Save

Diasporas and Public Diplomacy: Distinctions and Future Prospects

In: The Hague Journal of Diplomacy
Author:
Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University Washington, DC 20052 United States

Search for other papers by Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff in
Current site
Google Scholar
PubMed
Close
Free access

Summary

Diaspora diplomacy encompasses diasporas as: agents in their own right; instruments of other’s diplomatic agendas; and/or intentional or accidental partners with other actors pursuing shared interests. Diaspora diplomacy is not territorially bound, and agendas are fluid. Three important features of diaspora diplomacy distinguish it from public diplomacy more generally. First, the diaspora identity results in specific applications of diplomacy for which diasporans may play a unique role. Second, diasporans’ responses to global crises of identity and inequity yield particular motivations and targets of engagement. Third, diasporans may have an in-between advantage for public diplomacy. The complexity of diaspora diplomacy is likely to increase because of circular migration, layered identities, and continued improvements and access to telecommunications. Researchers and policy-makers should focus attention on how to integrate diasporas into existing efforts to account for the complexity of transnational relations.

Introduction

Public diplomacy and diaspora diplomacy are inextricably linked. Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton summed it up nicely. In her remarks to the first ever US State Department-organized Global Diaspora Forum, she stated:

You have the potential to be the most powerful people-to-people asset we can bring to the world’s table. Because of your familiarity with cultural norms, your own motivations, your own special skills and leadership, you are, frankly, our Peace Corps, our USAID, our OPIC [the Overseas Private Investment Corporation], our State Department all rolled into one.1

This is high praise indeed. And it encompasses lofty expectations. Are they warranted? What role do diasporas actually play in public diplomacy? What might we expect from diaspora public diplomacy in the future? Following an overview of diaspora diplomacy, this article examines how diaspora diplomacy can be defined, what makes it different from other forms of public diplomacy, and what to expect in the future. The article concludes with implications for our conceptualizations of diaspora and public diplomacy.

The Scope of Diaspora Diplomacy

Both independently and in conjunction with other actors, including state officials, diaspora diplomacy can contribute to a range of objectives. Many of these are embodied in the largest, most known and historically enduring diasporas. The Chinese diaspora, for example, has long facilitated business networks throughout South-East Asia and beyond. One is hard pressed to find a country that does not host Chinese restaurants — an indicator of cultural diffusion. And, more recently, Chinese migration to Africa coincides with, and arguably supports, Chinese foreign policy related to accessing Africa’s natural resources.2 For its part, the Israeli diaspora benefits enormously from the historic dispersion of the Jewish people. In modern times, the Israeli state has strategically cultivated its diaspora, for example through programmes such as Birthright Israel, which provides free organized trips to Israel for Jewish adolescents. The American Jewish Committee seeks to capitalize on its extensive diaspora-engaged experience to train US-based diasporans from Latin America and Africa through institutes, representing unique multi-pronged, non-state-based public diplomacy. Both the Chinese and Israeli/Jewish diasporas encompass public diplomacy objectives to: improve the image of their country of origin (COO); secure the support of their country of residence (COR) for policies or interventions targeted to their COO; influence perceptions of their COR within the COO; facilitate material exchanges between the COO and the COR; and support the settlement and integration of their compatriots in the COR.

Through the many cultural associations that they form, diasporas can proactively improve the image of their COO in their COR or internationally. State and private-sector officials in the COO may also target them for this purpose. The Irish diaspora in the United States, for example, has established a plethora of cultural organizations (such as the American Irish Historical Society, The Friendly Sons of St Patrick, and clubs for hurling and Gaelic football), alongside philanthropic organizations such as the American Ireland Fund. St Patrick’s Day celebrations have arguably become a uniquely American tradition. These cultural celebrations directly impact the consumption of all things Irish. IrishCentral, a global website for the Irish diaspora, encourages Irish companies to market their products directly to the US-based Irish diaspora, promoting it as easy and cost-effective.

