Abstract
Since independence, the politicisation of Islam in Pakistan has fostered a culture of atrocities against religious minorities. This explains why Pakistan tops the list of countries at the risk of mass killings. The Islamic revivalist movement that emerged under the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq during the 1970s-80s is often equated with Pakistan’s descent into religious intolerance. The controversial blasphemy laws modified under his regime continue to abet atrocity crimes across Pakistan. This article reflects on the constitutional and legal frameworks to understand the prevalence of hate speech and incitement in the country. Through case studies of recent episodes of violence, it sheds light on the state’s complex governance structures, its struggle to counter episodes that incite violence, and the barriers to implementing rule of law. Furthermore, the article highlights the need for key reforms on both national and international level to push for the implementation of atrocity prevention frameworks.
1 Introduction
Ever since Pakistan’s inception as a sovereign state in the aftermath of the British India partition in 1947, the nation has suffered from continuous political instability and competing ethnic and religious tensions, and has witnessed a flagrant emergence of religiously fundamentalist movements. All of these factors have repeatedly cost Pakistan its international reputation, while oftentimes making headlines for its blatant violation of human rights and the lack of compliance with international conventions. The ideological foundations of the constitutional and legal framework supplemented by the politicisation of Islam by successive governments and the lack of rigorous accountability measures explain the rise of hate speech and the risk of mass atrocity crimes against sectarian and other religious minorities in Pakistan.
Over the past decade, Pakistan has repeatedly been identified as a country of concern due to its negligence in mitigating the risk of mass killings against its civilians. While the international community is cohesively concerned about the rise of terrorism in Pakistan, the looming threat of mass atrocity crimes is understated and demands further attention. According to the Statistical Risk Assessment conducted by the Early Warning Project,1 Pakistan tops the list of countries at risk of mass killings in 2021–2022.2 The indicators for this estimate are premised on the continuing security and human rights challenges in the country alongside ongoing mass killings perpetrated by the far-right religiopolitical parties and associated militias. Reflecting on the history of mass killings, the risk assessment estimates a 15.2 per cent chance for new mass killings to commence in Pakistan in 2021 and 2022.3 The risk assessment acknowledges hate speech as a useful predictor of mass violence but it is not accounted for due to a lack of data availability. However, this article proposes that ‘hate speech and discrimination produce similar consequences of stripping vulnerable populations of their rights and livelihoods despite the absence of mass killings’.4 This suggests the need for international partners to push for the implementation of atrocity prevention frameworks and to endorse the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine to counter all efforts that incite hate crimes in the country.
The United Nations Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes highlights the differences between the three types of atrocity crimes that victims are targeted by – genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The framework also highlights 14 risk factors alongside indicators for each of these factors that help assess a country’s risk of atrocity crimes and accordingly devise prevention strategies. In the case of Pakistan, genocide is the most relevant as it is defined as ‘a crime committed against members of a national, ethnical, racial or religious group … targeted because of their membership, real or perceived, in one of these groups’.5 According to the framework, the risk factors are identified as conditions ‘that create an environment conducive to the commission of atrocity crimes, or indicate the potential, probability or risk of their occurrence’.6 Moreover, the greater number of risk factors present in a particular context indicates a greater risk for an atrocity crime to be committed. The risk factors 2 to 107 explain why a culture of atrocities against religious minorities has taken root in modern-day Pakistan, which will be elaborated on throughout the article.
This article highlights the deeply embedded intrareligious and interreligious tensions across Pakistan that contribute to the tense social fabric of the country. The most evident tensions are between the Shi’a and the Sunni sects of Islam in which the former continues to experience targeted persecution at the hands of the hard-line Sunni ideologues. The intrareligious tensions are further exemplified by the divergent views of the two subsects of Sunni Islam – Deobandi and Barelvi – concerning the religious interpretations of the Islamic doctrine. Alternatively, Pakistan is home to a very small percentage of prominent religious minorities that include the Ahmadiyya, Christians, Hindus, and others, who are often deemed as ‘infidels’ by the Sunni extremists based on which they are subjected to extreme forms of oppression and harassment. The negative trends that hinder the conditions of religious freedom explain why Pakistan is listed as one of the 15 ‘Countries of Particular Concern’ (cpc)8 by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (uscirf). According to the uscirf Annual Report of 2022, Pakistan witnessed continuous ‘targeted killings, lynching, mob violence, forced conversions, and desecration of houses of worship and cemeteries’ throughout 2021.9 These episodes of violence usually targeted marginalised communities which include Ahmadiyya Muslims, Shi’a Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, and other religious minorities.
Since the indicators of hate speech in Pakistan are extremely diverse, a collective analysis is a complex task. While religious minorities remain one of the most subjugated groups in society, discriminatory behaviours are also prevalent against ethnic minorities whereas gendered hate speech against women is so insidious that it has become a normalised feature of everyday public discourse – making intersectional discrimination a common feature. Nevertheless, to highlight the gravity of hate speech and incitement to violence, this article focuses on the intense anti-religious attitudes in Pakistan which have been fostered in the wake of the controversial blasphemy laws that act as one of the primary contributors in aggravating biased attitudes and continue to intensify divisiveness in the country along religious and sectarian lines. Multiple efforts and appeals have been made in recent years to modify or repeal the archaic laws; however, these have been met with continuous resistance by religious groups that have hindered any possibility of progress.
To demonstrate the severity and the injustices brought about by the exploitation of the blasphemy laws, this article outlines the case study of Asia Bibi, a Christian woman who was convicted of blasphemy in 2010. Asia Bibi’s eight-year-long ordeal received considerable media attention, stirred public outrage, provoked an international response, and led to a push for a greater debate on policy and legal reforms in Pakistan. The case study examines the strengths and weaknesses of the measures taken by the government, non-state actors, and international actors to combat hate speech and incitement in Pakistan. It further predicts the likelihood of recurrent targeted attacks and the risk of mass atrocity crimes against minority groups in the guise of religious sentiment.
2 Historical Background
Pakistan was carved out of British India almost seven decades ago in 1947. Alongside British rule, the political dynamic between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League was crucial in defining the imminent fate of the region. While the Congress had a more secular outlook and vowed to represent all Indians regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation, the Muslims who comprised one-fourth of the Indian population sensed a lack of representation which motivated them to form the Muslim League in 1906. The secular ideals of the Congress were often challenged by the personal beliefs of the various political elites who throughout history relied on Hindu symbolism to strengthen Indian nationalism that mobilised and appealed to the Hindu identity at the expense of other religious minorities.10 The gradual shift from Indian nationalism to Hindu nationalist sentiments led to the formation of the Muslim League, which intended to safeguard and advance the political rights of the marginalised Muslim community in the region. Although the political party advocated for Hindu-Muslim unity in an independent India, it was not until the 1940s that the narrative of a separatist movement gained prevalence after Hindu-Muslim antagonism peaked during the 1920s and the 1930s.
This period is characterised by extreme atrocities committed by both the Hindus and the Muslims undermining each other’s religious beliefs and practices due to which the hate speech rhetoric gained serious momentum in the subcontinent. The desecration of temples and mosques, creation of chaos during each other’s religious processions, insulting of holy figures and monuments, and widespread distribution of polemic content became a frequent occurrence.11 Moreover, there was an increase in religiously motivated groups, movements, and organisations that later carried their legacies to modern-day India and Pakistan where they continue to contribute to the countries’ atmosphere of intense religious nationalism. Since it became increasingly difficult to contain the communal and religious tensions between the Hindus and the Muslims, an abrupt decision was made to partition British India into a Hindu-majority India and a Muslim-majority Pakistan, resulting in a rather hasty demarcation of the borders. As a result, India and Pakistan share a complex social fabric today, mired in religious, ethnic, and sectarian divisions.
In modern-day Pakistan, the us versus them dynamic is deeply ingrained in society as it is home to six major ethnicities that include Punjabi (44.7%), Pashtun (15.4%), Sindhi (14.1%), Saraiki (8.4%), Muhajir (7.6%), and Balochi (3.6%), who due to various socio-political factors have contributed towards the intense ethnic tensions that consume the society today.12 Pakistan is a Muslim-majority country – accounting for 96.28 per cent13 of the population – however, the age-old sectarian division between the Sunni majority of 85–90 per cent14 and the Shi’a minority of 10–15 per cent15 is another contention that underlies the fractured society since the Shi’a community continually experiences violence at the hands of the Sunni extremists and radical groups that have gained institutional legitimacy over the years. Hence, the severe formal and informal restrictions that Pakistan places on religious freedom and its failure to provide adequate protection to religious minorities have tarnished the state’s international reputation when it comes to its compliance with human rights.16 The religious communities that often become victims of proselytisation and face extreme forms of oppression include Hindus that make up 1.60 per cent of the population, Christians that account for 1.59 per cent, the Ahmadiyya community that contributes 0.22 per cent, and others at 0.32 per cent.17
3 Constitutional History and Religion
Religion has always played a crucial role in Pakistan’s constitutional history which in hindsight has established the foundations of discriminatory attitudes in the country. The current atmosphere of hate speech and incitement to violence can be traced back to some of the provisions that were added over the years. Although Pakistan was envisioned as a secular state by the leader of the Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, it became a point of contention after his untimely death only a year after partition. Considering the vacuum of leadership after Jinnah’s death, the fate of Pakistan depended on the secular-liberal and the conservative religiopolitical elites who debated their interpretations of Jinnah’s vision for Pakistan’s future. While the former were descendants of Jinnah’s Muslim League and advocated for a democratic state rooted in Islamic principles, the latter represented a group of ulema18 alongside the religiopolitical organisation Jamaat-e-Islami who ‘argued for a modern totalitarian theocracy as the appropriate blueprint for an Islamic state’.19 The common vision for an Islamic Pakistan by the religious groups outnumbered those advocating for a secular nation, which eventually led to the formal integration of religion into the constitution.
