a country of transit, but behind this was a new reality.
4.3 Adoption of a Welcoming and Humanist Approach in 2013
Morocco’s consolidation of its Africa strategy and the events that shook the Arab world in 2011 presaged a possible change in Morocco’s migration policy35 towards increased emphasis on respect for human rights and a more open attitude toward Africa. The security-based transmigration management that was up until now was replaced by a more focused strategy on human rights in 2013. In addition to the creation of a new ministerial department for migration affairs, this was materialised in separate operations to regularise the administrative situation of foreigners and refugees recognised by the UNHCR. Morocco had also committed to develop and implement an effective national asylum system, notably through the adoption of an asylum law and the initiation of a transitional process with the support of the UNHCR.
The new policy was also reflected in the adoption – on 18 December 2014, International Migrant Day – of its National Strategy for Immigration and Asylum (NSIA). Part of Morocco’s ‘societal project’,36 the NSIA aims to ‘ensure better integration for immigrants and refugees […] as part of a coherent, global, humanist, and responsible policy’.37 Its primary objective is to provide regularised foreigners with the means that help them integrate into Moroccan society. Specific steps were taken to ensure that regularised persons have the same rights as Moroccan citizens. For example, the NSIA opened up access for migrants to the entire public education system (public institutions as well as informal education) and to job training programmes regardless of their administrative status. The integration of regularised foreigners into the formal labour market was facilitated thanks to the lifting of the principle of national preference in terms of employment, which thus could no longer be invoked against them. Other moves that were not successful were to extend the subsidised health insurance scheme to cover regularised people as well as make it possible for them to access social and economic housing and take out property loans. In terms of civic and political rights, the NSIA provides regularised migrants with the ability to set up organisations. Also, the NSIA plans to amend the Electoral Code in order to grant foreigners the (constitutional) right to vote in local elections.
This policy, particularly the welcome of foreigners, was largely seen as a major symbolic rupture with the recent past.38 It is a considered response of the Moroccan authorities to recent demands and expectations from Europe but also to its own interests in Africa. Indeed, in the early 2000s, Morocco developed a genuine Africa strategy as a means of establishing itself as a continental power and a central player in a triangular North – South – South collaboration. Its Africa policy took the form of a series of royal tours in which the Moroccan Sovereign visited a number of African countries and led to the signing of several investment agreements in areas called ‘social and human development’. Morocco’s change in direction with respect to migration coincided with a period in which Morocco was deepening its relations with various African states and aspiring to join the African Union (AU) and become a powerful force on the continent. In this context, it was no longer viable for Morocco to maintain a restrictive approach focused on stemming migration flows because doing so could prove particularly counterproductive to economic and political relations and undermine its ambitions in Africa.
The 2013 policy was also a response to strong expectations from the EU, which remains determined to keep the number of irregular migrants and asylum seekers who arrive there at an absolute minimum. In this sense, the new immigration and asylum policy was an ingenious response quite removed from the approach of Europe to securitising migration in Morocco. In offering potential irregular migrants to Europe the means of living decently in Morocco, it is hoped that they will reconsider their migration plans and choose to settle permanently in Morocco rather than venture onto increasingly perilous and uncertain prospects.
With its migration diplomacy, Morocco is trying to accommodate competing interests that are often very difficult to reconcile. For example, while it is in Morocco’s interest to strengthen its partnership with the EU, the latter’s externalisation project, which includes better control of arrivals to Morocco, is in conflict with the desire of Morocco to join the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is an area of free movement of people. With its migration policy, Morocco is thus constantly seeking to maintain a delicate balance that will satisfy both its European and its African partners.
In addition to a foreign policy tool, migration diplomacy is increasingly seen as a means for Morocco to promote itself on the African continent and the international stage. In developing its expertise on a topical global issue that has been little or insufficiently negotiated in various cooperation frameworks, Morocco is conducting a truly niche kind of diplomacy. In developing this new migration diplomacy Morocco aims to be recognised as a regional power and an intermediary between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa or more broadly between the North and the South. The launch of the new migration policy in September 2013 served as a catalyst to carry out a whole series of diplomatic moves in areas that were not previously part of Morocco’s migration diplomacy.