Diasporas may also seek support for a policy or intervention targeted to the COO. This is an enduring feature of US international relations historically.3 Diasporas are important listening channels for states to gain a better understanding of ‘foreign’ public opinion. Diasporas may provide these perspectives through direct advocacy, as well as their own representation efforts and actions in the public sphere. Diasporas’ influence on COR foreign policy is most effective when it corresponds with the COR’s national interest and values — in this case, their American identity.4 For example, the US Copts Association has worked to promote awareness of the plight of Coptic Christians in Egypt. Its advocacy efforts have been reflected in the US State Department’s Religious Freedom Reports, where instances of discrimination, violence and repressive laws are identified. These advocacy efforts align well with freedom of religion, and the US Copts Association has appealed to the broader Christian community accordingly.

Alternatively, diasporans may oppose a COR foreign policy targeted to their COO, even when it is welcomed in the COO. Polling shows, for example, that American Jews are much less supportive of the US Embassy’s recent move to Jerusalem than are Israelis.5

Diaspora diplomacy may also aim to influence perceptions of the COR within the COO, often promoting diplomatic agendas of COR state actors, whether intentionally or not. The US Peace Corps is the most obvious example of such state-sponsored public diplomacy. Indicorps exemplifies Secretary Clinton’s assertion that diasporas are ‘our Peace Corps’. For over ten years, Indicorps provided fellowships to people of Indian heritage, enabling them to ‘reconnect with India and with the means to contribute to its development, while fostering a new generation of socially-conscious global leaders’.6 Fellows were intentionally assigned to regions other than their family heritage in order to foster a pan-Indian global identity.7

Diasporas are increasingly recognized for their potential to facilitate and contribute to material exchanges between the COO and the COR. Beyond the much-touted remittances they contribute, the diaspora phenomenon is now viewed as a potential brain gain as opposed to a brain drain. Diasporans participate in short- and long-term knowledge-transfer activities, such as through the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) (most recently in Sudan and the Palestinian Territory); invest in their COOs; facilitate investment in their COO by other actors, including their multinational corporation (MNC) employers;8 and organize and deliver philanthropic programming and humanitarian assistance. The Haitian diaspora, for example, has long contributed philanthropic aid and initiatives in Haiti. Following the 2010 earthquake, the Haitian diaspora’s contributions escalated and were officially recognized by state actors, such as when the Haitian diaspora gained a representative seat on the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.9 Haitian diasporans were also included among the state officials involved — for example, Foreign Service Officer Jean Pierre-Louis served on loan as Senior Program Manager of the Clinton–Bush Haiti Fund from 2010-2012. When working in tandem with official actors, diasporas may enhance relevance, representativeness and responsiveness of development and aid efforts.10

Finally, diaspora efforts can more internally focus within the COR to support the reception of compatriot newcomers. New Coptic immigrants flooded into the United States following the Arab Spring and its aftermath. The Los Angeles Diocese of the Coptic Orthodox Church developed an elaborate support system, including linking new Coptic immigrants to public social services available from other sources. The Diocese also provides cultural education programmes to support new immigrants’ integration into American society, addressing intermarriage and ‘Bridging the Gap’ between parents and their children who have no memory or experience of living in Egypt. US state-sponsored internal diplomatic mechanisms were launched at the city level, supported under the Obama administration through the Building Welcoming Communities Campaign. The city of Pittsburgh launched the ‘30 Neighbors in 30 Days’ project, where immigrants of diverse backgrounds share their stories, broadcasted broadly through social media. The project addresses the perceived need to combat fear of refugees following the 11 September 2001 attacks.

Diaspora Diplomacy Defined

Efforts to define diaspora diplomacy are often case specific (such as the Philippine diaspora),11 function specific (for example, influencing COR foreign policy),12 or role specific (such as the functions of an ambassador).13 Elaine Ho and Fiona McConnell,14 whose work offers the most comprehensive treatment to date, provide a useful starting point for understanding and further refining diaspora diplomacy definitions. Below, I offer several amendments.

Ho and McConnell focus on ‘the role of diasporas in shaping diplomacy’s core functions of representation, communication and mediation’.15 They provide a much-needed expansion of reductionist definitions of diaspora diplomacy. Taking a spatial approach, they move beyond individual nation-states in their analysis, challenging simplistic interpretations of this complex phenomenon. They aptly recognize that diaspora diplomacy extends beyond the territories and targets of nation-states and their governments.