Over the years, Pakistan formalised three different constitutions, in 1956, 1962, and 1973, which reflect the nation’s trajectory of transitioning from an ‘Islamic Republic’ into an ‘Islamic state’. Pakistan’s constitutional history is indicative of the strategic role played by the religious groups and individuals who have significantly contributed towards its nation-building and continue to exert their schismatic influence through street politics today. The question regarding the role of Islam in governing Pakistan significantly delayed the formalisation of the first constitution. Moreover, once the draft version was shared by the Prime Minister, it faced widespread criticism and protests by the ulema and Jamaat-e-Islami claiming that it was too secular and even ‘un-Islamic’.20 To prioritise the role of religion in the constitution, the ulema from different schools of thought united in hopes to gain leverage within the parliament while Jamaat-e-Islami took to the streets to mobilise public support in their favour, which was then used to pressure the government into accepting their demands.21
Although sectarianism is pervasive in Pakistan, it is common for religious leaders and parties to form informal alliances to pressurise the government into submission and achieve political concessions, even today.22 This coincides with risk factor 4 – motives or incentives and 7 – enabling circumstances and preparatory action as outlined in the UN Framework of Analysis. The indicators of these risk factors suggest how political motives are aimed to consolidate power, create a homogenous identity, and push for the supremacy of a certain identity which accentuates differences between the majority and minority communities. Furthermore, enabling circumstances is based on the increased politicisation of identity and interference with state institutions that alter the balance of power thereby promoting exclusionary ideologies that create an atmosphere conducive to hate speech and incitement to commit atrocity crimes.
The first Prime Minister of Pakistan gave into the pressures of the religious groups and proposed the Objectives Resolution which is undoubtedly the most important document in Pakistan’s constitutional history, acting as the preamble to all the successive constitutions. The document highlights the importance of religion in governing the affairs of the state. It opens with the affirmation that ‘sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limit prescribed by Him is a sacred trust’.23 Further, it elucidates that ‘the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective sphere in accord with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna’.24 Although the document favoured that the state must function as per the Islamic values and principles, it emphasised that ‘adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures’.25 According to the constitution, the religious minorities of Pakistan are guaranteed many protections even today ‘from freedom of worship to the right to equality and non-discrimination’, however, the reality suggests otherwise.26 Over the years, as religious militant groups and radical nationalist sentiments took root in Pakistan, the protection of minorities has suffered immensely.
What I hear in this Resolution is not the voice of the great creator of Pakistan, the Quaid-i-Azam (may his soul rest in peace), nor even that of the Prime Minister of Pakistan … but of the Ulemas of the land.29
Considering the tensions between the various actors involved, the first constitution was abrogated within two years after martial law was imposed. It was superseded by the constitution of 1962 promulgated by the President of Pakistan who made efforts to neutralise the overt influence of Islamist ideology in the constitution by deliberately omitting any ‘references to the nation as an Islamic Republic’.30 However, once again, the government gave in to the pressure of the religious groups as the President ‘soon realized that his approach was too radical for the country’s more conservative opinion leaders’ resulting in a constitutional amendment to reinstate the word ‘Islamic’.31 In Pakistan’s struggle between the modernists and the traditionalists, the latter has always enjoyed the upper hand by amassing public support and resorting to demonstrations. This remains true even today when various political factors have enabled the religious parties to strengthen their legitimacy over time.
While the Islamic provisions that underline the constitution of Pakistan were made in the best interests of the Muslim population to preserve an Islamic identity in the aftermath of the partition, they also cultivated an atmosphere of discrimination against anyone who did not identify as a Muslim. Although the constitutions of 1956 and 1962 sowed the seeds of religious intolerance it did not manifest until after the constitution of 1973 was adopted – this officially declared Islam as the state religion and fostered an environment conducive to hate speech and violence.
4 Islamisation of Pakistan
The constitution of 1973 was enforced in the aftermath of the 1971 war that led to the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan under the populist leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. While Bhutto was inclined towards establishing a secular state, he was bound by the pressures of the religious groups and wider public opinion to preserve the status of Pakistan as an Islamic state. To ensure the longevity of his administration, Bhutto used religion for his political gain to appease the conservative groups who maintained their strong influence in society. As a result, he went to the extent of accepting the irreverent demands of the Islamist parties to make a constitutional amendment and declare the Ahmadiyya community as non-Muslims – a group who self-identify as Muslims.32 The specific risk factors for genocide in the UN Framework of Analysis seek to explain how such policies can encourage patterns of abuse that may result in atrocity crimes. For instance, risk factor 9 – intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups – refers to the denial of the existence of a specific community or refusal to recognise elements of their identity, unresolved past grievances, and lack of national mechanisms to diffuse identity-based tensions in the community. Similarly, risk factor 10 – signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group – refers to institutionalised impunity that allows systematic targeting of a specific community with an intention to change or control its identity. This has been realised in modern-day Pakistan where religious groups encourage incendiary narratives against the Ahmadiyya community leading to mass atrocity crimes to eliminate the existence of their identity altogether.
Despite Bhutto’s efforts to appease the religious parties, they remained dissatisfied with his support and implementation of socialist policies across Pakistan. As a result, an alliance of nine religious and conservative political parties was formed under the name of the Pakistan National Alliance (pna) to contest as a single bloc against the popular leader in the 1977 elections.33 The pna campaigned for its right-wing political agenda that appealed to Islamic revivalism in the country and used religious slogans demanding that the state must be governed based on Nizam-e-Mustafa (the system of the Prophet Muhammad).34 Although the pna enjoyed public support, they suffered a massive defeat in the elections and accused the opposition of electoral fraud. This was followed by extreme civil unrest in the country as voter sentiments heightened and led to violent street demonstrations.35 Consequently, Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup, and the Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq assumed power for the next eleven years.
Being an orthodox Muslim himself and to enhance his political legitimacy, Zia-ul-Haq supported the demands of the pna and sought to enforce Nizam-e-Mustafa which led to the notorious decade of Pakistan’s ‘Islamisation’. Under his dictatorial rule, he made adjustments to accommodate the Sharia or Islamic law in judicial courts, facilitated religious militants, funded the expansion of madrassahs or Islamic seminaries, and modified the colonial blasphemy laws, alongside other exclusionary reforms that crippled the rights of the already subjugated religious and sectarian minorities. Evidently, after the widespread institutionalisation of discriminatory policies, Pakistan became a breeding ground of hatred against anyone who did not comply with the orthodox version of Sunni Islam.
4.1 Policy and Legal Reforms
Following the divisive policy and legal reforms made under Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule, sectarian violence became a permanent feature of Pakistan’s socio-political landscape. Moreover, religious leaders were offered a platform to promote agendas that normalised derogatory and inflammatory rhetoric against religious minorities, often labelling them as ‘heretics’, ‘infidels’, or ‘enemies of Islam’. This eventually cultivated a culture of forced conversions, mob violence, and targeted and extrajudicial killings, which has only become worse with time.
The judicial, educational, economic, and social reforms imposed by Zia-ul-Haq immediately weakened the status of Shi’a Muslims, religious minorities, women, and other individuals whose views were incompatible with the imposed interpretation of Islam. As far as judicial reforms are concerned, Sharia law was enforced by establishing the Federal Shariat Court and expanding the Council of Islamic Ideology (cii)36 by enlisting many conservative ulema to ensure that none of the laws were repugnant to Islam.37 Today, the cii plays a defining role in negotiating crucial legal matters concerning human rights and the protection of religious minorities. Furthermore, drastic measures were made to completely reform the education system from the primary level through to the tertiary level to make it more compatible with the teachings of Sunni Islam.38 The vision to do so was twofold, first, to curb the growing Western influence in the country,39 and second, to counter the prevalence of ethnicism that defined Pakistan’s political fabric at the time.40 As a result, Zia-ul-Haq relied on religion to strengthen the national identity and to signify the importance of Muslim brotherhood.
On the contrary, this fanned sectarian debate between the Shi’a and the Sunni Muslims in which the former protested against the streamlining of the Sunni worldview through education.41 The Shi’a-Sunni divide deepened after economic reforms concerning Zakat (a religious obligation of almsgiving) were imposed as it was mandated according to the Sunni school of thought while the Shi’a fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) differed in their understanding of giving Zakat.42 The Shi’a-Sunni tensions were minimal prior to Zia’s rule; however, disparaging the role of Shi’a Muslims through skewed policies led to the first large-scale sectarian violence in 1983 and then in 1984. The persecution of Shi’a Muslims was amplified in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution amidst state suspicions that the Shi’a organisations of Pakistan ‘were being provided monetary and weapons assistance by Shia Iran’.43 Similar to the exclusion of the Ahmadiyya community, the indicators of risk factor 9 – intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups – suggest how political elites manipulate identities for personal and political gain to deepen societal divisions that may give rise to atrocity crimes.
The education reforms also sought to revise textbooks in a way that perpetuated anti-Hindu bias framing them as the ‘traitors’ of the state covertly linked to neighbouring India. Hindus are also viewed as the ‘enemies of Islam’ whose religious beliefs are rooted in ‘injustice and cruelty’ as opposed to the Islamic tenets of ‘peace and brotherhood’.44 These state-sanctioned books have been crucial in conditioning the masses into believing that Hindu minorities are a threat to Islam and the state. Recently, in 2011, provincial governments implemented small-scale reforms to remove discriminatory references;45 however, state-wide education reforms are essential to combat hate crimes in the long term. As per the UN Framework of Analysis, risk factors 4 and 10 are the most relevant in understanding the threat of enabling hate speech and incitement to violence through the implementation of such policies. For instance, state-sanctioned textbooks with discriminatory references toward religious minorities highlight the political motive to promote the significance of one identity at the expense of others. It also indicates the intent to destroy the so-called ‘others’ where the references ‘can be inferred in a way that the implicit message could reasonably lead to acts of destruction against the group’.46 The framework also highlights that it is not one specific motive or policy that will lead to atrocity crimes but a combination of specific motives and policies, particularly the ones based on exclusionary ideologies that can aggravate hate speech and incitement to commit violence.
