Abstract
This paper departs from a deductive premise seeking to apply the theory of “collectivised system of refugee responsibility” to the EU-Egypt migration arrangements. In its basic form, the theory proffers the funding and oversight of the wealthy North to assert protection, and integration of refugees in southern countries. At face value, the design and structure of the EU-Egypt migration arrangements appear to reflect this formula: EU funding in return for Egyptian principled accommodation of refugees. A profounder analysis of these deals, nevertheless, discerns the emergence of an alternative linguistic and legal discourse that priorities security and control over the humanitarian cause. Practice, as well, demonstrates that neither the EU is willing to undertake any refugees’ oversight roles, nor Egypt is vying for EU funding. To the contrary, Egypt’s generous funding of EU commercial interests and ruthless crackdown on refugees represent Egypt’s basic offerings to appease the EU and garner its political support.
1 Introduction
The refugee crisis in the Middle East post-Arab revolts in 2011 intensified migration cooperation between the Global North and South. This has given rise to a migration collaborative paradigm echoing the principles of an international system for shared refugee responsibility as proposed by Hathaway and Neve.1 This observation invites a comparison between the theoretical framework and a practical case study of the emerging migration arrangements across the Mediterranean. To this end, this article studies the EU-Egypt migration cooperation to assess the hypothesis that a collectivist regime involving developing and developed states can enhance refugee protection and legal oversight, and foster an effective solution-oriented system.2
The article begins by exploring how these migration arrangements align with the collective responsibility theory, focusing on their aims, structural design and implementation mechanisms. While the primary goal is to determine if a shared protection system can enhance the current state of refugees and vulnerable migrants (in comparison to the status quo ante), this article ultimately contends that this type of migration cooperation has further jeopardised refugee safeguard in Egypt. It also argues that such cooperation inherently fails to account for the variations in relations between the North and South.
A deductive approach is deployed to evaluate the logic and feasibility of collectivist arrangements in balancing political interests with the legal protection of refugees. This framework invokes ‘integrative literature review’ as a method to contextually analyse and link legal instruments, national legal policies, and political statements. For instance, Egypt has recently adopted a host of legal instruments, agreements and policy statements that have been largely ignored or considered in isolation.3 Simultaneously, the EU initiated a migration dialogue with Egypt in 2017 and allocated an emergency trust fund to Egypt that same year (Enhancing the Response to Migration Challenges in Egypt). Onwards, various EU migration projects,4 bilateral security agreements with EU countries, and joint and national migration policy statements ensued.5 Therefore, an integrated approach is crucial to comprehensively understand and synthesise developed legal and political instruments into a coherent whole.
This article starts by introducing Hathaway and Neve’s collectivised theory. It then provides a chronological review of salient EU-related documents and projects, alongside corresponding Egyptian legal and political responses. Finally, it examines the real-world impact of the EU-Egypt collaboration on the refugee situation in Egypt.
2 Collectivised, Solution-Oriented Refugee Protection
In 1997, Hathaway and Neve suggested a collectivised, solution-oriented refugee system as a remedy for the current international system (hereinafter ‘collectivised approach’). They propose a utilitarian understanding of international refugee law as a basic compromise to “afford states a politically and socially acceptable way to maximise border control in the face of inevitable involuntary migration.”6 As such, the theory aims to restore a workable balance between states’ sovereign control over their borders and the right to secure refuge for those in need of it.7
To do so, it calls for an international system recognising that refugee protection should not serve as a “backdoor” for permanent immigration but rather as a temporary solution that should end once the perilous situation in the country of origin ceases to exist.8 Second, it proposes to ensure that burdens and costs associated with protection are not solely imposed on a limited number of receiving countries.9 It puts forward a system of collectivised, but differentiated responsibility in which each country assumes a role tailored to its particular circumstances and capabilities. The concerned states shall divide, inter se, the tasks of “providing temporary protection, receiving refugees whose special needs make temporary protection inappropriate, resettling those refugees who cannot return home at the end of the period of temporary protection, funding the protection system, or through a combination of these roles.”10
To its advocates, this theory is as ethical as much as it is pragmatic because the deficiencies of the extant refugee system impose a moral imperative to devise new alternatives.11 In addition, it is unethical to let particular states, based on accident and geographical proximity, bear the brunt of refugee protection, whereas a collectivised system enables reciprocal legal oversight between its members.12 The ethics of the proposal are thus derived from the system’s ability to improve the situation on the ground, as it is contingent on achieving tangible results. Passing the ethical test of this theory, therefore, requires the improvement of the quality and quantity of refugee protection, while maintaining meaningful control over refugee movement and states’ borders.
Due to the impracticality of considering a universal system, Hathaway and Neve recommend working on the sub-global level. This means setting up “sub-global associations of states” among stakeholders who share common interests.13 The mission of these sub-global associations should be complemented with close cooperation with inter- and non-governmental organisations, namely UNHCR and other lead NGOs in the field.14 Eventually, there is a recognition, under this role-differentiated model, that poorer countries shall mostly bear the responsibility of providing shelter and physical safety while rich states will fund the operationalisation of this model.15 This is justified by referencing the current situation in which the south already hosts the majority of refugees; there is no moral wrong in securing protection in the region of the country of origin, which is mostly the south.16 In return, the North should be committed to ensuring the physical security of refugees, fund and improve this protection, and accept resettlement of those who cannot benefit from temporary protection due to their special needs or cannot return to their home country after the end of the period of temporary protection.17
3 The European Migration Cooperation Framework
Shortly before the turn of the century, the EU implemented a novel approach to address relations with the South, emphasising a collective, regional perspective. This strategy seemed particularly apt to South-North migration which typically involves multiple countries (i.e., countries of origin, transit and destination). Consequently, numerous regional meetings, encompassing both the EU and African countries convened to sculpt this burgeoning cooperative framework on migration.
3.1 The Barcelona Process: Ambivalent Move Towards Regionalism
Commencing in 1995, the Barcelona Process aimed to promote regionalism over bilateralism in the relationship between the EU and the southern Mediterranean.18 The declared objective of the emerging European- Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was to launch a comprehensive platform to foster socioeconomic and political cooperation between the two regions. To counter the lack of institutional integration and rivalries amongst southern Mediterranean countries, the EMP sought a model of North-South-South integration. This framework envisioned two partnership axes: the first fosters integration between the North and South, whereas the second promotes cooperation among Southern states.19 In support of this transition, the EU sought to diversify its regional governance tools introducing multilateralism alongside the existing bilateralism and unilateralism (the provision of aid).20 As a manifestation of this strategy, most of the Mediterranean southern states negotiated and signed Association Agreements with the EU in the period from 1995 to 2005.21
Egypt signed an Association Agreement in 2001, which subsequently entered into force in 2004.22 The Agreement encompassed political, economic and cultural subjects. Migration, intersecting the spheres of politics, security and humanitarian concern, was addressed in several articles (Articles 63, 65, 68, 70 and 72). Notably, the Agreement eschewed the terminology of “refugees,” “asylum,” or any explicit reference to migrant protection. While declaring an interest in enhancing the living conditions of local communities to mitigate migration, including illegal migration, the Agreement did not incorporate operational mechanisms. It also lacked a viable framework for South-South integration whether in the field of migration or other socio-economic and political areas.23 Contrary to the proclaimed objectives of the Barcelona Process, the EMP did not adhere to a discourse transitioning towards regionalism; instead, relations between the North and the South continued to be dominated by bilateralism and unilateralism.
