Infallibilism and Easy Counter-Examples

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
Author: Alex Davies1
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Infallibilism is commonly rejected because it is apparently subject to easy counter-examples. The author describes a strategy that infallibilists can use to resist this objection. Because the sentences used in the counter-examples to express evidence and belief are context-sensitive, the infallibilist can insist that such counter-examples trade on a vacillation between different readings of these sentences. The author describes what difficulties await those who try to produce counter-examples against which the proposed strategy is ineffective.

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