4.2 Rise of Madrassahs
A few political factors also favoured Zia’s vision of ‘Islamising’ Pakistan at the time. For instance, the significant growth of madrassahs or seminaries in Pakistan is often linked to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution. The madrassahs were initially funded by Saudi Arabia to train the Afghan mujahideen but later to realise the agenda of propagating and strengthening the puritanical teachings of Sunni Islam across the Muslim world, following the rise of Shi’a Iran.47 The estimated number of seminaries that were established under Zia’s regime alone amounted to 12,000,48 which has increased to approximately 32,000 madrassahs today.49 Considering that most of these institutions were funded by Saudi Arabia, they adopted the stricter doctrine of Sunni Islam that espoused intolerance against non-Muslims which ‘is encapsulated in the line that Muslim pupils in radical madrassas chant at the morning assembly: “When people deny our faith, ask them to convert and if they don’t, destroy them utterly.”’50 Such indoctrination of religious fundamentalism cultivated an extremely problematic narrative against non-Muslims, first by dehumanising other religions and second by justifying violence against them.
Before Zia’s Islamisation of Pakistan, madrassahs were known to provide moderate religious education and were mostly viewed as traditional centres of learning. However, a militant approach was adopted after the Soviet invasion ‘encouraging students to sacrifice themselves for their faith’ and to save ‘Islam from Western and domestic infidels’.51 Hence, extremist madrassahs are known to preach hard-line ideologies that foster a culture of hate speech, incitement, and subsequent violence against anyone who is denounced as an ‘infidel’ or considered to be an ‘enemy of Islam’. Zia-ul-Haq’s government also incentivised traditional religious education by offering financial assistance and making it more accessible to the impoverished pockets of society, which significantly impacted the radicalisation of young men across Pakistan and supplemented the rise of religious militancy.52 In this context, the indicators for risk factors 5 – capacity to commit atrocity crimes and 8 – triggering factors are the most relevant as the religious indoctrination facilitates the capacity to recruit a large number of supporters to mobilise them and create a ‘strong culture of obedience to authority and group conformity’.53 Alternatively, trigger factors refer to events that might be unrelated to atrocity crimes but have the potential to spark their onset. Some of the relevant indicators of risk factor 8 include sudden changes in the political power of the groups or religious events that may trigger religious intolerance within the country, which was the effect that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution had on Pakistan.
5 Rise in Hate Speech and Violence
Zia’s legacy has made a profound impact on what Pakistan is today since it has not been possible to challenge most of his reforms which are perceived as ‘divinely ordained’ by the religious lobbies.54 One such example is the discriminatory provisions introduced in the legislative framework:
5.1 Blasphemy Laws
The laws that penalise blasphemy are inherited from the British legal system; however, a number of clauses were introduced in the Pakistan Penal Code (ppc) by Zia-ul-Haq during the 1980s to specifically protect the status of Islam, disregarding the significance of other religions. The most commonly invoked clauses are Sections 295B and 295C in which the former mandates life imprisonment for anyone who desecrates a copy of the Holy Quran while the latter enforces the death penalty for defiling the name of the Prophet.55 Soon after the new clauses were introduced, there was an evident increase in the number of blasphemy-related cases. Only 14 cases56 were reported prior to 1986; however, more than 80 cases57 were filed in the next two years until the end of Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorship. According to the data collected by Pakistan’s Centre for Social Justice (csj), 1,855 people58 were accused under Sections 295B and 295C from 1987 to 2020, which is only expected to increase in the years to come if no efforts are made to amend the laws. The highest number of cases were reported in 2020 alone, amounting to 200.59 In 2021, 55 people were detained or imprisoned on charges of blasphemy, which has incited mob violence against minority groups and those with differing belief systems.60 Although no one has been executed under the blasphemy law to date, at least 78 alleged blasphemers have become victims of extrajudicial killings.61 The inclusion of discriminatory provisions in the legal framework has facilitated the rise of derogatory narratives against religious minorities and has increased the risk of atrocity crimes in Pakistan.
The culture of mob violence and lynching in Pakistan stems from the glorification of killing a non-believer or an apostate to protect Islam’s and, mostly, the Prophet’s honour. This is followed by the narrative endorsed by Islamic clerics who have assumed the responsibility of declaring takfir and mandating killings under the pretext of wajib-ul-qatal. The idea of takfir is to label another Muslim group as kafir or ‘disbeliever’ if their theological understanding of Islam contrasts with the commonly accepted interpretations. Hence, the far-right ulema often preach that it is wajib (a religious duty) to qatal (kill) someone who is found guilty of apostasy, which has been used to justify the widespread persecution against the Shi’a and Ahmadiyya Muslims of Pakistan. This call for violence is also extended to individuals that are found guilty of blasphemy. The debate regarding this ruling being a divine concept versus a man-made one is extremely complex and can only be settled by engaging well-informed theologians and academic experts who specialise in the subject matter.
Considering the influential status of the ulema, this narrative is propagated through traditional media, madrassahs, mosques, religious sermons, religiopolitical leaders, and even textbooks. It is common for clerics to impose fatwas or religious edicts against the killings of alleged apostates and blasphemers – ‘a formal ruling or interpretation on a point of Islamic law given by a qualified legal scholar (known as a mufti) … usually issued in response to questions from individuals or Islamic courts’.62 Mostly the fatwas authorised by official religious bodies and well-versed legal scholars are considered to be credible; however, in recent years radical leaders with no formal training and minimal religious education have been known to impose fatwas that trigger hate speech against vulnerable groups and incite violence.63 This shows the need for official bodies to monitor the types of fatwas that are being imposed and assess their credibility.
As of 2018, around 46.3 per cent of the people charged under these laws are Muslims while 51.9 per cent are known to be religious minorities.64 These statistics indicate that there is a narrow margin between the religious minorities and Muslims who are charged with blasphemy. It must be noted that the vast majority of the cases are known to exploit blasphemy laws by making false accusations to settle personal scores, further supplemented by a dearth of legal mechanisms to counter those misleading accusations. This coincides with risk factor 3 – weakness of state structures – of the UN Framework of Analysis which indicates the likelihood of atrocity crimes in the absence of a national legal framework that can offer effective protection to the members of the minority communities, an impartial judiciary, adequate mechanisms of accountability, and resources to ‘implement overall measures aimed at protecting populations’.65
The heightened politicisation of Islam and an increase in a culture of atrocity crimes in Pakistan is associated with the recently emergent far-right extremist political party Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (tlp) that gained prominence during Asia Bibi’s trial in 2015. It was created with the sole purpose to protect the country’s stringent blasphemy laws by politicising Barelvism’s deep reverence for the Holy Prophet of Islam. Historically, the Deobandi-oriented groups have mobilised hate campaigns against religious minorities. However, the recently founded Barelvi-oriented groups have weaponised the blasphemy laws to fuel their ideological narrative of religious superiority. In simple terms, the Deobandi subsect of Sunni Islam adheres to puritanical interpretations of the Islamic doctrine that facilitated the rise of religious militancy during Zia-ul-Haq’s regime. Alternatively, the Barelvi subsect is known for its more tolerant approach rooted in Islamic mysticism, intercession, and veneration of saints, deemed impermissible by Deobandi followers. However, the recent radicalisation of Barelvi Islam has eroded the already compromised social fabric of the country. Ever since its inception, tlp has been at the forefront of inciting hatred and violence by encouraging vengeance against people accused of blasphemy which has contributed to the significant rise of vigilantism in Pakistan.
5.2 Anti-Ahmadiyya Laws
The Ahmadiyya community of Pakistan faces persecution based on their supposedly unconventional stance regarding the finality of Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet of Islam. Their belief in the possibility of a succeeding prophet contrasts the mainstream Islamic view and defies the constitutional definition of being a Muslim which refers to an individual ‘who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah’ and in the ‘unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him)’. Consequently, Zia-ul-Haq introduced ‘Ordinance xx of 1984’ in the ppc which criminalises the community for preaching their faith and for referring to themselves as Muslims under Sections 298B(2) and 298C, resulting in a punishment of at least three years of imprisonment.66 As mentioned above, the indicators of risk factors 9 and 10 emphasise the impact of such policies on minimising the status of the targeted communities in society and inciting hatred against them with an intent to eliminate their identity.
Irrespective of their significance during the creation of Pakistan, the Ahmadiyya community is the most persecuted minority group in the country. Legalised discrimination is supplemented by institutional policies that belittle the community’s status. For instance, the issuance of passports and national identity cards for all Pakistani citizens is conditional upon signing a declaration form that recognises Ahmadis as non-Muslims and identifies the movement’s founder as an imposter.67 Terms such as ‘Qadiani’ and ‘Mirzai’ used as racial slurs are derived from the name and birthplace of the community’s founder; yet, the term ‘Qadiani’ is ingrained in the constitution as well. Moreover, they are publicly declared as ‘kafir’ and ‘wajib-ul-qatal’ by religious clerics who incite violence through both broadcast and print media, public sermons, and digital networks as they use the anti-Ahmadiyya and blasphemy laws as their rallying point. For instance, in 2014, one religious leader, Syed Arif Shah Owaisi, commented on a popular television show that ‘the sect of Qadiyani’ is an enemy of the state and Islam ‘blaspheming against the holy prophet’.68 Consequently, an Ahmadi man was shot dead by a person in his village who was provoked by the comments of the leader.69 Similar incidents are widespread across Pakistan against the community.
It is agreed that the recent spike in violent attacks against the Ahmadiyya community is fuelled by the unfortunate rise of the tlp and particularly by the notorious efforts of a religious scholar, Hassan Muawiya, who works on the most coordinated campaigns against them, assisted by a large supporter base.70 This is why most of the targeted killings and other relevant attacks against the Ahmadiyya are preceded by explicit hate speech campaigns by tlp that publicly calls them out as apostates. Moreover, the pre-attack smear campaigns often incite violence to destroy their places of worship and graves, and sometimes against specific individuals in an area. For instance, a renowned Ahmadi professor and a leader of a left-wing socialist political party became the victims of targeted killing after being called out in a hate speech campaign by tlp in that area.71 These acts of violence are often unnoticed by the government to avoid contention with the religious parties.
