What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s Preemption Thesis, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that epistemic deference requires a layperson to perform a number of epistemic tasks and involves an active and critical stance that conflicts with the Preemption Thesis.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
-
Anderson Elizabeth 2011. “Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony.” Episteme 8, 144–164.
-
Benton Matthew A. 2014: “Believing on Authority.” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6, 133–144.
-
Coady David 2012. What to Believe Now: Applying epistemology to contemporary issues. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
-
Douglas Heather 2000. “Inductive Risk and Values in Science.” Philosophy of Science 67, 559–579.
-
Feyerabend Paul 1978. Erkenntnis für freie Menschen. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
-
Finke Peter 2014. Citizen Science: Das unterschätzte Wissen der Laien. München: Oekom.
-
Goldman Alvin I. 2001. “Experts: Which ones should you trust?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, 85–110.
-
Jäger Christoph 2016. “Epistemic Authority, Preemptive Reasons, and Understanding.” Episteme 13, 167–185.
-
John Stephen . 2011. “Expert Testimony and Epistemological Free-Riding: The mmr Controversy.” Philosophical Quarterly 61, 496–517.
-
Jones Ward E. 2002. “Dissident Versus Loyalist: Which Scientists Should We Trust?” The Journal of Value Inquiry 36, 511–520.
-
Kagan Shelly . 1989. The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Clarendon.
-
Kuhn Thomas S. 1996. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
-
Matheson David 2005. “Conflicting Experts and Dialectical Performance: Adjudication Heuristics for the Layperson.” Argumentation 19, 145–158.
-
Miller Boaz 2016. “Scientific Consensus and Expert Testimony in Courts: Lessons from the bendectin litigation.” Foundations of Science 21, 15–33.
-
Parfit Derek 2001. “Rationality and Reasons.” In: Exploring Practical Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Ingmar Persson, edited by Egonsson D. et al., Aldershot: Ashgate, 17–39.
-
Quine W. V. & Ullian J. S. 1978. The Web of Belief. New York: Random House.
-
Scholz Oliver R. 2009. “Experts: What they are and how we recognize them—a discussion of Alvin Goldman’s views.” Grazer Philosophische Studien 79, 187–205.
-
Stanley Jason . 2005. Knowledge and Practical Interest. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-
Weatherson Brian . 2005. “Can We Do without Pragmatic Encroachment?” Philosophical Perspectives 19, 417–443.
-
Zagzebski Linda 2012. Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-
Zagzebski Linda 2016. “Replies to Christoph Jäger and Elizabeth Fricker.” Episteme 13, 187–194.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 397 | 40 | 3 |
| Full Text Views | 197 | 24 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 84 | 22 | 0 |
What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s Preemption Thesis, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that epistemic deference requires a layperson to perform a number of epistemic tasks and involves an active and critical stance that conflicts with the Preemption Thesis.
| All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 397 | 40 | 3 |
| Full Text Views | 197 | 24 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 84 | 22 | 0 |