In its application of various means of soft power,39 Morocco is building and asserting a role identity.40 Through its foreign policy, it is striving to forge an international brand image:41 that of a responsible and caring actor that seeks to satisfy its interests without undermining those of other states. Indeed, the Kingdom is trying to project an image of a state embodying a ‘regional model of responsible management of migration’,42 to which naturally falls the role of mediator between the different governmental systems to which it belongs. Through the good practices it has developed, the experience it has gained, its geographical location, and its migration history, Morocco aspires to become a natural and indispensable partner with regard to migration cooperation frameworks. In this respect, Morocco is particularly attentive to appreciation shows.43 Over the course of only a few months during 2018, Morocco was recognised by the African Union as a leader on migration issues; it became co-president of the Global Forum on Migration and Development; and it was chosen to host in Marrakech the intergovernmental conference on the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration (GCM). Morocco uses the GCM mechanism to portray itself as a champion country in human rights and migration management not only regionally but also at the UN level.44 These decisions, which were highly publicised, were all proof of the effectiveness of the migration diplomacy path it had followed for several years.
Diplomatic and foreign policy considerations weigh heavily on Morocco’s migration policy. This is even more so due to the three-level game in which Moroccan authorities must engage, taking into account Morocco’s own interests as well as those of the countries of origin and the countries of destination of migrants.45 In this context, it is particularly difficult to strike a balance. As migration policy is narrowly tied to changes in foreign policy and the vagaries of geopolitics, it is fragile and not immune to sudden changes in course.
The resumption of intensive operations to arrest and move large numbers of African migrants to destinations in the south of Morocco in the summer of 2018 reported by NGOs,46 serves to underline the fragility of the process. In addition, new asylum and immigration laws intended to replace Law 02–03 have not been adopted – or, indeed, even discussed – in the government council. Along with the introduction, in November 2018, of compulsory electronic authorisation for travel to Morocco from some Central and West African states, these examples point to a return to security-orientated practices and suggest an externalisation that is no longer so removed from European migration policies. Morocco’s actions are best understood when seen in the context of the changes in its Africa policy, which has begun to flounder, and the ups and downs of its relations with the EU in recent years.
Regarding asylum, the Moroccan authorities are divided between two strong desires. On the one hand, the orientation to Africa is an incentive to comply with international commitments to which they had previously been particularly resistant. Indeed, asylum is one of the last areas in which the process of bringing public action into line with international standards (with the aim of supporting Morocco’s foreign policy) has been spared, despite considerable pressure from outside. On the other hand, in line with the European approach, heightened security fears and the complex relationship shared by a large number of Arab states on the subject of asylum47 partly explain the Moroccan authorities’ categorical refusal to accept Syrians as refugees. The authorities’ strategy for reconciling these two strongly contradictory desires was to seize the opportunity presented by the launch of the new migration policy in 2013 to add an ‘asylum’ component, which is more or less visible or invisible depending on the circumstances. More than a decade after the new policy was announced, the planned law to manage asylum, as the immigration law, has not been passed or even presented to the government council. However, at least three draught bills adopting particularly restrictive readings of the right to asylum had circulated between 2014 and 2017.
5 Conclusion
In their extension of the concept of migration state, Adamson and Tsouparas view migration management solely in terms of its potential to generate material gains and do not consider the possibility that migration management can be perceived and used as a foreign policy tool. Applying a Moroccan perspective in interpreting and analysing changes in Morocco’s approach to managing migration since 2000 shows that the development of Morocco’s migration and asylum policy over the past decades can only be understood if foreign policy is included in the analysis as an additional lens.
