Abstract
A stronger emphasis on domestic politics and national sovereignty has recently shaped international economic relations, for instance, in the United Kingdom and the United States. This trend weakened the liberal international economic order (lio) with its promotion of globalisation and multilateralism. Why have the UK and the US, which formerly spearheaded the liberal order, embraced nation-centred foreign economic policies (ncp) under the Trump and Johnson governments? I argue that domestic forces predominantly drove this shift, since a political de facto alignment of value-based societal ideas and material interests increasingly favoured national self-determination and the privileging of domestic groups. The negative consequences of the lio such as rising income inequality, job losses and a perceived heteronomy had strengthened societal ideas and interests that converged in support of ncp. I examine these arguments by applying the societal approach to governmental preference formation in case studies on Johnson’s Brexit policy and Trump’s trade policy towards China.
Introduction and Puzzle
In the past two decades, the traditional liberal international economic order (lio) with its promotion of multilateral rules, globalisation, and regional as well as international organisations has lost support in several countries around the world.1 Established powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom weakened their commitment to international and regional economic institutions. The UK’s exit from the European Union (EU) as well as President Trump’s trade war with China, the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) into the usmca and the withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp) are prominent examples for this trend. Political parties that distanced themselves from liberal multilateralism recently also governed Italy, Poland, Greece, Brazil and India. The common ground of these instances of a more nation-centred economic policy (ncp) is a stronger emphasis on national sovereignty and self-determination as well as on the primacy of domestic groups. The trend towards ncp is especially puzzling regarding the US and the UK as former champions of economic globalisation and multilateralism, and as traditional liberal market economies. Thus, the question is: why have recent UK and US governments partly turned away from lio and decided to emphasise ncp? Specifically, why has Trump’s trade policy towards China turned to confrontation and why did the Johnson government fulfil the departure from European economic integration?
Research has mostly employed either a domestic politics focus in analysing the characteristics and foundations of anti-establishment populism or the international politics lens in examining the disruptive consequences of ncp for the international order. The research community that works on populism widely studied the electoral successes of Trump and Brexit/Johnson regarding their structural-material and socio-cultural causes. Studies mainly focused on either ideational or material dimensions, on populist politicians, political parties, and electoral systems. Findings demonstrate that workers and industrial regions suffered from economic liberalisation, that incomes partly stagnated, populist discourse grew and that many voters felt a loss of social status.2 Methodologically, research often quantitatively looked at large-n data sets (such as on oecd countries and on party manifestos),3 thus leaving space for more in-depth country analyses and comparison to reach a more differentiated picture of the political forces and processes. The second research community analysed the disruptive implications of Trump’s policy and Brexit for international relations, the EU and multilateralism in general.4 Studies mainly focused on the international systemic level or on individual cases of disruption such as on the EU and the World Trade Organisation (wto). Findings show that ‘America First’ and Brexit might weaken the liberal international order and partly reduce the power of international organisations and the achievements of globalisation.
Research, however, has left space for examination of the mutual reinforcement of globalisation-critical material interests and ideational expectations of voters and of their competition with pro-lio interests and ideas. It seems especially promising to investigate this interplay and competition of domestic ideas and interests as independent variables on the one hand and Trump’s trade policy and Johnson’s policy towards Brexit as dependent variables on the other hand. Thus, the article’s aim is to contribute to the analysis of the domestic sources of foreign economic policy by investigating the questions on how and why a society’s ideas and interests relating to international economic integration aligned in shaping politicians’ nation-centred foreign economic policy preferences.
Regarding the questions raised above, I argue that the lio and globalisation have had two core adverse effects on large segments of Western societies that triggered socio-economic divisions and rising support for ncp s. First, the liberalisation of finance and trade in the framework of international organisations such as the wto and the EU contributed to economic losses for many and to rising inequality of income distribution. This has alienated voters that materially lost or only gained little from globalisation and de-legitimised international economic integration in the eyes of voters that grew ideationally discontent with rising inequality. Second, the increasing powers of seemingly opaque and non-accountable transnational bureaucracies as well as multilateral rules have left many voters with the impression of heteronomy and a loss of control. These consequences of international economic integration have led some parties and politicians to seize on societal discontent and steer economic policy towards a more nation-centred course, especially in majoritarian voting systems and liberal market economies with relatively weak compensation for inequality, such as in the UK and the US.
Nation-centred economic policy (ncp) is defined here as a policy that seeks to strengthen national sovereignty to the detriment of multilateral rules and international organisations, and which aims at privileging certain domestic interests and ideas. Liberal economic policies had followed the interests and ideas of different domestic groups by strengthening multilateral lio and liberalising trade and finance. This latter course had privileged pro-globalisation businesses, hurt some domestic manufacturing sectors, weakened national sovereignty, and allowed some businesses in other countries to participate in the gains of liberalisation. Regarding the shift to more ncp s in America and Britain, the literature often uses the term ‘economic nationalism’.5 This term, however, will not be used here because of three reasons even though some authors employ it in a similar way as ncp is defined above. First, definitions of ‘economic nationalism’ considerably diverge in the literature. Some focus on state building and strengthening national industry, others on neo-mercantilism or protectionism, and still others on free market nationalism or political nationalism.6 Second, this article does not intend to associate its analysis with specific theories of ‘economic nationalism’, for example, by Alexander Hamilton or Friedrich List. Third, neither Johnson’s Brexit policy nor Trump’s trade policy aimed at economic isolationism. Rather, their intent was to regain national autonomy vis-à-vis multilateral institutions and to increase specific domestic gains from international economic integration, while continuing to selectively participate in economic exchange (e.g., ‘Global Britain’, new usmca treaty, forcing China to follow international rules). The latter aims are largely consistent with definitions of economic patriotism7 which substantially overlap with ncp but include supranational governance as a form of economic patriotism. ncp, however, favours national self-determination. In sum, the term ‘nation-centred’ would seem to describe the phenomenon at stake in this article in a more appropriate way.
The article’s contribution is threefold. First, it correlates evidence for voters’ ideational expectations and material interests regarding international economic integration with the nation-centred course of Johnson’s Brexit policy and Trump’s trade policy. Second, it examines how de facto alignments between voters’ economic policy-related ideas and interests contributed to the electoral successes of Brexit and Trump, which enabled the ncp desired by these voters. Third, through a systematic comparison of the domestic ideational and material alignments in the US and the UK, the article provides evidence for the causes of both turns to ncp as reactions to the impact of international economic integration. Theoretically, the article contributes to the elucidation of the role of domestic forces in shaping governmental preferences by further developing the societal approach’s concept of the domestic alignments of voters’ ideational and material demands.
Analytical Framework: the Societal Approach
To address the questions on how and why a society’s ideas and interests relating to international economic integration aligned in shaping politicians’ nation-centred foreign economic policy preferences, theories of international political economy (ipe) that offer a bottom-up explanation seem appropriate. While some domestic politics approaches of ipe have centred on the role of material interests,8 others have concentrated on domestic institutions9 and ideas.10 Still other theories, such as the liberal theory of ir11 and comparative political economy approaches12 consider all three dimensions, but neither focusses on ipe puzzles nor on the conditions for the relative significance of each domestic variable for governmental preferences. The latter perspective is at the core of the societal approach that was developed in Europe in the context of the above-mentioned domestic politics theories of ipe and ir.13 Besides the concept of societal alignments (see below), the strengths and novel contributions of the societal approach include the consideration of actors’ circumstances and interpretations, and the hypothesising about conditions under which each of the three variables prevails in shaping governmental preferences. It argues, for instance, that material interests prevail if well-organised economic sectors are affected directly by the governance issue at stake, while societal ideas tend to dominate if fundamental and salient questions on the role of the government in steering the economy are raised. Several studies by European scholars of ipe employed the societal approach to explain the variation of governmental preferences over time and in cross-country comparison regarding trade policy, investment cooperation, global economic governance, the Eurozone, and the global financial crisis.14 These studies display the limitations of the approach that does not consider the direct influence of international organisations on governmental preferences and the full theoretical range of ideas and institutions. The studies, however, also demonstrate the merits of the approach in theorising on the conditions under which ideas, interests and institutions matter, as well as on how they reinforce each other and align in shaping governmental preferences.