The Ahmadiyya community faced further discrimination when they were excluded from the National Commission for Minorities established in May 2020. The group was not recognised as a minority and the government had to revert their decision allowing them representation in the commission as it ‘sparked fierce criticism from powerful Sunni leaders who consider the Ahmadi belief an insult to Islam’.72 This was further fuelled by the comments made by the Minister for Religious and Inter-faith Harmony Affairs, Noor-ul-Haq Qadri, and the State Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Ali Muhammad Khan, where the former said that anyone who shows sympathy towards the group ‘is neither loyal to Islam nor [to] the state of Pakistan’ while the latter referred to them as ‘agents of chaos’.73 The concerning violation of these human rights perpetrated by government officials and far-right extremist parties has normalised episodes of violence against the group. As a result, in 2020, 7 Ahmadi Muslims became victims of target killings while 7 others were wounded in unsuccessful attempts, 30 were charged with blasphemy alongside 71 other faith-based legal cases, and 164 of their gravestones were desecrated.74 Similarly, in 2021, the community witnessed 2 targeted killings, the desecration of 121 gravestones and 15 places of worship, and 49 police cases that were reported for religious concerns.75 This demonstrates that ‘hate speech and discrimination produce similar consequences of stripping vulnerable populations of their rights and livelihoods despite the absence of mass killings’.76 The systemic persecution against the community has caused many of them to flee the country and seek asylum abroad, while those in Pakistan usually conceal their identity to fit into society.
5.3 Violence against Hindus and Christians
Alongside Ahmadiyya Muslims, the Christian and Hindu communities remain two of the most persecuted minority groups in the country who often become victims of brutal acts of violence based on suspicions of being the enemies of the state. While Hindus are portrayed as the ‘traitors’ whose loyalties are with India, Christians are classified as ‘Western agents’ who are believed to assist foreign countries in undermining the status of Islam.77 The minority groups also meet with a greater risk of false blasphemy accusations which have intensified incidents of mob violence against them under the justification that anyone who dishonours Islam and its religious figures is ‘wajib-ul-qatal’. According to the most recent data from 2018, at least 253 Christians and 31 Hindus are serving sentences for allegedly committing blasphemy.78 The majority of Hindus and Christians are settled in the rural areas of Pakistan which makes them a relatively easy target considering their lower socio-economic status. Hence, underage girls often become victims of forced abductions and conversions through marriages to Muslim men who fear death threats by religious groups in case they renounce their new faith and are found guilty of committing apostasy.
Throughout history, houses of worship have also been constantly targeted by state authorities, terrorist groups, and mobs which has increased the fear of discrimination and intimidation among the communities who rightfully complain that the government fails to provide them with adequate protection against such atrocities. The most recent case of vandalising an ancient Hindu temple took place in December 2020 when a charged crowd of 1,000 to 2,000 people set fire to the holy site, incited by local Muslim clerics.79 The Supreme Court had ordered the restoration of the pre-partition temple, however, a local Islamic institution issued a religious edict declaring the reconstruction to be ‘against the spirit of Islam’.80 Hence, once the construction process began, the clerics instigated the people of the village to destroy the temple themselves. The act was condemned by the government and political figures who promised to take action against the perpetrators which led to the arrests of 109 people, including the Muslim cleric who incited the mob, alongside the suspension of 92 police officials who were on duty at the time.81 Similarly, in August 2021, a mob of 50 people attacked a Hindu temple by destroying their gods and burning down the main door after the granting of bail to an eight-year-old Hindu boy who was accused of desecrating one of the madrassahs – an act punishable under the blasphemy laws.82 The attack was strongly condemned by the government which vowed to arrest the culprits, take action against police negligence, and restore the temple. While such efforts taken by the government are appreciable, it is essential to implement a wider deradicalisation process to strategically challenge mass public opinion against religious minorities. Nevertheless, the state authorities are also responsible for demolishing various Hindu temples for commercial purposes over time. A survey conducted by the All-Pakistan Hindu Rights Movement found that the number of temples has been reduced from 428 pre-partition to only 20 in 2019.83 Hence, state-level discrimination supplemented by the radical calls to violence by the Islamist groups has created an extremely suffocating environment for the religious minorities of Pakistan, intensifying the risk of atrocity crimes.
Simultaneously, the government continues to reiterate the second-class status of the Christian community by advertising positions for the discriminatory job of sewage workers specifically reserved for them. Almost 80 per cent of sanitation workers are Christians while the remaining positions are occupied by the Hindu community who have to work under unpleasant and often unsafe conditions.84 The status of Christians in Pakistan derives from pre-partition India as they are converts from the lowest Dalit caste of Hinduism commonly referred to as ‘untouchables’.85 The Christian missionaries under British occupation had provided them with an incentive to convert to Christianity to elevate their status in society, however, the concept of ‘untouchables’ is still prevalent across Pakistan. Christians are derogatorily known as ‘choora’, ‘chamaar’, or ‘bhangi’ which are references made to their former Hindu Dalit castes. Today, many conservative Muslims do not share their utensils with Christians citing reasons of contamination and impurity which was evident in the case of Asia Bibi as discussed later in this article. Alternatively, the concept of impurity has a religious connotation where Muslims avoid sharing utensils as per the Islamic doctrine that outlines rules regarding ritual purity and hygiene based on which non-Muslims are often rendered impure.
The World Watch List 2021 by Open Doors has declared Pakistan as the fifth most dangerous country for Christians who are subjected to extreme forms of oppression.86 While Asia Bibi’s case attracted international attention, there are many other victims of lynching, torture, targeted killings, and other forms of violence perpetrated by radical Islamists. Since 2020, there has been a significant rise in targeted killings and mob attacks against religious minorities. This followed former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s call for a united Islamic world to tackle Islamophobia in the aftermath of Samuel Paty’s murder. Paty made caricatures of the Holy Prophet – a blasphemous act in the eyes of the Muslim community – and the case became a rallying point for the notorious far-right religiopolitical parties to exploit the blasphemy laws, orchestrate hate speech campaigns, and incite violence against the Christian community. International Christian Concern (icc) documented 92 incidents of persecution in Pakistan in 2019 which increased to 118 incidents in 2020, ranging from false blasphemy accusations to religiously motivated murders and other acts of violence.87 Furthermore, 52 incidents were documented in the first half of 2021, which is expected to increase in the second half.88 The nescient population of Pakistan easily surrenders to religiously motivated fear and finds it sacrilegious to question the widespread misinformation, making it easier for extremist groups to politicise religion and amass public support to advance their motives. While some people engage in vigilante behaviour as per their intense religious sentiments harboured over years of religious indoctrination, others exploit the laws to settle personal vendettas. Hence, there is a pressing need for Pakistan to review its current legislative framework and tease out legal ambiguities to curb the severity of violence instigated against religious minorities on the grounds of blasphemy.
5.4 Violence against Shi’a Muslims
Pakistan has witnessed various waves of sectarian violence over the years where the Shi’a sect of Muslims has repeatedly been targeted by extremist militant groups, religiopolitical parties, and anti-Shi’a organisations that continue to operate with impunity. Shi’a Muslims remain subjugated because of their religious beliefs that are not in agreement with the mainstream Sunni views regarding the first successor of the Prophet as the caliph of Islam. Hence, hate speech against Shi’is is mobilised in pervasive ways on political and institutional levels that abets violence on the grounds of heresy. The hatred against Shi’a Muslims is so insidious that they are synonymously referred to as ‘kafirs’ which has significantly minimised their status in society. According to data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there have been 471 attacks against Shi’is between 2001 and 2018 resulting in almost 2,700 killings and 4,800 injuries.89 Furthermore, a rough estimate calculated by various Shi’a activists suggests that more than 22,000 Shi’is have been targeted and killed in Pakistan since 1968.90 Historically, most of these attacks have been perpetrated by the Deobandi-led anti-Shi’a militant group, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (ssp), which emerged during Zia-ul-Haq’s regime tasked to contain the ‘Iranian influence by terrorizing Shias through [the] use of violence and coercion’.91 The violence was further orchestrated by the group’s later-developed armed wing, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which has claimed responsibility for most of the mass casualty attacks and bombings against the Shi’a community despite being banned in 2002. These terrorist organisations, as recognised by the international community, re-emerged under different names to continue their hate campaigns against Shi’a Muslims. For instance, the former ssp now operates as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (aswj), expanding its local influence by pursuing electoral politics to advance the anti-Shi’a campaign on an institutional level.
Considering the similarities between Barelvi and Shi’a processions, the Barelvi-led groups and organisations have historically acted as a buffer between the Shi’a community and the Deobandi-led militant organisations. However, the recent radicalisation of the Barelvis and their alliance with the Deobandis to rid Pakistan of Shi’a influence has given rise to a new era of sectarian violence in the country. The notorious religious parties such as the tlp and aswj often join hands to advance their motives of making Pakistan the ‘land of the pure’ by eliminating any groups whose beliefs differ from mainstream Sunni ideology. The core religious practices and beliefs of the Shi’a Muslims are perceived to insult the Holy Prophet which is deemed blasphemous by the tlp and used as a rallying point to incite hatred against the community. The recent wave of anti-Shi’a sentiment is perceived to be one of the most frightening since the events that took place in September 2020 when tlp and aswj came together to lead massive rallies against Shi’is over a span of four days. The parties managed to gather more than 30,000 demonstrators, blocking the major city of Karachi, chanting slogans of Kafir! Kafir! Shi’a Kafir! and openly calling for violence to behead anyone who blasphemes against the Holy Prophet.92 These rallies spiralled out of control after aswj influenced the arrest of a person reciting a salutatory prayer specific to the Shi’a doctrine and accused an orator of blasphemy for delivering a sermon to Shi’a devotees in a private gathering.93 As a result, the slogan for declaring Shi’is as ‘kafirs’ started trending on Twitter, followed by graffiti on walls across the city. Moreover, charged sentiments against the Shi’a Muslims led to 5 killings, 30 blasphemy charges, and multiple attacks on religious congregations within a month of the mass demonstrations.94 This sectarian strife in Pakistan is encouraged by the government’s unwillingness to upset the stronghold of the religious parties for its own political clout.
