1 Introduction¹

The Leiden University Library has an important collection of manuscripts of the Dutch humanist and international lawyer Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). Apart from the famous manuscript of De iure praedae (On the Law of Prize and Booty), it possesses a collection of legal and political manuscripts, which includes an unpublished autograph, entitled De societate publica cum infidelibus, ‘On Public Partnership with Unbelievers’.² The existence of De societate has been known since 1864, when it was discovered by the bibliographer Pieter Anton Tiele during preparations for an auction of a large collection of Grotius’s manuscripts and working papers.³ However, it was largely ignored by scholars until Peter Borschberg described it in an article published in 1998.⁴ Borschberg identified De societate as an early work of Grotius, probably written in the first decade of the seventeenth century. Analyzing the text and its sources, he concluded that De societate was written in connection with De iure praedae – a title that was posthumously given to a work to which Grotius himself referred as De rebus Indicis (On Indian Affairs).⁵ As Borschberg explained, in both treatises, Grotius’s aim was to defend the Dutch policies of treaty and alliance-making in the East Indies, and more particularly, the right of the Dutch East India Company (voc) to enter into alliances with non-Christian rulers that were aimed against the Spaniards and Portuguese.⁶

Borschberg’s thorough analysis of De societate has remained the standard interpretation in the literature. As no transcription or translation of De societate was available, scholars tended to consult Borschberg’s analysis of the text, rather than the text itself. However, in our view, there are several reasons why it is valuable for jurists and historians to study the original text of De societate. First of all, Grotius’s treatise is important for understanding his ideas about legal relations between Christians and non-Christians (e.g., Jews and Muslims). In De societate, Grotius explains what kinds of public and private partnerships with non-Christians are lawful, both in the international context (e.g., treaties and alliances with non-Christian rulers) and in the domestic context (e.g., legal relations with non-Christian minorities residing in Christian states). Secondly, De societate gives important insights into Grotius’s ideas about the relationship between natural law and Christian law and, more particularly, the role of natural law as a source of universal legal norms which apply across cultural and religious boundaries. For instance, in his treatise, Grotius explains that partnerships between Christians and non-Christians are generally permissible under natural law, while they should also be limited and regulated on the basis of Christian law. And finally, De societate may contribute to a better understanding of the connection between Grotius’s earlier and later writings. As we will show in this introduction, there are many parallels between De societate and some of Grotius’s other writings, notably De iure praedae, the Remonstrantie (Remonstrance, 1615), and De iure belli ac pacis (On the Law of War and Peace, 1625).⁷ Studying De societate may thus contribute to a better understanding of how Grotius’s ideas about legal relations between Christians and non-Christians developed over time.⁸ For these reasons, we have decided to publish the first complete transcription and English translation of Grotius’s text.

In recent years, there has been increasing attention for Grotius’s role as legal advisor of the Dutch East India Company.⁹ The fact that the ‘founding father of modern international law’ had also been active as voc advisor has attracted the attention of jurists and historians who seek to understand how his ideas about international law related to his defense of Dutch empire-building in Asia and the East Indies. This has led to a renewed interest in Grotius’s De societate: as a renowned historian puts it, De societate shows that Grotius was ‘himself in the forefront of the Dutch attempts in these years to build a network of alliances with infidels against the Portuguese’.¹⁰ Like Borschberg, historians such as Richard Tuck and Martine van Ittersum believe that Grotius wrote De societate alongside De iure praedae to demonstrate that the voc’s alliances with non-Christian rulers in the East Indies were justified by the law of nature.¹¹ As is well known, Grotius had written De iure praedae at the request of the Amsterdam Chamber of the voc to defend the seizure of a Portuguese vessel, the Santa Catarina, off the coast of Johor (present-day Singapore).¹² As Grotius argued in his treatise, the voc had entered into an alliance with the (Muslim) king of Johor on behalf of the Dutch Estates General; the voc had thereby obtained access to local trade in exchange for offering the king and his people military protection. When the Portuguese had attacked Johor, the Dutch had provided military assistance to their ally and seized the Santa Catarina.¹³ For Grotius, the alliance with the king of Johor thus served as an important argument for justifying the seizure of the Santa Catarina as a ‘just prize’ taken in a ‘public war’.¹⁴

As Martine van Ittersum and Richard Tuck have pointed out, Grotius’s claims in De iure praedae regarding the right of the Dutch to enter into military alliances with non-Christian rulers such as the king of Johor were not uncontroversial.¹⁵ The traditional view was that military alliances with non-Christians were permissible only in case of self-defense: a Christian nation could thus use the aid of non-Christian allies to protect itself from (impending) attack, but only in case of ‘imminent necessity’, not otherwise.¹⁶ By contrast, Grotius claimed that the Dutch had a right to wage a public war against another Christian nation (e.g., the Portuguese) on behalf of a non-Christian ally (e.g., the king of Johor), even if they were not themselves attacked. He also maintained that they had seized the Santa Catarina on behalf of the king of Johor, who had ceded his right to the prize to the voc in gratitude of its assistance.¹⁷ In the eyes of Grotius’s contemporaries, these were startling claims, as they implied that the Dutch had more in common with ‘infidels’ than with their fellow-Christians. According to Van Ittersum, it is therefore likely that Grotius wrote De societate to support the conclusions he had presented in De iure praedae: his aim was to demonstrate that the right to enter into military alliances with non-Christians originated from natural law, and more specifically, from the natural law of non-offensiveness (i.e., the duty not to harm others without cause), which applied irrespective of religious belief. Like Borschberg and Tuck, Van Ittersum emphasizes the similarities between De iure praedae and De societate: in both texts, Grotius concluded that Christians had a natural right to enter into military alliances with non-Christians to protect each other from harm, and he evoked the same sources and examples to prove his conclusion.¹⁸

In view of these similarities, the interpretation proposed by Borschberg, Van Ittersum and Tuck that De societate should be read alongside De iure praedae does indeed seem plausible. However, it should also be noted that De societate is a rather abstract treatise dealing with all kinds of partnerships between Christians and non-Christians, not only military alliances, but also, for instance, private associations, such as commercial contracts, marriages, and relations of servitude. Moreover, in his treatise, Grotius never explicitly refers to the East Indies or the voc. Instead, he discusses examples of interreligious partnerships that are mentioned in the Bible and other sources (e.g., Roman and canon law). In this regard, De societate stands in sharp contrast to De iure praedae, in which Grotius explicitly defended the voc’s policies in the East Indies, focusing on particular alliances with non-Christian rulers such as the king of Johor.¹⁹ Of course, the fact that Grotius does not mention the voc’s alliances in De societate does not mean that it is unrelated to the East-Indian context.²⁰ However, it does raise the question why Grotius refrained from discussing the voc’s alliances explicitly. As we will argue below, he probably intended to write a more general treatise on public and private partnerships between Christians and non-Christians, which pertained not only to the East-Indian context, but also to domestic debates about the legal position of non-Christians in the Dutch Republic. There are, for instance, important similarities – both in terms of content and use of sources – between De societate and the Remonstrantie of 1615, in which Grotius proposed a set of legal regulations for Jews residing in Holland and West-Friesland.

As our analysis of De societate will show, no sharp boundaries can be drawn between Grotius’s views on partnerships with non-Christians in the international and domestic contexts. Indeed, as we will explain in this introduction, ideas about military alliances with non-Christians which Grotius developed in view of the East-Indian context were in fact closely related to his thoughts about legal partnerships with religious minorities living in Christian states and vice versa. For instance, the right to protect non-Christians from harm, which Grotius discussed in De societate, could simultaneously serve as an argument for overseas expansionism (e.g., protecting East-Indian nations from Portuguese aggression) and as a justification for religious toleration (e.g., protecting non-Christian minorities, who had fled from religious persecution and taken refuge in the Dutch Republic). In our view, Grotius’s De societate should thus be interpreted as a general treatise on legal partnerships between Christians and non-Christians that relates both to the voc’s policies of alliance-making in the East Indies and to debates about the rights of religious minorities in the Dutch Republic itself.²¹ More specifically, we will argue that Grotius’s treatise can be regarded as an important step in the development of his ideas about legal relations with non-Christians, starting with his early reflections in De iure praedae on alliances with non-Christian rulers in the East-Indian context, continuing with his proposal in the Remonstrantie for legal regulations for Jews in the Dutch Republic, and culminating in his general conclusions in De iure belli ac pacis regarding partnerships with ‘strangers of the Christian religion’ in both European and non-European contexts.

Before presenting Grotius’s De societate, we would like to emphasize that our edition of the text should be considered a working document. This means that we did not intend to give definitive answers to all the questions raised by Grotius’s manuscript and that further research will be necessary. In particular, we have not been able to solve all the reading problems in the manuscript. We have indicated possible alternative readings in notes to the transcription of the Latin text. Moreover, translating the text into English often required us to make interpretative choices, which are of course open to discussion. Hence, we invite other researchers to further improve our transcription and translation of the text, which is possible due to the availability of excellent, high resolution pictures of the manuscript itself on the website of Leiden University Library.²² Moreover, in footnotes to the Latin text, we have focused on parallels with writings of Grotius in which he expressly discusses legal relations with non-Christians, such as De iure praedae, the Remonstrantie, and De iure belli ac pacis, but we have not systematically looked for parallels with his other writings. In particular, we have not compared the text of De societate with his later theological writings, even though this might be a promising field of research, as Grotius frequently discusses biblical examples in De societate. Moreover, we have not been able to identify all the sources to which Grotius refers in De societate. To mention the most intriguing example: in his reading notes on fol. 316 (2)v, Grotius refers to ‘c. 6 de Manubiis’. We suspect this might be a reference to chapter 6 of De iure praedae, although this cannot be determined with certainty.²³ So, the analysis of Grotius’s De societate we present in this introduction should not be seen as the end, but rather as the continuation of a scholarly debate about the text’s meaning and significance. In particular, we hope that our edition of Grotius’s text will stimulate new discussions about Grotius’s views on legal partnerships with non-Christians, both in the international and domestic contexts.

2 History and Transmission of the Manuscript

The manuscript of De societate was originally part of a larger volume containing manuscripts and working papers of Grotius. The original folio numbers, written in Grotius’s hand, are still visible at the top of the (uneven) pages. As Martine van Ittersum explains in a forthcoming monograph, Grotius probably had his manuscripts bound in volumes when he was living in exile in Paris.²⁴ In May 1619, he had been convicted for high treason by a special court of the Estates General and sentenced to lifelong imprisonment at Loevestein Castle.²⁵ Following his arrest and conviction, his books and working papers were confiscated and removed from his house in Rotterdam.²⁶ In March 1621, Grotius escaped from Loevestein, hidden in a bookchest. After his spectacular escape, he found a refuge in Paris. In the meantime, Grotius’s wife Maria van Reigersberch lodged several unsuccessful appeals to the Court of Holland and Zeeland against the confiscation of her husband’s possessions, until her request was partially granted in 1625 and then fully in 1630.²⁷ It would take several more years before Grotius finally received his books and working papers in Paris. By that time, he had become Swedish ambassador at the court of Louis xiii. According to Van Ittersum, Grotius probably sent his working papers to the binder in the late 1630s or early 1640s. Being an ambassador, he had both the means and need to systematically order his personal papers.²⁸

It is unclear whether Grotius had the manuscript of De societate at his disposal when he wrote his magnum opus De iure belli ac pacis in the early 1620s in Paris. As we have seen, his possessions, including his manuscripts, had been confiscated in May 1619, and they were only partially returned to him after September 1625, when De iure belli ac pacis had already appeared in print. However, after his arrest in August 1618, Grotius’s father Jan de Groot had managed to remove some manuscripts from his son’s house in Rotterdam.²⁹ Moreover, in June 1619, his wife Maria obtained permission to remove thirty-one books, including ‘two books written with the hand in folio’, and send them to Loevestein.³⁰ It is, of course, possible that these included the manuscripts of De iure praedae and De societate. After his escape to Paris, Grotius repeatedly requested his family members to send his manuscripts to Paris. In the Spring of 1622, he specifically instructed his brother-in-law Nicolaes van Reigersberch to send him the manuscripts of his Annales et historiae (Annals and Histories of the Dutch Revolt) and his Defensio capitis quinti maris liberi (Defense of the Fifth Chapter of Mare liberum).³¹ Moreover, in a letter of 20 June 1622, Grotius thanked his brother Willem de Groot for sending him Vossius’s copy of Stobaeus’s Eclogae physicae as well as ‘those childish works (illis puerilibus) of which we had great need’.³² According to Peter Haggenmacher, the puerilia of the letter to Willem de Groot probably referred to the manuscript of De iure praedae.³³ It should be noted, however, that Grotius used the word puerilia in the plural: he probably referred to multiple manuscripts, and it is possible that these included both De iure praedae and De societate.³⁴ However, we cannot know for certain to which manuscripts Grotius referred in his letter, and hence, we simply do not know whether he had the manuscripts of De societate and De iure praedae at his desk when he wrote De iure belli ac pacis. We therefore agree with Van Ittersum that this can only be determined through a systematic comparison of the quotations and marginal references in these texts and in the 1625 and 1631 editions of De iure belli ac pacis.³⁵

After Grotius’s death in 1645, his manuscripts remained in the possession of his direct descendants for more than two centuries. When an inventory was made in 1778, it listed no less than 32 volumes of manuscripts and working papers (both of Grotius himself and his son Pieter), which were preserved in a ‘big square white chest’.³⁶ As Van Ittersum explains, two volumes contained Grotius’s papers on the East Indies as well as his early writings on natural law. Volume 18 contained documents relating to Grotius’s advisory work for the Dutch East India Company: it consisted of reports, letters, petitions and other documents which Grotius had either received from or prepared for the Company in the period between 1604 and 1615.³⁷ Volume 24 contained the manuscript of De iure praedae, along with other legal and political treatises from an early phase of his career, including the Theses xi, Theses lvi, De pace and De societate publica cum infidelibus.³⁸ The contents of this volume have been reconstructed by L.J. Noordhoff based on the original foliation: De societate was placed directly after a hand-written memorandum (not in Grotius’s hand) on the legal grounds that could potentially be presented by the Spaniards for declaring the peace between the Northern Netherlands and the archdukes Albert and Isabella of Austria invalid (fol. 308–313) – a document that was probably written in 1607 or 1608.³⁹ Directly following De societate was a collection of reading notes and comments in Grotius’s hand on Greek and Roman law, entitled Ius Atticum et formulae et sententiae (fol. 319–344).⁴⁰ Interestingly, the same volume also contained Grotius’s Remonstrantie or draft regulations for Jews residing in Holland and West-Friesland of 1615 (fol. 1–34) as well as several other documents pertaining to the legal position of Jews in the Dutch Republic (fol. 198–211).⁴¹

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the collection of Grotius’s manuscripts was still in the possession of his family. It was inherited by Hugo Cornets de Groot (1783–1864), a low-ranking tax collector from the village of Cuyck. After his death in 1864, Grotius’s manuscripts were appropriated by his landlord, Jean-Baptiste Regouin, who used them to pay off his debts to Christian Snelleman, a tobacco merchant from Rotterdam. It was Snelleman who decided to offer the papers for sale at a public auction, organized by Martinus Nijhoff in The Hague.⁴² Nijhoff hired the eminent bibliographer Pieter Anton Tiele to provide a description of the collection for the auction’s catalogue. By that time, the volumes with Grotius’s working papers were still in their original bindings. However, Nijhoff decided to have the manuscripts taken from their bindings, so that they could be offered as multiple lots (a strategy meant to increase the auction’s profits).⁴³ At Nijhoff’s request, Tiele disassembled several volumes and described their contents at document level.⁴⁴ In advance of the auction, Nijhoff reached out to potential buyers, offering a large collection of Grotius’s manuscripts (that had originally been part of volume 24 in the inventory of 1778) to the University of Leiden. As Van Ittersum explains, the Law Faculty was particularly determined to acquire manuscripts that could raise Grotius’s profile as a ‘founder of modern international law’.⁴⁵ Due to a prior agreement with Nijhoff, it succeeded in buying the entire collectanea juridica et politica (lots 72–78) for 261 guilders. It contained the manuscript of De iure praedae (lot 72), the Remonstrantie and other documents relating to Jewish rights (lots 73–75), as well as a collection of about 450 pages of early legal and political treatises, including the manuscript of De societate publica cum infidelibus (lot 78).