The societal approach seems especially adequate for the analysis of the puzzle at stake, because it conceptualises alignments between reinforcing ideas and interests. Its basic assumption is that governments wish to remain in office and that opposition parties aim to win office. Therefore, government and opposition politicians tend to be responsive towards societal demands in democratic political systems. Weak responsiveness would in turn lead to electoral defeat. This article complements the societal approach by conceptually refining and empirically investigating how certain ideas and interests can converge, mutually reinforce each other, work in parallel (thus politically de facto align) and compete with different alignments of other converging ideas and interests in informing governmental preferences. In addition, this article develops the societal approach further by examining general societal interests via material indicators (for circumstances) and opinion polls (for interpretation), and by evidencing sectoral interests via changes in competitiveness (circumstances) and positions of business associations (interpretation). Hence, the societal approach conceptually and empirically addresses both structural circumstances and their interpretation by actors.15 In addition, political and economic institutions as well as critical junctures will be considered as background variables (see below).
Interests are defined as material considerations of voters (general societal interests) and of economic sectors (sectoral interests) whose cost-benefit calculations can change according to circumstances such as economic crises, income distribution, competitiveness, and global, regional as well as national regulations. Interests can diverge, for example, regarding the desire for protection from competition versus the demand for liberalisation. Ideas are defined as value-based interpretations and expectations of voters about appropriate governmental positions. Societal ideas express themselves as attitudes that are empirically evidenced in public opinion polls and quotes. Regarding the topic of this article, relevant societal ideas refer to the appropriate role of the government in steering the economy, especially regarding the (dis)advantages of international trade and income distribution. Societal ideas and interests interact with one another and can mutually constitute, support, or oppose each other. The analytical separation serves the purpose of identifying their sui generis characteristics. Indicators for the independent variables may overlap in their meaning. For instance, ‘distribution’ has a material dimension (income), but may also concern an idea (equality, fairness), while ‘national self-determination’ can be an idea (autonomy) and an interest (stronger national jurisdiction).
Conceptualisation of de facto ‘alignments’ between ideas and interests. Given the plurality of ideas and interests in societies, ideational expectations may encounter material interests that demand similar policies from the government, while different ideational expectations may go hand in hand with other material interests. This can lead to a competition of diverging societal demands that both rest on ideas as well as interests. This argument implies that the preferences of the government and of politicians striving for governmental office can be informed by de facto alignments of converging and mutually supportive ideas and interests which prevail over other alignments of ideas and interests that prefer a different course.16 Thus, an alignment is defined here as a mutual reinforcement of specific ideas and interests that both demand similar/compatible political measures. Which of the competing alignments prevails, plausibly depends, first, on voters’ and sectors’ support (as a result of concern and issue salience) and, second, on ideas and interests in one alignment actually reinforcing each other (as a result of similarity or complementarity of the policy-demands). Policy change is thus conceived as induced by an ascending alignment prevailing over the established alignment. The concept of ideational and interest-related alignments will guide the analysis in the case studies.
In its complete version, the societal approach also includes domestic institutions as an explanatory variable for governmental preferences. Due to the focus of this article on ideational-material alignments, however, institutions will be considered only as a background variable. Domestic institutions are defined as regulations which structure domestic political (e.g., electoral system) and socio-economic (e.g., welfare system) coordination. Domestic political and economic institutions can inform ideas and interests of voters (and interest groups) and governmental preferences directly. Thus, institutions can influence the magnitude of policy change. First, if policy change occurs in majoritarian voting systems it will plausibly take a more radical form than policy change in proportional electoral systems that tend to moderate the impact of voters’ demands and the execution of policies. Second, Liberal Market Economies (lme) as defined by the Varieties of Capitalism theory (such as the UK and the US) possess smaller welfare provisions than Coordinated Market Economies (cme, such as Germany, Scandinavia).17 While the UK has considerably higher health and unemployment benefits than the US, both countries are classified as lme s by Varieties of Capitalism research and offer less redistribution than cme s. Material compensation for voters that are disadvantaged by free trade is relatively smaller in lme s compared to cme s. This plausibly contributes to a stronger opposition against economic liberalism. Furthermore, governmental preferences towards international economic integration are informed by the consideration of how international rules will affect domestic regulations that shape domestic sectors’ competitive situation.18
Besides domestic institutions in form of electoral systems and economic models it seems promising to consider exogenous shocks/critical junctures as third dimension of the institutional background variable which might have contributed to the rise of the pro-ncp alignment. Inspired by Capoccia and Kelemen’s concepts, critical junctures are defined here as institutional changes whose path-dependent consequences allowed for exogenous shocks that impacted on domestic politics both materially and regarding their endogenous interpretation.19 This article considers the process of the international institutionalisation of globalisation and the lio (wto, European integration, liberalisation of finance) as a critical juncture that induced certain path-dependent consequences (China’s wto accession, magnitude of financial crisis, transfer of state powers to EU) with negative repercussions on domestic material circumstances and ideational interpretations. Thus voters’ ideational and material demands are informed by repercussions of exogenous/international developments which are anchored in international institutions and rules.
In sum, this article’s explanatory framework focuses on societal alignments between ideational and material demands of voters. In addition, it considers the institutional dimensions of voting systems, economic models, and critical junctures/exogenous shocks as a background variable that can influence societal ideas and interests.
Three disclaimers apply to the following analysis. First, due to length restrictions, the evidence can only be exemplary in nature. A full consideration of the literature and a complete test of the argument will need further research. The examination of the independent and the dependent variables concentrates on their foreign economic policy dimensions. Second, the focus on societal ideas and interests and their alignments (plus domestic institutions and exogenous critical junctures as a background variable) does not imply that other forces such as political parties, ideational leaders, and intergovernmental negotiations might not have influenced governmental preferences as well. Third, the article’s aim is neither to engage in a general debate about the causes of anti-establishment populism nor to discuss the (dis)advantages of economic nationalism, liberalism, and multilateralism. Rather, the article’s goal is to demonstrate the relevance of ideational-material societal alignments for the explanation of recent nation-centred economic policies in the UK and the US.
Societal Foundations of the UK’s Withdrawal From the EU
The Brexit vote is a highly interesting case for analysing how a plurality of societal ideas and material interests partly competed and partly reinforced each other. Both the Remain-camp that favoured a continuation of UK’s membership in the EU and the Leave-camp that advocated Brexit, rested on ideational as well as material considerations. Thus, the competition for influence on governmental preferences via the result of the referendum in 2016 and the parliamentary election in 2019 included ideas and interests on both sides. Both ideational-material alignments were composed of several groups and issues. The Remain-camp encompassed parts of the financial industry, a majority of the urban voters, of the well off and highly educated, and strongly (Liberal Democrat) to ambivalent (Labour, Tories) the political establishment of the political parties. On the other hand, the Leave-camp was predominantly supported in smaller cities and rural areas, by middle to low income and education segments of the electorate, the Midlands, Northern and Southeast England.20
The referendum in June 2016 was the culmination of a decade-long process of domestic controversies over the political and economic costs and benefits of EU membership. The domestic contestation of UK’s membership became apparent, inter alia, in the 1980s when Prime Minister (pm) Thatcher renegotiated the British contribution to the budget of the then European Community (‘I want my money back’). The referendum in 2016 resulted in a 52 percent majority favouring Leave and thus winning, with the Remain-voters taking 48 percent. The Brexit campaign enhanced already existing opposed attitudes in the British society.21 Foreign economic policy related controversies focused on the costs of free trade and globalisation, the restrictions for British sovereignty, the EU competencies over trade policy, and immigration. The following analysis will document, first, the material interests and ideational expectations on both sides and, second, explain how and why the material and ideational reasons for leaving the EU aligned and prevailed over the ideas and interests that motivated the Remain-voters. In addition, it sheds light on the impact of electoral and economic institutions and on the domestic consequences of certain background variables affecting societal demands for ncp—such as institutionalised globalisation and Europeanisation.