In July 2020, two months before the mass demonstrations, the Punjab Assembly passed the Tahaffuz-e-Bunyad-e-Islam (Protection of the Foundation of Islam) Bill which mandated the Sunni version of Islam as the only acceptable interpretation while making it compulsory for all Pakistanis to honour the holy figures of the majority sect, which is contrary to Shi’a beliefs. Thus, non-compliance with the Bill is punished by five years of imprisonment and hefty fines, magnifying fear among the Shi’a community to practise their religion freely.95 Moreover, this has allowed the tlp and aswj ‘to assemble, make public anti-Shia speeches, carry out rallies, run for political office and mobilise against the Shia community, ensuring their power and influence in Pakistan has gone from strength to strength’.96 The hatred against the Shi’a community is further supported by other non-state militant organisations making it easier for them to proliferate in the country due to the already established anti-Shi’a networks. For instance, Islamic State – Khorasan Province, claimed responsibility for one of the deadliest attacks in decades on a Shi’a mosque in March 2022 that resulted in 62 deaths and 194 injuries, in a largely Shi’a neighbourhood that has witnessed many sectarian attacks in the past.97 Historically, attacks against Shi’a Muslims increase during the month of Muharram of the Islamic calendar which is religiously significant for the Shi’is to commemorate the death of an esteemed holy figure. The radical Islamist groups are, however, demanding a state ban on these processions, encouraging mob violence and organised attacks against them. Hence, the negligence of the government to protect religious minorities combined with the alliance of the hard-line Sunni groups indicates a looming threat of an irreparable Shi’a genocide in the country.
5.5 Hate Speech during covid-19
The recent pandemic has reiterated the peripheral status of minorities in Pakistan after Shi’a Muslims were accused of spreading the virus while Christians and Hindus were denied relief based on their faith. The hashtag #Shiavirus started trending on Twitter after a group of pilgrims returned from Iran, spreading hate against the community. In particular, the chairman of the anti-Shi’a organisation aswj singled out two Shi’a government ministers and held them responsible for the spread of the virus after their return.98 As a result, the Shi’a community faced discrimination in workplaces and social circles as they were forced to go on leave99 and were repeatedly called out as the cause of the rampant transmission of the virus in Pakistan.
Simultaneously, a renowned welfare organisation, Saylani Welfare Trust (swt), prepared ration bags that were denied to Hindu patrons after the volunteers checked their identity cards.100 Reportedly, the workers were instructed by a Muslim cleric heading swt’s operations that the bags must only be given to Muslims. In another account, Christians were denied access to food until they recited the kalimah (Islamic declaration of faith).101 Similar incidents are witnessed across Pakistan as the pandemic continues today, followed by a pattern where ‘some religious figures are enforcing their views on welfare organizations’ and influencing aid workers to provide relief only to Muslims.102 Hence, not holding these clerics accountable for their actions highlights the greater weakness of state mechanisms that are unable to fulfil the guaranteed protection of minority groups as identified in risk factor 3 of the UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes.
5.6 Role of Social Media
In recent years, the far-reaching user base of online spaces and multiple social media platforms allow people to freely express their views, which has amplified the stereotypes and derogatory terms used against minority groups in Pakistan. The two most commonly used platforms for inflammatory hate comments and fomenting hatred are Facebook and Twitter. Bytes for All (B4A), a Pakistan-based human rights organisation and a research think tank that focuses on Information and Communication Technologies (ict s) has authored a detailed report on online hatred in Pakistan reflecting on hate spikes linked to crucial events over a period of 10 months from September 2019 to 2020.103 The report is commissioned by the Minority Rights Group (mrg) as part of the Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development (creid). The Pakistan Hate Speech Monitor was developed collaboratively to mine hate speech data from Twitter and Facebook which targeted a set of inflammatory keywords.104
The findings of the report confirm the incendiary narrative propagated against the persecuted groups of society where people are found to be ‘more charged with religious sentiments after attending Friday sermons’.105 The hate speech monitor detected over 10,000 conversations on a daily average where keywords of extreme hatred such as ‘Kafir’, ‘Qadiani’, ‘fitna’, and ‘Wajib-ul-Qatl’ are tweeted the most. The term ‘Wajib-ul-Qatal’ is found in over 1,011 mentions mainly linked to the Ahmadiyya community and the Shi’a Muslims to a lesser extent. Some of the tweets were traced back to the comments made by high-level political figures in a Facebook video in which the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, Noor-ul-Haq Qadri, and the State Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Ali Muhammad Khan, publicly accused the Ahmadis of fitna or rebellion. The State Minister also amplified the hate message in a later deleted tweet ‘Gustakh-e-Rasool ki aik hi saza, sir tan se juda, sir tan se juda…Allahu Akbar!’ suggesting that ‘Beheading is the only punishment for whoever disrespects the Prophet…Allah is the greatest!’ This is a commonly repeated chant during street protests against people accused of blasphemy. Within 24 hours, the tweet received 24,500 likes and 3,500 retweets, while anti-Ahmadiyya hashtags kept trending for days.106 Considering the social responsibility political elites have in shaping public opinion, such calls for violence send a dangerous message to society, triggering mob mentality and extrajudicial killings.
6 Legal Framework: Mechanisms to Prevent Hate Speech
As far as hate speech is concerned, there are no specific sections in the constitution that deal with the issue directly, instead, different legal provisions penalise offences that might be understood as hate speech. For instance, the Pakistan Penal Code (ppc), 1860 outlines a few provisions to deal with incidents that incite violent riots, create animosity between religious groups, insult a specific group and defile their place of worship, trespasses burial sites, and engage in hateful speech or disseminates polemic content with an intention to outrage religious feelings. These acts are punishable by imprisonment or with fines under Sections 153-A, 295, 297, 298, and 505 (2). Additionally, Section 8 of the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act (ata), the 2014 National Action Plan, the 2015 Provincial Sound System Acts, and Sections 9 and 11 of the 2016 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (peca) have outlined consequences for individuals or groups promoting hatred or violence against members of the community. Although these legal provisions are present in writing, the implementation and effectiveness of the rule of law in Pakistan are questionable since the system is often exploited by religious, political, and social elites.
In recent years, however, a few bills were proposed to enhance the overall safety of religious minorities but were repeatedly turned down at the insistence of the religious parties and groups indicating the greater weakness of state mechanisms to protect civilians. For instance, after Asia Bibi’s conviction in 2010, Sherry Rehman who is an influential Pakistani politician, submitted a bill to the National Assembly Secretariat to modify the blasphemy laws and abolish the harsh death penalty. As a consequence, she received death threats from Islamist militants who threatened the government with extreme consequences if the bill was not withdrawn. Although the government pacified the religious leaders by declaring that no amendments would be made, approximately 40,000 demonstrators took to the streets to rally against the bill.107 Similarly, the Criminal Law (Protection of Minorities) Bill Act was passed by the Provincial Assembly of Sindh in 2016 to prohibit forced religious conversions of young Hindu and Christian girls. However, the leading religious parties concluded the provisions to be against Islamic principles, and ‘threatened to lay siege to the Sindh Assembly’ if the law was not repealed within 15 days.108 Amidst the pressure of these demands, the Governor of Sindh returned the bill to the assembly suggesting a revision of a few clauses impinging on Islamic principles. A revised version of the bill was submitted in 2019 but was rejected since most of the ministers voted against it to avoid contention with the Islamist groups. The religiopolitical parties also condemned the Protection of the Rights of Religious Minorities Bill (2021) which advocated for religious minorities to visit their places of worship without the fear of persecution and condoned acts of forced conversion. The bill was rejected and declared redundant by the Senate Standing Committee on Religious Affairs and Inter-faith Harmony after the religious leaders concluded that the current laws already provide adequate protection to minorities.109 There is an obvious pattern of religious parties blocking any efforts to protect minorities due to their ability to mobilise street power by organising rallies, protests, and demonstrations that can bring the entire nation to a halt.
7 Case Study: Asia Bibi
The discussion of blasphemy laws in Pakistan is often incomplete without exploring the case of Asia Bibi which attracted international condemnation of the law for the first time. The high-profile case sheds light on the state’s complex governance structures, its struggle to counter heightened religious sentiments that incite violence, and the barriers to implementing the rule of law.
7.1 Context
In November 2010, Asia Bibi became the first woman to be convicted under the blasphemy laws and was later sentenced to death by hanging. Asia Bibi, a Roman Catholic, belonged to the Sheikhupura District of Punjab and came from the lower end of the social strata. She worked as a farmworker in her district and, according to some resources, was often encouraged by her Muslim co-workers to convert to Islam. In June 2009 while they were picking berries, the women took a break and requested Asia to fetch some water from the nearby well. However, on her way back she took a sip of water from the metal cup which ignited a religious debate between Asia and her co-workers. The Muslim women accused her of contaminating the water and further undermined her faith by insisting that she should convert to Islam. According to one account, Asia Bibi responded with the following: ‘I believe in my religion and in Jesus Christ, who died on the cross for the sins of mankind. What did your Prophet Muhammad ever do to save mankind?’110 Hence, she was accused of blasphemy as she allegedly defiled ‘the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him)’ according to Section 295C of the ppc.
7.2 Hate Speech and Incitement to Violence
Following the incident, the women informed the local Muslim cleric, Qari Muhammad Salim, and also spread the word throughout the village regarding Asia Bibi’s alleged blasphemy, which eventually led to her arrest. There are two accounts about her arrest, the first one claims that Asia Bibi confessed to committing blasphemy after which she was brutally beaten by a mob in the presence of police before being arrested on blasphemy charges.111 The other account mentions that the cleric went to her house along with a few other men and threatened her with the worst possible consequences after which Asia’s family informed the police who then took her into custody for her own safety.112 The contradictions in these two versions are also reflected in the statements113 made during the trial which makes it difficult to decipher the factual accuracy of the events that followed.