3.2 The Rabat Process: Introducing Sub-Regional Cooperation
The Rabat Process (RP), initiated in 2006, introduced several innovative elements. Firstly, deviating from the conventional bilateral agreement structure, it established a platform for a cross-regional migration dialogue, facilitating the involvement of 29 European countries, 28 African countries, the EU, and various inter- and non-governmental organisations.24 Secondly, it assigned countries to different organs with different roles to ensure functionality and a level of commitment. Namely, the governance of the RP is comprised of the Steering Committee (the governing body comprising of ten countries, in addition to the EU and ECOWAS), National Focal Points, Reference Countries,25 the Chair of the Dialogue, and the Secretariat.26 Thirdly, the RP restricted its scope to migration routes in West and Central Africa striking a balance between broad participation and focused interest. Over time, the RP’s objectives have evolved, yet the core has consistently concentrated on associating migration with development, managing legal migration while combating illegal migration, and fostering shared responsibility. Notably, in 2018, the objectives were expanded to underscore migrant protection and repatriation.27
In this light, the RP came quite close to the suggested structural design of the collectivised cooperation:
[…] a model of cooperation based on […] collective security, implemented by groups of states that feel that common interests, albeit varying in degree and impact, merit a shared response. […] Not all states will be equally drawn to cooperate in the provision of refugee protection, nor will they be willing to commit themselves to other governments with equivalent intensity. […] Those governments that wish to work extremely closely together should be encouraged to do so. Their efforts, however, will be more likely to succeed where supported, even if only in limited ways, by states whose self-interests dictate that they refrain from fully allying their refugee protection programs with those of other governments.28
The RP accommodates variations in participation and responsibility, and provides for collective oversight. It further facilitates sub-regional cooperation aligned with migration objectives resonating with those underscored by the collectivised approach. This shift towards regionalism and collective action in migration was further validated by subsequent legal and political instruments. For instance, the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (2007) recognised the need to address challenges in “peace and security, migration and development” and “to promote a multilateral system to address, inter alia, migration.”29 Similarly, the 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility advocated for the establishment of an additional subregional framework alongside the Rabat Process, specifically for the Horn of Africa/East Africa.30 A proposal that eventually culminated in the creation of the Khartoum Process.
3.3 The Khartoum Process and Joint Valetta Action Plan: Confirming Sub-Regional Cooperation
Initiated in 2014, the Khartoum Process (KP), was specifically directed at migration routes within the Horn of Africa/East of Africa. Mirroring the RP, the KP embraced a soft law framework, emphasising the voluntary nature of participation and clarifying that it “does not create legal rights or obligations under international law.”31 The KP’s organisational structure comprises the “Steering Committee” (the governing body), “Participating Countries”, “Chair” and “Secretariat”, and supporting regional and international actors.32 In essence, in purpose and structure, the KP represented an extension of the RP towards the East of Africa.
The foundational document of the KP, known as the Rome Declaration, identified ten cooperation domains, encompassing the prevention of human trafficking and migrant smuggling, the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, and the creation of a regional framework for return and integration. Crucially, the Declaration explicitly articulated that countries of the region could receive aid in “establishing and managing reception centres, providing access to asylum processes in line with the international law, if needed, improving camp services and security, screening mixed migratory flows and counselling migrants.”33 This alignment brought the KP into near-complete consonance with the collectivised approach. The approach’s main principles were satisfied: financing operational costs by affluent nations; ensuring protection within the regional countries; facilitating repatriation and integration; and averting illegal immigration while filtering migratory movements to permit lawful migration and mobility.
Creating two separate processes for migration cooperation was the product of political convenience and the need to ensure the geographical focus for each process. Considering, however, the commonalities between them, it was rational to amalgamate their efforts and align them under a unified agenda. The Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP) came to serve this purpose, and a way to foster inter-African cooperation under the auspices of the EU. The JVAP outlined five priority areas: (1) development benefits of migration and addressing root causes; (2) legal migration and mobility; (3) protection and asylum; (4) prevention of irregular migration and human trafficking, and (5) return, readmission, and reintegration. The JVAP assimilated both the Rabat and Khartoum processes as two monitoring devices for the implementation of the JVAP.34 In effect, executing the JVAP has become the practical mission of the processes and their members.
In sum, by the end of 2015, the EU managed to set up a trans-regional structure that is potentially capable of initiating a collectivist (yet differentiated) response to various migration situations. Notably, the JVAP in objective 5 replaced the conventional triad of durable solutions (return, integration, and resettlement) with “return, readmission and reintegration” without elaborating much on the meaning of “readmission” and whether the solution of resettlement is still viable under other objectives.
Soon, the year 2016, dubbed the “refugee crisis year”, came to test the validity of these migration arrangements. Egypt, a transit and origin country for refugees, is selected for this purpose because it is a participant country in the KP and the JVAP. Additionally, in 2016, Egypt was an early caller for a migration response due to the capsizing of a refugee boat that sailed from Egyptian shores leading to the death and disappearance of hundreds.35
4 The Impact of EU Policies on Egyptian Migration Governance
4.1 Egypt’s Refugee Policy before 2016
Despite that Egypt has been a signatory to both the UN and OAU Refugee Conventions since 1981, Egypt did not have any declared refugee strategy or asylum legislation until 2016.36 Although this could have been interpreted as a gap, closer examination reveals a consistent refugee policy that has been in place for decades.37 The core of this policy is encapsulated in Egypt’s 1954 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with UNHCR, specifically Articles 2 and 6, which state:
(i) UNHCR is to conduct RSD (refugee status determination) on behalf of the government in exchange for the government’s issuance of residence permits to recognized refugees;
(ii) […] local integration is not a recognised durable solution for refugees in Egypt; and
(iii) that the Egyptian government is not to be financially responsible for mandate refugees.38
This “policy of three no’s” (no responsibility, no cost, no integration) in exchange for a temporary stay outlines Egypt’s approach to refugee treatment up to the present. Still, tension emerges due to the challenge of preserving a formula that has been in place for seven decades amidst numerous changes since 1954. Namely, how to delegate the legal handling of refugees to UNHCR while retaining complete state control over the refugee population, and how to maintain minimal engagement with refugees while subsequently being a signatory to regional and international refugee conventions.
4.1.1 Hosting but Not Engaging
Egypt’s long history of hosting refugees cannot be simply attributed to its weak border control. Provided political will, Egypt has demonstrated its capability to seal off its borders effectively against any undesirable groups.39 It is more accurate to say that Egypt willingly tolerates the presence of refugees and migrants, even the undocumented, within its territory.40 Several motivations are proposed for such tolerance including the desire to receive international aid and funding, the exploitation of undocumented refugees as an inexpensive workforce in the informal economy, and the aspiration to uphold a reputation of being a refugee-hosting country.41 Regardless of the specific reasons, this tolerance towards refugees should be at no financial or institutional expense to the Egyptian state.