3 Description of the Manuscript

The manuscript of De societate consists of six sheets, numbered fol. 314–317.⁴⁶ Two sheets are unnumbered. One of these was later inserted between folios 316 and 317; we will refer to it as fol. 316 (2). The other unnumbered sheet can be found at the end of the manuscript and has text only on the verso side; it will be referred to as fol. 318v. The title of Grotius’s treatise – De societate publica cum infidelibus – is mentioned twice, on fol. 314r and on fol. 318v. All in all, De societate consists of six pages of densely written text and another four pages with reading notes. All folio sheets are folded in the middle. The main text can be found on the right side of the page, with references to the sources on the left side. As Borschberg has pointed out, Grotius adopted the same working method in other manuscripts, for instance, in his Theses lvi, where he also wrote the main text on the right side of the page, leaving the left side open for additions and references to sources.⁴⁷ The main text of De societate consists of six pages and can be found on fol. 314, 315 and 317. Apart from the main text, there are four pages with reading notes, which can be found on fol. 316r, 316 (2) and 318v. The reading notes are written in two columns, on the left and right side of the page. On fol. 316 (2)v, the notes are written first in two columns, then across the entire page, and then again in two columns.

Grotius inserted references to the sources he used in the main text, in marginal notes to the main text (on left side of the page) and in reading notes (on separate pages). Sometimes the same sources are mentioned at different places, allowing the reader to connect the main text to the reading notes. For instance, in the main text on fol. 314v, Grotius presents his first conclusion that ‘private and public persons’ may enter into a ‘pact’ (foedus) with non-Christians with the aim not to harm one another. To support his conclusion, he refers to the biblical examples of the alliances of Abraham and Isaac with the Philistine king Abimelech, of Jacob with his father-in-law Laban, and of David and Solomon with Hiram, the king of Tyre, inserting references to the relevant passages in Genesis and Samuel.⁴⁸ These same examples are also mentioned in the reading notes on fol. 316 (1)r, with short descriptions of their content. For instance, the alliance between Abraham and Abimelech is here characterized as an alliance ‘of non-offensiveness and of cultivating friendship’.⁴⁹ However, not all the sources mentioned in the reading notes can be found in the main text, and conversely, not all sources cited in the main text reappear in the reading notes. For instance, in the main text on fol. 315r, Grotius discusses several philosophical sources, including Cicero’s De officiis and Seneca’s De beneficiis, which are not mentioned in the reading notes. Conversely, the references to Alberico Gentili’s De iure belli in the reading notes (fol. 316 (2)v) do not reappear in the main text. Hence, it is not always possible to relate the main text to the sources mentioned in the reading notes.

In our view, there are several reasons why De societate should probably be regarded as a draft. First of all, the manuscript is written in Grotius’s own hand. There are several examples of manuscripts of Grotius of which we have clean copies in the hand of a clerk, sometimes with revisions made by Grotius himself.⁵⁰ However, in this case, no scribal copy has been preserved and we only have Grotius’s autograph. Secondly, the content of De societate suggests that it was not a definitive version. It describes the skeleton structure of Grotius’s argument, consisting of premises, propositions and conclusions. While the first three propositions are accompanied by lengthy explanations, later propositions and conclusions lack such explanations. This suggests that Grotius started writing out the text of De societate, but left it unfinished. A third reason for regarding the text of De societate as a draft is that often words or sentences have been crossed out or inserted. Moreover, the text contains some open variants, that is, alternative formulations about which Grotius still had to take a decision.⁵¹ To give one significant example of a later insertion: in the title of the manuscript on fol. 314r the word publica is placed above the line. This suggests that the title was originally De societate cum infidelibus, ‘On Partnership with Unbelievers’, and that Grotius at a later stage added the word publica to the title: De societate publica cum infidelibus, thereby clarifying that the main focus of his treatise was on public partnership (e.g., treaties and alliances) between Christians and non-Christians. The reason for this shift of focus can perhaps be explained in light of the historical circumstances which led Grotius to write his treatise.

4 Dating the Manuscript

As noted above, Borschberg believed De societate to be an early work of Grotius, which was written in the first decade of the seventeenth century.⁵² The content and physical aspects of the manuscript, as well as the manner in which it has been transmitted, allow us to propose a more specific dating, viz. between 1606 and 1609. As we have seen, the manuscript of De societate was originally part of a volume (listed as volume 24 in the inventory of 1778) containing legal and political treatises from an early phase of Grotius’s career. The most extensive treatise in this volume was De iure praedae, which was written between 1604 and 1606, and thoroughly revised in 1607 and 1608.⁵³ It was bound together with other manuscripts dating from the first decade of the seventeenth century. For instance, the manuscript relating to the peace negotiations between the Northern Netherlands and archdukes Albert and Isabella of Austria, which can be found directly before De societate in the volume (fol. 308–313), dated from 1607 or 1608.⁵⁴ Placed just before it was the manuscript of De pace (fol. 302–307), which probably originated from the same period and also related to the peace negotiations.⁵⁵ The volume also contained several other treatises from an early phase of Grotius’s career. For instance, his Commentarius in theses xi (fol. 276–283) was probably written between 1603 and 1608,⁵⁶ while his Theses lvi (fol. 287–290) may have been produced a bit earlier, between 1602 and 1605.⁵⁷ However, the volume also included documents from the following decade, for instance, the Remonstrantie (fol. 1–34), which was written in, or shortly after, 1615.⁵⁸

The sources to which Grotius refers in De societate allow us to propose a more precise dating of the manuscript. In the reading notes on fol. 318v, Grotius refers to a treatise on Mosaic law by Wilhelmus Zepperus. He gives a specific page number which corresponds to the relevant chapter in the 1604 edition of Zepperus’s work.⁵⁹ However, the reference to Zepperus can be found on the last page of De societate (fol. 318v) and it may have been added at a later stage, after Grotius had completed the main text. The text also contains two other references to an even later work, which may serve as a terminus post quem for dating the manuscript. In a marginal note to the main text on fol. 315v, Grotius mentions Josephus Justus Scaliger’s Animadversiones in Eusebium, of which the first edition appeared in 1606.⁶⁰ Grotius’s reference to Scaliger’s work is lapidary: no explanation is added. The work is mentioned in relation to Grotius’s proposition that marriages between Christians and non-Christians should generally be condemned (since the main purpose of marriage is the education of children to the glory of God, which, according to Grotius, is ‘not a little hindered’ by such marriages).⁶¹ A second reference to Scaliger’s Animadversiones can be found on fol. 317r, in a marginal note to Grotius’s fifth conclusion that Christians and non-Christians can live together in one state.⁶² It is of course possible that Grotius added these marginal references to Scaliger at a later stage, after completing the main text. No references to later works can be found in the manuscript. This means that Grotius probably wrote De societate in or after 1606.

Unfortunately, we have not been able to find a terminus ante quem for the manuscript of De societate. The text does not contain any references to historical events which would make it possible to determine the latest date when it could have been written. However, there is another indication that we are dealing with a text that was probably written in, or not long after, 1606. The paper of fol. 316 (2) contains the watermark of a grape with a diamond shape cluster with a horn-shaped stem. This paper was produced by the papers mill of Troyes in France.⁶³ The same grape watermark can be found on a draft letter which Grotius wrote on behalf of the Dutch East India Company to the king of Ternate.⁶⁴ This letter was probably written between the summer and winter of 1606.⁶⁵ The watermark can also be found on Grotius’s draft of De pace, which, as we have seen, was written in the context of the peace and truce negotiations, between 1607 and 1609.⁶⁶ The fact that Grotius used the same paper for these manuscripts may serve as a rough indication that they were written around the same time. Of course, watermarks cannot give us any certainty with regard to the dating of manuscripts. It is, for instance, possible that Grotius used the same paper containing a particular watermark for several years. However, the paper containing the watermark of the diamond shape cluster was relatively inexpensive: Grotius seems to have used it only for drafts and reading notes.⁶⁷ It is, therefore, not very likely that he kept a stock of this inexpensive drafting paper for many years. This suggests that De societate was written either in 1606, or shortly after 1606, but not many years later.⁶⁸

In the period between 1606 and 1609 (when a truce with Spain was concluded), Grotius had good reasons to be interested in the topic of De societate, and more specifically, in its main question if, and to what extent, it was permissible for Christians to enter into public partnerships with non-Christians. In 1606, the voc directors had entrusted him with the task of writing a series of letters to Asian and East Indian rulers to reconfirm their ‘contracts of alliance’ (contracten van verbondt).⁶⁹ In previous years, the voc had entered into alliances and treaties with a number of Asian and East Indian rulers, including the ‘emperor’ of Malabar’, the ‘kings’ of Johor, Tidore and Ternate, and the ‘lords’ of Ambon and the Banda islands.⁷⁰ In his letters to these rulers, Grotius defended the voc’s alliances: he claimed that the Dutch had united their trading companies, not only to better protect their own rights (e.g., to free navigation and trade), but also to ‘liberate the princes and nations of the East Indies from the tyranny’ of the Spaniards and Portuguese.⁷¹ In his letters, Grotius reminded the East Indian rulers of their obligations as allies of the Dutch, urging them to refrain from trading with other European nations. If the East Indian rulers continued to deliver their spices to other nations, then the Dutch would no longer be able to finance the war fought on their behalf against the Iberian enemy.⁷² Grotius’s defense of the voc’s alliances with East Indian rulers was, of course, not uncontroversial. A key question was whether alliances with non-Christian rulers could be legitimate if they were aimed against other Christians (such as the Spaniards and the Portuguese). As we will see, this would also be one of the main questions in De societate publica cum infidelibus.

In the winter of 1607–1608, negotiations started for a peace or truce agreement between the Dutch Republic and Spain. Grotius was asked by the voc directors to work out a strategy for the Dutch negotiators, aimed at safeguarding the Company’s strategic interests in Asia and the East Indies.⁷³ He prepared two drafts of a memorandum, in which he sketched three possible scenarios: under the first scenario, both parties would be free to trade in the East Indies and hostilities would cease. According to the second, the Dutch would agree to withdraw from the East Indies and the voc would end its activities there in a few years. The third scenario was that notwithstanding the peace in Europe, the war in the East Indies would be continued.⁷⁴ As Grotius suggested, the first scenario was the preferred outcome, but if it would not be accepted, then the Dutch negotiators should seek to achieve the more realistic third scenario: a treaty permitting a continuation of the war beyond the Line (i.e., the tropical Line of Cancer). In his memorandum, Grotius expressly referred to the voc’s ‘correspondence, friendships and alliances’ with East Indian rulers.⁷⁵ As Grotius explained, the Company had entered into these alliances on behalf of the Dutch Estates General, and these rulers could not be left to the mercy of the Spaniards and Portuguese without seriously damaging the Dutch reputation.⁷⁶ In February 1608, the voc directors enthusiastically approved Grotius’s memorandum and the Estates General adopted it as its official negotiating position.⁷⁷ In accordance with Grotius’s proposal, the Dutch and Spanish rights in the East Indies would be determined on the basis of the legal principle of uti possidetis: parties would continue to possess those territories they already possessed at the moment the truce would come into effect.⁷⁸ In April 1608, the voc directors therefore sent instructions to their officials overseas to enter into as many treaties and alliances with East Indian rulers as possible before the truce would take effect.⁷⁹

It is not unlikely that Grotius wrote De societate between 1606 and 1609. In these years, the issue of the legitimacy of alliances with non-Christian rulers in Asia and the East Indies was particularly high on the agenda of both Grotius and the voc directors. Grotius’s thesis in De societate that both ‘private and public persons’ were permitted to enter into alliances with non-Christians with the aim of protecting each other from harm could thus serve as a justification for the voc’s policy of allying with East Indian rulers against the Spaniards and Portuguese.⁸⁰ It is true that Grotius had already defended the voc’s alliances as early as 1604, when he had argued in De iure praedae that the Company was waging a ‘public war’ against the Portuguese on behalf of its non-Christian ally, the Sultan of Johor.⁸¹ But as we have seen, the references to Scaliger’s Animadversiones suggest that Grotius wrote De societate somewhat later, that is, in or shortly after 1606. By that time, Grotius had become personally involved in building the voc’s network of alliances in the East Indies. Perhaps Grotius’s letters to East Indian rulers prompted him to write De societate to develop his ideas about interreligious alliances in a more systematic manner: the main question was no longer whether these alliances were permissible at all, but rather under what legal conditions they were justified. The treatise may also have been written in conjunction with the diplomatic initiative of April 1608, and the Company’s policy to conclude as many treaties and alliances with East Indian rulers as possible before the truce with Spain would take effect. Although it remains uncertain, the combination of factors – references to particular sources, the diamond shape grape watermark, the historical context of the peace and truce negotiations – all point to a dating between 1606 and 1609.