In an exclusive interview with the French journalist Anne Isabelle Tollet, Asia Bibi remembers that the mob approached her house by chanting ‘Death! Death to the Christian!’ followed by ‘Filthy b*tch! … You insulted our Prophet! You’ll pay for that with your life!’ Other members of the mob hurled comments like ‘She insulted our Prophet, she should have her eyes torn out!’ ‘Put a rope around her neck and drag her through the village like an animal!’ Asia Bibi also recalls being grabbed by two men who dragged her away followed by other members of the crowd hitting her furiously.114 The village cleric confronted her about her blasphemous comments and gave her two options to redeem herself – conversion or death. After refusing to convert, the cleric threatened that ‘since you won’t convert and the Prophet cannot defend himself, we shall avenge him’, which instigated the already angered mob to continue the beating.115
After Asia Bibi was sentenced to death by a local court in Sheikhupura, the judge received a standing ovation from the crowd in the courthouse who shouted slogans of ‘Kill her, kill her! Allahu Akbar!’116 Consequently, Bibi’s lawyers appealed to the Lahore High Court, which was rejected in 2014. During this time, various human rights organisations, secular Pakistanis, and religious minorities united in their efforts to publicly condemn the death sentence and called to repeal the law. The President of Pakistan at the time, Asif Ali Zardari, was also willing to use his presidential pardon in Bibi’s case but was barred by the High Court since a decision regarding her appeal was underway.117 The president’s action significantly angered the religious groups who feared that Asia Bibi’s sentence might be reduced. As a result, the right-wing political parties allied and took to the streets across Pakistan chanting slogans to ‘Hang Asia, the insolent!’ and boasting placards with a noose around her picture. The religious fervour heightened after one of the clerics, Maulana Yusuf Qureshi, also an active member of Jamaat-e-Islami, offered a reward of Rs. 500,000 (approximately usd 5,800 at the time) ‘for the loyal follower of Muhammad who beheads Asia Bibi’ in case the court did not go through with the death sentence.118 This call to violence was also endorsed by the newspaper Nawa-e-Waqt, Pakistan’s Urdu daily newspaper which has a wide readership.119 However, neither the cleric nor the newspaper faced any consequences for inciting violence, which highlights a culture of impunity in the country. As a result, Asia Bibi’s safety was severely compromised which forced her into solitary confinement, keeping her safe from other inmates who also called for her to be hanged.
7.3 Inciting Violence: Killings of Prominent Figures
This section demonstrates how even the political elite are not safe when it comes to cases of blasphemy. Asia Bibi’s eight-year-long ordeal garnered both domestic and international attention, with some supporting the death sentence while many were against it. Thus, her case has cost the lives of the Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, and the Minister of Minorities Affairs of Pakistan, Shahbaz Bhatti, who stood up in her support and critiqued the blasphemy laws.
7.3.1 Salman Taseer
The Governor of Punjab, a Muslim by faith, was at the forefront of supporting Asia Bibi’s plea for mercy. He played an important role in convincing the president to pardon the accused on grounds of human decency as he found the punishment to be ‘extremely strict and oppressive’.120 He continuously appealed to revise the blasphemy laws and at one point referred to it as kala qanun or ‘black law’ in a televised interview which triggered the far-right of the country who concluded this very statement to be blasphemous.121 As a result, Taseer was murdered by one of his own bodyguards, Mumtaz Qadri, who identified himself as a follower of the Barelvi subsect of Sunni Islam.
Taseer was one of the few politicians who publicly voiced against the legal black holes and insisted on prioritising humanity over religion. However, due to his unconventional support towards Asia Bibi and criticism of the blasphemy laws, the leading ulema of the country deemed him as a ‘blasphemer’, ‘enemy of Islam’, and a ‘Western agent’. His religious and moral character became a subject of scrutiny amongst the clerics who declared his way of life as ‘un-Islamic’ referring to ‘his habit of eating pork or drinking alcohol’ and non-compliance with the religious duties of fasting and praying.122 This implies the reductionist view of the ulema who suggest that only people who, according to them, lead an un-Islamic way of life can ‘think of siding with a convicted blasphemer’.123
7.3.1.1 Trigger: Mufti Hanif Qureshi
Don’t you know that we say openly that we are not afraid of anything! If the law in our country does not call for the death penalty for a blasphemer, for 295-C, then Allah gave us the power that we take the weapons in our own hands. We know how to shoot a gun, or how to cut a blasphemer’s throat … Are we Sunnis not able to do this? Remove the cowardice from yourself! Allah has given us so much power and courage. We can strangle the blasphemer, we can cut his tongue, we can dismember his body with bullets. No law can catch us! The punishment for blasphemy is death! … Somebody who insults the prophet has no right to live.124
Considering Qureshi’s influential status amongst his Barelvi followers, this speech was bound to foment religious zealots as it explicitly condoned brutal acts of violence, undermined the significance of the legal system, and justified extrajudicial killings in the name of protecting the Prophet’s honour. This is indicative of how hate speech can incite violence, as Qadri took the law into his hands and murdered Salman Taseer in an affluent marketplace of the capital city of Islamabad by shooting him with 26–28 bullets on 4 January 2011.
7.3.1.2 Government Response
The government took prompt action to condemn one of the most high-profile assassinations in Pakistan’s history. Mumtaz Qadri was arrested immediately after the incident and later pleaded guilty to the murder citing reasons to take the law into his own hands due to the state’s incompetence in holding Taseer accountable for blasphemy. As a result, Qadri was sentenced to death for murder and was executed on 29 February 2016, mainly to set a precedent that no one is above the law. The government also took drastic measures and heightened security ahead of Qadri’s funeral to hinder the possibility of widespread demonstrations across the country by deploying police contingents and closing marketplaces. This was followed by a media blackout in which the local news channels were discouraged from broadcasting the funeral fearing that it would incite religious hatred and promote violence.125 While some commended the efforts of the government others were critical of the draconian censorship. Although Qadri was arrested for the crime, Mufti Hanif Qureshi and other such scholars did not face any consequences for delivering inflammatory speeches against the Governor of Punjab. The police did open an investigation against the clerics; however, they were granted pre-arrest bail by the Anti-Terrorism Court based on insufficient evidence and lack of intention to directly instigate the killer.126 Hence, no such actions are taken to curb the indirect influence that the sermons may have on the attendees.
7.3.1.3 Public Response
Both of these incidents, Taseer’s murder in 2011 and Qadri’s execution in 2016, divided the nation – the liberal Pakistanis sympathised with the murdered Taseer while the more conservative population applauded Qadri’s courage and hailed him as a hero. Taseer’s assassination was condemned internationally as thousands of mourners proceeded to attend his funeral. Alternatively, almost 500127 clerics issued statements to their followers to block the funeral processions followed by warnings that whoever offered condolences to the family could suffer a similar fate.128 Some of the religious parties even went to the extent of declaring that sympathising with the death of a blasphemer is also an act of blasphemy.129 This is a common tactic used to create fear among the conservative population who may not be fully aware of the authentic religious teachings, often leading them to believe in a narrative offered by the so-called religious leaders of society.
On the other hand, Mumtaz Qadri’s death sentence was followed by large-scale protests throughout the country mobilised by multiple religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamaat-e-Ahle Sunnat, Jamiat-i-Ahle Hadith, and Sunni Tehreek. Thousands of protestors pleaded for a presidential pardon for Qadri, reframing him as a ‘soldier of Islam’ who fought to protect the nation’s ideology; however, the plea was denied. Taseer’s assassin was also defended by many lawyers in the country who showered him with rose petals and praised him for his act of bravery during the initial court hearings.130 Hence, receiving encouragement on an institutional level suggests how personal religious affiliations can hinder the effective implementation of the law and normalises the incitement of violence in the name of religion. Despite the overwhelming support that Qadri received, he was sentenced to death by the District and Sessions Judge Pervez Ali Shah who was immediately sent abroad after receiving death threats from far-right groups in the country.131
The religious fanaticism was even more pronounced after Qadri’s execution which once again led to nationwide backlash and violent protests, mainly carried out by the Barelvi-oriented Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (tlp). Qadri’s funeral in Rawalpindi witnessed a crowd of approximately 100,000132 people who hailed him as a ghazi (warrior) and shaheed (martyr) – honorific titles for a Muslim who fights against the enemies of Islam or someone who sacrifices their life in the path of Allah. The glorification that Qadri received for his actions sends a dangerous message to the wider society by desensitising the brutality of taking a life and normalising extrajudicial killings to protect the Prophet’s honour. Although the government managed to contain the escalation of violence on the day of the funeral, they remained underprepared to face 25,000133 demonstrators a month later who took to the streets to commemorate Qadri’s chehlum which marks the end of the 40-day mourning period as practised in Islamic culture.134 The protestors resorted to violence by setting fire to trucks, removing blockades, and damaging public property across Islamabad before 2,000 of them staged a sit-in outside the parliament and delivered extremely passionate anti-government speeches.135 The protestors refused to move until their demands were met which included immediate implementation of Sharia law, national recognition of Qadri as a martyr, and execution of Asia Bibi.136 Struggling to contain the violent outburst, the government had to request the military to intervene as the police fired teargas shells and used batons ‘to disperse the stone-pelting crowd from the high-security zone outside the parliament building’.137
Despite government efforts to dispel the admiration that Qadri received, supporters built a shrine around his grave to commemorate his death for years to come. This was followed by a mosque and a seminary built in the same vicinity under his name, largely funded through public donations.138 Today, thousands of Pakistanis visit the shrine to gain the blessings of the deceased and observe his urs annually which is a popular Barelvi tradition to celebrate the death anniversary of a Sufi saint. Once again, such extreme forms of glorification for a convicted murderer justify the killing of Taseer in the eyes of the public which may inspire other people to take the law into their own hands in hope of receiving similar admiration and to be recognised as a ghazi or shaheed after their death. Moreover, the government did not take any action against the building of the shrine fearing an extreme fallout that could severely impact the country’s law and order. This highlights the fact that despite short-term military success in fighting extremists, little progress has been made to tackle the root causes of radicalisation in Pakistan.139 Hence, there is a pressing need for the country to shift its focus on implementing long-term reforms that can efficiently deal with issues of radical religious indoctrination, hate speech, and incitement to commit violence.