Migration policy, like any other public policy, does not occur in a vacuum, and any analysis must take into consideration the context from which it springs. In the case of policies for the management of transnational migration, the international context must also be taken into account. Thus, Morocco’s security-orientated 2003 policy and its 2013 policy more open to immigration and asylum cannot be understood independently of the geopolitical situation of Morocco. If in 2003 Morocco aimed to position itself as a vital force in the security of its European partners, especially in terms of the fight against terrorism and illegal migration, its policy ten years later reflects its strategic repositioning in Africa and constitutes a much more proactive and considered response that takes into account the different international priorities of Morocco. This change in direction was prompted by Morocco’s desire to rehabilitate its unfavourable image after the tragic events in autumn 2005 and its realisation that it could not hope to become a force on the continent and do business with other African countries without ensuring decent treatment of arrivals from those countries. Each change in behaviour regarding immigration is matched by a change in discourse reflecting the new approach to migration as a means of justifying and legitimating the public policy measures adopted. The migration and asylum policy initiated in 2013 cannot be understood as separate from Morocco’s aspirations with respect to the African continent. In addition to being a foreign policy tool, migration diplomacy is seen and used by Morocco as a means of increasing its influence in Africa and on the international stage. The resurgence of the security approach since 2018 reflects Morocco’s less marked interest in the African continent.
Acknowledgment
This paper received a valuable support from Heinrich Boll Stiftung – Rabat”.
MCMREAM (2016). Politique nationale d’immigration et d’asile: Rapport 2016. Rabat: MCMREAM.
Adamson, F.B. and Tsouparas, B. 2019. The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalising, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management. International Migration Review 54 (3), pp. 853–882.
Hollifield, J.F. 2000. Migration and the ‘New’ International Order: The Missing Regime. In Managing Migration: Time for a New International Regime?, edited by Bimal Ghosh, pp. 75–109. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zolberg, A.R. 1978. International Migration Policies in a Changing World System. In Human Migration: Patterns and Policies, edited by William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams, pp. 241–286. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Weiner, M. 1985. On International Migration and International Relations. Population and Development Review 11 (3): pp. 446.
Zogata-Kusz, A. 2012. Theoretical Perspectives on Immigration Policy and Politics. Contemporary European Studies 7 (1): pp. 5–21.
Hollifield, J.F. 2004. The Emerging Migration State. The International Migration Review 38 (3), pp. 885–912.
Boswell, C. 2007. Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitisation. Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (3), pp. 589–610; Peters, M.E. 2017. Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Adamson, F.B. and Tsouparas, B. 2019. The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalising, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management. International Migration Review 54 (3), pp. 853–882.
Hollifield, J.F. and Sharpe, M.O. 2017. Japan as an ‘Emerging Migration State’. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 17 (3), pp. 371–400.
Weber, M. 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hollifield, J.F. and Sharpe, M.O. 2017. Japan as an ‘Emerging Migration State’. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 17 (3), pp. 371–400.
Hollifield, J.F. 2004. The Emerging Migration State. The International Migration Review 38 (3), pp. 885–912; Hollifield, J.F., Hunt, V.F. and Tichenor, D.J. 2008. The Liberal Paradox: Immigrants, Markets, and Rights in the United States. SMU Law Review 61 (1), pp. 67–98.
Adamson, F.B. and Tsouparas, B. 2019. The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalising, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management. International Migration Review 54 (3), pp. 853–882.
Ibidem.
Belguendouz, A. 2006. Le traitement institutionnel de la relation entre les Marocains résidant à l’étranger et le Maroc. CARIM Research Reports 2006/06. San Domenico di Fiesole: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.
Ibidem.