Interests
The material interest side of the societal division centres on the (dis-)advantages of globalisation and EU membership. The UK had been one of the drivers of trade liberalisation since the 1960s and of finance since the 1980s. This process has been implemented in the UK via a reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers for goods and services, first, through negotiations in the gatt (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and its successor wto and, second, through the European Community (EU since 1993) which Britain joined in 1973. The UK experienced de-regulation since pm Thatcher in the 1980s and financial market liberalisation especially in the 1990s under pm Tony Blair. The stronger international economic integration led to an increase in imports of manufactured goods and to a partial de-industrialisation. Thus, while consumers in general benefited from cheap imports, the imports of manufactured goods, especially the ‘China shock’ after China’s wto accession in 2001, contributed to an elimination of many industrial jobs.22 Loss of employment was due to both imports and automation plus technological development that was also triggered by the stronger import competition. This crisis of de-industrialisation represented a consequence of trade liberalisation anchored in international rules that contributed to a polarisation of interests and ideas in the society and strengthened opposition to lio.
While transnational corporations, business consultants, and the financial services sector especially gained from economic openness through higher incomes and profits, rising unemployment and economic degradation in the traditional industrial regions documented the downsides of international integration. Regarding the material interests of economic sectors and their lobbying vis-à-vis the government, the former businesses engaged in the Remain-camp, while sectors and voters in the latter regions endorsed the Leave-camp. The Confederation of British Industry (cbi) feared deteriorating business opportunities and predominantly demanded a continuation of UK’s membership in the EU.23 The financial industry and other transnational firms partly favoured Remain, but apparently miscalculated their strategy to threaten the EU with a referendum to achieve further de-regulation and exceptions for the UK. Using the referendum as a bargaining chip backfired for finance.24
The British Chambers of Commerce (bcc), decided to officially stay neutral due to the split interests of their member firms. Companies that focused on the domestic market, and less organised sectors, thought they would benefit from Brexit.25 Jensen and Snaith conclude that most big business interest groups preferred to remain in the EU, but ultimately had limited influence on the political process.26 In the end, organised sectoral interests that predominantly supported Remain were apparently not as influential as the alignment between general societal interests and societal ideas (see below) favouring Leave. Regarding general societal interests, evidence shows a clear correlation between the decline of industrial structure and the exposure to economic liberalisation as well as statistically a strong relationship between international economic integration and the vote for Brexit.27 The material dimension of the societal division induced by economic openness, however, did not only encompass the specific effects on the winners and losers of this development, but also included an increasingly unequal income distribution in the whole society. The Gini Index that measures the distribution of income (0 = total equality, 1 = one person has all income) had risen by about 20% from 0.284 (1979) to 0.348 (2016).28 Thus, rising income inequality materially shaped general societal interests. While the UK had become a more equal nation during the post-World War ii decades, inequality rose since the 1980s and reached a peak after the global financial crisis in 2009–2010.
The latter magnified material divisions in the society and mistrust towards the British elites. The crisis led to an economic downturn in most Western industrialised countries, rising unemployment, and large governmental rescue-packages for the financial industry which the taxpayers paid or guaranteed.29 This management of the global financial crisis increased the perception of many voters that the government would privilege the interests of the economic elite, while ordinary citizens had to bear the costs of this policy.30 Pro-Brexit politicians took up and enhanced this anti-elite sentiment of many voters. The Equality Trust summarises findings on income distribution: ‘Rising inequality has seen a dramatic increase in the share of income going to the top, a decline in the share of those at the bottom and, more recently, a stagnation of incomes among those in the middle.’31
This growth of socio-economic inequality has two implications. First, it shows that the bottom and the middle strata of income receivers either did not gain at all or only modestly benefitted from neoliberal policies and economic openness, while the top earners became much wealthier. Second, it evidences that the losers and the less advantaged of liberal economic policies were not compensated effectively by the winners. Apparently, redistributive domestic institutional arrangements did not suffice to prevent rising inequality. This situation was aggravated by the government’s austerity policies after 2010. Thus, the post-war ‘social contract’ that acknowledged that socio-economic hardship induced by liberalisation had to be compensated to secure voters’ political support, was not fulfilled (anymore).32 In this regard, compensation does not only refer to transfer payments, but rather involves the maintenance of jobs with decent remuneration. Colgan and Keohane comment on the failed compensation: ‘The Brexit and Trump phenomena reflect a breakdown of the social contract at the core of liberal democracy: those who do well in a market-based society promise to make sure that those disadvantaged by market forces do not fall far behind’.33 In consequence of this domestic institutional failure to substantially cushion the impact of liberalisation, the opposition to lio and unequal distribution increased and the demand for protection through ncp became attractive for a growing part of the electorate.
Rising inequality triggered opposition towards international economic integration, especially vis-à-vis the EU, whose Commission is responsible for the common external trade policy. Much of the Brexit campaign, however, argued against isolationism and advocated the idea of a ‘Global Britain’ without the restrictions of EU membership.34 These findings point to the conclusion that the motivation for some Brexiteers was not trade per se, but the interpretation that EU membership and unequal distribution of gains needed correction through a stronger national control over trade and a change in distributional patterns. While the Leave-camp expected Brexit to benefit the UK economically, the Remain-camp feared economic losses. A YouGov poll conducted 20–22 June 2016 reported that, when asked about whether Britain would be worse or better off economically after Brexit, only 4 percent of Leave voters, but 78 per cent of Remainers, thought Britain would be worse off.35 The general societal interests showed a clearly divided society.
In addition to the trade and finance dimensions of societal interests, fears of job losses, wage levels and public services induced by growing immigration from EU-members and non-EU-countries strengthened the Brexit-camp (see below).36
Ideas
The material conditions of rising inequality also influenced ideational expectations, since ‘fairness’ of income distribution and economic opportunities is a widespread societal value in the UK (and other industrialised countries).37 Many voters identify with ‘the broad nation’ that is characterised as capturing a society’s aversion to inequality.38 In other words, since both the economic disadvantaged and many of the economic well-off share an opposition to rising inequality/unfairness, both groups feel discontent with this development. According to a British social attitudes poll, 84% of the respondents believed in 2016 that ‘the income gap in the UK is too large’.39 Thus, many voters became dissatisfied with the predominant economic course, even those voters who personally may have benefitted from neoliberal policies. The liberalisation of trade affected material interests as well as ideational expectations.