7.3.2 Shahbaz Bhatti
The Minister of Minorities Affairs of Pakistan, Shahbaz Bhatti, the only Christian member of the cabinet was killed only two months after Taseer’s assassination on 2 March 2011. Bhatti was vocal in his support for Asia Bibi and advocated for the abrogation of the blasphemy laws which according to him victimised the religious minorities of the country. Tehrik-i-Taliban (ttp), a militant organisation, claimed responsibility for his killing citing that he was a blasphemer. The spokesperson of the ttp told bbc Urdu that ‘this man was a known blasphemer of the Prophet [Muhammad]’ and that ‘we will continue to target all those who speak against the law which punishes those who insult the prophet. Their fate will be the same’.140 Hence, such incidents and warnings are what discourage the civilian population to voice their concerns against the stringent laws. Most of them prefer to stay silent to protect themselves and their families.
After Asia Bibi was sentenced to death, Bhatti committed himself to her cause and advocated for her release both domestically and internationally. Subsequently, he met with the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Washington and later with Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper to express his thoughts on promoting religious freedom in the country and also sought clemency for Asia Bibi. Bhatti’s obvious support for Bibi combined with his campaign to reform the harsh blasphemy laws, made him a target for the religiously motivated groups of Pakistan. As a result, he received continuous death threats to deter him from the cause. Bhatti recorded a video to be released in the event of his death confirming that ‘these Taliban threaten me’.141 Four months after the video was released, he was declared dead when two gunmen shot his car in Islamabad, hitting him with at least eight bullets. The men left behind a few pamphlets signed by ‘Taliban al-Qaida Punjab’ which read ‘with the blessing of Allah, the mujahideen will send each of you to hell’.142 Furthermore, the pamphlet referred to Bhatti as a ‘Christian infidel’ who deserved to be killed for challenging the sacred law of the country.143 The inflammatory statements issued by the spokesperson for ttp and the language used in the pamphlet are indicative of the open incitement of violence against anyone who questions the controversial laws. The statements also provoked civilians to terrorise or kill anyone who is a blasphemer in their eyes, normalising the exploitation of the law to settle personal vendettas.
Although Bhatti’s assassination was condemned by the government, the killers were never held accountable and his case remains unresolved144 despite assurances from the Islamabad police that a few suspects were taken into custody who were allegedly responsible for the shooting.145 In another account, Bhatti’s murder is linked to ‘an extremist mindset that has, with the sponsorship of some institutions of the state, spread far and wide in Pakistani society’,146 where the ‘institutions’ refer to the state’s strong intelligence agencies who abet crimes but remain largely unchecked for their actions.147 Bhatti’s murder also saw violent protests by the Christian community for the first time across Punjab, who took to the streets and demanded justice by burning tyres.148 Bhatti was later honoured as a ‘martyr’149 after the bishops of Pakistan appealed to Pope Benedict for recognition and his cause for beatification was formally opened five years after his death.150
The two high-profile assassinations that occurred during Asia Bibi’s case indicate the web of violence that develops when it comes to supporting an accused blasphemer or questioning the laws that penalise blasphemy. The hate speech narrative endorsed by the various religious parties is a reflection of deeper root causes in society that press for large-scale social and institutional reform instead of one-off military interventions to curb the violence that follows.
7.4 International Response
Ever since her conviction, Asia Bibi’s case became a topic of international concern ranging from Pope Benedict xvi’s and Pope Francis’s pleas for clemency to the world leaders demanding immediate abrogation of the blasphemy laws. Considering Bhatti’s crucial role in pushing Bibi’s case on the world stage, international actors publicly condemned the brutal killings of the two politicians and repeatedly urged Pakistan to reform the laws that support the rise of extremism in the country.151 Among the various organisations and institutions, the World Council of Churches (wwc) remained one of the most active in demanding justice for Asia Bibi. Initially, the General Secretary of wwc wrote to the Prime Minister of Pakistan about his concerns regarding ‘the use and misuse of the blasphemy laws’ and requested the government to ‘take all necessary measures to provide safety and security to the Christian minority in Pakistan, and other minorities, and not to be deterred by the violent crimes committed by religious extremists’.152 The organisation stood firm in its support during the rejection of her appeal in 2014 and later through her acquittal.
Asia Bibi’s case received greater attention through several international organisations that are committed to creating awareness and working toward defending the rights of persecuted Christians and religious minorities across the globe. Several petitions were initiated by the Voice of Martyrs, Open Doors, International Christian Concern, and Aid to the Church which resulted in an overwhelming number of signatories worldwide.153 Simultaneously, the humanitarian organisations Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch led the way in advocating for Bibi’s release and called out on Pakistan’s incompetency in curbing religious extremism.154 On the state-to-state level, the EU parliament motioned a resolution on Pakistan’s blasphemy laws listing a set of provisions necessary to defend human rights in the country alongside making its gsp+ status conditional to the compliance of the 27 core international conventions.155 Although the imposed international pressure did not result in far-reaching outcomes, it did assist with the cause of Asia Bibi, eventually leading to her acquittal on 31 October 2018.
In similar cases triggered by hate speech and resulting in adverse consequences, international pressure has been significant in dealing with isolated incidents by placing impositions to influence government behaviour. However, a long-term solution would require the international actors to directly engage academic experts, political elites, faith-based leaders, and other relevant personalities from Pakistan to initiate a dialogue or a goal-oriented plan to curb the intensification of discriminatory rhetoric in the country, potentially by adopting and implementing the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Rabat Plan of Action.
7.5 Acquittal of Asia Bibi
Considering how emotive the blasphemy laws are in Pakistan, the decision to release Asia Bibi was not well received as it was met with a three-day nationwide protest encouraged by tlp. Although the government took necessary measures to ward off the demonstrators by suspending mobile phone signals in major cities,156 violent protests brought the country to a standstill.157 Alongside tlp, supporters of other religious parties such as Jammat-ud-Dawa and Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam took to the streets to deliver inflammatory speeches against the accused and the government for the landmark decision.158 The protestors blocked all the major roads across Pakistan, burned vehicles, and demanded the decision be reversed immediately. At the forefront were the tlp leader and founder, Khadim Hussain Rizvi, and Mohammad Afzal Qadri, who instigated the demonstrators to take the lives of the three Supreme Court judges involved in acquitting Asia Bibi by justifying that they are ‘liable to be killed under religious edict’159 and urged that their domestic workers must carry out the act.160 As a result, the lawyers were forced to leave the country amid constant death threats by religious extremists.
While the ultraconservative groups were appalled by the decision to set Asia Bibi free, the former Khan government applauded the verdict and worked towards ensuring that the hard-liners of the country did not create further chaos across the nation. In a public speech, the Prime Minister warned that the actions of the religious groups are ‘not the service of Islam, this is enmity with the country. Only anti-state elements talk like this, that kill the judges, start a revolt in army … they are only trying to beef up their vote bank’.161 He also threatened that any extreme reactions will ‘force the government to have to take action’.162 This eventually led to a brutal clash between the protestors and the police as the religious leaders incited massive crowds to take revenge for the verdict and called to overthrow the army chief of Pakistan, which is an unimaginable comment considering that the ‘army normally does not tolerate such dissent’.163
Hence, the government agreed to strike a deal with the tlp officials and accepted most of their demands on the condition that the nation-crippling protests would come to an end. Some of the agreed-upon demands included the release without charge of tlp protestors who were arrested over the three days, that the government will not block the appeal against the acquittal ruling, and that Asia Bibi must be placed on the Exit Control List (ecl) which will bar her from leaving the country.164 Although the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal against the ruling, it upheld its verdict and dismissed the ‘review petition’ on 29 January 2019.165 The government then took Asia Bibi into protective custody until arrangements could be made to fly her out of the country given that many Western countries such as Italy, France, Spain, Australia, and Canada had offered her and her family asylum. Hence, four months later, it became public knowledge that Asia Bibi had left Pakistan and arrived in Canada – a decision that was widely appreciated by the international community and sparked hope for Pakistan’s future.
The case of Asia Bibi has been witnessed by three successive governments and shows the inconsistency in their legal responses when dealing with hard-line Islamist groups. While Mufti Hanif Qureshi did not face any consequences for his incendiary sermons that incited Mumtaz Qadri to murder Salman Taseer, tlp leaders Khadim Hussain Rizvi and Afzal Qadri were arrested along with 3,000 protestors on terrorism charges for inciting violence, destroying property, and setting fire to vehicles,166 but the leaders were later granted bail. However, the tlp leader Rizvi passed away at the end of 2020, and while his son tried to carry on his legacy he remained unsuccessful since tlp got banned under the anti-terrorism law in April 2021 by the Khan government who deemed its intentions as ‘very horrifying’.167 This was considered to be a remarkable effort by the Pakistani authorities in combatting incitement to violence until the ban was lifted in November 2021 to support the ‘larger national interest’ amid anti-France protests against Islamophobia.168
8 Role of Civil Society Actors
There are various international and domestic ngo s, human rights activists, and faith-based organisations across Pakistan that work towards improving religious freedom in the country and providing remedies to persecuted communities. However, civil society actors remain at risk for helping vulnerable groups as their activities are closely monitored by the government. The law enforcement and intelligence agencies of Pakistan are notorious169 for enforced disappearances of human rights defenders or civil rights activists which limits the impact of implementing a long-term solution for tackling hate speech and atrocity crimes in the country. Moreover, the recently ousted Khan government struggled with implementing secular values in Pakistan while simultaneously appeasing the religious groups. The Khan government declared many foreign-funded ngo s as enemies of the state suggesting that they promote liberal values that go against the teachings of Islam – a narrative adopted from the conservative groups of the state.170 At least 18 international non-governmental organisations have been shut down in the past few years with 20 more to follow,171 which threatens humanitarian work and poses a significant challenge in effectively combatting hate speech and religious intolerance in the country. This coincides with risk factor 6 – absence of mitigating factors – of the UN Framework of Analysis which refers to the ‘absence of elements that, if present, could contribute to preventing or to lessening the impact of serious acts of violence against protected groups, populations or individuals’ such as a ‘strong, organized and representative national civil society’ focused on mobilising support for the protection of the marginalised members of the community.172
9 Conclusion
… by taking measures to prevent atrocity crimes and fulfilling their primary responsibility to protect, States reinforce their sovereignty and reduce the need for more intrusive forms of response from other States and international actors … the principle of the Responsibility to Protect is designed to be an ally of sovereignty, rather than to undermine it.173
Reflecting on the nexus between rebranding Islam as a political tool and the culture of atrocities against religious minorities in Pakistan, there is much scope for introducing and implementing preventative measures on both a national and an international level.