Belguendouz, A. 2003. Le Maroc, vaste zone d’attente? Plein Droit 2 (57), pp. 35–40; Belguendouz, A. 2005. Expansion et sous-traitance des logiques d’enfermement de l’Union européenne: l’exemple du Maroc. Cultures & Conflits 57, pp. 155–219; Khachani, M and Bensaïd, M. 2010. Les nouveaux défis de la question migratoire au Maroc. International Migration Papers No. 103. Geneva: International Labour Office, International Migration Programme; Wunderlich, D. 2010. Differentiation and Policy Convergence Against Long Odds: Lessons from Implementing EU Migration Policy in Morocco. Mediterranean Politics 15 (2), pp. 249–272; Lahlou, M. 2011. Le Maghreb dans son environnement régional et international. Un schéma migratoire reconfiguré, dans les faits et dans l’approche politique. Note de l’IFRI. Paris: IFRI, Programme Migrations, identités, citoyenneté; Cassarino, J. 2014. Channelled policy transfers: EU-Tunisia Interactions on Migration Matters. European Journal of Migration and Law 16 (1), pp. 97–123; Limam, M. and Del Sarto, R.A. 2015. Periphery under Pressure: Morocco, Tunisia and the European Union’s Mobility Partnership on Migration. Borderlands Project, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2015/75. San Domenico di Fiesole: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.
Belguendouz, A. 2003. Le Maroc non-africain, gendarme de l’Europe? Alerte au projet de loi 02–03 relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers au Maroc, à l’émigration et à l’immigration irrégulières! Salé: Imprimerie Beni Snassen.
Bensaad, A. (2005, October 28). The Maghreb caught in the crossfire. Le Monde. https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2005/10/28/le-maghreb-pris-entre-deux-feux-par-ali-bensaad_704363_3232.html.
Natter, K. 2012. The Formation of Morocco’s Policy Toward Irregular Migration (2000–2007): An Investigation on Migration Policies in Transit States and Public Policy Making Outside the Liberal-Democratic Context. Master’s thesis, Institut d’Études Politiques, École doctorale de Sciences Po, Paris; Natter, K. 2021. Crafting a ‘Liberal Monarchy’: Regime Consolidation and Immigration Policy Reform in Morocco. The Journal of North African Studies 26 (5), pp. 850–874.
El Qadim, N. 2015. Le gouvernement asymétrique des migrations. Maroc/Union européenne. Paris: Dalloz; Jiménez-Alvarez, M.G., Espineira, K. and Gazzotti, L. 2021. Migration Policy and International Human Rights Frameworks in Morocco: Tensions and Contradictions. The Journal of North African Studies 26 (5), pp. 893–911.
Natter, K. 2012. The Formation of Morocco’s Policy Toward Irregular Migration (2000–2007): An Investigation on Migration Policies in Transit States and Public Policy Making Outside the Liberal-Democratic Context. Master’s thesis, Institut d’Études Politiques, École doctorale de Sciences Po, Paris; Berriane, M., De Haas, H. and Natter, K. 2015. Introduction: Revisiting Moroccan Migrations. The Journal of North African Studies 20 (4), pp. 503–521; Cherti, M. and Collyer, M. 2015. Immigration and Pensée d’État: Moroccan Migration Policy Changes as Transformation of ‘Geopolitical Culture’. The Journal of North African Studies 20 (4), pp. 590–604; Ait Ben Lmadani, F. 2016. La politique d’immigration. Un jalon de la politique africaine du Maroc? Cas de la régularisation des migrants subsahariens. Report, version April 2016. Rabat: Association Marocaine d’Études et de Recherches sur les Migrations (AMERM).
Adamson, F.B. and Tsouparas, B. 2019. The Migration State in the Global South: Nationalising, Developmental, and Neoliberal Models of Migration Management. International Migration Review 54 (3), pp. 853–882.
Perrin, D. 2009. Les migrations en Libye, un instrument de la diplomatie kadhafienne. Outre-Terre 23 (3), pp. 289–303.
Tsouparas, G. (2018). The Politics of Migration in Modern Egypt: Strategies for Regime Survival in Autocracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Natter, K. (2018). Immigration Policy Theory: Thinking Beyond the ‘Western Liberal- Democratic’ Box. Working Paper 145, MADE Project Paper 3. Oxford: International Migration Institute.