Besides the value-based ideas of equality and fairness of the domestic ‘social contract’, the ideational dimension of the societal division relevant for the Brexit-vote centred on two issue areas: national sovereignty and culture. First, the process of UK’s international economic integration included its membership in multilateral organisations that gained considerable competencies in the previous decades. Especially the EU Commission and the European Court of Justice obtained powers formerly exercised by the member states themselves. National sovereignty was thus restricted by international rules and partly by a transfer of state powers to European institutions. This process of the supranationalisation of tasks that were formerly accomplished by elected governments was driven by the goal to enhance the efficiency of international economic integration. The institutions of international economic governance, however, do not possess the legitimacy and accountability of national parliaments and governments of democratic nation states.40
Thus, the intended increase of economic efficiency induced a weakening of national sovereignty, accountability, and democracy. In the eyes of many voters, the seemingly opaque and distant international organisations were exercising a growing influence without voters’ control—a situation constituting a ‘failure of representation’ according to Frieden.41 Consequently, one of the most salient reasons for Leave-voters was the wish to reduce this heteronomy and to ‘take back control’ as formulated in one of the key slogans of the Leave-campaign.42 The Economist reports a poll among 12,000 Leave-voters that found that the main motive in voting for Brexit, mentioned by 49 percent, was democratic self-government and concludes: ‘By their own lights they were voting against a closed elite in favour of open and accountable government’.43 On the other hand, Remain-voters shared the conviction that international organisations such as EU were better suited to govern the globalised economy than the UK alone. The idea of multilateral governance and of a weakened national sovereignty was appealing especially to those voters that endorsed a more cosmopolitan way of life and that benefited from open borders, finance, and trade. In a nation-wide YouGov poll, 72 percent of voters which intended to vote Remain thought of Brexit to be ‘bad for jobs’ (13 percent responded it would ‘make no real difference’), while among the Leave-voters 44 percent thought it would be ‘good for jobs’ (45 percent responded it would ‘make no real difference’).44 Hence, in the Leave-camp, the worry about material interests (jobs/income) aligned with ideational concerns about self-determination (accountability/heteronomy).
The second ideational issue of key relevance in the Brexit-vote were cultural questions mixed with interests, especially relating to immigration. The latter involved material interests of those voters who saw their jobs endangered by immigrants as well as ideational preferences about British culture and community, that is, the wish to preserve a traditional British way of life.45 The material and ideational parts of the rejection of large-scale immigration are difficult to disentangle. Overall, immigration has been an important reason for voting Leave together with sovereignty and economic issues, while Remain-voters mentioned the economy as their first motivation and the UK’s global influence as second.46 The influx of refugees to Germany during Chancellor Merkel’s policy of unlimited immigration since 2015 contributed to fears of mass-immigration in the UK that were exploited by Brexit campaigners and ultimately increased the wish to ‘take back control’.47
(…) it is to be Prime Minister of the whole United Kingdom and that means uniting our country answering at last the plea of the forgotten people and the left behind towns’ (…) ‘Brexit was a fundamental decision by the British people that they wanted their laws made by people that they can elect and they can remove from office (…) and yes, let’s start now on those free trade deals.48
Summing up, both the Leave-camp and the Remain-camp comprised ideational expectations as well as material interests that reinforced each other within the two alignments. The alignments competed in shaping politicians’ preferences and in trying to win the 2016 referendum and the 2019 election. The motives of the Leave-voters included ideational expectations about democratic self-government, control, and accountability as well as greater equality of income distribution, a revitalisation of the embedded liberalism ‘social contract’ and a more communitarian, traditional British way of life. Leavers’ material interest in a stronger economic participation of regions and voters disadvantaged by liberalisation reinforced and politically aligned with these ideational expectations. On the other hand, the Remainers’ motives encompassed ideational expectations that favoured supranational governance and a more cosmopolitan vision of society. These ideas reinforced and overlapped with the material interests of Remain-voters in the continuation of liberalisation, European integration as well as multilateralism. The Leave-camp narrowly prevailed in the 2016 referendum and therefore shaped the government’s preferences. The pro-Brexit alignment expressed itself again in the 2019 electoral success of pm Johnson, whose campaign had focused on ending the UK’s membership in the EU (‘get Brexit done’). In both electoral cases, the winning alignment included, first, strongly supportive voters (resulting from strong concern and high issue salience) and, second, highly complementary (regional and general) material interests and societal ideas that informed governmental preferences in the same policy-direction. Thus, the Brexit case plausibly confirms the argument about the conditions for the prevalence of one ideational-material alignment over the other stated in the theory section. Evidence for the institutional background variable for the turn to ncp was detected in form of a largely majoritarian voting system (referendum, parliamentary election), lme (social contract, insufficient compensation), and exogenously induced crises as consequences of the institutionalisation of the lio/EU (China’s wto accession, global financial crisis, transfer of state powers to EU).
Societal Foundations of Trump’s Trade Policy Towards China
Why has US trade policy turned to confrontation by departing from President Obama’s diplomatic demands for changes in Chinese policy towards trying to enforce these demands through punitive measures? The trade war started in 2018 when the Trump administration imposed tariffs on Chinese exports to the US. The tariffs aimed at pressuring China to fulfil US demands in the areas of intellectual property rights protection, access to the Chinese market for US companies, and ‘unfair’ trade practices such as subsidies to Chinese firms and currency undervaluation. These areas of contention had shaped US-China relations before. President Obama’s administration had already embarked on a more assertive diplomatic course, for instance, by criticising China for currency manipulation and subsidies for Chinese companies.49 In Trump’s trade war with China, tariffs were increased in 2018 to 12.4 percent (up from a low of 3.1 percent after China’s wto accession in 2001) covering 200 billion$ worth of imports from China. In 2019, the President announced new tariffs against an additional 300 billion$ in imports, thereby increasing tariffs to 21.5 percent, and threatened to raise tariffs further to an average of 27.8 percent. China retaliated by raising tariffs against US products.50 There was reason for doubt about whether the trade war will lead to the desired results or rather leave both sides worse off.
We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength. […] We will seek good friendship […], but we do so with the understanding that it is the right of all nations to put their own interests first.54
Regarding China, Trump justified the punitive tariffs in his 2019 State of the Union Address as a measure to reach ‘a new trade deal with China. But it must include real, structural change to end unfair trade practices, reduce our chronic trade deficit, and protect American jobs’.55
Thus, Trump’s imposition of tariffs pressuring China to comply with US demands followed his campaign promises that had become attractive to many voters due to the material and ideational downsides of liberal trade policy (see below). Trump’s campaign positions shaped US trade policy and the US Trade Representative, Robert Lighthizer, stated: ‘President Trump was elected in part due to his commitment to reform the global trading system in ways that would lead to fairer outcomes for U.S. workers and businesses […]. In 2017, the Trump Administration began to fulfil that commitment.’56
How far did Trump’s trade policy correspond to the interests and ideas of voters and certain economic sectors? Why did the alignment of societal ideas and interests that favoured ncp prevail in the 2016 election over those societal ideas and interests which supported lio?
Interests
The fact that the huge gains from trade and technology have flowed to such a small elite, while earnings in other categories have stagnated, may go far to explain why the anti-globalization movements blame not only crucial elements of the lio, but increasingly a small and nefarious global elite.62
Rising income inequality became a major political problem that triggered a shift in foreign economic policy since the winners of globalisation did not compensate the disadvantaged. This was because the ‘social contract’ of embedded liberalism was partly abandoned.63 Similar to the British case, the domestic institutions of the US lme apparently did not sufficiently compensate the disadvantaged to prevent political opposition. Voters who did not benefit (much) from the gains of international economic integration turned against the lio and demanded protection from its downsides. In addition, many voters perceived the established elites as reaping the lion’s share of growing wealth.64 The discontent of many voters about the unequal distribution of liberalization’s gains was picked up by Trump’s 2016 electoral campaign.
Growing inequality, with many workers losing income and the middle class stagnating (or gaining relatively little) helps us to understand why in 2016 it was not only low-skilled workers but also 44 percent of all US college graduates voted for Trump (49 percent for Clinton).65 Regarding voters’ incomes, Carnes and Lupu quote the American National Election Study showing that about two thirds of Trump supporters came from the better-off half of the economy and title in The Washington Post: ‘It’s time to bust the myth: Most Trump voters were not working class’.66 Furthermore, Trump’s voters were not only old white men, since 52 percent of white women and 41 percent of all 30–44 year old voters also voted for him.67 In sum, Trump voters came from diverse demographic, educational and economic strata and apparently endorsed, inter alia, his criticism of the traditional foreign economic policy.