5 Explaining the Title

Before analyzing the content of Grotius’s treatise, we should first consider its title: De societate publica cum infidelibus. Borschberg translates it as ‘Of Public Society with Non-Christians’.⁸² Other scholars have left the Latin title untranslated.⁸³ The word societas is particularly difficult to translate. In Grotius’s time, societas did not have the same connotations it has today, of a community of people sharing the same laws and customs. Instead, for Grotius, societas also referred to relations between communities (e.g., ‘nations’ or religious communities), which often had their own customs and laws, while also sharing certain laws (e.g., those of natural law and the ius gentium). The legal term societas originated from Roman private law: it was one of the consensual contracts, whereby two or more persons agreed to co-operate for a common purpose (often a business association).⁸⁴ The more specific term societas publica was unknown to Roman law: what came closest was societas publicanorum, an association of tax collectors.⁸⁵ It was Cicero who first used the private law concept of societas as a model for understanding public associations. Thus, in De re publica, he defined the state (res publica) as ‘an assemblage of people in large numbers associated [sociatus] in an agreement with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good’.⁸⁶ Building on Roman law and Cicero, medieval jurists and theologians developed the concept of societas publica. For instance, in his Liber contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem (ca. 1256), Thomas Aquinas distinguished between a societas privata, an association for private purposes (e.g., a business association), and a societas publica, which was created when men assembled to establish a state.⁸⁷

Like Cicero and Aquinas, Grotius used the term societas publica to define the state (res publica): he concluded that ‘the highest public partnership is the union of the state (summa publica societas est unio reipublicae)’.⁸⁸ However, he also employed the term societas publica to refer to treaties and alliances between states, using the words societas and foedus as synonyms.⁸⁹ As we have seen, in De societate he discussed not only ‘public societies’, but also ‘private societies’, such as commercial contracts, marriages, and relations of servitude (e.g., relations between masters and slaves or servants). On the first page of his treatise, he explicitly referred to Aquinas’s distinction between societas privata and societas publica, that is, between private and public societies.⁹⁰ However, he also explained that ‘in both cases the principle [was] almost the same [in utroque ferme eadem est ratio]’.⁹¹ For Grotius, the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ was not absolute,⁹² so that, for instance, public alliances with non-Christians could be concluded by private actors (e.g., the voc as a private trading company) on behalf of a public authority (e.g., the Dutch Estates General).⁹³ As Grotius explained in De societate, ‘public societies’ were governed by ‘almost the same’ principle as ‘private societies:’ for instance, alliances between states and contracts between private parties were in general permissible, provided that they did not undermine the unity of the state or the Christian religion.

As other scholars have pointed out, the concept of societas would take center stage in Grotius’s later work.⁹⁴ Thus, in De iure belli ac pacis (1625), Grotius famously defined human nature itself in terms of an ‘impelling desire for society [appetitus societatis]’, which he later identified with the Stoic doctrine of ‘sociability [οἰκείωσις]’.⁹⁵ He explained that man’s ‘desire for society’ was to be understood in a Stoic sense as a ‘certain inclination [of man] to live with those of his own kind, not in any manner whatever, but peaceably, and in a community regulated according to the best of his understanding’.⁹⁶ From this ‘maintenance of social order [societatis custodia]’, to which man was by nature inclined, the main principles of the ‘law properly so called’, that is, natural law, could be rationally deduced. These included the principle that one should abstain from taking away someone else’s property, that one should restore what belonged to another (including the profit one had received from it), that one should fulfill one’s promises, that one should compensate for the losses incurred by one’s fault, and that one should inflict punishment on others if deserved.⁹⁷ For Grotius, these fundamental principles of natural law served as the foundation not only of private law (e.g., the law of property, contracts and torts), but also of public law (e.g., constitutional law, criminal law and public international law). In De societate, Grotius first developed the term societas as a general legal concept underlying private and public partnerships with non-Christians: in De iure belli ac pacis, it came to be identified as the main source of natural law itself.

Just as complex as Grotius’s use of the term societas publica was his use of the term infideles. Who were the ‘infidels’ to whom Grotius refers in the title of his treatise? As we have seen, Borschberg translates De societate publica cum infidelibus as ‘Of Public Society with Non-Christians’. He thereby suggests that it primarily refers to non-Christians, that is, to those who do not believe in Christ or Christian doctrine. However, as Borschberg himself notes, Grotius not only discusses partnerships with non-Christians, but also with ‘heretics [haeretici]’. Indeed, throughout the text, he uses the standard expression ‘societas cum infidelibus aut haereticis [society with infidels or heretics]’, suggesting that non-Christians and heretics belong to the same general category of non-believers.⁹⁸ As Grotius specifies, there are two kinds of ‘infidels’, namely ‘those who never belonged to the Church’, and ‘those who departed from it, or are expelled by an ecclesiastical judgement’.⁹⁹ We may assume that the first category includes Jews, Muslims and ‘pagans’.¹⁰⁰ Grotius may have thought of the Muslim populations of the East Indies as well as non-Christian minorities (e.g., Jews) in the Dutch Republic itself. The second category relates to heretics and apostates: it is uncertain whom Grotius has in mind, as he does not give specific examples. From the perspective of some of the Catholic (and Counter-Reformatory) sources he uses in De societate (e.g., Sylvester, Cajetan and Vitoria), Dutch Protestants could, of course, themselves be regarded as heretics. In the context of the peace negotiations with Spain, Grotius’s aim may have been to convince international audiences that a peace treaty with the Dutch was binding, even if the Spaniards regarded them as heretics.¹⁰¹ Interestingly, elsewhere in De societate, Grotius refers to a third category, of those who ‘wish to be considered as faithful [ii qui Fideles haberi velint]’, which should probably be read as a pejorative reference to Catholics (e.g., the Spaniards and Portuguese).¹⁰²

Grotius’s understanding of these distinctions seems to have been informed by Aquinas’s Summa theologiae, which is cited on the first page of De societate.¹⁰³ Aquinas had distinguished between three types of unbelief. First, there were the ‘pagans or heathens [pagani sive gentiles]’, that is, those who had never heard the Gospel. Second, there were the ‘Jews [Iudaei]’, who had heard the message of Christ, but did not believe that he was the redeemer. The third category consisted of ‘heretics [haeretici]’, who had accepted that Christ was the redeemer, but distorted his message.¹⁰⁴ Addressing the question whether ‘the unbelief of pagans or heathens [was] graver than other kinds’, Aquinas emphasized the importance of free will in accepting or rejecting the message of Christ.¹⁰⁵ Those who had intentionally rejected the message of Christ sinned more grievously than those who had never heard it, while those who had accepted his message, but then distorted it, sinned more grievously than those who had not accepted it.¹⁰⁶ Aquinas concluded that ‘the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all’.¹⁰⁷ In other words, according to Aquinas, the sins of the pagans or heathens, who had never heard the Gospel, were less grievous than those of the Jews, who had heard the Gospel but rejected it, while the sins of the Jews were less grievous than those of the heretics, who had distorted the message of Christ. As Aquinas concluded, ‘speaking absolutely, the unbelief of heretics [was] the worst’.¹⁰⁸

In De societate, Grotius seems to share Aquinas’s conclusion that the unbelief of heretics is worse than that of pagans and Jews. While Christians are generally allowed to live together with pagans and Jews, Grotius warns that they ‘must abstain from intimate relations and social intercourse with those who have fallen from the Church, or have been condemned by its judgement: because this is so arranged for a special reason, that they should return to shame and repentance’.¹⁰⁹ However, instead of Aquinas’s threefold distinction between ‘pagans’, ‘Jews’ and ‘heretics’, Grotius presents a twofold distinction between ‘those who never belonged to the Church’ (i.e., non-Christians) and ‘those who departed from it, or are expelled by an ecclesiastical judgement’ (i.e., heretics or apostates).¹¹⁰ Crucially, in Grotius’s twofold distinction, the Jews no longer constitute a separate category, but they are now grouped together with other non-Christians, including those who have never heard the Gospel (Aquinas’s ‘pagans or heathens’). By placing ‘Jews’ and ‘pagans’ in the same category of ‘those who never belonged to the Church’, Grotius implicitly introduces a more positive understanding of the Jews: like pagans who have never heard the message of Christ, the Jews may not be punished for their ignorance. Indeed, in some respects, the Jews seem to be placed above other non-Christians. This is the consequence of Grotius’s focus on examples from the Old Testament, in which the Jews appear as God’s chosen people and as an example for the believers. Grotius would further develop these more positive views of the Jews in his Remonstrantie, where he observed that ‘[t]he pagans have false Gods. The Mohammedans have a false Prophet. The Jews at any rate have the true God and the true Prophets’.¹¹¹

6 Structure of the Text

De Societate begins with a short introduction, in which Grotius presents his main question: ‘if and to what degree it be allowed to Christians to enter into a partnership with non-believers, or even heretics’.¹¹² As Grotius explains, this question is old, yet still frequently discussed in his own time. The sources to which Grotius refers in the main text and reading notes indicate that the question is indeed very old: they include Scripture, Roman law (e.g., the Codex Theodosianus), medieval theology and canon law (e.g., Gratian, Aquinas, Panormitanus, and Oldradus) as well as the later scholastic tradition (e.g., Cajetan, Sylvester, and Vitoria). Grotius also refers to legal and theological sources from his own time (e.g., Gentili, Zepperus and Scaliger), albeit less frequently. In the introduction of De societate, he observes that in these sources, the question if and to what degree public partnerships with non-believers are allowed has been considered primarily on the basis of exempla, while the underlying principles or reasons for particular solutions have been insufficiently explained. It is true that many of the sources mentioned in De societate (in particular, medieval scholastic sources) are casuistic, in the sense that concrete cases and examples are discussed to justify particular solutions: examples of ‘societies’ with non-believers are thus discussed in glosses or commentaries on questions pertaining, for instance, to ‘unbelief’, ‘war’, ‘charity’, or ‘marriage’.¹¹³ Unlike his predecessors, Grotius wants to address the question regarding the permissibility of ‘public societies’ with non-believers in a more comprehensive and systematic (i.e., syllogistic) manner.

Apart from the brief introduction, the text of De societate consists of ten premises, nine propositions and nine conclusions. Grotius suggests that the propositions are rationally deduced from the premises and that the conclusions follow logically from the premises and propositions. For instance, after presenting his first proposition, he adds the words: ‘ex primo praemisso’, implying that this proposition derives ‘from the first premise’.¹¹⁴ He then continues with a brief explanation, before adding the words ‘[u]nde sequitur conclusio’, indicating that the conclusion follows from his first proposition.¹¹⁵ According to the first proposition, Christians have a duty to refrain from harming non-believers and heretics. As Grotius explains, this proposition follows from the first premise that an ‘error of faith’ does not change the obligations that originate from the law of nature. The proposition then leads to the first conclusion that ‘it is permissible for both private and public persons to enter into a pact with non-believers or heretics not to harm one another’.¹¹⁶ According to Grotius, this conclusion follows logically and thus necessarily from his first premise and proposition. However, the relationship between premises, propositions and conclusions is not always as straightforward and logical as in the discussed example. Often conclusions are not placed directly behind the relevant propositions,¹¹⁷ and sometimes they even precede them.¹¹⁸ Moreover, it is not always certain from which premises particular propositions are derived, as the relevant premises are not always indicated by Grotius. For this reason, the intricate system of premises, propositions and conclusions remains difficult to decipher.

The premises Grotius presents in De societate are in general relatively short; in most cases, they consist of a single sentence. Sometimes, they contain distinctions that are relevant for analyzing the main question (e.g., between those who belong to the church and those who do not), which are further developed in the propositions and conclusions.¹¹⁹ Premises 7 to 10 are particularly short; they seem to be hastily added and contain distinctions relating to the different types of infidels and partnerships. By contrast, the propositions and conclusions tend to be more extensive: they are followed by (sometimes lengthy) explanations, in which relevant examples and sources are discussed. Moreover, Grotius often adds ‘limitations’ or ‘amplifications’ to his propositions and conclusions, which are indicated with the abbreviations ‘lim[itatio]’ and ‘ampl[ificatio]’ and separately numbered. For instance, his second proposition is followed by one amplification and two limitations. As Grotius indicates, these limitations and amplifications follow from the premises.¹²⁰ Often a particular proposition is developed on the basis of one premise and then limited on the basis of another. An example is the second proposition, according to which the faithful are allowed to do good to non-believers.¹²¹ This proposition is first amplified on the basis of the first premise, in the sense that depending on the circumstances, it is not only allowed (i.e., a right), but also necessary (i.e., a duty) to do good to non-believers.¹²² The proposition is then limited on the basis of the second premise, in that preference should be given to the faithful over non-believers and heretics, and that no harm may be brought to the Christian religion.¹²³

The system of premises, propositions and conclusions of De societate is in some respects comparable to the axiomatic-deductive system which Grotius first used in De iure praedae and further developed in De iure belli ac pacis.¹²⁴ As Grotius explained in the prolegomena of De iure praedae, just as mathematicians usually begin their demonstrations by presenting certain axioms on which all persons can easily agree, jurists should preferably begin by outlining certain laws and rules of the most general nature, which no rational person can disagree with.¹²⁵ From these general laws, the main conclusions can be rationally deduced. In his prolegomena, Grotius presents a framework consisting of nine rules and thirteen laws, from which he derives his conclusions. One of these laws is the so-called law of non-offensiveness: ‘let no one inflict injury upon his fellow’.¹²⁶ This law reappears in the form of a proposition in De societate, where it is applied to non-Christians and heretics: ‘To refrain from harming non-believers and heretics in general is not only permissible for Christians, but also necessary’.¹²⁷ Another law presented in De iure praedae is the law of (individual and collective) protection: ‘Individual citizens should not only refrain from injuring other citizens, but should furthermore protect them, both as a whole and as individuals’.¹²⁸ This law seems to be related to the amplification of the second proposition of De societate, according to which Christians should not only refrain from harming non-Christians, but should also provide assistance to them, especially when they ask for help.¹²⁹ In both De iure praedae and De societate, these laws and propositions then serve to support the conclusion that it is permissible for Christians to enter into alliances with non-Christians to protect each other from harm.¹³⁰ According to Grotius’s axiomatic-deductive system, this conclusion follows logically, and thus necessarily, from the premises and propositions. However, as our analysis of the main text of De societate will show, the relations between premises, propositions and conclusions are not always as logical and necessary as Grotius’s axiomatic-deductive system suggests.