In practice, this means that Egypt entirely delegates RSD to UNHCR, effectively making it both the “refugee protector and refugee decision-maker”.42 Although UNHCR neither has the proper resources nor competencies to run all the RSD operations,43 the arrangement absolves Egypt of the responsibility to be directly involved in the legal determination of refugees. At the same time, despite the RSD delegation, Egypt retains ultimate authority over who is allowed entry and the terms of that entry, with no particular regard to UNHCR, or any other stakeholder. Whenever the Egyptian state feels alarmed by any specific group, it promptly stems its flow as a matter of a sovereign act.
Second, Egypt decides what legal instrument to implement with no strong adherence to the established hierarchy of public international law. Despite that Egypt has been a signatory to both the UN and OAU Refugee Conventions since 1981, it would disregard them in favour of its MoU with UNHCR (1954), or unilaterally limit their scope of application. For example, Egypt does not recognise the durable solution of local integration, giving precedence to the MoU Articles 2 & 6 over its obligations under the UN Refugee Convention (Articles 17–19 and 34).44 Similarly, following the US invasion of Iraq, UNHCR’s proposal to apply the OAU Convention to Iraqi refugees (because Article 1(2) recognises as “refugee” a person fleeing “[…] external aggression, occupation, foreign domination […]) was rejected by the Egyptian government based on the logic that the OAU is only applicable to Africans,45 which does not find any support in the text of the Convention. In exercising this self-proclaimed prerogative of selecting what legal instrument to apply, Egypt does not seek the legal opinion of international or regional actors. Lastly, since the moment of ratification, Egypt has de jure undermined its legal obligations under the UN Refugee Convention by lodging five reservations to Article 12(1) relating to personal status; Article 20 (rationing); Article 22(1) access to primary education; Article 22 (access to public relief and assistance), and Article 24 (labour legislation and social security).46 The number of reservations and the nature of pertinent articles speak to the logic of ratification. When it ratified the UN and OAU Conventions, Egypt was only seeking to cement its relations with the international and African communities following a crisis in its Arab regional relations,47 with no tangible impact on Egypt’s refugee policy.
By shifting its responsibilities to UNHCR, undermining its convention obligations whether de jure or de facto, and controlling migrant flows to its territories, Egypt has managed to proclaim the position of a refugee-hosting country and a signatory to refugee conventions, while taking no active role in providing basic rights and services to its refugee population.
4.1.2 Creating a Façade for Refugees’ Situation in Egypt
Despite this policy of inaction and minimal engagement, Egypt has consistently projected itself as a generous state concerning the hosting and treatment of refugees. While not necessarily supported by evidence, this image is systematically reinforced by reiterating three claims: that the refugee population in Egypt is numbered in millions;48 that they enjoy equivalent rights to citizens; and that Egypt does not permit refugee encampment policy to ensure life normalcy for refugees in Egypt.49 For decades, Egypt’s officials have numbered refugees on Egyptian territories in millions, while UNHCR counts them in thousands.50 For example, in 2015, the Egyptian president affirmed that Egypt hosted five million refugees in clear disparity to UNHCR’s declared record of less than one-quarter of a million registered refugees.51 Although in some instances the official statement alludes to that exaggerated estimate includes both refugees and economic immigrants, this is not always the case.52
Likewise, Egyptian officials for long have proudly asserted that refugees are treated with due respect to international and regional treaties.53 Repeatedly, they confirm that refugees are “guests in the country” who are “entitled to free health care and education”, “enjoy the same services as Egyptians” or even “receive better treatment than nationals in Egypt”.54 According to the official rhetoric, Egypt consciously never resorts to confining refugees to camps for the betterment of refugees who enjoy equal rights to Egyptians.55 Egypt vehemently rejected the EU’s idea that migrant reception centres could be built in Egypt.56 Truly, unlike some regional countries (such as Lebanon, Jordan, Sudan and Kenya),57 Egypt only once resorted to temporarily setting up a refugee camp.58 Following the official claim, there is no need to limit the movement of refugees in Egypt who are being treated as citizens in terms of rights and services.
However, a closer look reveals that the idea of establishing European reception facilities in Egypt contradicts the state’s propagated version of Egyptian nationalism,59 and may draw undesirable attention to the refugee presence and their conditions in Egypt. Meanwhile, the free movement of refugees does not pose any threat to Egypt’s social and economic balance, as experience has proven that almost any refugee presence has been overwhelmed by Egypt’s population and size.60 In fact, setting up a refugee camp, run by UNHCR, is a frequent solution raised by advocacy groups for the deteriorating refugee conditions in Egypt.61 It was even requested in writing, by leaders of refugee communities in Egypt, to escape the mounting xenophobia and harassment (whether from citizens or officials) they encounter in society at large.62
In sum, Egypt has been deliberately managing two fronts in its treatment of refugees. To the international community, Egypt inflates the refugees’ presence on its territories to demonstrate its hospitality while implicitly alluding to its role as a gatekeeper for a potential refugee flow to the Mediterranean. Domestically, Egypt actively pushes the refugee population away from the mainstream attention, while relying on the size of Egypt’s territory and population to dilute their presence. In this strategy, it follows a policy of balancing discrepancies: ratifying refugee conventions with no intention of implementation, and increasing the visibility of refugees in Egypt on the international stage while ensuring their invisibility on the domestic level.
4.2 The EU-Egypt Migration Cooperation since 2016
Against this background, 2016 inaugurated a new phase for the EU/Egypt migration cooperation.63 For the EU, it came on the heels of the so-called “Mediterranean refugee crisis”, for Egypt, it was the year of the refugees’ ship tragedy. It was a moment of interest convergence, there was a need to stem the south-north refugees flow (for the EU), and Egypt needed to maintain its image as a country capable of controlling its borders. This section examines the most salient migration products of this cooperation phase.
4.2.1 Law 82/2016 (CIMSM)
The introduction of CIMSM marked Egypt’s first-ever legislation dealing with “migrant smuggling”. The Law’s development, which began before 2016, was notably influenced by Egypt’s active engagement in the KP and the Valletta Summit.64 The 2016 EU deal with Turkey and the EU promises of financial aid, in general, are also reported motives for the promulgation of the Law.65 The Law’s terminology and approach, following the KP and the JVAP, eschews the term “refugees” and prioritises security. The Law solely uses the term “smuggled migrant/s” with no reference to any refugee convention or UNHCR. Practically, CIMSM ignores the possibility that amongst this group of “smuggled migrants” there may be those who qualify for refugee status. Instead, the Law broadly alludes to the importance of adhering to bilateral and multilateral treaties related to judicial and security cooperation (Article 22), the execution of foreign final judicial decisions (Article 24), and providing protection, due care and services to smuggled migrants (Article 27). Simultaneously, CIMSM’s security-focused orientation is apparent. Articles 5 to 14 meticulously list offences associated with migrant smuggling, while Articles 20 and 21 outline the criteria for extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Law even imposes on any person aware of the commission of/ or the attempt to commit any offence mentioned in this Law the positive duty to report it to competent authorities under penalty of a fine and/or jail sentence (Article 15).