Material inequality in the US also has a strong regional and sectoral dimension. Geographically, the former industrial states in the Mid-West and the Great Lakes were hit by de-industrialization that reduced incomes and led to falling real estate prices as well as to a deterioration of local public services which depend on taxes.68 Shrinking industrial output had been a consequence of rising competition with cheaper products from countries such as China and Mexico and of automation of production processes. Many voters in the affected states had traditionally voted for the Democratic Party but switched to Trump in 2016 apparently believing in his credo of protecting their interests by pursuing a nation-centred trade policy.69 While the former industrial heartlands suffered the most from globalisation, urban centres benefitted.70 Fears of losing jobs to immigrants further increased the support of many voters for ncp positions.
Besides this geographical cleavage, globalisation also widened the gap between sectors by negatively affecting manufacturing, while allowing profits to grow steeply in the information, finance and internet sectors. The manufacturing, coal mining, steel, textiles and car industries had in particular suffered severely under international economic integration and were hoping that Trump’s nation-centred course would revitalise them.71 The largest US industry lobby group, the National Association of Manufacturers (nam), had demanded a tougher action of the US government towards China for many years regarding the Chinese government’s subsidies to its industry, weak protection of intellectual property rights, and obstacles for US companies’ access to the Chinese market. Therefore, the nam was highly satisfied with Trump’s trade policy towards China: ‘President Donald Trump has done more for manufacturing workers than any President in recent history’.72 It endorsed Trump’s assertive course and demanded a trade agreement, in which China should concede to US demands. nam’s President Jay Timmons supported this strategy in a letter to the President in January 2018: ‘Your high-level engagement with China’s leaders and robust use of U.S. trade rules are forcing the Chinese government to take the United States seriously. Both tools provide critical leverage to push China to reverse policies that have long discriminated against American businesses and workers.’73 In addition, the business lobby most directly interested in trade with China, the American Chamber of Commerce in China, supported Trump’s punitive tariffs hoping for a level playing field for US business.74 Thus, the cost-benefit calculations of sectoral interests that were directly affected by lio led to strong support of Trump’s trade-related ncp preferences.
Ideas
Similarly once again to the UK case, many American voters were unsatisfied with growing inequality. A poll by Gallup from the year preceding Trump’s election shows that 67% of Americans were ‘dissatisfied with the way income and wealth are distributed in the U.S.’75 Thus, increasing inequality affected material circumstances as evidenced above and the interpretation (by plausibly more voters than were materially affected) that these circumstances were ideationally inadequate (unfair).
Furthermore, voters’ basic expectations from the election year 2016 towards US foreign economic policy and the (dis-) advantages of international trade serve as evidence for the correlation between societal ideas and President Trump’s ncp. According to the Pew Research Center, more Americans stated that US involvement in the global economy is a ‘bad thing’ because it lowers wages and costs jobs (49 percent), than Americans seeing this as a ‘good thing’ because it provides the US with new markets and opportunities for growth (44 percent).76 These numbers show the division of the US society. Respondents who backed Trump were even more sceptical of US involvement in the global economy, with 65 percent saying that it is a ‘bad thing’, while 55 percent of Clinton supporters viewed US global economic involvement as a ‘good thing’. The supporters of Bernie Sanders, however, unveiled an almost equal split on this issue, with only 47 percent viewing US global economic involvement as a ‘good thing’ and a slight majority of 48 percent viewing it as a ‘bad thing’. In the 2016 electoral battleground states (Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania), ‘trade’ was interpreted by voters both more negatively and more salient than in the whole country.77
In another poll from the election year, Pew Research reported that the American public and foreign policy experts significantly disagreed over international economic integration. While 49 percent of the general public stated that US involvement in the global economy is a ‘bad thing’, 86 percent of foreign policy experts thought of US involvement in the global economy as a ‘good thing’.78 These numbers evidence why theoretical approaches that focus on epistemic communities or elite discourses fail to explain the societal foundations of ncp.
In addition to attitudes towards inequality and foreign economic policy, ideational expectations of voters about their democratic participation in the policy-making process apparently played an important role in voters’ support for Trump’s ncp positions. Since the two dominant parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, supported international economic integration, voters who were dissatisfied with this course were lacking political representation and leaned towards Trump who promised to weaken US global economic involvement. Frieden detects ‘failures of representation’ when voters believe that prevailing politics do not pay adequate attention to their problems due to a consensual support of international economic integration by all dominant political parties, and concludes: ‘In such “cartelized” political systems, those who feel ill-treated and unrepresented by the dominant parties have only two choices: either they can vote for new political parties that challenge the trend, or they can vote for insurgent candidates within the existing parties.’79 The majority voting system seems to have increased the possibility of a gap in representation as well as the opportunity for significantly overturning previous policies in elections.
Summing up, the Trump administration’s trade war with China correlated with a rejection of international economic integration by a (slight) majority of US voters. In addition, the perception of too much inequality and a lack of political representation as well as material economic degradation and rising inequality of income distribution plausibly led to a political alignment of ideas and interests that supported ncp and held negative attitudes towards globalisation and the lio. At the same time, those who benefitted materially from lio and ideationally endorsed the traditional policies plausibly continued aligning in support of liberalisation. In the end, the US society seems divided both materially and ideationally. Opinion polls document the latter and show a split interpretation of the involvement in the global economy as ‘bad/good thing’. The alignment that favoured ncp prevailed (especially in some swing states) in 2016 due to the high salience and complementarity of its ideational and material demands, and due to the strong support of sectors and voters that were concerned because they suffered materially under liberalisation. This confirms the conditions for an alignment‘s strength, as formulated in the theory section above. The institutional background for the turn to ncp was shown in form of a majoritarian voting system, a lme (low compensation for losses), and economic repercussions of the international institutionalisation of the lio (China’s accession to the wto, financial crisis).
In the 2020 presidential election, the political influence of the societal alignment in support of ncp shifted partly in favour of the Democratic Party since its candidate, Joe Biden, had explicitly endorsed ncp preferences in his campaign by promising both a tough trade policy towards China and the creation of millions of manufacturing jobs in the US. In addition, ‘Mr Biden has pledged to fight back against countries undercutting American manufacturing using “unfair subsidies“’.80 These positions have apparently contributed to winning back voters for the Democratic Party in some Mid-West and Great Lake swing states. In addition, Biden endorsed a bipartisan initiative for an US industrial policy to counteract the Chinese challenge, following a nation-centred economic policy idea and moving away from lio’s pledge for free trade.81 Thus, the political power of the pro-ncp alignment seems not to have faded but rather (partly) moved to Biden who proved responsive to core ncp positions.
Conclusion
The article investigated the questions of how and why a society’s ideas and interests relating to international economic integration aligned in shaping politicians’ nation-centred foreign economic policy preferences in the US and the UK. The evidence indicated that the politics of globalisation and liberal multilateralism had contributed to rising income inequality in both countries and divided the societies between voters that materially gained from this course and voters that were disadvantaged. The growth of the latter group as well as the weak economic compensation for losses correlated with the rising wish for more national self-determination, less inequality, and improved participation. In addition, evidence showed that many voters shared an adverse ideational interpretation of inequality, of the ‘failure of representation’, and of international and European economic integration. These domestic material interests and societal ideas politically led to a de facto alignment in demanding ncp. The pro-ncp demands were seized by some politicians and prevailed over the traditional pro-lio alignment in the two cases.