7 Analysis of the Text

8 Conclusion: Grotius’s Contribution

Although Grotius was not the first to devote attention to the question if and to what degree it was permissible for Christians to enter into legal partnerships with non-Christians, he was the first to address this question in a comprehensive and systematic manner. By bringing together insights from older legal and theological debates on such diverse topics as marriage, slavery, alms-giving, usury, and just war, he attempted to articulate the underlying principles that governed public and private partnerships between Christians and non-Christians. As Grotius emphasized in De societate, ‘errors of faith’ did not diminish the rights and obligations that existed under the law of nature: this implied that Christians could have legal obligations and rights towards non-Christians and even heretics. Grotius concluded that, under natural and divine law, it was permissible for the believers to enter into private and public partnerships with non-believers as long as it did not undermine the authority of God or the Christian religion. These partnerships were based, not only on the natural duty to protect others from harm, but also on the religious obligation to treat all human beings, including those of other creeds, as neighbors. However, according to Grotius, partnerships with non-believers were not permissible if they entailed the risk of apostasy: for that reason, Christians were not allowed to voluntarily submit themselves as slaves or subjects to the authority of non-Christian masters or rulers. Moreover, preference had to be given to the faithful over non-believers, and ties of friendship and familiarity with heretics had to be avoided. Under these conditions, public and private partnerships with non-believers and heretics were permissible and even commendable.

Grotius’s main contribution in De societate was to provide a new justification for military alliances between Christians and non-Christians. Medieval jurists and theologians had focused on the question whether it was permissible for Christians to use the aid of non-Christians in a war against other Christians.³⁷⁴ As we have seen, they had generally condemned such alliances, especially if they were aimed against Christians. However, an exception was made in cases of ‘urgent necessity’, when the aid of non-Christians was necessary to defend one’s own life and possessions. The sixteenth-century Spanish scholastics had proved less reluctant to accept military alliances with non-Christians, as they recognized their importance for empire-building in Asia and the Americas. According to Vitoria, the believers were generally allowed to enter into military alliances with non-believers, not only to protect their own rights, but also to protect the rights of their (infidel) allies. However, Vitoria had referred to alliances with non-Christians that were aimed against other non-Christians, and he had not discussed alliances aimed against Christians. By contrast, in De societate, Grotius concluded that an alliance for protecting the ‘infidels’ from oppression could also be justified if it was aimed against Christians, or, as he carefully put it, against those who ‘wish to be considered as faithful.’³⁷⁵ As Grotius explained, the duty to protect non-Christians from oppression originated from natural law, which applied irrespective of religious ‘errors’. It was confirmed by the Gospel, as Christ himself had taught the believers to extend their good deeds to all human beings, including the most alien.³⁷⁶ Hence, Christians had a duty to protect non-Christians from unjust oppression, even if those who oppressed them were Christians.

Grotius’s justification of military alliances with non-Christians was no doubt prompted by his attempts to defend the Dutch policies of treaty and alliance-making in Asia and the East Indies.³⁷⁷ As Grotius had explained in De iure praedae, Christians (e.g., the voc) had the right to enter into military alliances with non-Christians (e.g., the king of Johor), even if they were directed against other Christians (e.g., the Spaniards and the Portuguese).³⁷⁸ In Grotius’s understanding, the voc’s alliances with East Indian rulers were essentially defensive alliances, which served to defend the rights of the Dutch (e.g., the rights to free navigation and trade) as well as those of their non-Christian allies (e.g., the right not to be unjustly oppressed). Grotius referred to the voc’s alliances with East Indian rulers in a memorandum which he prepared in 1607 in view of the peace negotiations between the Dutch Republic and Spain. As he pointed out, the voc had entered into these alliances on behalf of the Dutch Estates General; if a peace agreement with Spain would force the voc to end its activities in the East Indies, then its allies would be left unprotected, which would seriously harm the Dutch reputation.³⁷⁹ In the context of the peace negotiations, Grotius’s defense of military alliances with non-Christians could thus serve to convince the Estates General (as well as international audiences) to support the outcome desired by the voc directors, namely that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Spain should not force them to give up the East Indian trade.

However, in De societate, Grotius not only contributed to the debate about treaties and alliances with non-Christian rulers in the East Indian context. He also intervened in the domestic debate about the legal conditions under which non-Christian minorities (e.g., Jews) could be admitted to the Dutch Republic. As Grotius emphasized in De societate, the ‘highest public partnership’ was the ‘union of the state’, and there was ‘no doubt’ that Christians could live together in one state with non-Christians.³⁸⁰ Building on Cicero’s definition of the state as an ‘association’ that originated from nature itself, Grotius argued that it could encompass both the faithful and non-believers. He concluded that it was generally permissible for a Christian government to ‘accept an infidel people under its authority’.³⁸¹ Indeed, if non-Christians were admitted to a Christian state, it was more likely that they would convert to Christianity than if they remained subject to non-Christian rulers. In his Remonstrantie, Grotius would use these same arguments to advocate the admission of Jews to the Dutch provinces. The principal reason for admitting the Jews was that it would contribute to their voluntary conversion to Christianity, which would not come about if the Jews were ‘cut off from the conversation with Christians’.³⁸² As Grotius concluded, under natural and divine law, the states of Holland had a duty to offer protection to the Jews, irrespective of their ‘errors of faith’. The arguments that applied to alliances between the believers and non-believers in the East Indian context thus also applied in the domestic context: Christians had a duty to protect non-Christians from unjust oppression, even if those who oppressed them were Christians.

Grotius also used some of the arguments he had developed in De societate in De iure belli ac pacis. In chapter 15 of book 2, he returned to the ‘frequently discussed question’ whether Christians were allowed to enter into treaties with ‘those who are strangers to the true religion’. As Grotius explained, it was ‘in no degree a matter of doubt’ that such treaties were permissible under the law of nature, because ‘the right to enter into treaties is so common to all men that it does not admit of a distinction arising from religion’.³⁸³ However, it was more questionable whether treaties with non-believers were allowed under Christian law. Recalling one of the main conclusions of De societate, Grotius observed that it was generally permissible under Hebraic law to make treaties with non-believers to prevent harm, mentioning the treaty between Jacob and Laban as example.³⁸⁴ Treaties of friendship and trade were permissible as well, as was proven by David and Solomon’s treaties with Hiram.³⁸⁵ Grotius continued by quoting Juvenal’s critique of the Jews, who had refused to show strangers the way to a well, explaining that ‘the example of pointing out the way stands for the benefits [beneficia] which are least troublesome and costly, which Cicero and Seneca say ought to be granted even to strangers’.³⁸⁶ Exactly the same combination of sources – Juvenal, Cicero and Seneca – had been discussed in De societate to support the proposition that the believers should do good, i.e., provide assistance and protection, to non-believers.³⁸⁷ As Grotius argued in De iure belli ac pacis, ‘alliances for purposes of war’ were permissible as well, as was demonstrated by the example of Abraham who had provided military assistance to the ‘impious Sodomites’.³⁸⁸ It was true that the Old Testament also mentioned examples of rulers who had been punished for allying with non-believers, but, on Grotius’s reading, these were exceptions to the general rule that alliances with non-believers were allowed by divine and natural law.³⁸⁹

There are also clear parallels between De societate and the section in De iure belli ac pacis, in which Grotius examined whether treaties with ‘those who are strangers to the true religion’ were in accordance with the Gospel. He began by observing that the law of the Gospel had not changed Hebraic law, in the sense that it remained permissible for the believers to make alliances with non-believers. Citing the Sermon on the Mount, and referring to Vitoria (amongst others),³⁹⁰ Grotius explained that the law of the Gospel had extended ‘even greater favor to treaties by which those who are strangers to the true religion receive help in a just cause; for the doing of good to all men, whenever there is opportunity, has not only been left free and praiseworthy, but has even been enjoined by precept’.³⁹¹ His phrase echoed one of the main conclusions of De societate: doing good to all men, including those of other creeds, was not merely a right, but depending on the circumstances, it could also be an obligation. However, the obligation to do good to non-believers was not without limitations: thus, preference had to be given to the faithful over non-believers: ‘we should be doers of good to all, but particularly to those who share the same religion’.³⁹² Moreover, cultivating ties of friendship and familiarity with heretics and apostates was allowed only if it ‘furnishe[d] the hope of their correction’.³⁹³ Exactly the same limitations had been formulated in De societate.³⁹⁴ In De iure belli ac pacis, Grotius made the permissibility of partnerships with non-believers subject to the same conditions he had proposed in De societate: the believers were not allowed to voluntarily submit themselves to the authority of non-believers or to conclude marriages with them, as it might lead to apostasy.³⁹⁵ For that same reason, ‘too great intimacy’ (e.g., living together) with non-believers had to be avoided, so that it did not bring ‘contamination to the weak’.³⁹⁶ Grotius recalled the premise he had formulated in De societate: it was never permissible to engage in partnerships with non-believers that could harm the authority of God and the Christian religion: ‘[f]or as a matter of first importance the kingdom of heaven is to be sought, that is, the spread of the Gospel’.³⁹⁷

However, notwithstanding these parallels, there was also an important difference between the conclusions presented in De societate and De iure belli ac pacis. As we have seen, one of the main conclusions in De societate had been that Christians were allowed to enter into military alliances with non-Christians, even if they were aimed against other Christians. The faithful could thus wage a just war to protect non-believers from unjust oppression, even if those who oppressed them were themselves Christians.³⁹⁸ Strikingly, this conclusion from De societate did not reappear in De iure belli ac pacis. Instead, Grotius quoted Fulk, the Archbishop of Reims (883–900), who had warned Charles the Simple not to enter into alliances with the ‘enemies of God’, arguing that it made ‘no difference whether any one allies himself with the heathen or denies God and worships idols’.³⁹⁹ The implication was that Christians were not allowed to use the assistance of non-Christians in a war against their fellow-believers.⁴⁰⁰ Moreover, Grotius now maintained that all Christians had a duty to contribute to a league against the enemies of Christianity.⁴⁰¹ While one of Grotius’s main conclusions in De societate had been that Christians could enter into military alliances with non-Christians, even against other Christians, in De iure belli ac pacis he emphasized the duty of the faithful to join a league with their fellow-believers against the ‘infidels’. He gave the example of the league that had been made ‘under the leadership of the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire’, perhaps a reference to the league formed by Frederick iii of Habsburg and the papacy against the Turks, after the fall of Constantinople.⁴⁰² Although Grotius still defended military alliances with non-Christians in non-European contexts (e.g., the voc’s alliances with native rulers in Asia and the East Indies),⁴⁰³ he now explicitly rejected such alliances in the European context, calling instead for a league of all Christian nations against the ‘enemies of Christianity’ (e.g., the Ottoman empire).⁴⁰⁴

The similarities and differences between Grotius’s De societate and his other writings (including De iure belli ac pacis) allow us to trace the development of his ideas about alliances with non-Christians. As we have seen, in De iure praedae, Grotius’s aim had been to defend the voc’s policies of alliance-making in the East Indies, and more specifically, the seizure of a Portuguese vessel, the Santa Catarina, as a just prize taken on behalf of a non-Christian ally, the Sultan of Johor. As Grotius explained, the right to enter into alliances with non-Christians followed from the natural laws of non-offensiveness and protection, which prescribed that others should be protected from harm, irrespective of religious differences. In the context of the peace negotiations with Spain, Grotius drafted a second treatise, De societate publica cum infidelibus, in which he explained why public partnerships with non-Christians – including military alliances – were allowed not only by natural law, but also by Christian law: the natural duty to protect others from harm was confirmed by the Gospel, according to which all human beings should be treated as neighbors and children of God. As we have seen, Grotius’s aim was no longer only to justify the voc’s policies of alliance-making in the East Indies, but to write a more general treatise on private and public partnerships with non-Christians, which was also relevant to the domestic debate about religious minorities in the Dutch Republic. Thus, in his Remonstrantie, he referred to the natural duty to protect non-Christians from oppression to argue that the States of Holland and West-Friesland had an obligation to offer a refuge to the Jews. Finally, in De iure belli ac pacis, Grotius focused on the European context, arguing that all Christians (i.e., Catholic and Protestant nations) had a duty to join a league against the enemies of Christianity. As an exile in Paris, his hope was that if all Christian nations would join a league against the Ottomans, it would contribute to overcoming the internal divisions of Christianity, thus laying the foundations for a lasting peace in Europe.⁴⁰⁵

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Third page of De societate publica cum infidelibus, written in the hand of Grotius. This page contains an explanation of the second proposition, followed by three limitations, which have been renumbered by Grotius. The old numbering is still visible. Leiden University Library, ms bpl 922 Ie, fol. 315r.

Citation: Grotiana 45, 1 (2024) ; 10.1163/18760759-20240001

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Synopsis

Fol. 314r

Introd.: Main question: if and to what degree it should be allowed to Christians to enter into a partnership with non-believers, or even heretics

Prem. 1: An ‘error of faith’ does not change those things that pertain to natural law

Prem. 2: One must avoid all things that appear to go against divine glory and the true religion

Prem. 3: Even in things that are generally permitted, we should distinguish what is decent from what is offensive

Prem. 4: If extreme urgency compels us, many things are done justly that are otherwise unjust

Prem. 5: Things that are generally called just or unjust sometimes cease to be so due to a special calling

Prem. 6: Many actions that are not unlawful in themselves are condemned because of the inner state of mind of the actor

Prem. 7: Distinction between those who belong to the Church and those who do not

Prem. 8: Distinctions between different types of alliance: ἐπιμαχία/ συμμαχία, private/ public, equal/unequal, superior/ inferior

Prem. 9: An alliance for purposes of war can be just

Prem. 10: Universal [alliance] should not be just without exception

Fol. 314v

Prop. 1: To refrain from harming non-believers and heretics in general is not only permissible, but even necessary (from prem. 1)

Concl. 1: It is permissible for both private and public persons to enter into a pact with non-believers or heretics with the aim not to harm one another

Prop. 2: Good deeds, duties, and trades may rightly be cultivated between the believers and non-believers or heretics, as they also originate from nature (as in prem. 1)

Ampl.: It is not only allowed to do good to non-believers or heretics, but according to the circumstances even necessary, when we can help them without great disadvantage, or when they ask our help themselves

Fol. 315r

The idea of this proposition should be restricted by these additions:

1 lim. [1]: Greater charity must be shown towards the faithful than towards the unfaithful

2. lim. (ex prem. 2): Unless it appears to harm the [true] faith. Usury may be taken from a stranger, but not from a brother. The closer the connection, the greater the benefits should be

1 lim. prop. 3 [2]:⁴⁰⁶ Likewise greater friendship and familiarity should be cultivated with the faithful than with the non-believers

Fol. 315v

1 prem. in prop.:

In prop.: There are two kinds of non-believers or ἑτεροδόξοι: those who never belonged to the Church and those who have departed from it, or are expelled by an ecclesiastical judgement

2 lim. prop. 3: Christians must abstain from intimate relations and social intercourse with those who have fallen from the Church or have been condemned by its judgement. However, this does not apply in case of necessity, or even utility, when heretics are approached with the hope of conversion