This is not to say that “smuggled migrants” do not enjoy any rights and protections under CIMSM. The Law confirms that the “smuggled migrant shall not bear any criminal or civil liability for the crimes of smuggling of migrants (Article 2)”.66 Given Egypt’s practice of detaining and prosecuting undocumented migrants in military tribunals,67 this provision alone could improve the conditions of Egypt’s migrant population. Also, CIMSM secures “the right of smuggled migrants to contact their diplomatic or consulate representative […] to receive possible assistance (Article 26)”. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “shall facilitate their [smuggled migrants] return to their countries of nationality or residence, or any other countries that admit them (Article 27). Moreover, the state shall ensure smuggled migrants’ rights:
to life, humane treatment, healthcare, [and their right of] physical, moral and psychological safety, protection of personal sanctity, and making them aware of their rights of legal aid […] (Article 25).
To be clear though, according to Article 27, these rights are temporary until the Egyptian state ensures the return of smuggled migrants to their country of residence, nationality or any country that accepts them. There is no provision for those who are incapable of leaving the country or seeking asylum. This leads to two possible scenarios. The first is that state authorities shall treat smuggled migrants within the purview of CIMSM without special consideration for any refugee or asylum system (whether national, regional, or international). The other scenario involves the consecutive application of two legal processes. While CIMSM may apply to smuggled migrants, a screening process could follow to identify those who may qualify for asylum under UNHCR MoU or Egypt’s other treaty obligations. Although the second scenario appears the only feasible way to reconcile the Law with Egypt’s refugee obligations, it lacks clear textual support.
For its part, the EU praised the Law as “a key transformation in legislation through criminalisation of smugglers”.68 This acclaim was bolstered by the fact that Egypt nearly eliminated the flow of immigrants from its shores to Europe, with only three cases reported from the last quarter of 2016 to April 2017.69 In turn, this pushed the EU-Egyptian cooperation in the field of migration to new levels contributing to the conclusion of the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities, the EU Emergency Trust Fund to Egypt, and the launching of the EU-Egypt Migration talks within the span of merely half a year.
4.2.2 Institutionalising EU-Egypt Migration Cooperation
4.2.2.1 The EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities and Migration Dialogue (2017)
Out of the three priorities of the EU-Egypt Partnership, the topic of migration emerges twice under the third priority of “Enhancing stability.” Initially, “smuggling migrants” is identified as one of the examples of transnational organised crimes to be tackled under “security and terrorism”.70 Albeit brief, associating migrant smuggling with “terrorism and security” is quite illustrative. Egypt had before propagated a narrative that links migration to “terrorism and arms trade”,71 and does manage migration from a securitised perspective invoking counter-terrorism measures.72 Thus, categorising “migrant smuggling” under security and terrorism reflects a shared viewpoint between European and Egyptian stances on migration, indicating a common ground in their approaches.
In the second mention, the Partnership underscores the necessity of managing “migratory flows for mutual benefit” as a distinct sub-priority. This objective refers to the political declaration of the Valletta Summit and the JVAP as foundational documents for migration cooperation.73 It also reaffirms the EU’s support of Egyptian efforts to combat all sorts of irregular migration, and to build “bridges between a high skilled labour force in the EU and Egypt”.74 In essence, the Partnership institutionalised the broader regional framework of the KP and JVAP into the bilateral context with Egypt, confirmed the utility of soft law, stepped up the securitisation of migration, and paved the way for more EU migration projects in Egypt.
By the end of 2017, the Egypt-EU Migration Dialogue was officially launched.75 In its inaugural session, the Dialogue set its overarching aim to align EU-Egypt initiatives to address common migration challenges. To this end, the Dialogue premised itself on the EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017–2020, the KP, and the JVAP identifying six priority domains for migration (which comprised the same five priority domains of the JVAP, in addition to a new domain of “global responsibility and migration”).76 The second and third sessions of the Dialogue convened in 2019 and 2021, with nearly the same representatives, yielded almost identical statements.77 Yet, in the third session, the EU commissioner for Home Affairs was keen to laud Egypt as “a key partner for the EU” and to commend its efforts in curbing irregular migration.78 The Dialogue in practice signalled the concurrence of the partners concerning their migration cooperation.
4.2.2.2 The EU Emergency Trust Fund, Egypt, 2017 (Enhancing the Response to Migration Challenges in Egypt (ERMCE)
Although the ERMCE Fund is budgetarily dwarfed by the EU/Turkey migration deal, it still stands as one of the largest EU funds to a southern partner (with a total cost of €63,3m).79 As outlined in its Action Fiche, the Fund has three special objectives: enhancing Egypt’s migration management, addressing the root causes of irregular migration, and supporting Egyptian communities hosting migrants and refugees. These objectives support the containment of the migrant flow within Egypt without offering resettlement alternatives, a perspective reinforced by the Fiche’s depiction of Egypt as “increasingly [becoming] a destination country for migrants”.80 In pursuit of this aim, the Fund finances seven projects all of which are on Egyptian territories in broad cooperation with the Egyptian authorities to ensure the projects’ sustainability and lasting impact on the governance system.81
Although this expansion is supposed to foster other regional programs and objectives,82 no clear impetus was given to South-South cooperation. In terms of execution mechanisms, the Fund leaned more towards bilateral agreements designed to advance EU interests in Egypt. The ERMCE’s specific objectives and the portrayal of Egypt as increasingly becoming a destination country subtly anchored Egypt’s long-term responsibility to accommodate migrants and refugees. Unlike the usual avoidance of the term “refugee” in EU-sponsored documents, the Fiche deployed it eighteen times only in association with vulnerable groups and refugee-hosting communities in Egypt, without referencing Egypt’s international law obligations vis-à-vis refugees.
4.2.2.3 Bilateral Arrangements
In April 2017, a formal agreement between Germany and Egypt concerning “Cooperation in the Field of Security” entered into effect.83 In the Agreement, the duty of the parties to protect and uphold human rights is mentioned in the preamble and Article 1 respectively. At the same time, Art 10 confirms that the Agreement shall not infringe on any other rights and obligations arising from other international treaties. Nonetheless, Germany’s security cooperation with Egypt was criticised due to Egypt’s reported human rights abuses.84 As long as no robust “human rights” guarantees were demanded from the Egyptian side, the Agreement meant not only condoning the Egyptian state’s security practices but also recognising their importance. The Agreement revealed a German (and potentially European) interest in tapping into the information collected through the ‘Egyptian methods’ by forming a strategic security alliance with Egypt. This inference is drawn from the Agreement’s far-reaching scope (22 fields, including ‘human trafficking and smuggling’ -Article 2(1)), and the nature and extent of the parties’ obligations. For example, under Article 2(2), Germany and Egypt are required to:
1. exchange experts to provide one another with information regarding the types and methods of crime prevention and suppression […] 2. inform one another, […] about the particulars of those involved in criminal offences, structures of offender groups and criminal organizations and the links between them, typical behaviour patterns of offenders and groups of offenders, facts of the criminal offences, in particular when, where and how they were committed, the means and resources used by the offender, any particularities […] 3. carry out, upon request, operational measures which are admissible under the law of the requested Contracting Party; they may grant representatives of the competent agencies of the other Contracting Party permission to be present when such operational measures are carried out; 4. cooperate in the course of operational investigations […] 5. carry out joint measures to combat illicit activities involving narcotics and precursor substances […]; 6. share experience and information in particular on common methods of cross-border organized crime and special and new forms of committing crimes; 7. cooperate in the field of forensic and criminological research […]; 8. provide one another with samples of objects obtained from or used in criminal activities […]. [Italicisation added].