Benjelloun, S. 2023. L’évolution des politiques migratoires marocaines de l’indépendance à nos jours. Marocains de l’extérieur 2021, edited by Mohamed Berriane, pp. 79–98. Rabat: Observatoire de la Communauté Marocaine Résidant à l’Étranger, Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l’Étranger; Benjelloun, S. 2021. Morocco’s new migration policy: between geostrategic interests and incomplete implementation. The Journal of North African Studies 26 (5), pp. 875–892; Benjelloun, S. 2020. Diplomatie migratoire du Maroc. La nouvelle politique migratoire ou la formation d’une politique publique engagée pour soutenir la politique étrangère du Maroc. Revue GéoDév.ma 8.
De Haas, H. 2014. Un siècle de migrations marocaines: Transformations traditions et perspectives d’avenir. In Marocains de l’extérieur 2013, edited by Mohamed Berriane, pp. 61–91. Rabat: Observatoire de la Communauté Marocaine Résidant à l’Étranger, Fondation Hassan II pour les Marocains Résidant à l’Étranger.
Natter, K. 2014. Fifty Years of Maghreb Emigration: How States Shaped Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian Emigration. Working Paper 95, DEMIG Project Paper 21. Oxford: International Migration Institute.
Magnani, V. 2017. L’Union africaine, théâtre pour les puissances continentales. Une recomposition des équilibres continentaux? In Ramses 2018. La guerre de l’information aura-t-elle lieu? Institut français des relations internationales, 2017, pp. 252–255.
Lamrani, E.M. 2013. L’Union du Maghreb ou l’invincible espoir. L’Année du Maghreb, IX, pp. 263–276.
Rakkah, A. 2009. La politique européenne en Méditerranée. Oasis 14, pp. 105–114.
Den Hertog, L. 2017. Study: EU and German External Migration Policies: The Case of Morocco. November (final draft). Rabat: CEPS and Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Afrique du Nord, Rabat.
Natter, K. 2014. Fifty Years of Maghreb Emigration: How States Shaped Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian Emigration. Working Paper 95, DEMIG Project Paper 21. Oxford: International Migration Institute.
Natter, K. 2012. The Formation of Morocco’s Policy Toward Irregular Migration (2000–2007): An Investigation on Migration Policies in Transit States and Public Policy Making Outside the Liberal-Democratic Context. Master’s thesis, Institut d’Études Politiques, École doctorale de Sciences Po, Paris.
Birou in MCMREAM 2014. Anis Birou was minister of migration affairs from the creation of the department in 2013 up until April 2017. See MCMREAM. 2014. Politique nationale d’immigration et d’asile: Rapport 2014. Rabat: MCMREAM.
MCMREAM. 2016. Politique nationale d’immigration et d’asile: Rapport 2016. Rabat: MCMREAM, p. 18.
Cherti, M. and Collyer, M. 2015. Immigration and Pensée d’État: Moroccan Migration Policy Changes as Transformation of ‘Geopolitical Culture’. The Journal of North African Studies 20 (4), pp. 590–604.
Nye, J.S. (1990). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books.
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anholt, S. 2011. Beyond the Nation Brand: The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations. In Brands and Branding Geographies, edited by Andy Pike, pp. 289–304. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
MDCMREAM. 2018. Politique nationale d’immigration et d’asile: Rapport 2018. Rabat: MDCMREAM.
Ahouga, Y. 2013. La gouvernementalité de la régulation des migrations euro-méditerra- néennes, le cas du Maroc et de l’UE. Master’s thesis, Institut d’études politiques et internationales, Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques, Université de Lausanne (UNIL).
Arbaoui, Y. 2022. The Impact of the Marrakech Compact for Migration in Morocco: The Role of the Government and of Civil Society. Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (World Comparative Law) 55(1), pp. 19–43.
Natter, K. (2018). Immigration Policy Theory: Thinking Beyond the ‘Western Liberal- Democratic’ Box. Working Paper 145, MADE Project Paper 3. Oxford: International Migration Institute.
GADEM. 2018. Coûts et blessures: Rapport sur les opérations des forces de l’ordre menées dans le nord du Maroc entre juillet et septembre 2018.
Elmadmad, K. (2002). Asile et Réfugiés dans les pays afro-arabes. Casablanca: Eddif.