Regarding Brexit, many voters were unsatisfied with not benefitting (enough) from EU-regulated trade, with trade-induced job losses and the transfer of national sovereignty to the EU. The general societal interests in leaving the EU aligned with the societal ideas of sovereignty, equality, and democratic participation (‘take back control’). In the 2016 Brexit referendum and the 2019 election, this alignment prevailed over the competing alignment between the material interest of the winners of international economic integration and the ideational support of supranational European governance. In the case of Trump’s trade war with China, evidence shows that a part of general societal interests supported a turn to ncp (‘Make America Great Again’) plausibly due to rising income inequality and to trade-induced job losses. Ideational concerns referred to the US involvement in the global economy, to inequality and to the perceived lack of political representation of voters that were discontented with international economic integration. Similar to the UK case, the US society was split between ideational-material supporters of ncp and ideational-material supporters of lio. The evidence in the case studies underpinned the argument that the predominance of one alignment vis-à-vis other alignments depends on voters’ and sectors’ support (as a result of strong concern and issue salience) and on ideas and interests actually reinforcing each other within one camp (resulting from the complementarity of policies demanded).
The comparison of the two cases sheds light on substantial similarities among the societal foundations of the turn to ncp regarding income inequality, job losses, disadvantages or low benefits from liberalisation as well as regarding a perceived failure of representation, unfairness, and lack of control over multilateral institutions. The institutional background in the form of largely majoritarian voting systems, relatively low economic compensation models, and negative economic repercussions of the international institutionalisation of the lio (China’s wto accession, global financial crisis) were also alike. The comparison of the cases, however, also shows the differences between leaving the most institutionalised international organisation (EU) and pressuring a country to follow one’s own demands as in the case of Trump’s trade policy towards China. In addition, the analysis reveals differences regarding the independent variables, for instance, that many Leave-voters in the UK endorsed global trade (but apparently rejected the EU’s handling of trade), while most voters in the US considered an involvement in the global economy a ‘bad idea’. In both cases, elections led to policy change and the elected governments’ preferences corresponded to societal ideas and interests that favoured ncp. The article’s focus on alignments between societal ideas and interests, however, does not imply that other forces and issues did not also influence policies. Rather, the aim of this article was to conceptualise and evidence the societal foundations of ncp.
Further research may compare countries characterised by majoritarian voting systems and Liberal Market Economies with other countries that have more proportional voting systems and/or Coordinated Market Economies in order to assess the relevance of these features for the societal support of lio and ncp. In addition, future research might investigate the motivation of the traditional alignment (that benefitted from the lio) for not preventing the turn to ncp through improved representation and compensation of the voters who had lost or not gained much from international economic integration. Why was the ‘social contract’ of embedded liberalism weakened by allowing income inequality to rise and huge profits to be reaped, for instance, by the financial industry with taxpayers guaranteeing the profits in the crisis? Why were the foundational principles of democratic accountability and subsidiarity partly side-lined in European integration? The policy implication of the analysis seems clear: without a new ‘social contract’ through a better distribution of globalisation’s gains as well as a stronger democratic accountability, the support of many voters for ncps will most probably continue.
Acknowledgement
This article is a considerably revised version of a paper presented at the 14th Pan-European Conference of the European International Studies Association (eisa), online 13–17 September 2021 (Section ‘The Domestic Politics of Global Governance and International Disruption’). I am grateful for the valuable comments of the conference-participants and of the anonymous reviewers.
Bibliography
Autor, David, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson. ‘The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States’, American Economic Review, vol. 103, no. 6 (2013), pp. 2121–2168.
Autor, David, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson and Kaveh Majlesi. ‘Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure’, American Economic Review, vol. 110, no. 10 (2020)pp. 3139–3183.
bbc, ‘EU referendum: bcc says businesses back Remain but gap narrows’, 10 May 2016, www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36252315.
Bolle, Monica de and Jeromin Zettelmeyer. ‘Measuring the Rise of Economic Nationalism’, piie wp19–15, Washington DC., 2019.
Bremmer, Ian. Us vs. Them. The Failure of Globalism (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2018).
Broz, Lawrence J., Jeffry Frieden and Stephen Weymouth. ‘Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash’, International Organization, vol. 75, no. 2 (2021), pp. 464–494.
Bulmer, Simon and Lucia Quaglia. ‘The politics and economics of Brexit’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 25, no. 8 (2018), pp. 1089–1098.
Capoccia, Giovanni and Daniel R. Kelemen. ‘The study of critical junctures. Theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism’, World Politics, vol. 59, no. 3 (2007), pp. 341–369.
Carnes, Nicholas and Noam Lupu. ‘It’s time to bust the myth: Most Trump voters were not working class’, The Washington Post, 5 June 2017.
Clift, Ben and Cornelia Woll. ‘Economic patriotism: reinventing control over open markets’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 3 (2012), pp. 307–323.
Colantone, Italo Piero Stanig. ‘Global Competition and Brexit’, American Political Science Review, vol. 112, no. 2 (2018), pp. 201–218.
Colgan, Jeff Robert O. Keohane. ‘The liberal order is rigged. Fix it now or watch it wither’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 96, no. 3 (2017), pp. 36–44.
cnn, ‘Election 2016 Exit Polls’, https://edition.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls.
Etzioni, Amitai. ‘The rising (more) nation-centered system’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 42, no. 2 (2018), pp. 29–53.
Fioretos, Orfeo. ‘Historical institutionalism in international relations’, International Organization, vol. 65, no. 2 (2011), pp. 367–399.
Flaherty, Thomas M. and Ronald Rogowski. ‘Rising inequality as threat to the Liberal International Order’, International Organization, vol. 75, no. 2 (2021), pp. 495–523.
Frieden, Jeffrey. ‘The politics of the globalization backlash: Sources and implications’, Harvard University WP 2017.
Gallup, ‘January 30, 2015, in US 60% satisfied with ability to get ahead’, https://news.gallup.com/poll/181340/satisfied-ability-ahead.aspx?version=print.
Geithner, Timothy. ‘Treasury Secretary Geithner’s Testimony on China’, Wall Street Journal, 16 September 2010.
Gidron, Noam and Peter A. Hall. ‘The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right’, British Journal of Sociology, vol. 68, S1 (2017), pp. S57–S84.
Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane. ‘Ideas and foreign policy: An analytical framework’. In Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, eds Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1993), pp. 3–30.
Goodhart, David. The Road to Somewhere. The New Tribes Shaping British Politics (London: Penguin, 2017).
Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman. ‘Identity Politics and Trade Policy’, wp2019, Princeton/Harvard University, Cambridge Mass.
Guillén, Mauro. ‘The Demise of the Global Liberal Order’, Survival, vol. 61, no. 2 (2019), pp. 87–90.
Hall, Peter A. ‘The role of interests, institutions, and ideas in the comparative political economy of the industrialized nations’, In Comparative Politics, eds Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), pp. 174–207.
Hall, Peter A. and David Soskice. ‘An introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, In Varieties of Capitalism, eds Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (Oxford: OUP, 2001), pp. 1–68.
Harnisch, Sebastian. ‘Deutschlands Politik gegenüber der Belt and Road Initiative der Volksrepublik China 2013–2018’, ASIEN-German Journal on Contemporary Asia, no. 148 (2018), pp. 26–50.
Helleiner, Eric. ‘Varieties of American Neomercantilism: from the first years of the Republic to Trumpian economic nationalism’, European Review of International Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (2019), pp. 7–29.
Hendrix, Cullen S. ‘Protectionism in the 2016 election’, Washington D.C., piie wp2016.
Hobolt, Sarah. ‘The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 23, no. 9 (2016), pp. 1259–1277.
Ikenberry, John G. ‘The end of the liberal international order?’, International Affairs, vol. 94, no. 1 (2018), pp. 7–23.
Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. ‘Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse’, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 15, no. 2 (2017), pp. 443–454.
James, Scott and Lucia Quaglia. ‘Brexit, the City and the Contingent Power of Finance’, New Political Economy, vol. 24, no. 2 (2019), pp. 258–271.
Jensen, Mads Dagnis and Holly Snaith. ‘When politics prevails: the political economy of a Brexit’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 23, no 9 (2016), pp. 1302–1310.
Johnson, Boris. ‘Johnson’s first speech as Prime Minister’, 24 July 2019, www.gov.uk/government/speeches/boris-johnsons-first-speech-as-prime-minister-24-july-2019.
Kassim, Hussein, Scott James, Thomas Warren and Shaun Hargreaves Heap. ‘Preferences, Preference Formation and Position Taking in a Eurozone Out: Lessons from the United Kingdom’, Political Studies Review, vol. 18, no. 4 (2020), pp. 525–541.
Kollewe, Julia. ‘Brexit could cost L100bn and nearly 1m jobs, cbi warns’, The Guardian, 21 March 2016.
Krotz, Ulrich and Richard Maher. ‘Europe in an age of transition’, Global Affairs, vol. 3, no. 3 (2017), pp. 193–210.
Lake, David A. ‘Open economy politics: A critical review’, Review of International Organizations, vol. 4, no. 3 (2009), pp. 219–244.
LobbyControl, ‘Brexit, finance sector lobbying and regulatory cooperation’, 2019, www.lobbycontrol.de/wp-content/uploads/brexit-finance-sector-lobbying-and-regulatory-cooperation.pdf.
Mahrenbach, Laura C. ‘The Domestic Foundations of Emerging and Established State Trade Cooperation’, In The International Political Economy of the BRICS, ed. Li Xing (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019), pp. 57–74.
Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and Nita Rudra. ‘The Globalization Backlash: Exploring New Perspectives’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 54, no. 13 (2021), pp. 2267–2285.
Martina, Michael. ‘U.S. business lobby says most firms favour tariffs while China trade talks underway’, Reuters, 26 February 2019.
McCorriston, Steve and Ian M. Sheldon. ‘Economic Nationalism: US Trade Policy VS. Brexit’, Ohio State Business Law Journal, vol. 14, no. 1 (2020), pp. 64–99.
Milner, Helen V. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP., 1997).
Moravcsik, Andrew. ‘Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics’, International Organization, vol. 51, no. 4 (1997), pp. 513–553.
National Association of Manufacturers (nam), ‘Press Release: nam’s Timmons: Here’s the Solution to Make China ‘Play By The Rules’’, 31 May 2018, www.nam.org/nams-timmons-heres-the-solution-to-make-china-play-by-the-rules-1140/.
Nölke, Andreas. ‘Brexit: Towards a new global phase of organized capitalism?’, Competition and Change, vol. 21, no. 3 (2017), pp. 1–12.
Novak, Roman. ‘Value-based ideas or material interests? An explanation of Polish governmental preference formation towards Eurozone accession’, Polish Political Science Review, vol. 8, no. 1 (2020), pp. 100–115.
Owen, Erica and Stefanie Walter. ‘Open economy politics and Brexit: insights, puzzles and ways forward’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 24, no. 2 (2017), pp. 179–202.
Pew Research Center. ‘American public, foreign policy experts sharply disagree over involvement in global economy’, FactTank, 28 October 2016.
Pew Research Center. ‘Public Uncertain, Decided Over America’s Place in the World’, Report 5 May 2016, www.people-press.org/2016/05/05/public-uncertain-divided-over-americas-place-in-the-world.
Politico. ‘China shapes a new U.S. economic era: The return of industrial policy’, 4 November 2020.
Porter, Eduardo. ‘Where were Trump’s votes? Where the jobs weren’t’, New York Times, 13 December 2016.
Protzer, Eric and Paul Summerville. Reclaiming populism. How economic fairness can win back disenchanted voters (Cambridge: Polity, 2022).
Reznikova, Nataliia, Volodymyr Panchenko and Olena Bulatova. ‘The policy of economic nationalism: from origins to new variations of economic patriotism’, Baltic Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 4, no. 4 (2018), pp. 274–281.
Rioux, Hubert and Stéphane Paquin. ‘Perspectives on the Resurgence of Economic Nationalism in North America: A Long-standing and Far-reaching Phenomenon’. European Review of International Studies, vol. 6, no. 3 (2019), pp. 3–6.
Rodrik, Dani. ‘Populism and the economics of globalization’, Journal of International Business Policy, vol. 1 (2018), pp. 12–33.
Schirm, Stefan A. ‘Global politics are domestic politics: a societal approach to divergence in the G20’, Review of International Studies, vol. 39, no. 3 (2013), pp. 685–706.
Schirm, Stefan A. ‘Domestic ideas, institutions, or interests? Explaining governmental preferences towards global economic governance’, International Political Science Review, vol. 37, no. 1 (2016), pp. 66–80.
Schirm, Stefan A. ‘Refining domestic politics theories of ipe: a societal approach to governmental preferences’, Politics, vol. 40, no. 4 (2020), pp. 396–412.
Schlesinger, Jacob M. ‘Trump Forged His Ideas on Trade in the 1980s—and Never Deviated’, Wall Street Journal, 15 November 2018.
Schmidt, Vivian A. ‘Britain-out and Trump-in: a discursive institutionalist analysis of the British referendum on the EU and the US presidential election’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 24, no. 2 (2017), pp. 248–269.
Sidahmed, Mazin ‘Big five US sectors whose decline has driven voters to Donald Trump’, The Guardian, 5 November 2016.
The Economist, ‘Bagehot: The politics of illusion’, 23 March 2018, p. 33.
The Economist, ‘Bagehot: The politics of somewhere, 25 January 2020, p. 28.
The Economist, ‘International trade: Continuity candidate’, 19 September 2020, p. 61.
The Equality Trust, What do people think, 2019, https://equalitytrust.org.uk/what-do-people-think.
The Equality Trust, How Has Inequality Changed? Development of UK Income Inequality (2020), https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/how-has-inequality-changed.
The World Bank, ‘Gini Coefficient US’ (2020), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=US.
The World Bank, ‘Gini Coefficient UK’ (2020), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2016&locations=US-GB&start=1969&view=chart.
Timmons, Jay. ‘National Association of Manufacturers’ President: Letter to President Donald Trump’, 8 January 2018, www.nam.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/JT-Letter-to-President-Trump-China-2018-01-08.pdf.
Trump, Donald J. ‘The Inaugural Address’, The White House, Washington DC, 20 January 2017, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/.
Trump, Donald J. ‘State of the Union Address’, Washington DC, 5 February 2019, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address-2/.
United States Trade Representative (ustr). ‘The President’s Trade Policy Agenda’, Annual Report 2018, Washington DC.
van Loon, Aukje. ‘Diverging German and British governmental trade policy preferences in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (ttip) negotiations’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 26, no. 2 (2018), pp. 165–179.
van Loon, Aukje. ‘Liberalism and Domestic Politics Approaches in ir’, In The Liberal International Theory Tradition in Europe, ed. Knud Erik Jørgensen (Cham: Palgrave Pivot, 2021), pp. 45–58.
Walter, Stefanie. ‘The backlash against globalization’, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 24 (2021), pp. 421–42.
Wang, Zhaohui. ‘Understanding Trump’s Trade Policy with China: International Pressures Meet Domestic Politics’, Pacific Focus, vol. 34, no. 3 (2019), pp. 376–407.
Widmaier, Wesley W., Mark Blyth and Leonard Seabrooke. ‘Exogenous shocks or endogenous constructions? The meanings of wars and crises’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 51, no. 4 (2007), pp. 747–759.