Further cementing their bilateral relations, Egypt and Germany signed another agreement on migration in August 2017.85 Beyond its stated objective of enhancing migration relations, the Agreement facilitates the return of Egyptian deportees from Germany to Egypt.86 These two Agreements indicate that bilateral hard law still dominates the European/Egyptian relationship.
In late 2017, Italy signed a protocol with Egypt to create a two-year international training centre at the police academy in Cairo, known as ITEPA. Financed by the EU and Italy, ITEPA’s mission was to “organise workshops to train African policemen in securing borders, managing migration affairs, and combating trafficking”.87 ITEPA’s particular nature and mandate were sufficient to raise several questions: why did Italy spearhead this initiative, and why was Egypt selected to host a police training centre? ITEPA was established following an intense political period during which Italy recalled its ambassador to Egypt for almost a year over the torture and murder of an Italian researcher in Egypt – a crime for which Italy continues to accuse Egyptian security personnel and criticises Egypt for its lack of genuine cooperation in prosecuting the perpetrators.88
The Protocol, which was eventually extended for an additional two years through 2021,89 might not have carried significant legal weight but held substantial political importance. Despite the lack of accountability for any Egyptian police officer in the murder of an EU citizen, Italy and the EU maintained their willingness to collaborate with the Egyptian police force. This situation implies that if Italy and the EU could overlook such a high-profile murder case for the sake of political cooperation, it is reasonable to anticipate a similar stance toward cases involving non-EU citizens, but refugees or African migrants. This pragmatic, albeit morally complex, approach reflects broader geopolitical and strategic considerations that often influence international relations and agreements.
5 The Real Deal
Against the backdrop of the discussed regional and bilateral arrangements, the EU-Egypt migration relations are evidently influenced by a myriad of engagements, documents, and declarations with inventive names and varying levels of binding force – including processes, partnerships, action plans, dialogues, protocols, agreements, and projects. The development of such a multifaceted relationship might be ascribed to the inherent complexities of international relations and the uneven institutional capacities between the North and the South. Yet, several shared characteristics emerge, shaping the nature and trajectory of the EU-Egypt migration relations.
First and foremost, the prime focus of these arrangements is migration regulation, border control, and prevention of human smuggling/trafficking. Discussions on crimes such as migrant smuggling and human trafficking are extensively covered and meticulously defined in regional fora. These offences are then criminalised in national legislations, as seen in the case of the CIMSM in Egypt, under the influence of the EU. Meanwhile, there is general reticence to use the terminology of “refugee” and “non-refoulement”, or to refer to international or regional refugee conventions. Further, the traditional durable solutions for refugees – “return, resettlement, and integration” – are consistently substituted by a trio of “return, readmission, and reintegration” only within regional countries (i.e., Africa). In contrast, the task of determining conditions for regular migration remains solely in the hands of the receiving European states. These conditions are not subjected to collective deliberation or discussion with their southern counterparts,90 indicating a significant imbalance in dialogue and decision-making.
Secondly, although “addressing the root causes of migration” is a much- reiterated topic in the EU arrangements, seldom are reasons mentioned on why resource-rich African countries are amongst the poorest in the world. There is no discussion on the role of European countries and companies in exploiting African resources or supporting corrupt governments in the South as one of the root causes of migration. Thirdly, the aspiration of south-south cooperation as one of declared aims has not had a clear impact on the EU-Egypt relations. In the EUTF or the EU-Egypt Dialogue, no clear initiatives on South-South relations were included.
Yet, accepting the logic of the collectivised approach advocates,91 funding robust protection for refugees and asylum seekers can lend practicality and ethical justification to these migration arrangements, thereby validating their existence and continuation. Integral to this aspiration is the question of whether an oppressive regime is capable of offering protections to specific vulnerable groups that are not extended to the general Egyptian population.
5.1 The Impact of EU-Egyptian Migration Cooperation
As a result of the growing EU-Egyptian migration cooperation, Egypt ramped up its efforts to curb “irregular immigration” departing from its northern shores, resulting in a notable decrease in its activities.92 This provided a testing ground for CIMSM which proscribes smuggling but decriminalises the smuggled individuals. Particularly that the Egyptian Cabinet Spokesman confirmed that the “Law will enable the prosecutor to start an investigation, and once satisfied that the person is an illegal migrant and not a smuggler, they will be released”.93 However, practice reveals that the Law (CIMSM) managed to alter Egypt’s tactics but not its overarching strategy. Since the promulgation of the Law, rather than facing criminalisation and prosecution, migrants (including those registered with UNHCR) are increasingly facing administrative detention, expedited deportations, and forced disappearances.94 The criteria for who to be detained, the duration of their detention, and who to be deported remain inconsistent. Nonetheless, registered refugees generally endure shorter detention periods, and Syrians with family connections in Egypt are more likely to be released rather than deported.95 Effectively, the introduction of CIMSM further compromised the legal process leaving the fate of a detained migrant solely with the administration, with no feasible access to judicial review.
Meanwhile, although the EU-funded monitoring reports on the EUTF avoid any mention of the application of CIMSM or statistics on detained migrants in Egypt, a closer look at these documents reveals a telling aspect. The first three reports, spanning June 2019 to April 2020, consistently noted that the EU-funded projects in Egypt were on hold, pending administrative approval.96 The third report specifically alluded to Egypt as one of the countries that require “extensive security clearance” and, due to Covid 19, there was an observed difficulty in updating clearances for implementing the EUTF projects.97 Only in the final report, covering 2017 to 2022, did it become apparent that some progress had been made on four out of seven projects designated for Egypt.98 This 4-year delay reveals Egypt’s reluctance to carry out the EUTF projects to the extent that procuring required security permits for such projects was not a straightforward process. This observation challenges the conventional understanding of Egypt’s motivation for cooperating in migration matters.99 The funding or the financial gain, the presumed motivation for the South in Hathaway and Neve’s collectivised approach, is not the driving force for the Egyptian state. On the contrary, Egypt is a significant financier of mega European contracts and investments, not vice versa.100 Whether in the fields of arms, gas and oil, power plants or transportation, Egypt has contracted influential EU companies, notably from Germany, France, and Italy, in multi-billion-euro deals. The idea that Egypt, the payer of billions, would be lured by funding projects estimated in millions can hardly hold any water.
Neither the migrant safeguard nor the EU funding represents Egypt’s interest in migration deals. With its inherent and persisting legitimacy deficit, the current Egyptian regime is continuously striving for validation and political support from Western actors.101 This trend persisted even after Egypt was severely impacted by the economic crisis post-2020, with the country maintaining its pace of financing multi-billion European contracts.102 Again, contrary to the assumptions of the collectivised approach, it was the Egyptian President who criticised European migrant policies, suggesting that Europe should emulate the Egyptian model.103 This reversal from the expected dynamic, where the President of Egypt acts as the overseer of the EU migrant policies, underscores the complexity and multifaceted nature of international relations and migration diplomacy. In sum, the essence of EU-Egyptian migration relations can be distilled into: (1) heightened security cooperation; (2) cessation of northward irregular migration voyages from Egypt; (3) no real content for “regular migration”;104 and (4) the absence of a definitive EU stance against human rights violations, including the deteriorating conditions of migrants and refugees, in Egypt.105
5.2 Resolving the “Declared” with the “Practised”
Egypt issued a law promising the non-prosecution of smuggled migrants (CIMSM), and the protection of vulnerable migrants is mentioned in the various forms of the EU-Egyptian migration engagements. Instead of delivering on these promises, Egypt is further tightening its grip on its migrant and refugee population. Tactics may vary including indefinite detention while denying any access to detention centres or border points, even to the UNCHR,106 disabling non-pliant NGOs,107 terrorizing researchers,108 deportations, or simply disappearances,109 but the goal remains fixated on the absence of information.