3 lim. ex prem. 3: One should not enter into a very close familiarity with non-believers or heretics without reason: those who converse with non-Christians should take care on all occasions, so that they try to bring them to good sense by doctrine and example

Let us first consider equal partnerships, of which there are different degrees

Prop. 3: It is permissible to have some friendship and familiarity with non-believers and heretics

Prop. 4: The highest union is in marriage. In case of a concluded marriage, it is not permissible to separate from a non-believer

Lim.: However, it is permissible for a faithful magistrate to make a law by which the marriage of a faithful person with an unbeliever is invalidated, but only for just reasons

Prop. 5: Marriages with non-believers that are still to be concluded should be condemned, because the main purpose of marriage is the education of children to the glory of God, which is not a little hindered by such marriages

Lim.: An exception should be made in case of a special calling (which may perhaps be said of Esther)

Fol. 317r

Public alliances

Concl. 2: Treaties with non-believers are rightly entered into for the sake of friendship, commerce, travels, and other benefits which are mutually guaranteed

Lim.: Unless there is a special reason, for instance, in case of apostasy

In prem.: There are two kinds of military alliances: defensive and offensive. Such alliances are unjust if war is agreed to without exception, unless the cause is just

Concl. 3: In a just war, the non-believers are rightly defended by the faithful, even if those who oppress the non-believers consider themselves as faithful. This work is not only permitted, but also highly praiseworthy, and because of the circumstances often necessary

Lim.: An exception should be made if God wants to punish particular nations for infidelity

Concl. 4: If they fight a just war, the faithful may use the help of non-believers. Conditions: 1. As long as no occasion is thereby offered to the non-believers for harming the truth; 2. As long as it is not done out of distrust or against a special command

Concl. 5: The highest public partnership is the union of the state. A faithful people can remain in one state with non-believers

Concl. 6: However, whether a [faithful] people may voluntarily enter into such a community with non-believers is more difficult to say. An analogy can be made with marriage. Thus, sharing a state with non-believers should be avoided outside cases of necessity, and especially with those who have departed from the Church

Prop. 6: It is permissible for the faithful to have non-believers as servants and even as slaves

Fol. 317v

Conc. 7: It is equally permissible for a faithful magistrate or people to accept an infidel people under its authority

Prop. 7: It is permissible for a faithful [person] to lend his services to non-believers

Prop. 8: A faithful [slave] who is a slave of an unfaithful master must remain so. However, the magistrate may issue a law prohibiting non-believers from having the faithful as slaves

Prop. 9: It is not easily allowed to submit oneself voluntarily in slavery to a believer, and even less so to a non-believer. However, in case of necessity, it does not seem to be prohibited

Concl. 8: A faithful people has a duty to obey an infidel prince or magistrate. However, a law can be made in the state to depose a prince who has become unfaithful

Concl. 9: It is hardly permissible [for a believer] to submit to such [an infidel ruler]

Ampl.: It is less permissible to submit to an apostate than to a non-believer

Lim.: It does not seem to be forbidden to place oneself under the protection of an infidel [ruler], in order to save religion and some freedom

Lim.: It is permissible (even without exception) to submit oneself to a non-believer where there is a special command of God

Lim.: It is (probably) permissible to submit to a non-believer in case of urgent necessity

Editorial principles

1. 1.Exact transliteration of the text of Grotius’s treatise, with a few exceptions:
2. –u/v: according to modern usage; consonantal u is printed as v, v used as a vowel is printed as u
3. –i/j: the letter j has been changed in i in all Latin words.
4. 2.All accents in the Latin text have been omitted.
5. 3.Punctuation has been adapted to modern usage.¹
6. 4.Grotius’s capitals have been retained, except for sentences after a period, which always open with a capital.
7. 5.Words or letters between square brackets […] are additions by the editors.
8. 6.Round brackets (…) are printed as found in the text or are silently added in a few cases for the sake of clarity.
9. 7.Textual commentary has been added to the Latin transcription, historical commentary to the English translation.

Transcription

Hugo Grotius, De societate publica cum infidelibus

(Leiden, University Library, ms. Cod. bpl 922)

xviii N 922 i e

Fol. 314–318: Hugonis Grotii Theses autographae de Societate cum infidelibus publica; accedunt Adversaria huc pertinentia, folia 6.²

Fol. 314r

De societate publica³ cum infidelibus

Vetus est quaestio et nostra hac aetate non minus agitata, an et quatenus hominibus Christianis liceat cum Infidelibus, aut etiam Haereticis inire societatem. Ea videtur a plerisque exemplis magis quam rationibus, ac praeterea non satis distincte esse tractata. Quare tentandum arbitramur an ei lux aliqua nova discussione afferri possit. Antequam autem ad argumentum veniamus haec praefabimur.

1. Cum duplex sit Humani generis societas, altera ex creatione, altera ex recreatione, sive naturalis et Ecclesiastica, et ad prioris illius conservationem institutum sit Ius illud quod Naturae dicimus, tum primarium, tum secundarium, sciendum est errorem in fide nihil eorum immutare quae ad ius Naturae et universalis illius societatis tuitionem pertinent, quo argumento utitur Thomas 2[a], 2[ae], quaest[io] 10, art[iculus] 10.⁴

2. Omnia ea quae apparet adversatura divinae gloriae et verae religioni adeo distincte sunt⁵ cavenda, ut neque spes, neque metus ullus contra persuadeat. Sed maneat illud: Quaerite primum regnum caelorum.

3. Etiam in his quae in universum libertati nostrae permittuntur maxima est habenda ratio⁶ eius quod deceat, aut offendat.

4. Sed tamen in his ipsis si extrema necessitas urgeat multa recte fiunt⁷ quae alioqui vitio non carerent.

5. Tenenda est et haec generalis exceptio quae iusta aut iniusta dicuntur, talia interdum esse desinere ob specialem vocationem.

6. Ac multas actiones per se non illicitas damnari propter internam constitutionem animi facientis. 2 Sam. 33; 2 Reg. 20 in fine.

7. Dist[inctio] Inf[idelium] 1:⁸ alii ad Ecclesiam pertinuerunt,⁹ alii non.

8. De societate duplici: ἐπιμ[αχία], συμ[μαχία]. Societas Privata – publica; aequalis – inaequalis; Superior – Inferior.

9. Societas bellica iusta esse potest.

10. Universalis sine exceptione iusta esse non sit.

Fol. 314v:

His praemissis prima sit propositio:

i. Prop[ositio]. Abstinere a noxa in Infideles, et haereticos universaliter non modo licet Christianis sed etiam necesse est; ex primo Praemisso. Nemini enim inferendum malum lex Naturae praecipit, idque Christus millies inculcat. Unde sequitur Conclusio:

i. Concl[usio]. Tum privatis tum publicis personis licet inire foedus cum Infidelibus aut Haereticis de non offendendo utrinque.

Quicquid enim recte fit idem recte futurum stipulamur et promittimus. Tale fuit foedus Abrahami et postea Isaaci, piorum hominum, cum Abimeleco profano Rege; idque haereditarium. Gen. 21 v. 27 et 26 v. 29. Item Iacobi cum Labane socero. Gen. 31 v. 49. Tale item Davidis et Hirami, Tyrionum Regis: 2 Sam. 5. 11. Itemque Solomonis et Hirami, quod manifeste Scriptura approbat. 1 Reg. [5 v. 26]; 2 Sam. 5 v. 12.

Excipe eos fideles, qui ex vocationis praescripto tenentur Infideles punire. Itaque Deus cum Amalecitis (Deut. 17. 16) et cum sex devotis populis vetat constitui foedus pacis (Deut. 25. 17),¹⁰ quia ad illos puniendos Deus populum suum elegerat. Ideoque hoc interdictum ex speciali, non ex generali causa venire inde etiam apparet, quia contra cum¹¹ Ammonitis et ipsis Infidelibus foedus pacis ipse Deus a populo fideli servari voluit. Deut. 2. 19.

Secunda propositio sit:

ii. Prop[ositio]. Beneficia, officia, commercia charitatis, civilitatis et utilitatis ergo inter Fideles et Infideles aut haer[eticos] ultro¹² citroque recte colantur. Sunt enim et haec ex Natura prodeuntia, atque ideo cunctis hominibus communia, ut in 1 Praem[isso].

Ampl[ificatio]. Adde non tantum licitum esse benefacere Infidelibus aut haer[eticis], sed etiam secundum circumstantias saepe necessarium puta, cum sine magno incommodo nostro commodare ipsis possumus, praecipue vero cum ipsi opem nostram exposcunt.

His positionibus Iudaei veteres non assentiebantur, quos dicit Iohannes Evangelista ([Ioh.] 4. 9)¹³ non solitos συγχρῆσθαι, hoc est consuetudine ulla uti cum Samaritanis, utpote ἑτεροδόξοις; ideoque Christus in Parabola ipsis ostendit proximi appellationem etiam ad hos pertinere. Luc. 10. 36; Act. 10. 28. Hunc Iudaeorum errorem etiam Satyra notat:

Non monstrare vias eadem nisi sacra colenti;

Quaesitum ad fontem solos deducere verpos.

Fol. 315r:

Hoc autem exemplo viam monstrandi, ut Cicero¹⁴ Ennii versum applicat (Off. 1. [51]), ea cuncta intelligi debent quae sine detrimento aliis commodari possunt; eaque praestanda dictat ipsa Naturae lex etiam ignoto cuique. Atque eadem ferme apud Senecam invenies, ubi quaerit¹⁵ an et improbis et ingratis benefaciendum sit; aitque Aristotelem imitatus, dari quaedam non homini sed humanitati. De Ben[eficiis] 4. 29. Quod et Herodes Atticus apud Gellium exprimit. Idem tractat Seneca De Benef[iciis] 4. 28. Ac Christus certissimo argumento docet beneficia nostra etiam ad alienissimos porrigenda, cum ipse Deus Optimus Maximus Solem suum oriri faciat et pluat super bonos et malos: ubi per Solem et pluviam cuncta Naturae bona intelligi voluit. Sed et ipse exiguum quamvis beneficium, aquae haustum a Samaritana muliere accipere non est dedignatus. Paulus vero ab Infidelibus Romanis etiam praesidium impetravit. Haec ad beneficia pertinent. Ad officia civilitatis illud: Si quis vos invitat Infidelium, et vultis ire, quicquid vobis apponitur manducate. 1 Cor. 10. 27. Obi[ectio] Deut. 5 et ratio adiecta.¹⁶ Quod ipsum quoque contrarium est Iudaeorum institutis, qui Christum eo nomine culparunt quod cum hominibus ab Ecclesia alienis convivia frequentaret. De commerciis quoque manifestum est. Abrahamus et Iacobus agros ab Infidelibus emerunt. Et alia exempla innumera suppetunt: quanquam et in hac parte quidam Iudaeorum non recte sensisse videntur, unde natum credibile est errorem discipulorum qui Christi monitum de cavendo fermento ita interpretabantur quasi panes a Pharisaicae superstitionis hominibus comparare vetarentur.

Huius propositionis sententia his additamentis¹⁷ restringenda est.

i. Limit[atio]. 1 [old number].¹⁸ Maior charitas erga fideles quam erga Infideles demonstranda est.¹⁹ Paulus ad Gal. 6. 10. Simus benefici erga omnes, praecipue vero erga domesticos fidei.

ii. Lim[itatio]. Nisi appareat secuturum unde²⁰ damnum religionis; ex 2 P[raemissio]ne.²¹ Quo forte et illud veteris legis pertinet: Extraneo dabis in usuram; fratri autem non dabis. Ab alienigena exiges, Deut. 15. 3. Ratio autem patet quia in his praeter societatem Naturae, accedit societas gratiae. Quo autem arctior est colligatio, eo beneficia esse maiora debere ratio dictat. Iam quae v[ide] p[er] seq[uentia].²²

i. Lim [itatio]. iii. Prop[ositio]. 2 [old number]. Similiter maior amicitia ac familiaritas cum fidelib[us] quam cum Infidelibus coli debet. Maximum enim amicitiae vinculum est studiorum consensio, praecipue circa res maximas. Hinc illa φιλαδελφία toties in Evangelio commendata. Arist[oteles].

Fol. 315v:

1 praem[issum/issio] in p[ropositione]m.²³

In p[ropositione]m. Notandum et hic duplices esse Infideles sive ἑτεροδόξους; alios, qui ad Ecclesiam nunquam pertinuerunt; alios qui ab ea desciverunt, aut iudicio Ecclesiastico eiecti sunt. Probatur haec distinctio 1 Cor. 5 v. 12.

ii. Lim[itatio]. iii. Prop[ositio]. Qui ab Ecclesia defecerunt, aut eius iudicio condemnati sunt, ab horum familiari convictu et consuetudine abstinere²⁴ Christiani debent: quia hoc ob rationem specialem ita constitutum est, ut ad pudorem et paenitentiam reverentur.²⁵ Inde haereticum hominem post unam et alteram admonitionem vitari²⁶ Apostolus praecipit ad Tit. 3. 10. Hoc tamen abstinendi praeceptum non ita destrictum est ut necessitatis casum, aut etiam utilitatem omnem excludat, cum sine dubio liceat Fidelib[us] interdum et hos spe conversionis accedere.

Sed et ab aliorum Infidelium consuetudine abstinere iis saltem expedit qui infirmitatis suae sunt conscii.²⁷

iii. Lim[itatio] ex iii p[rae]m[isso/issione].²⁸ Non admodum arcta familiaritas cum Infid[elibus] et Haer[eticis] sine causa ineunda, sed qui cum alterius generis Infidelibus²⁹ conversantur diligenter omnibus occasionibus invigilare debent, ut ipsos et doctrina et exemplo conentur ad sanam mentem perducere. 1 Thess. 4. 12.

Iam quae societatis genera inter Fideles et Infideles esse possint videamus, tum privatim, tum publice, nam in utroque ferme eadem est ratio. Ac primum videamus in societate aequali; cuius diversi sunt gradus.

Primum gradum aequalem ponamus convictum et familiaritatem.

iii. Prop[ositio]. Licet amicitiam aliquam et familiaritatem cum Infid[elibus] et cum Haer[eticis] habere. Ex sup[eriore loco].³⁰

iv. Prop[ositio]. Summa coniunctio est in matrimonio. Agitur autem aut de contracto aut de contrahendo. Contracto non licet ab Infideli divertere. 1 Cor. 7. 12.