The current socio-cultural dynamics of Pakistan demand a reassessment of the Islamic reforms that were introduced under Zia-ul-Haq’s rule, including potentially abolishing the discriminatory policies that foster an environment conducive to mass atrocity crimes. This must be supplemented by necessary educational, legal, and media reforms. For instance, state- and federal-level education must be revised and vetted for discriminatory references and these should be replaced with lessons promoting religious pluralism and interfaith harmony. The government must also reassess the education curricula of traditional seminaries and work towards standardising religious education rooted in promoting tolerance. As far as legal reforms are concerned, ideally, Sections 295B, 295C, 298B(2), and 298C that punish blasphemy and exclude the Ahmadiyya community must be repealed. However, considering the possibility of a severe backlash from religious groups, dialogue needs to be initiated to amend the laws by teasing out legal ambiguities. Reflecting on traditional and social media reforms, the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (pemra) needs to screen and monitor the broadcasting of tv shows and newspapers that publicly express hatred towards a specific group in society. Moreover, the government must ensure that any legislative mechanisms to combat online hate speech comply with international human rights law and do not threaten freedom of speech.
Considering the pervasive politicisation of religion in Pakistan, there are other preventive measures that the government must take to mitigate the risk of mass killings and atrocity crimes. There is a lack of robust accountability mechanisms to counter the culture of impunity which could be improved by strengthening legislative and administrative capacities to penalise false blasphemy allegations and hold Muslim clerics along with high-level political elites accountable for propagating hate speech and inciting episodes of violence. Other prevention strategies would require monitoring the content of publicised religious sermons and the issuance of religious edicts. Moderate faith-based leaders and organisations must convene to draft a list of criteria that mandates the kind of content that can and cannot be preached during religious sermons, strictly prohibiting the use of hateful terms that incite violence against vulnerable groups. Whereas official religious bodies should be in charge of monitoring the religious edicts or fatwas that are frequently imposed by Muslim clerics and must ensure that they are not incendiary in nature. Only qualified legal scholars with years of training should be authorised to issue fatwas with the condition that it does not incite hatred against other religious groups.
On an international level, a collaborative effort of establishing partnerships with civil society actors, well-informed and experienced theologians, and academic experts on Islamic studies from across the world can help dispel the misinterpretations surrounding the commonly used terms of ‘kafir’ and ‘wajib-ul-qatal’ with an aim to publicly communicate the consensus, potentially through sermons. International pressure has proven to be successful in the case of Asia Bibi and hence the EU’s conditional gsp+ status must stay in place to encourage Pakistan to work towards improving its conduct with minorities and eventually eliminate incidents of hate crimes in the long term.
However, Pakistan’s commitment to atrocity prevention remains at risk now more than ever due to the ongoing political crisis. The political events that unfolded this year with the ousting of the Khan government alongside the pressure of the pandemic have pushed Pakistan towards intense political polarisation and have increased the possibility of a severe economic crisis. With the worsening socio-economic conditions, it will be difficult for Pakistan to allocate resources towards good governance mechanisms and ensure the protection of marginalised communities. This can inadvertently set the stage for greater political manoeuvring in the country as weakened state capacities might struggle to combat the heightened risk of mass killings, fear-mongering, and other episodes of violence suggesting a bleak reality for Pakistan’s future. Hence, it is in times of these crises when the protection mandate of R2P needs to be exercised by international actors to prevent further escalation of atrocity crimes.
The Early Warning Project is a joint initiative of the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum and the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College that assesses the risk of mass atrocities in countries around the world.
Early Warning Project, Pakistan: 2021–22 Statistical Risk Assessment for Mass Killing (Washington DC: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide; Dartmouth, November 2021), https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/storage/resources/2207/Early-Warning-Project-Statistical-Risk-Assessment-2021–22.pdf, accessed 21 June 2022.
ibid.
Ruji Auethavornpipat, ‘Hate Speech and Discrimination as Mundane Violence against Rohingya Refugees during covid-19’, this issue.
United Nations, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (New York: UN Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect, October 2014), https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocity-crimes/Doc.49_Framework%20of%20Analysis%20for%20Atrocity%20Crimes_EN.pdf, accessed 21 June 2022.
ibid., 5–7.
Risk Factor 2 – Record of serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law; Risk Factor 3 – Weakness of state structures; Risk Factor 4 – Motives or incentives; Risk Factor 5 – Capacity to commit atrocity crimes; Risk Factor 6 – Absence of mitigating factors; Risk Factor 7 – Enabling circumstances or preparatory action; Risk Factor 8 – Triggering factors; Risk Factor 9 – Intergroup tensions or patterns of discrimination against protected groups; Risk Factor 10 – Signs of an intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group.
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ibid., p. 91.
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A constitutional body to review that the legislature is in compliance with the Islamic principles.
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Haider, ‘The Specter of Intolerance: Understanding Religious Violence in Pakistan’, p. 34.
Hiro, Apocalyptic Realm, p. 162.
Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention, 2014, p. 14.
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U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2022, p. 28.
ibid.
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Siddique and Hayat, ‘Unholy Speech and Holy Laws’, p. 310.
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ibid.
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ibid.
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Greenwalt, Mohammad, and Vellturo, ‘Factsheet: Ahmadiyya Muslims’, p. 2; Al Jazeera, ‘“When the Blood Starts”’.
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2022, p. 28.
Auethavornpipat, Hate Speech and Discrimination as Mundane Violence against Rohingya Refugees during covid-19.
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Ud Din, Study on Challenges in Exercising Religious Freedom in Pakistan, p. 29.
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Ibid.
Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, ‘What Role Does the State Play in Pakistan’s Anti-Shia Hysteria?’ The Diplomat, 17 September 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-role-does-the-state-play-in-pakistans-anti-shia-hysteria/, accessed 28 May 2021.
Mirza, ‘The Changing Landscape of Anti-Shia Politics in Pakistan’.
ibid.
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ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
ibid.
Bytes for All, Pakistan, ‘Online Hatred Pushing Minorities to the Periphery: An Analysis of Pakistani Social Media Feeds Sep 2019 – June 2020’, Bytes for All, mrg, creid, March 2021, https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Hate-speech-targeting-minority-faiths-report-090321-EW-1.pdf, accessed 15 April 2021.
The word bank of keywords – blasphemy, blasphemous, blasphemer, ghustakh, gustakhi, Christianity, Christian, Esai, Maseehi, Ahmadi, Ahmadiya, Ahmedi, Ahmadya, Qadiani, Qadiyani, Qadian, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Kafir, Infidel, Takfiri, Kufr, Hindu, Hinduism, Bhagwan, Sikh, Gurdawara, Wajib Ul Qatal, Wajibul Qatal, Lynching, Rabwah, Dr Abdul Salam, Khatm-e-Nabuwat, Khatum-i-Nabuwat, Islam, Muslim, Yasu Masih, Yahudi, Choora, Chura, Chooray, and Churay.
Bytes for All, Online Hatred Pushing Minorities to the Periphery, p. 13.
Tehreem Azeem, ‘Pakistan’s Social Media is Overflowing with Hate Speech Against Ahmadis’, The Diplomat, 30 July 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/pakistans-social-media-is-overflowing-with-hate-speech-against-ahmadis/, accessed 20 November 2022.
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Anne Isabelle Tollet, ‘I’m Afraid She’ll Be killed Very Soon if Nothing Happens’, interview by Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, Christianity Today, 23 September 2013, https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2013/september-web-only/asia-bibi-pakistan-blasphemy-im-afraid-shell-be-killed.html, accessed 20 May 2021.
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Jürgen Schaflechner, ‘Blasphemy and the Appropriation of Vigilante Justice in “hagiohistoric” Writing in Pakistan’, in Paul Rollier, Kathinka Frøystad and Arild Engelsen Ruud (eds.), Outrage: The Rise of Religious Offence in Contemporary South Asia (London: ucl Press, 2019), p. 214.
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Asia Bibi and Anne-Isabelle Tolle, ‘Conversion or Death’, Christianity Today, 29 August 2013, https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2013/september/conversion-or-death.html, accessed 23 May 2021.
Ibid.
St John Hal, ‘Ten Million People Now Want to Kill Me’, Catholic Herald, 14 June 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20131204163407/http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/features/2012/06/14/ten-million-people-now-want-to-kill-me/, accessed 25 May 2021.
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Nasir Habib, ‘Pakistan Parties Protest Possible Blasphemy Law Changes’, cnn, 23 December 2010, http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/12/23/pakistan.blasphemy.protest/index.html, accessed 26 May 2021.
Declan Walsh, ‘Cleric Puts Price on Head of Pakistani Woman’, The Guardian, 7 December 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/06/cleric-pakistani-christian-woman-blasphemy, accessed 26 May 2021.
Schaflechner, ‘Blasphemy and the Appropriation of Vigilante Justice’, p. 214.
ibid., p. 215.
ibid., p. 217.
ibid.
ibid., p. 219, translated by Schaflechner.
Mehreen Zahra-Malik, ‘As Pakistan Bars Extremists from Airwaves, Some Fear Creeping Censorship’, Reuters, 23 July 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-media-militants-idUSKCN1021NI, accessed 05 June 2021.
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bbc, ‘Salman Taseer: Thousands Mourn Pakistan Governor’, bbc, 5 January 2011, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12116764, accessed 05 June 2021.
Ibid.
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Zulqernain Tahir, ‘Qadri Case Judge Sent Abroad’, Dawn, 24 October 2011, https://www.dawn.com/news/668688/qadri-case-judge-sent-abroad, accessed 05 June 2021.
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Boone, ‘Mumtaz Qadri Supporters in Islamabad’.
Haider et al., ‘Nearly 2,000 Pro-Qadri Protesters Continue Sit-In’.
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ibid.
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ibid.
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ibid.
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United Nations, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes, p. 15.
ibid., p. 2.
