Gibt es so etwas wie intellektuelle Toleranz?

In: Grazer Philosophische Studien
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  • 1 Universität zu Köln, Germany

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In this article, it will be argued that tolerance is not necessarily a political or ethical, but rather an abstract attitude that can be applied to many different dimensions of normative evaluation. More specifically, it will be argued that there are genuinely intellectual forms of tolerance that are epistemically motivated and that need to be assessed on purely epistemic grounds. To establish this claim, an abstract characterization of tolerance will be applied to the epistemic phenomenon of disagreement in order to develop a specific conception of tolerance that picks out a genuinely intellectual attitude towards recognized disagreement. Since the attitude that is picked out by this conception is very popular and widespread, an epistemology of tolerance would be of great significance to our intellectual practice.

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