Egypt effectively added a fourth “no” (no information) to its traditional policy of “three no’s”. Although these practices are not entirely novel to the Egyptian state, their scale, intensity, and collaboration with the EU are. Moreover, these actions reflect the broader treatment of Egyptian citizens, making the official claim that migrants are treated similarly to citizens valid in this context. This situation creates a significant data void, conveniently serving the interests of these strategic partners by alleviating scrutiny and relegating migrants and refugees further into obscurity and invisibility.
Setting aside humanitarian or legal considerations, the so-called “migration cooperation” appears to be meeting its pragmatic objectives. From the Egyptian perspective, Egypt is often commended by EU officials as a strategic and essential partner, and the Egyptian President has been honoured with the highest awards from EU Member States.110 Furthermore, EU criticism of human rights violations in Egypt is either non-existent or timid. On the European side, irregular migration from Egyptian shores has been halted, and the prerogative of legal/regular migration continues to remain exclusively within the competence of EU states.
5.3 Egyptians as Irregular Migrants
However, the narrative doesn’t conclude here. An uninvited party to the migration cooperation has set three records that are unlikely to be well-received by Europe. In 2022, Egyptians constituted the largest nationality among irregular migrants to Europe,111 formed the highest percentage of unaccompanied minors arriving in Italy,112 and lodged the greatest number of Egyptian asylum claims in Europe since 2014.113 Reinforcing the trend, in August 2023, Frontex announced that the Central Mediterranean route “remains the most active route […] with over 89,000 detections […] in the first seven months of 2023. This is the highest total on this route for this period since 2017.”114 In this tally, Egyptian migrants ranked second only after Côte d’Ivoire.115 Rather than embarking from Egyptian shores, the majority of Egyptian migrants are now predominantly departing from Libya, followed by Turkey.116
Instead of stemming southern migration, Egyptians are actively partaking in the perilous flight to Europe. The oppressive conditions under which Egyptians are living together with the persistent economic downturn fuel an outbreak scenario, and thus more Egyptian refugees. This leaves two possible courses of action: genuinely addressing the root causes of migration from Egypt, or doubling down on imposing stringent control over the southern borders. The EU’s chosen path is no longer a matter of speculation. In October 2022, the EU signed a €80m agreement to fund a border control deal with Egypt aimed at stemming migration through Libya.117 In March 2024, the EU-Egypt Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership was signed. The Partnership promises Egypt €5bn concessional loans, €1.8 EU investments and €600m in grants including €200m for migration management.118 With the mounting pressures of Egypt’s faltering economy and the Gaza War, it was inevitable to bankroll an ailing regime through a glamourous title (now Egypt is a strategic partner to the EU) and a financial deal that is chiefly made of loans. Once again, the EU confirms its bet on suppression as a migration management strategy.
6 Conclusion
In the case of Egypt-EU migration cooperation, the attempt to establish a collectivised paradigm for refugee responsibility sharing (as inspired by Hathaway & Neve) did not endure. Initiating fora and making promises to create sub-regional cooperation along migration routes between the North and South have proven insufficient. Building institutional capacity and fostering south-south and north-south collaboration is a long-term endeavour that requires steady funding and apt allocation of human and technological resources. The quick revert to bilateralism in shaping EU-Egypt migration relations indicates both a lack of confidence in a unified southern response and Egypt’s success in attracting powerful European actors into more ‘private’ relations, away from the regional framework.
Furthermore, the premise that Northern funding can ensure legal oversight and protection of refugees in the South is not impeccable for several reasons. Firstly, the overtness of this model may conflict with the anti-colonial, autochthonous nationalism promoted in parts of the South. In Egypt, acquiescing to direct foreign supervision or setting up a refugee camp run by a foreign entity could undermine the regime’s self-image as independent and sovereign. Secondly, the EU is more focused on stemming migratory flows to its territories than on ensuring refugee protection. Experience shows that the EU is unlikely to jeopardise its relationship with a loyal partner like Egypt solely to protect refugees and asylum seekers. Thirdly, the interests of authoritarian regimes may not necessarily align with the principles of good governance. In Egypt, the counterintuitive scenario in which a poor country of the South is paying for the political support of wealthier European nations is more realistic than it might seem. Compared to what Egypt contributes to influential European countries and companies, the EU’s funding programs to Egypt act more as gestures of political support rather than catalysts for change. Fourthly, the idea that an authoritarian regime can protect a specific vulnerable group from its arbitrary practices is largely unfounded. The institutionalised ‘above the law’ culture within Egypt’s security agencies requires broad and profound political and structural reforms. Simply enacting anti-smuggling legislation, per se, is unlikely to change the entrenched absence of the rule of law. The principle that human rights are indivisible, interrelated, and interconnected overshadows any supposed humanitarian-inspired migration cooperation. Ultimately, the purported practicality of the collectivised approach seems overrated which, in turn, questions its ethical premise.119
Regardless of names and deployed terminology, the so-called EU migration deals with Egypt are essentially security arrangements that involve, inter alia, refugees and migrants. They imply the conscious desire to capitalise on the “effectiveness” of Egypt’s harsh practices in curbing migratory flows to Europe. However, solely tying opportunist European interests to the continuity of an authoritarian regime creates a precarious situation in which any sporadic loss of border control can lead to devastating effects for all invested stakeholders.
James Hathaway and Alexander Neve “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection”, Harvard Human Rights Journal 10 (1997) 115–211.
Ibid, supra n.1, 149–151.
See Infra n. 64, 75, 83 and 89 and related text.
EuroMed Migration V (2020–2023); The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability (2021); Governance on Migration through Institutional Support, CONMIGO Project, 2021.
See Infra n. 64, 69, 75 83 and 89 and related text.
Hathaway and Neve, supra n. 1, at 116.
Ibid, 116–118, 151.
Ibid, 117–118, 138–140, 155–157, 210.
Ibid, 117, 118, 141–145.
Ibid, 145.
Ibid, 151–152.
Ibid, 153–154.
Ibid, 187–189.
Ibid, 196–198.
Ibid, 205.
Ibid, 205–206.
Ibid, 206–207.
Brigid Gavin, “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership an Experiment in North-south-south Integration”, Intereconomics, (2005) 353.
Ibid, 353.
Ibid, 354.
Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia have concluded Association Agreements. European Commission (Southern Neighbourhood), accessed April 2022.
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, Official Journal L 304, 30/09/2004 P. 0039–0208.
Gavin, supra n. 18 at 355–357; Ashraf S.E. Saleh, “Egypt and the EU: An Assessment of the Egyptian Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies (2013) 58.
Rabat Process (Partners), accessed April 2022.
“Reference countries have specific roles in executing the objectives of the annual strategic framework of the RB.” Rabat Process (Reference Countries), accessed April 2022.
