What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s Preemption Thesis, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that epistemic deference requires a layperson to perform a number of epistemic tasks and involves an active and critical stance that conflicts with the Preemption Thesis.
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What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s Preemption Thesis, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that epistemic deference requires a layperson to perform a number of epistemic tasks and involves an active and critical stance that conflicts with the Preemption Thesis.
All Time | Past Year | Past 30 Days | |
---|---|---|---|
Abstract Views | 397 | 40 | 3 |
Full Text Views | 197 | 24 | 0 |
PDF Views & Downloads | 84 | 22 | 0 |