Lim[itatio]. Quod tamen ita puto intelligendum, ut liceat Magistratui fideli ferre legem qua matrimonium fidelis cum Infideli nullum et irritum declaretur ita ut non obliget. Est enim in³¹ Magistratus potestate ob iustas causas contractus³² irritos facere. Talis lex cum apud Iudaeos fuerit, recte Esdras tempore αὐτονομίας Iudaeos ab Infidelium contubernio iussit discedere. [Esdras] c[ap.] 10.

v. Prop[ositio]. Si de contrahendo agatur in universum non possunt non damnari matrimonia cum Infidelibus: quia qui praecipuus est finis matrimonii educatio liberorum ad gloriam Dei in³³ tali coniugio non parum impeditur.³⁴ Ita ut locum hic suum habeat: illud nolite iugum ducere, ἑτεροζυγεῖν, cum Infidelibus. 2 Cor. 6. 13 [= 14]. Sc[aliger], Anim[adversiones] in Euseb[ium], 149. Solomon hoc nomine reprehenditur et Manassis frater summi pontificis dicitur sacerdotium tali coniugio polluisse. Neh. 13 v. 26 et 28.

Lim[itatio]. Excipe eos qui ad hoc vocantur specialiter, quod forte de Esthera dici potest. An idem obtineat in casu necessitatis, puta si quis continentiae dono non praeditus eo loco sit ut aliter uxorem habere non possit, consideratione indiget; nisi quod haud impie credetur Deum providere, ne sui fideles ad eas angustias coarctentur. Hic eius subiectio. De affinitate. Deut. 7.

Fol. 317r:

His similia in publicis societatibus procedunt.

Concl[usio] ii. Nam foedera cum Infidelibus amicitiae,³⁵ commerciorum, itinerum aliorumque beneficiorum quae mutuo praestantur causa recte ineuntur. Tale foedus Solomonis cum Hiramo fuit 1 Reg. 5. 11 et 10. 22. Igitur quod simile foedus in Iosaphato reprehenditur, ex iis quae vi loco praemissa sunt interpretationem recipit. 2 Chr. 20. 37.

Limit[atio]. Nisi hoc forte eam rationem habet specialem,³⁶ quia Rex Isr[ael] erat apostata.

Restringe: ita haec fieri debere ut interim Fidelibus non minora beneficia aut etiam maiora praestentur.

In praemiss[a]. Ad societatem bellicam quod attinet, ea duplex est: ἐπιμαχία et συμμαχία, hoc est, defensiva et offensiva. Utraque sive cum Infidelibus sive cum Fidelibus inita iniusta est, si in omne futurum bellum contrahitur,³⁷ sine exceptione, nisi causa³⁸ iniusta sit.³⁹

Concl[usio] iii. In bello autem iusto Infideles⁴⁰ recte a Fidelibus defendentur, etiamsi ii qui Infideles opprimunt Fideles haberi velint. Imo hoc opus non modo licitum, sed et summe laudabile et ex circumstantiis saepe necessarium est; ex 2 Prop[ositione]. Ps. 82. 4; Prov. 24. 1.

Limit[atio]. Excipe, nisi revelatum sit Deum aliquas⁴¹ gentes ob Infidelitatem velle punire. Inde illud: osores Iehovae diligere te. 2 Chr. 19. 2. Item: Non enim est Iehova cum Israelitis. 2 Chr. 25. 7.

Concl[usio] iv. Vicissim fideles bellum iustum gerentes auxilio Infidelium uti possunt.⁴² A quib[us]⁴³ accipienda beneficia. Sen[eca] 2 [De] Ben[eficiis] 18.

1. 1.Dum ne occasio ea ratione detur Infidelib[us] nocendi veritati.
2. 2.Dum ne fiat ex diffidentia.

Aut contra praeceptum speciale: ut Iud[aei] in accersendis Aegyptiorum auxiliis.

Concl[usio] v. Summa publica societas est unio reipublicae. Quin⁴⁴ autem populus fidelis cum infideli in una⁴⁵ republica manere possit dubium non est.

Sc[aliger] in Anim[adversionibus] ad Eus[ebium] 148.

Exemplum: Iud[aei] cum Idum[aeis]; Israel[ites] cum Aegypt[iis].

Concl[usio] vi. An autem sponte in talem communionem venire debeat, plus habet difficultatis. Cumque hoc matrimonio non sit dissimile, et fini verae reipublicae non parum repugnet, idem docendum videtur, maxime extra casum necessitatis, et cum Infidelibus qui ab Ecclesia abierunt.

Societas inaequalis aut Fideles superiores aut inferiores facit; estque aut privata aut publica. 1 Reg. 5. 6.

Prop[ositio] vi. Fidelibus licet habere ministros atque etiam servos infideles. Th[omas] 2. 2. 10. 9.

Fol. 317v:

Concl[usio]. vii. Pariter Magistratui aut Populo Fideli licet populum Infidelem in ditionem suam accipere.

Prop[ositio] vii. Licet Fideli operam suam locare Infideli. Esdras. Nehemias. Iosephus. Daniel. Vide⁴⁶ Philipp. 4. 22.

Prop[ositio] viii. Fidelis si sit servus Infidelis domini⁴⁷ talis manere debet. 1 ad Tim. 6. 1. Potest tamen fidelis Magistratus lege lata Dominium Infidelium in homines fideles in ditionib[us] suis impedire, quae lex iustam habet rationem. C. ne Christ. manc. L. unica.

Prop[ositio] ix. Sponte autem dare se in servitutem ne Fideli quidem extra casum necessitatis facile licet. Infideli multo minus. Tamen in casu necessitatis non videtur prohibitum.

Concl[usio] viii. Pariter populo fideli⁴⁸ incumbit obsequi Principi aut Magistratui Infideli. Lex tamen fieri potest in Rep[ublica] ut Princeps factus⁴⁹ Infidel[is] principatu excidat.

Concl[usio] ix. At tali se subiicere, vix licet. 1 Cor. 6. 1 et 6. Deut. 17. 15: e Fratri[bus] tuis.

Ampl[ificatio].⁵⁰ Distingue: ut minus liceat Apostatae se subiicere quam tantum Infideli.

Lim[itatio]. Deinde, ut in protectionem se dare Infideli salva religione et libertate aliqua non videatur prohibitum. Ita Iacobus se Regis Aegyptii fidei permisit. Rex Solomon civitates aliquas Hiramo tributarias fecit.

Lim[itatio]. Praeterea ut liceat etiam sine exceptione se Infideli subiicere ubi est speciale Dei imperium: ut Iudaei Assyrio iussi sunt se mancipare. Ierem. 27. 8.

Lim[itatio]. Idem probabiliter dici posset in ultimo casu necessitatis, arg[umentum] Ierem. 27. 13.

David Israelitis pepercit.⁵¹

Transcription of the reading notes and source-references

Fol. 316 (1) rv, 316 (2) rv are inserted between fol. 315v and fol. 317r

Fol. 316 (1) r.

Left column

Sol[omon] cum Phar[aonis] filia.

Ante legem.

Foedus Abrahami viri pii cum Rege profano Abimeleco de non offendendo et colenda amicitia idque haereditarium. C[ap.] 21 Gen. 27.

Simile foedus Isaaci: ubi illud de non offendendo clarius exprimitur. Gen. 26. 29.

Iacob cum Labane socero pagano foedus init: de matrimonio integre servando, item⁵² et non offendendo. Gen. 31. 49 et seq[uentes].

Foedus cum civitatib[us] se dedentib[us] permittitur.

Ita:⁵³ Extra vi populos, 20. 17, Deut. *⁵⁴

Bellum aeternum cum Hamalecitis 17. 16, Exo. et Deut. 25. 17.

Contra in Ammonitas bellare vetantur Isr[aelites]. Deut. 2. 19.

Foedus cum Gabaonitis de non occidendo contra legem tamen servatur. Ios. 9. 15; 2 Sam. 21. 2.

Ita:⁵⁵ nisi se dedunt in tempora Innum[eralia].⁵⁶ Ios. 9. 18, aliter⁵⁷ Deut. 20. 10. Ios. et de Rahab et 1 Reg. 9. 20.

Congregatio xi trib[uum] contra Beniam[in]. Iud. 20[. 30].

Foedus privatim Davidis et Ion[athae] amicitiae. 1 Sam. 18. 2 et 23. 18.

Rex David foedus paciscitur cum seniorib[us] Isr[ael]. 2 Sam. 5. 3; 1 Chr. 11. 3.

1. 1 Sam.David ad Abimelecum profugit. 1 Sam. 21.

   Deinde ad Moabitos. [1 Sam.] 22. 3.

   Ad regem Gathi, [1 Sam.] 27, offert se Philist[iim] q[uam] Isr[ael] auxiliatorem. [1 Sam.] 29.

Sal[omon]⁵⁸ affinitatem iungit cum Rege Aegyptio. 1 R[eg.] 3. 1.

Legati inter Davidem et Hiramum. 2 Sam. 5. 11.

Inter Sol[omon] et Hir[amum]. 1 Reg. 5. 1;

commercium, v. 11;

pax et foedus, [v.] 12. Sapienter et pie.

Sal[omon] xx civitates Hiramo donat. 1 R[eg.] 9. 12

Societas mercatoria inter Reges. 10. 1 R[eg.] 22.

Abneri foedus cum Davide de regno eius procurando. 2 Sam. 3. 12

Asa Rex Iudae⁵⁹ contra Bahascham Regem Isr[ael] foedus cum Syro init. [1 Reg.] 15. 19.

Ante foedus pacis⁶⁰ (2 Chr. 16. 3) cum utroque erat⁶¹ Syro.

Israel. Idolatria. 2 Chr. 13. 8.

Prophetae denuntiatio ad Asam: quando Syro Regi et non Deo innixus, et copiae Syrorum ab auxilio tuo se proripiunt etc. de diffidentia. 2 Chr. 16. v. 7.

Sicut infra: quod in medicis fideret. [2 Chr.] 16. v. 12.

Achab cum Syro devicto foedus init sibi honorificum. 1 R[eg.] 20. 34.

Reprehenditur quod anathemate devotum servasset, v. 42.

Fol. 316 (1) r.

Right column

2 Chr. 16.

Achab impius pium Iosaphatum ad foedus pertrahit belli contra Syrum gerendi. 1 R[eg.] 22. 4. Praedicitur infelix eventum.

Pax inita inter hos duos, 1 R[eg.] 22. 45; et filios.

Et mox idem Iosaph[atus] cum⁶² Ioramio⁶³ ad bellum Moabiticum foederatur. 2 R[eg.] 3. 5.

Propheta eum reprehendit ob foedus cum Achabo:

An improbo auxiliari et osores Iehovae diligere te [oportuit]? At propter haec tibi incumbit fervens ira a Iehova. 2 Ch. 19. 2.

Mox cum Achazia Rege Isr[ael] foedus init et societatem mercatoriam: quae ob socii improbitatem male ipsi cedit, causa diserte expressa. 2 Ch. 20. 37.

Ioiada sacerdos cum primorib[us] populi foedus init ad regnum regi legitimo tradendum.

2 R[eg.] 11. 4; 2 Chr. 23. 1.

*

Isr[aelitae] vetantur foedus pacisci cum populis terrae promissae; aut affinitatem iungere. Ex. 34. 12 [et] 15; ne mutatione ad Idolatriam prolaberentur. Deut. 7. 3 et 4. Iud. 2. 2.

Consortia impiorum fugienda. 1 Cor. 15. 33. Prov. 1. 15; 13. 20; 22. 24; 24. 1.

Fructus societatis. Utilis communio. Ecc. 4. 9.

Societas ad malum finem. Act. 23. 12. V[ide] Loc[os] Comm[unes] in verbo Coniuratio.

Recedite a tabern[aculis] impiorum in seditione Corachi. Num. 16. 26.

* paena addita Num. 33. 55.

Amasia Rex Iud[ae] prius⁶⁴ mercede conduxit Isr[aelitas]. Propheta ait: Ne venito tecum exercitus Israel[itarum]. Non enim est Iehova cum Israelitis. Sed procede tu, age, confirma te ad hoc bellum, etc. Dicente vero Rege quid ergo faciam c[entum] tal[entis]? Respondit: Est Iehovae dare tibi amplius eo. Separavit⁶⁵ itaque eos Amasia: quare accensa est ira Isr[aelitarum] contra eum. Sequitur victoria.

No[ta]: Paulus auxilium a Romanis magistratib[us] sumit. Caesarem appellat. Indecorum fidelib[us] esse dicit inter se coram infidelib[us] disceptare.

Uxor a viro infideli divertere non debet. 1 Cor. 7. 12.

Contra Esrae c[ap.] 10.

De Excommunicatis; et quatenus eorum consortio abstinendum.

Quatenus media alias non licita ex necessitate fiunt licita.

Fol. 316 (1)v.⁶⁶

Fol. 316 (2)r.

Eleemosyna an propinquioribus facienda an peccatori[bus].

Quo ordine Th[omas] 2. 2. 32. 9.

Utrum magis diligendi meliores an coniunctiores 2. 2. 26. 7.

Fol. 316 (2)v.

Left column

De societate pro defensione singulorum infid[elium] contra infid[eles]. Vict[oria] 368.

De societate cum infideli iuste bellante contra inf[idelem] iniuste bellantem. 370.

An liceat societatem inire cum Heterodoxis.

Dem. 206. Col. 2 et 3.

Christiani habentes iustum bellum ad sui defensionem uti possunt infidelib[us] pacificis non ha[ben]tibus guerram activam aut passivam nobiscum; imminente necessitate, aliter non. Silv[ester] Bellum. 1. n. 9, concl[usio] 3. All[egat]⁶⁷ Nic[olaum] de Lir[a] et alios.

Mac[cabaeorum] foedus cum Romanis. 1 Mac. 8. 18. Defensivum.⁶⁸

Rex Francisc[us].

Rex Antonius.

Ius Canonicum.

Pan[ormitanus] in c[anonem] quod super de voto: licitum esse Christ[ianis] uti auxilio Infid[elium].

All[egat]⁶⁹ Oldr[adi] cons[ilia] 67.

Et all[egat] hist[oriam] Maccab[aeorum]. Item quia insidiis uti li[citum] a maiori.⁷⁰ Item quia fideles dominum infidelem licite iuvant, c[anon] Iulianus, et c[anon] si dominus, 11. Q[uaestio] 3.

Iudaei Samaritanis debent officia proximi. Luc. 10. 29.

Infidelitas non tollit Ius Naturale, aut humanum. Tho[mas].

Dist[inctio:] infideles ab initio. Apostolus: haereticos ab initio, sine vel cum⁷¹ Idol[olatria];

et relapsos in haeresim. Excommunicatos, singulos, Universos.

Societas ad def[ensionem] fidelis; vel ad defensionem infidelis; vel ad off[ensionem].

Item contra fid[eles] aut contra infid[eles].

Damn[um] christianitatis aut religionis apparens: ex⁷² def[ensione] aut off[ensione].