Rabat Process (Governance Body), accessed April 2022.
Five ministerial declarations were adopted setting the evolving objectives of the RP in 2006, 2008, 20011, 2014, and 2018. Rabat Process (Cooperation Programmes), accessed April 2022.
Hathaway and Neve, supra n. 1, at 189–190.
The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership: A Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2007) 16344/07 (Presse 291).
European Union: European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM(2011) P 8.
Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process (EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative) Rome, 28th November 2014, p. 4.
Khartoum Process (actors and governance), accessed May 2022.
Rome Declaration, supra n. 31 at 4.
The Joint Valletta Action Plan, (2015) p. 1.
“Egypt Migrant Boat Capsize: Hundreds Feared Dead,” BBC, accessed September 2023.
Martin Jones, “Legal Empowerment and Refugees on the Nile: The Very Short History of Legal Empowerment and Refugee Legal Aid in Egypt”, International Journal of Human Rights (2015) 309.
Kelsey Norman, “Ambivalence as Policy: Consequences for Refugees in Egypt”, Égypte: Monde Arabe, (2017) 28.
Tarek Badawy, “The Protection of Refugees Between Obligations under the United Nations Charter and Specific Treaty Obligations: The Case of Egypt”, African Yearbook of International Law Online (2008) 163.
Kelsey Norman, “Migration and Refugee Policy-Making in Modern Egypt, Morocco, & Turkey”, Journal of Middle East and North African Migration Studies (2018) 59. For example, after the assassination attempt of President Mubarak in 1995, Egypt changed asylum procedures for the Sudanese to UNHCR, “Who Asked Them Anyway? Rights, Policies and Wellbeing of Refugees in Egypt”, American University in Cairo (2006) 14. Likewise with Syrians. Jones, Legal Empowerment, supra n. 36 at 318; Lamis Abdelaaty, Discrimination and Delegation: Explaining State Responses to Refugees (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021) 68, 75, 190. See Michael Kagan, “The UN ‘Surrogate State’ and the Foundation of Refugee Policy in the Middle East”, Scholarly Works (2012) 31–32.
Norman, Policy-Making Egypt, supra n. 39 at 57; See Grabska, Who Asked, supra n. 39 at 18–19.
Norman, Ambivalence as Policy, supra n. 37 at 28.
Kagan, Michael, “Frontier Justice: Legal Aid and UNHCR Refugee Status Determination in Egypt”, Scholarly Works (2006) 48.
Ibid.
Badawy, The Protection of Refugees, supra n. 38 at 168–169. Another example, instead of providing refugee information to UNHCR (according to Article 35 of the Refugee Convention), Egypt receives refugee information from UNHCR according to Article 2 of the MoU. Ibid, 166–167. For other examples see E. Habersky, A. Hetaba-Sabry & C. McNally, “On Idle Possibilities and Missed Chances: Refugee Rights in Egypt”, Refugee Survey Quarterly (2023) 270–271.
Badawy, The Protection of Refugees, supra n. 38 at 179–180.
Maja Janmyr and Dallal Stevens, “Regional Refugee Regimes: Middle East”, in Costello Cathryn et al., The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law, (Oxford University Press: United Kingdom, 2021) 335.
Hirotaka Fujibayashi, “When an Arab State Entered into International Refugee Instruments: Behind the Scenes of Egypt’s Accession to the 1951 Refugee Convention”, Journal of Refugee Studies (2022) 232–233.
Omer Karasapan, “Who Are the 5mn Refugees and Immigrants in Egypt?”, Brookings (2016). “Egypt Refuses EU Call for Migrant Reception Centers”, Deutsche Welle (2018), accessed Sep 2022. In 2021, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry Spokesman stated that Egypt hosts six million refugees. “Egypt is Proud of Hosting Six Million Refugees”, State Information Service (2021), accessed September 2022.
“FM Shoukry Confirms Egypt’s Rejection of Idea of Refugee Camps”, Ahramonline, accessed September 2022.
The number of registered refugees in Egypt in 2018 was 242,873 and 261,741 in 2022 “Vulnerability Assessment of Refugees in Egypt: Risks and Coping Strategies”, UNHCR (2019) 8. The number in 2022 was no more than 272,000. Egypt Fact Sheet, UNHCR, accessed September 2022.
“Sisi: Egypt Hosts Around Five Million Refugees”, Ahramonline (2015), accessed Septem- ber 2022.
In 2016, the President reiterated the figure of five million during the G20 summit meeting clarifying this time that the number included immigrants and refugees. “Egypt Hosting 5 mln Refugees despite Economic Challenges: Sisi at G20”, Ahramonline (2016), accessed September 2022. However, the latest official number of refugees as declared by the Egyptian government is six million. Hosting Six Million, supra n. 48.
For example, “in October 2009, then President Hosni Mubarak […] proudly claimed that Egypt provides a large number of refugees it hosts with “the needed support as stated in international and regional treaties”. AKM Ullah, Refugee Politics in the Middle East and North Africa: Human Rights, Safety, and Identity, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 159.
Statements made by the following officials respectively: the former Speaker of the House of Representatives (2018), the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2021), the current President of the State (2022) and the Head of Refugee Affairs Department (2005). Egypt Refuses EU Call, supra n. 48; Hosting Six Million Refugees, supra n. 48; Egypt Hosts Five Million Refugees, supra n. 51, Grabska, Who Asked, supra n. 39 at 19.
Rejection Refugee Camps, supra n. 49.
Egypt Refuses EU Call, supra n. 48.
This is not to suggest that refugees in these countries are always entirely kept in camps. For example, only 20% and 25% of the refugee populations in Jordan and Turkey respectively live in designated camps. Norman, Ambivalence as Policy, supra n. 37 at 31. Also, Lebanon followed a no-camp policy for Syrian refugees. Lewis Turner, “Explaining the (Non-)encampment of Syrian refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan”, Mediterranean Politics, (2015) 393–395.
The Saloum Camp (2011). Patricia Ward, “Refugee Cities: Reflections on the Development and Impact of UNHCR Urban Refugee Policy in the Middle East”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, (2014) 33.
The former Speaker of the Egyptian House of Representatives stated that, without any legal citation, setting “EU reception facilities for migrants in Egypt would violate the laws and constitution of our country”. Egypt Refuses EU Call, supra n. 48.
Unlike the concerns that may arise in other Arabic countries of sensitive demographic balances such as Lebanon and Jordan. Janmyr and Stevens, The Oxford Handbook, supra n. 46 at 335.
Jones, Legal Empowerment, supra n. 36 at 312.
Ibid at 312, 318.
Muhammad al-Kashef & Marie Martin, “EU-Egypt Migration Cooperation: At the Expense of Human Rights”, EuroMed Rights (2019) 3.
Jan Völkel, “Fanning Fears, Winning Praise: Egypt’s Smart Play on Europe’s Apprehension of More Undocumented Immigration”, Mediterranean Politics (2022) 181.
Ibid, 180–181.
Article 2 adds that the “consent of the smuggled migrants or the consent of the person responsible for them or their guardian shall not be considered in the crimes of smuggling […].”
“Country Report Immigration Detention in Egypt: Military Tribunals, Human Rights Abuses, Abysmal Conditions, And EU Partner”, The Global Detention Project, (September 2018) 7, 14–15.