YouGov. ‘Poll on Brexit referendum’, 20–22 June 2016, https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/atmwrgevvj/TimesResults_160622_EVEOFPOLL.pdf.
Zimmermann, Hubert. ‘Brexit and the External Trade Policy of the EU’, European Review of International Relations, vol. 6, no. 1 (2019), pp. 27–46.
Colgan/Keohane, ‘The liberal order is rigged’; Etzioni, ‘The rising (more) nation-centered system; Ikenberry, ‘The end of the liberal order; Nölke, ‘Brexit: Towards a new global phase’.
Colantone and Stanig, ‘Global Competition and Brexit’; Frieden, ‘The politics of the globalization backlash’; Gidron and Hall, ‘The politics of social status’; Inglehart/Norris, ‘Trump and the Populist Authoritarian; Flaherty/Rogowski, ‘Rising inequality as threat to the Liberal Order’, Schmidt, ‘Britain-out and Trump-in’.
See for instance Mansfield et al., ‘The Globalization Backlash’; Walter, ‘The backlash against globalization’.
Etzioni, ‘The rising (more) nation-centered system; Guillén, ‘The Demise of the Global Liberal; Ikenberry, ‘The end of the liberal order’; Krotz/Maher, ‘Europe in an age of transition’; Zimmermann, ‘Brexit and the External Trade’.
Bolle/Zettelmeyer, ‘Measuring the Rise of Economic Nationalism’; McCorriston/Sheldon, ‘Economic Nationalism’; Rioux/Paquin ‘Perspectives on the Resurgence of Economic Nationalism’.
Helleiner, ‘Varieties of American neomercantilism’; Reznikova/Panchenko/Bulatova, ‘The policy of economic nationalism’.
Clift/Woll, ‘Economic Patriotism’, p. 308.
Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information; Lake, ‘Open economy politics.’
Fioretos, ‘Historical institutionalism’.
Goldstein/Keohane, ‘Ideas and foreign policy’; Schmidt, ‘Britain-out and Trump-in’.
Moravcsik, ‘Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory’.
Hall, ‘The role of interests, institutions, and ideas in comparative political economy’.
Schirm, ‘Refining domestic politics theories of ipe’; van Loon, ‘Liberalism and Domestic Politics Approaches’.
For instance, Harnisch, ‘Deutschlands Politik’; Kassim et.al, ‘Preferences, Preference Formation and Position Taking’; Mahrenbach, ‘The Domestic Foundations of Emerging Powers and Established State Trade’; Novak, ‘Value-based ideas or material interests?’; Schirm, ‘Global politics are domestic politics’; Schirm, ‘Domestic ideas, institutions, or interests?’, van Loon, ‘Diverging German and British governmental trade preferences.’
On the relevance of interpretation see Schmidt, ‘Britain-out and Trump-in’; Widmaier et.al., ‘Exogenous Shocks’.
Schirm, ‘Refining domestic politics theories of ipe’, p. 408.
Hall/Soskice, ‘Varieties of Capitalism’.
Fioretos, ‘Historical Institutionalism’, p. 701.
Capoccia/Kelemen, ‘The study of critical junctures’; Widmaier et al., ‘Exogenous shocks.’
Colantone/Stanig, ‘Global competition and Brexit’; Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere; Hobolt, ‘The Brexit vote’.
Bulmer/Quaglia, ‘The politics and economics of Brexit’; Hobolt, ‘The Brexit vote’.
Colantone/Stanig, ‘Global Competition and Brexit’; McCorriston/Sheldon, ‘Economic nationalism’.
James/Quaglia, ‘Brexit, the City’; Kollewe, ‘Brexit could cost L100bn’.
LobbyControl, ‘Brexit, finance sector lobbying’.
bbc, ‘EU referendum: bcc says businesses.’
Jensen/Snaith, ‘When politics prevails’, p. 1308.
McCorriston/Sheldon, ‘Economic nationalism’, p. 81.
The World Bank, Gini Coefficient UK, 2020.
Rodrik, ‘Populism and the economics of globalisation’.
Frieden, ‘The Politics of the globalization backlash’; Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere.
The Equality Trust, ‘How Has Inequality Changed?’.
Colantone/Stanig, ‘Global competition and Brexit’; Frieden, ‘The politics of the globalization backlash’; Goodhart, The road to somewhere; Owen/Walter, ‘Open economy politics and Brexit’; The Economist ‘Bagehot: The politics of somewhere’, p. 28.
Colgan/Keohane, ‘The liberal order is rigged’, p. 38.
Owen/Walter, ‘Open economy politics and Brexit’, p. 6.
YouGov, ‘Poll on Brexit referendum’.
Rodrik, ‘Populism and the economics of globalization’.
Protzer/Summerville, ‘Reclaiming populism’.
Grossman/Helpman, ‘Identity Politics and Trade Policy’.
The Equality Trust, ‘What do people think’.
Etzioni, ‘The rising (more) nation-centered system’, p. 33.
Frieden, ‘The politics of the globalization backlash’, p. 18.
Colantone/Stanig, ‘Global competition and Brexit’, p. 207.
The Economist, ‘Bagehot: The politics of illusion’, p. 33.
YouGov, ‘Poll on Brexit referendum’.
Goodhart, The road to somewhere.
Hobolt, ‘The Brexit vote‘; Owen/Walter, ‘Open economy politics and Brexit.’
Schmidt, ‘Britain-out and Trump-in’, p. 262.
Johnson, ‘Johnson’s first speech as Prime Minister’.
Geithner, ‘Treasury Secretary Geithner’s Testimony’.
McCorriston/Sheldon, ‘Economic Nationalism’, p. 85.
Schlesinger, ‘Trump Forged His Ideas on Trade in the 1980s’.
Trump, ‘The Inaugural Address’; ustr, ‘The President’s Trade Policy Agenda’.
Wang, ‘Understanding Trump’s Trade Policy’.
Trump, ‘The Inaugural Address’.
Trump, ‘State of the Union Address’.
Lighthizer in: ustr, ‘The President’s Trade Policy Agenda’, p. 33.
The World Bank, ‘Gini Coefficient US’, 2020.
Autor et al., ‘Importing Political Polarization?’.
Autor et al., ‘The China Syndrome’, p. 2122.
Inglehart and Norris, ‘Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties’, p. 448.
Bremmer, Us vs. Them. The failure of globalism, p. 27.
Flaherty and Rogowski, ‘Rising inequality as threat’, p. 517.
Rodrik, ‘Populism and the economics of globalization’.
Colgan and Keohane, ‘The liberal order is rigged’, p. 38.
cnn, ‘Election 2016 Exit Polls’.
Carnes and Lupu, ‘It’s time to bust the myth’.
cnn, ‘Election 2016 Exit Polls’.
Broz et al., ‘Populism in Place’, p. 474; Frieden, ‘The politics of the globalization backlash’, p. 9.
Porter, ‘Where were Trump’s votes? Where the jobs weren’t’.
Flaherty and Rogowski, ‘Rising inequality as a threat’, p. 506.
Sidahmed, ‘Big five US sectors’.
National Association of Manufacturers, ‘Press Release: nam’s Timmons’.
Timmons, ‘National Association of Manufacturers’ President’.
Martina, ‘U.S. business lobby says most firms favour tariffs’.
Gallup, ‘January 30, 2015’.
Pew Research Center, ‘Public Uncertain, Decided Over America’s Place in the World’.
Hendrix, ‘Protectionism in the 2016 Elections’.
Pew Research Center, ‘American public, foreign policy experts sharply disagree’.
Frieden, ‘The politics of the globalization backlash, p. 19.
The Economist, ‘International trade: Continuity candidate’, p. 61.
Politico, ‘China shapes a new U.S. economic era’.