Exempla Rom[anorum] de sociis defendendis. Cic[ero]. Aug[ustinus] 3 de Civit[ate] Dei. Tho[mas].

Abraham pro Lotho arma suscipit ipse non offensus. Gen. 14.

De defendendis oppressis v[ide] al[iter]⁷³ c[aput] 6 de Manubiis. V[ide] 23, q[uaestio] 3 per totum, praecipue c[anon] Non inferenda.

Iudaei vetantur contra Nabuc[hodonosor] ab Aegyptio Rege auxilium petere. Es. 31. 1. et 36. 6.

Sen. Ep. 95.

Iacob in Regis Aegyptii patrocinium se⁷⁴ contulit.

Ioseph, Daniel, alii in aedes barbarorum.

Esdras. Nehemias. Esther.

Esther nupta Regi profano.

2 Cor. 6. 14. Nolite iugum ducere cum Infidelibus. Et seq[uentes].

Cum infidelib[us] caenare. Ita⁷⁵ 1 Cor. 10.

Exempla Christi.

Charitatis officia in o[mn]es, praecipue domesticos fidei. Gal. 6. 10.

Alienigenae a[utem] foenerabis.

Commercia cum Infidelib[us]. Abr[aham] et Iacob agros⁷⁶ emunt.

Paulus tentoria vendit. Alienigenae a[utem] foenerabis.

Salomon cum Hiramo.

Contractus tenere cum infid[elibus]; leges de deditione.

Amicitia violetur vetari.

Haeretici vitandi. Tit. 3. 10.

Foedus inaequale: dedere se infidelib[us].

Ita⁷⁷ Exemplum in Iudaeis: melius servire quam interire.

Fol. 316 (2)v.

Right column

Ps. 82. 4: Eripite pauperem et egenum de manu peccatoris liberate.

Erue eos qui ducuntur ad mortem. Prov. 24. 11.

Caiet[anus] 2. 2, q[uaestio] 40, art[iculus] 1; ibi in eodem art[iculo]: pro ultione sociorum iusta causa belli.

Item externis ministris ad bellum uti licet.

No[ta]: arg[umentum] a relatis.

Ut de usura.

συμμαχία

ἐπιμαχία

Tropheia. Foedera. Livius.

In Fabrum et Iab.⁷⁸

De alienis subditis defendendis. V[ide] Gent[ilim].

De rebellib[us] et proditoribus.

2 Cor. 7. 16:

διὸ ἐξέλθατε ἐκ μέσου αὐτῶν

καὶ ἀφορίσθητε, λέγει κύριος,

καὶ ἀκαθάρτου μὴ ἅπτεσθε:

κἀγὼ εἰσδέξομαι ὑμᾶς.

Manassis affinitas cum Sanballete reprehenditur.

Neh. c[aput] 13. [28–29]; v[ide] Io[sephum].

οὐ γὰρ συγχρῶνται Ἰουδαῖοι Σαμαρίταις. Ioh. 4. 9.

Christus a Sam[aritana muliere] aquam sumit.

Christus apud Pharis[aeos] caenat. Luc. 7. 36 et 39.

Math. 18. 17. Esto tibi ut Ethnicus et Publicanus; i[ta:] Curam tuis ne habeto: ne te scandalizent.

Inimici iuvandi tempore necessitatis. Prov. 25. 21.

Fol. 318v

De publica societate cum infidelibus⁷⁹

V[ide] Tract[atum] de leg[ibus] Mosaicis, p. 304.

Iunius⁸⁰ in Irenico distinguit inter inimicos Ecclesiae et amicos extra Ecclesiam.

His benefaciendum et ab his beneficia accipiend[um].

Ait:⁸¹ qui non est quam nobis nobiscum.

Benedicentib[us] tibi benedicit de Abrahamo.

Qui aquam in nomine Proph[etae] ministraverint.

Math. 10.

Editum Irenicum Iunii a[nn]o 93 circa⁸² mutatione[m], ut puto, Henrici iv.

Translation

Hugo Grotius, On Public Partnership with Non-Believers

(Leiden, University Library, ms. Cod. bpl 922)

xviii n 922 i e

Fol. 314–318: Autograph theses of Hugo Grotius On public partnership with non-believers; with added notes pertaining to the matter, 6 folio sheets.

Fol. 314r

On public partnership with non-believers.

It is an old question, and also in our days frequently discussed, if and to what degree it be allowed to Christians to enter into a partnership with non-believers, or even heretics. The question appears to be treated on the basis of multiple examples, rather than reasons, and moreover not with sufficient distinctions. Therefore we think it necessary to try whether some light may be shed on it by a new discussion. Before we come to the argument, let us declare these things in advance.

1. Since the community of mankind is of two types, one stemming from creation, the other from recreation, that is, the natural and the ecclesiastical, and for the preservation of the former one a law is instituted that we call [the law] of nature (either primary or secondary), it should be known that an error of faith changes nothing of those things that pertain to natural law and the protection of that universal community, an argument used by Thomas 2[a], 2[ae], quest[io] 10, art[iculus] 10.¹

2. One must therefore carefully guard against all things that appear to go against divine glory and the true religion, so that neither hope, nor fear will advise the contrary. Let this admonition however remain: first of all, seek the kingdom of heaven.²

3. Also in those affairs that are permitted to our liberty in general, one should first and foremost take into account what is decent or offending.

4. But even in these affairs, however, if extreme urgency compels us, many things are done justly that otherwise would not be devoid of error.

5. This general exception must be made, that things that are called just or unjust, sometimes cease to be thus due to a special calling.

6. And that many actions that are not illicit in themselves are condemned as the result of the inner state of mind of the one who performs them. 2 Sam. 33;³ 2 Kings 20 at the end.

7. Distinction between non-believers 1: some belonged to the Church, others did not.

8. On two types of alliance: ἐπιμ[αχία] [defensive], συμ[μαχία] [offensive].⁴ Private alliance – public; equal – unequal; superior – inferior.

9. An alliance for purposes of war can be just.

10. Universal [alliance] should not be just without exception.

Fol. 314v:

After these premisses, let the first proposition be:

i. Proposition. To refrain from harming non-believers and heretics in general is not only permissible for Christians, but also necessary; from the first premise. For the law of nature prescribes that evil should be inflicted on no one, and Christ emphasizes this a thousand times. Hence follows the conclusion:

i. Conclusion. It is permissible for both private and public persons to enter into a pact with non-believers or heretics not to harm one another.

For whatever is rightly done, we stipulate and promise that the same will be right in the future. Such was the pact of Abraham, and afterwards of Isaac, pious men, with the heathen king Abimelech; and that was hereditary. Gen. 21 v. 27 and 26 v. 29. Likewise of Jacob with his father-in-law Laban. Gen. 31 v. 49.⁵ Such also of David and Hiram, king of Tyre: 2 Sam. 5. 11.⁶ And likewise of Solomon and Hiram, which Scripture clearly approves.⁷ 1 Kings. [5 v. 26]; 2 Sam. 5 v. 12.

Make an exception for those believers, who are bound by the prescription of a calling to punish non-believers. And so God forbids to conclude a peace treaty with the Amalekites (Deut. 17. 16)⁸ and with the six cursed peoples (Deut. 25. 17),⁹ because God had chosen his people to punish them. And therefore, that this prohibition comes from a special, not from a general reason, also appears from the fact that, on the contrary, God himself wished that the peace treaty with the Ammonites and precisely the non-believers was to be kept by the faithful people. Deut. 2. 19.¹⁰

Let the second proposition be:

ii. Proposition. Good deeds, duties, trades, for the sake of charity, civility, and utility,¹¹ can be rightly cultivated reciprocally between the faithful and the non-believers or heretics. For these things also proceed from nature, and are therefore common to all men, as in the first premise.

Amplification. Add to this that it is not only allowed to do good to non-believers or heretics, but according to the circumstances, consider it even necessary, when we can help them without great disadvantage to ourselves, especially when they ask our help themselves.

Fol. 315r:

Now by this example of showing the way, as Cicero applies the verse of Ennius ([On] dut[ies] 1. [51]),¹⁴ all those things must be understood which can be offered (as help) without harm to others: and the very law of nature dictates that these should be provided, even to an unknown person. And you will find almost the same things in Seneca, where he asks whether good should be done both to the wicked and the ungrateful; and following Aristotle,¹⁵ he says that some things are not given to men, but to humanity. On Benefits 4. 29.¹⁶ Which also Herod Atticus expresses in [Aulus] Gellius.¹⁷ Seneca discusses the same thing in On Benefits 4. 28. And Christ teaches with the most certain argument that our good deeds should be extended even to the most alien people, since God himself, the Best and the Greatest, makes his sun rise for and his rain fall upon the good and the bad alike, as he wanted all the good things of nature to be understood through the sun and the rain.¹⁸ But even he himself did not disdain to receive a drink of water from a Samaritan woman, even though it was a small benefit.¹⁹ But Paul also obtained protection from the non-believing Romans.²⁰ These [examples] pertain to good deeds. For the duties of civility, this is valid: If some of the non-believers invite you, and you want to go, eat whatever is set before you. 1 Cor. 10. 27.²¹ Objection: Deut. 5 and the added reason.²² This, too, is against the institutions of the Jews, who blamed Christ because he attended banquets with men who were strangers to the Church.²³ It also holds for trade. Abraham and Jacob bought lands from the non-believers.²⁴ And countless other examples are at hand: although even in this respect some of the Jews seem not to have judged correctly, from which it is believed that the error was born of the disciples, who interpreted Christ’s warning about being careful of leaven as if they were forbidden to purchase bread from people of Pharisaic superstition.²⁵

The idea of this proposition should be restricted by these additions.

i. Limitation. 1 [old number]. Greater charity must be shown towards the faithful than towards the unfaithful. Paul to Gal. 6. 10.²⁶ Let us be charitable to all, but especially to those who are of the household of faith.²⁷

ii. Limitation. Unless it appears that damage to the faith would result from this; from the second premise. To which perhaps also pertains this rule of the old law: You shall lend to a stranger at usury; but not to your brother.²⁸ You shall demand [usury] from a foreigner, Deut. 15. 3.²⁹ Now the reason is clear, because in these things, the fellowship of nature is supplemented by the community of grace. Reason dictates that the closer the connection, the greater the benefits should be. Now see what follows.

i. Limitation. iii. Proposition. 2 [old number]. Likewise greater friendship and familiarity should be cultivated with the faithful than with the non-believers. For the greatest bond of friendship is the harmony of strivings, especially concerning the greatest matters.³⁰ Hence that brotherly love (φιλαδελφία) is so often recommended in the Gospel.³¹ Aristotle.³²

Fol. 315v:

First premise to the proposition.

To the proposition. It should also be noted here that there are two kinds of non-believers or ἑτεροδόξοι; those who never belonged to the Church; and those who departed from it, or are expelled by an ecclesiastical judgement. This distinction is approved in 1 Cor. 5 v. 12.³³

ii. Limitation. iii. Proposition. Christians must abstain from intimate relations and social intercourse with those who have fallen from the Church, or have been condemned by its judgement: because this is so arranged for a special reason, that they should return to shame and repentance. Hence the Apostle to Tit. 3. 10 commands to avoid a heretical man after one admonition and another. However, this precept of abstinence is not so restricted as to exclude the case of necessity, or even all utility, since it is without doubt permissible for the faithful to sometimes approach these heretics with the hope of conversion.

But it is at least expedient for those who are aware of their weakness to abstain from the intercourse with other non-believers.

iii. Limitation from the third premise. It is recommended not to enter into a very close familiarity with non-believers and heretics without reason, but those who converse with non-believers of another kind should take care on all occasions, so that they try to bring them to good sense by both doctrine and example. 1 Thess. 4. 12.

Now let us see what kinds of partnership there can be between believers and non-believers, both privately and publicly, for in both cases the principle is almost the same. And let us first consider an equal partnership; of which there are different degrees.

Let us point out that the first degree [comprises of] living together and familiarity on an equal footing.

iii. Proposition. It is permissible to have some friendship and familiarity with non-believers and with heretics. From [above].

iv. Proposition. The highest union is in marriage. Now it is a matter of either a concluded marriage or a marriage to be concluded. In case of a concluded marriage it is not permissible to separate from the non-believer. 1 Cor. 7. 12.³⁴

Limitation. However, I think that it should be understood in such a way that it is permissible for a faithful magistrate to make a law by which the marriage of a faithful person with an unbeliever is declared null and void, so that it does not bind. For it is in the power of the magistrate to invalidate contracts for just reasons. Because such a law existed among the Jews, Ezra rightly commanded the Jews at the time of independence (αὐτονομία) to depart from the common dwelling with the non-believers. [Ezra] c[hapter] 10.³⁵

v. Proposition. If it is a question of contracting in general, it is impossible not to condemn marriages with non-believers: because the main purpose of marriage, the education of children to the glory of God, is in such a union not a little hindered. So that it has its place here: do not yoke, ἑτεροζυγεῖν, with the non-believers. 2 Cor. 6. 13 [= 14].³⁶ Scaliger, Animadversiones in Eusebium, 149.³⁷ Solomon is reproached for this reason, and Manassis, the brother of the high priest, is said to have defiled the priesthood with such a marriage. Neh. 13 v. 26 and 28.³⁸

Limitation. Make an exception for those who are especially called to this, which may perhaps be said of Esther. Whether the same pertains in a case of necessity, for example, if a person, not endowed with the gift of self-restraint, finds himself in such a place where he cannot otherwise have a wife, needs consideration; except that it is by no means impious to believe that God will provide that his faithful should not be constrained to such straits. Here is her submission.³⁹ On kinship. Deut. 7.

Fol. 317r:

These same things occur in public alliances.

Conclusion ii. For treaties with the non-believers are rightly entered into for the sake of friendship, commerce, travels, and other benefits which are mutually guaranteed. Such was Solomon’s treaty with Hiram, 1 Kings 5. 11 and 10. 22.⁴⁰ Therefore, the fact that a similar treaty is criticized in Jehoshaphat receives an interpretation from what is stated in the sixth premise. 2 Chr. 20. 37.⁴¹

Limitation. Unless perhaps this has a special reason, because the king of Israel was an apostate.

Make a restriction: these things must be done in such a way that in the meantime the faithful are not given less but even greater benefits.

Regarding the premises. As regards a military alliance, it is of two types: ἐπιμαχία and συμμαχία,⁴² that is, defensive and offensive. [An alliance] entered into either with the non-believers or with the faithful, is unjust if war is agreed to for every future, without exception, unless the cause is just.