“Joint statement following the EU-Egypt Association Council”, Council of the European Union, accessed November 2022.
European Commission, Action Fiche of the EU Emergency Trust Fund, Egypt 2017 (Enhancing the Response to Migration Challenges in Egypt (ERMCE)) (T05-EUTF-NOA- EG-01) P. 3.
EU-Egypt Partnership Priorities 2017–2020, 7.
This was Egypt’s declared position during the “Second African Union Regional Conference on Human Trafficking and Smuggling in the Horn of Africa” held in 2015 in preparation for the Valletta Summit. “AU-HOA Human Trafficking Regional Conference,” CCCPA (2015), accessed November 2022.
Al-Kashef & Martin, “EU-Egypt Cooperation, supra n.63 at 23. Egypt also included the fight against terrorism as one of the priority axes in the Khartoum process. Ibid.
Partnership, supra n. 70 at 8.
Ibid.
The First session was held in December 2017. 1st Session of the EU-Egypt Migration Dialogue, European Union External Action, accessed July 2023.
Ibid.
The noticeable difference is that the sixth migration domain declared in the first round (Global responsibility and migration) was replaced in the second statement by “Regional dimension of migration, tackling undergoing regional projects under EUTF for Africa”. Second Meeting of the Migration Dialogue, European Union External Action; Joint Press Statement: The third EU – Egypt Political Dialogue on Migration, accessed July 2023.
Sofian Naceur, “Black Box Egypt: Egypt’s Opaque Detention and Deportation Practice against Refugees”, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung North Africa (April, 2022) p. 1.
The ERMCE tops the list of the 38 Projects of the North of Africa, EU Emergency Trust Fund. “EU Emergency Trust Fund for Arica,” European Commission, accessed January 2023. For the budget breakup see ERMCE, supra n. 69 at 16.
ERMCE, supra n. 69 at 4.
Ibid, 12–13.
Ibid, 5–6.
German Bundestag – 18th legislative period – 7 – No. 18/11508.
E.g., “Germany/Egypt: Agreement Risks Complicity in Abuses”, Human Rights Watch, accessed August 2023.
“Egypt and Germany Signs an Agreement in the Field of Migration”, Deutsche Welle, accessed August 2022 (in Arabic).
“Cooperating Even More Closely on Migration Policy”, The Federal Government, accessed August 2022. Flights carrying deported Egyptians from Germany to Egypt started for the first time in 2017. Al-Kashef & Martin, “EU-Egypt Cooperation, supra n. 63 at 7.
“Italy to Establish Training Center at Egyptian Police Academy”, Egypt Today, accessed June 2022.
Italian Parliamentary Panel Accuses Egyptian Security of Regeni Murder”, Reuters, accessed June 2022; Italy to Establish Training Center ”, supra n. 87.
International Training Centre at the Egyptian Police Academy (ITEPA), European Parliament, accessed June 2022.
“Even after borders re-opened [post covid], continued travel and health restrictions have impacted available pathways for regular labour migration and mobility”. Monitoring and Learning System EUTF – North of Africa 2022 Report: Covering the Period 2017–2022, InProve EEIC – Samuel Hall, (December 2022) 21.
Supra n. 11 and 12.
Immigration Detention, supra n. 67 at 5.
As quoted in Egypt’s Anti-Smuggling Bill: New Criminals, Old Victims, Mada, accessed August 2023.
Immigration Detention, supra n. 67 at 19–20; Cases of disappearances were particularly reported against Uyghurs living in Egypt “Uyghurs are Being Deported from Muslim Countries”, CNN, accessed July 2023.
Immigration Detention in Egypt, supra n. 67 at 20.
“EUTF for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration And Displaced Persons in Africa, First Monitoring Report”, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, (June 2019) p. 62; “Second Monitoring Report”, (July–November 2019) p. 64; “Third Monitoring Report”, (1 December 2019–30 April 2020) p. 76.
The Third Report, supra n. 96 at 84.
Monitoring and Learning System, supra n. 90 at 35. Analysis of these contracts, Ibid pp. 33–40.
E.g., Norman, Ambivalence as Policy, supra n. 37 at 31; Dina A. Fattah, Victoria Rietig & Alia Fakhry, “Egypt, the EU, and Migration: an Uncomfortable Yet Unavoidable Partnership”, DGAP Report, (September 2021) 14.
“France to Sell Egypt 30 Fighter Jets in $4.5 bln Deal”, Reuters, accessed June 2022; “French Dassault Delivers 2 Luxury Jets to Egyptian Government”, Mada, accessed June 2023; “The Real Reason Egypt Is Buying Fighter Jets From France”, Time Magazine, accessed June 2023; “Siemens Mobility Wins $8.7 Billion High-Speed Rail Deal in Egypt”, Reuters, accessed June 2023; “Siemens Signs 8 Billion Euro Power Deal with Egypt”, Reuters, accessed June 2023; “German Weapons Exports Hit Record with Bumper Egypt Sales, Deutsche Welle, accessed June 2023; “Italy, Egypt to Sign Mega Arms Deals includes 24 Eurofighters”, Global Defense Corp, accessed August 2023; “How Eni Bet Big and Won Big on Natural Gas off Egypt” New York Times, accessed September 2023.
Khalil Al-Anani, “Sisi Intensifies Arms Imports to Secure External Support for His Policies”, Arab Center Washington DC, accessed June 2023.
See supra n. 100.
“Egypt Leader Criticizes Europe’s Handling of Migrant Crisis”, Associated Press, accessed September 2023.
In September 2023, for the first time, the President of Egypt called for facilitating legal migration to Europe. “Sisi Calls for Facilitating Legal Migration to Export Manpower to Europe ,” BBC (in Arabic), accessed September 2023.
E.g., Naceur, Black Box, supra n. 78 at 1–2.
“Detention Prevention and Response: November, 2022”, UNHCR, accessed September 2023.
Amy Holmes, “Tightening the Noose on Egypt’s Civil Society”, Carnegie Endowment, 2017.
E.g., “Egyptian Researchers Must Choose Between Forced Exile and Arrest” Open Democracy, accessed August 2023;
“Egypt: UN experts condemn expulsions of Eritrean asylum seekers”, OCHCR, United Nations, accessed September 2023; Black Hole p. 7.
France and Germany: “Macron Gave Sisi France’s Highest Award”, France 24; “Egypt’s Sisi gets Germany’s St. George Medal for Peace-making in Africa”, Ahramonline, accessed September 2023.
“Migration Flow to Europe: Arrivals”, IOM, accessed June 2023.
“Italy Sea Arrivals Dashboard”, UNHCR (April 2022), accessed September 2023.
Monitoring and Learning System, supra n. 90 at 34.
“Central Mediterranean Accounts for More Than Half of Irregular Crossings into EU”, Frontex, accessed September 2023.
Ibid.
“Italy Sea Arrivals Dashboard”, UNHCR (April 2022), accessed September 2023.
“EU Funds Border Control Deal in Egypt With Migration Via Libya on Rise”, Reuters, accessed September 2023.
“Joint Declaration on the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership”, European Commission, accessed March 2024; “EU pledges billions of euros for Egypt”, Reuters, accessed March 2024.
Supra n. 11, 12 and 91.