Conclusion iii. But in a just war the non-believers will be rightly defended by the faithful, even if those who oppress the non-believers wish to be considered as faithful. Nay, this work is not only permitted, but also highly praiseworthy, and because of the circumstances often necessary; from the second proposition. Ps. 82. 4; Prov. 24. 1.⁴³

Limitation. Make an exception, unless it has been revealed that God wants to punish some nations for infidelity. Hence the saying: should you love those who hated Jehovah. 2 Chr. 19. 2. Again: For Jehovah is not with the Israelites. 2 Chr. 25. 7.⁴⁴

Conclusion iv. On the other hand, the faithful who are waging a just war can use the help of the non-believers. From whom benefits are to be received. Seneca in 2 On Benefits 18.

1. 1.As long as no occasion is thereby offered to the non-believers for harming the truth.
2. 2.As long as it is not done out of distrust.

Or against a special command: as the Jews in calling for the Egyptian auxiliaries.⁴⁵

Conclusion v. The highest public partnership is the union of the state. But there is no doubt that a faithful people can remain in one state with non-believers.

Scaliger in Animadversionibus ad Eusebium 148.⁴⁶

Example: Jews with Idumeans; Israelites with Egyptians.

Conclusion vi. But whether a people should voluntarily enter into such a communion is more difficult. And since this is not unlike marriage, and not a little inconsistent with the end of a true state, it seems that the same thing should be taught, especially outside cases of necessity, and with non-believers who have departed from the Church.

An unequal partnership either makes the faithful superior or inferior; and it is either private or public. 1 Kings 5. 6.⁴⁷

Proposition vi. It is permissible for the faithful to have non-believers as servants and even as slaves. Thomas 2. 2. 10. 9.

Fol. 317v:

Conclusion. vii. It is equally permissible for a faithful magistrate or people to accept an infidel people under its authority.

Proposition vii. It is permissible for the faithful to lend his services to the faithless. Ezra, Nehemiah, Joseph, Daniel.⁴⁸ See Philip. 4. 22.

Proposition viii. If a faithful [slave] is a slave of an unfaithful master, he must remain so. 1 to Tim. 6. 1. It is possible, however, for a faithful magistrate, by law, to prevent the ownership of non-believers over faithful men under his jurisdiction, which law has a just reason. C. ne Christ. manc. L. unica.⁴⁹

Proposition ix. But it is not easily allowed to submit oneself voluntarily in servitude to a believer, except in cases of necessity. Much less so to a non-believer. However, in case of necessity, it does not seem to be prohibited.

Conclusion viii. Likewise, it is incumbent upon a faithful people to obey an infidel prince or magistrate. However, a law can be made in the state so that a prince who has become unfaithful may be deposed from his leadership.

Conclusion ix. But it is hardly permissible to submit oneself to such a prince. 1 Cor. 6. 1 and 6. Deut. 17. 15: from your brothers.⁵⁰

Amplification. Note the distinction: that it is less permissible to submit oneself to an apostate than just to a non-believer.

Limitation. Then, it does not seem to be forbidden to place oneself under the protection of an infidel, in order to save religion and some freedom. Thus Jacob committed himself to the good faith of the king of Egypt.⁵¹ King Solomon made certain cities tributary to Hiram.⁵²

Limitation. Moreover, that it is permissible even without exception to submit oneself to a non-believer where there is a special command of God: as the Jews were ordered to subject themselves to Assyria. Jeremiah 27. 8.

Limitation. The same could probably be said in the utmost case of necessity, the argument of Jeremiah 27. 13.

David spared the Israelites.⁵³

Translation of the reading notes and source-references

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Solomon with Pharaoh’s daughter.

Before the Law.⁵⁴

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Reading notes in De societate publica cum infidelibus, written in the hand of Grotius. Leiden University Library, ms bpl 922 Ie, fol. 316 (1)r.

Citation: Grotiana 45, 1 (2024) ; 10.1163/18760759-20240001

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Reading notes in De societate publica cum infidelibus, written in the hand of Grotius. Leiden University Library, ms bpl 922 Ie, fol. 316 (2)v.

Citation: Grotiana 45, 1 (2024) ; 10.1163/18760759-20240001

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The pact of Abraham, the pious man, with the heathen king Abimelech, of non-offensiveness and of cultivating friendship, and that was hereditary. C[hapter] 21 Gen. 27.⁵⁵

A similar pact of Isaac: where the pact of non-offensiveness is more clearly expressed. Gen. 26. 29.

Jacob enters into a pact with his heathen father-in-law Laban: of keeping the marriage intact and of non-offensiveness. Gen. 31. 49 and following.⁵⁶

A pact with surrendering peoples is allowed.

That is: except for the six peoples, 20. 17, Deut. *

Eternal war with the Amalekites 17. 16. Ex. and Deut. 25. 17.⁵⁷

On the other hand, the Israelites are forbidden to make war on the Ammonites. Deut. 2. 19.⁵⁸

The pact with the Gibeonites about not killing is still kept against the law. Jos. 9. 15; 2 Sam. 21. 2.

That is: unless they give themselves up forever. Jos. 9. 18. otherwise Deut. 20. 10. Jos. and about Rahab⁵⁹ and 1 Kings 9. 20.

The gathering of the eleven tribes against Benjamin. Jud. 20[. 30].⁶⁰

A pact of friendship concluded privately between David and Jonathan. 1 Sam. 18. 2 and 23. 18.

King David makes a treaty with the elders of Israel. 2 Sam. 5. 3; 1 Chr. 11. 3.

1. 1 Sam.David fled to Abimelech. 1 Sam. 21.

   Then to the Moabites. [1 Sam.] 22. 3.

   To the king of Gath, [1 Sam.] 27, he offers himself as an auxiliary from Israel to the Philistines. [1 Sam.] 29.

Solomon makes an alliance by marriage with the king of Egypt. 1 Kings 3. 1.

Ambassadors between David and Hiram. 2 Sam. 5. 11.

Between Solomon and Hiram 1 Kings 5. 1;

trade, verse 11.

peace and pact, [verse] 12. Wisely and piously.⁶¹

Salomon gives twenty cities to Hiram. 1 Kings 9. 12.

A partnership for trade between the kings. 10. 1 Kings 22.⁶²

A pact with David made by Abner concerning the procuration of the latter’s kingdom. 2 Sam. 3. 12.

Asa king of Judah enters into a treaty with Syria against Bahasha, king of Israel. [1 Kings] 15. 19.

Before, Syria had a peace treaty (2 Chr. 16. 3) with both kings.

Israel. Idolatry. 2 Chr. 13. 8.

The announcement of the prophet to Asa: because you relied on the Syrian king and not on God, the forces of the Syrians also have rushed away from your help, etc. on distrust. 2 Chr. 16. v. 7.⁶³

As below: that he trusted the doctors. [2 Chr.] 16. v. 12.⁶⁴

Ahab enters into an honorable treaty with conquered Syria. 1 Kings 20. 34.

He is blamed for having spared someone struck with a curse, v. 42.⁶⁵

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2 Chr. 16.

The impious Ahab draws the pious Jehoshaphat into a treaty to wage war against Syria. 1 Kings 22. 4. An unfortunate ending is foretold.

Peace was made between these two, 1 Kings 22. 45; and [their] sons.

And soon the same Jehoshaphat is bound in an alliance with Jehoram for the Moabite war. 2 Kings 3. 5.

The prophet reproached him for his pact with Ahab:

Did you have to help a depraved man and love those who hated Jehovah? But because of these things the burning anger of Jehovah lies upon you. 2 Chr. 19. 2.⁶⁶

Soon he entered into a treaty and a commercial partnership with Ahaziah, king of Israel: which due to dishonesty of his partner turned out badly for him, for a reason eloquently expressed. 2 Chr. 20. 37.

Joiada the priest enters into a covenant with the foremost of the people to hand over the kingdom to the rightful king. 2 Kings 11. 4; 2 Chr. 23. 1.

*

The Israelites are forbidden to negotiate a treaty with the peoples of the promised land; or to enter into an alliance of marriage. Ex. 34. 12 [and] 15; so that they do not fall into idolatry by the exchange. Deut. 7. 3 and 4. Judges 2. 2.

The company of the unfaithful must be avoided. 1 Cor. 15. 33. Prov. 1. 15; 13. 20; 22. 24; 24. 1.⁶⁷

The fruits of society. A useful companionship. Ecc. 4. 9.

Partnership for a bad aim. Act. 23. 12. See Commonplaces on the word ‘conspiracy’.⁶⁸

Depart from the camp of the impious in the rebellion of Korah. Num. 16. 26.⁶⁹

* penalty added Num. 33. 55.

King Amaziah of Judah first hired the Israelites for a fee. The Prophet said: Do not let the army of Israel come with you. For Jehovah is not with the Israelites. But go on, act, strengthen yourself for this war, etc.⁷⁰ While the king rightly says, what then shall I do with one hundred talents? He answered: Jehovah is able to give you more than this.⁷¹ Amaziah therefore discharged them: wherefore the anger of the Israelites was kindled against him.⁷² Victory follows.

Note: Paul receives help from the Roman authorities. He appeals to the emperor.⁷³ He says that it is unworthy of the faithful to argue among themselves in the presence of the unfaithful.⁷⁴

A wife should not divorce from an unfaithful husband. 1 Cor. 7. 12.⁷⁵

Against Ezra c[hapter] 10.⁷⁶

On the excommunicated; and to what extent their company is to be abstained from.

To what extent otherwise impermissible means become permissible by necessity.

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Fol. 316 (2)r.

Whether alms should be given to those to whom we are more closely related or to sinners.

In which order Thomas 2. 2. 32. 9.⁷⁷

Whether the better or the more closely related are to be preferred 2. 2. 26. 7.⁷⁸

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On the alliance for the defense of some of the non-believers against the non-believers. Vitoria 368.⁷⁹

On the alliance with a non-believer who is waging a just war against a non-believer who is waging an unjust war. 370.⁸⁰

Whether it is permissible to enter into a partnership with the heterodox.

Dem. 206.⁸¹ Col. 2 and 3.⁸²

Christians having a just war for their own defense can use peaceful infidels who have no active or passive war with us; when necessity is pressing, not otherwise. Sylvester on the word ‘war’. 1. no. 9, conclusion 3.⁸³ He refers to Nicholas of Lyra and others.⁸⁴

A treaty of the Maccabees with the Romans. 1 Mac. 8. 18. Defensive.

King Francis.

King Antoine.⁸⁵

Canon law.

Panormitanus on the canon ‘Quod super de voto’ [What above on the vow]: that it is lawful for Christians to use the assistance of infidels.⁸⁶

He refers to Oldradus’s Consilia [Advices], 67.⁸⁷

He also refers to the history of the Maccabees. Also because it is permitted to use ambushes, reasoned from the more extended case. Also because the faithful may lawfully help an unfaithful master, canon Julian, and canon Si dominus [If the owner], 11. Question 3.⁸⁸

The Jews owe the Samaritans the duties of a neighbor. Luke 10. 29.⁸⁹

Unbelief does not take away the natural or human law. Thomas.⁹⁰

Distinction: unbelievers from the beginning. Apostle: heretics from the beginning, without or with idolatry; and those who have relapsed into heresy. Those who are excommunicated, individually, or in general.

Partnership for defense of the faithful; or for defense of the unbeliever; or for offense. Likewise, either against the faithful or against the unfaithful.

Evident harm to Christianity or religion: from defense or offense.

Examples of the Romans defending their allies. Cicero. Augustinus 3 The City of God. Thomas.⁹¹

Abraham takes up arms for Lot without being attacked himself. Gen. 14.

On the defense of the oppressed see otherwise c. 6 of De Manubiis.⁹² See 23, question 3 throughout, especially canon Non inferenda [Not inflicting].⁹³

The Jews are forbidden to ask the assistance of the Egyptian king against Nebuchadnezzar. Isaiah 31. 1 and 36. 6.⁹⁴

Seneca, Epistles, 95.⁹⁵

Jacob committed himself to the patronage of the king of Egypt.

Joseph, Daniel, and others into the houses of barbarians.

Ezra. Nehemiah. Esther.

[right column:] Esther married to a heathen king.

2 Cor. 6. 14. Avoid being yoked together with infidels. And the following.⁹⁶

Eating with unbelievers. Thus 1 Cor. 10.⁹⁷

Examples of Christ.

Duties of charity towards all, especially to those who are of the household of faith. Gal. 6. 10.⁹⁸

You will, however, lend to a foreigner.⁹⁹

Trade with infidels. Abraham and Jacob buy fields.¹⁰⁰

Paul sells tents.¹⁰¹ You will, however, lend to a foreigner.

Solomon with Hiram.¹⁰²

To keep contracts with the unfaithful; the laws of surrender.

To forbid that friendship is violated.

Heretics must be avoided. Titus 3. 10.

An unequal pact: to surrender oneself to the unfaithful.

Thus the example of the Jews: it is better to serve than to perish.¹⁰³

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Ps. 82. 4:¹⁰⁴ Deliver the poor and liberate the needy from the hand of the sinner.

Hold back those who are being led to death. Prov. 24. 11.¹⁰⁵

Caietanus 2. 2. question 40, article 1; there in the same article: revenge of one’s allies is a just cause of war.

Likewise, it is permissible to use foreign assistants for war.¹⁰⁶

Note: Argument from related issues.

As on usury.

Defensive alliance

Offensive alliance.¹⁰⁷

Trophies. Covenants. Livius.

In Fabrum and Jab.

On defending foreign subjects. See Gentili.¹⁰⁸

On rebels and traitors.¹⁰⁹

2 Cor. 7. 16:¹¹⁰

come out from among them

and be absolved, says the master,

and do not touch impurity:

and I will welcome you.

Manasseh’s kinship with Sanballat is criticized.

Neh. c[hapter] 13. [28–29]; see Josephus.¹¹¹

For Jews do not mix with Samaritans. John 4. 9:

Christ takes water from a Samaritan woman.¹¹²

Christ dines with the Pharisaeans. Luke 7. 36 and 39.

Math. 18. 17. Let him be to you as a pagan and a tax-collector;¹¹³ so: Pay no heed to your limbs: lest they offend you.¹¹⁴

Enemies should be helped in time of need. Prov. 25. 21.

Fol. 318v

On public partnership with unbelievers.

See the Treatise on the Mosaic Laws, p. 304.¹¹⁵

Junius distinguishes in Eirenicum between the enemies of the Church and friends outside the Church.

The latter should be treated well and from them benefits may be accepted.

He said: there is no one with us but he who is for us.¹¹⁶

He blesses those who blessed you, on Abraham.¹¹⁷

Those who shall have administered water in the name of the Prophet.

Math. 10.¹¹⁸

The Eirenicum of Junius published in the year [15]93, I think around the change of Henry iv.¹¹⁹