They distinguish diplomacy by diaspora (an agency perspective) and diplomacy through diaspora (an instrumental orientation). I argue that diasporas play three general roles in public diplomacy, as: agents; instruments of others’ diplomatic agendas; and intentional or accidental partners with other actors through uncoordinated efforts in pursuit of common interests. These roles are illustrated in the examples above. Diasporas endeavour to influence public opinion and the opinion of targeted non-state actors and collectives; they also engage directly with governments and international organizations; and they may be used by these to advance state objectives.

Diasporans may be represented among ‘official’ state diplomats. They may even be selected for particular duties because of their diaspora identity, as in the above example of the Haitian-American US Foreign Service Officer. Diasporans may move in and out of official and public roles and positions. For example, Geneive Brown Metzger was a prominent organizer and leader of the Jamaican diaspora in the United States before she was invited by the government of Jamaica to become the Jamaican Consul General for New York. She rescinded her US citizenship to do so and served in that capacity from 2008-2012. She continues to live in New York City and refers to herself as a ‘diaspora strategist’, working with US-based Jamaicans who want to give back to their country of origin.16

As these and other examples attest, diaspora diplomacy is not the exclusive domain of collectives, as Ho and McConnell argue.17 Individuals matter, and they may act decisively, and independently. Ho and McConnell privilege organized groups without sufficiently examining the changing interface between individuals and the groups they organize or whence they emerge, and related activist agendas. For example, individual diaspora leaders from former Zaire mobilized an advocacy campaign for political change in their COO, specifically for support to (targeting the United States) or non-interference in (targeting France) Laurent Kabila’s march to Kinshasa to overthrow Mobutu Sese Seko. They later separated from their diaspora organization to pursue opportunities to serve as individuals in Kabila’s government. The example is similar to Ahmad Chalabi’s influence on US engagement in Iraq.18 Members of Kabila’s government — including some of these diasporans — were not as welcoming of democracy as the United States had been led to believe. The potential for an individual to have a significant impact on diplomacy, including but not limited to their ability to mobilize like-minded diasporans and others, is too obvious to ignore.

What Makes Diaspora Diplomacy Different?

Three important features of diaspora diplomacy distinguish it from public diplomacy more generally. First, the diaspora identity results in specific applications of diplomacy for which diasporans may play a unique role. Second, diasporans’ responses to two global political crises that affect the institutions of governance — crises of identity and inequity19 — yield particular motivations and targets of engagement. Third, diasporans may have a particular in-between advantage20 for public diplomacy.

Diaspora Identity

A fundamental difference between diasporans and other public diplomacy actors is that diasporans’ everyday existence, alone, is an act of public diplomacy. Diaspora identity is neither completely one nor the other, but a mix of characteristics from the country of origin, the country of residence and lived experience. This mix is precisely the foundation on which modern societies have flourished, incorporating diversity along with shared values and aspirations.21 Diasporans may be uniquely capable of bridging the people-to-people understandings that are often the subject of public diplomacy. These identity features are a key component of the in-between advantage discussed below.

The lived experience of diasporans leads to significant public diplomacy — whether intentionally or not. Diasporans are compelled — either for identity expression or social obligation — to remain in contact with their places of origin. Manuel Orozco classifies related engagements as the ‘Five Ts’: transportation; tourism; telecommunications; transfer (remittances, investment and philanthropy); and nostalgic trade.22 Former US Under-Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Maria Otero perhaps put it best: ‘what the State Department might call diplomacy is what you might think of as a phone call home. For those of us who come from a different country, “foreign relations” is family relations’.23

Many diasporans have a sense of not fully belonging in any one territory or affinity group — neither their COO culture nor their adopted country’s culture. This identity challenge may compel them to engage in diaspora diplomacy activities that bridge the divide. In the words of a Dutch-Ethiopian who helped to create a coffee project in Ethiopia: ‘Sometimes I feel schizophrenic. I don’t know who I am. Through this project I know who I am. It has helped me to be myself. […] I don’t have to choose’.24 Mobilization around identity is different from mobilization prompted by material interests. Identity is likely to generate greater passion and staying power, and it may include sacrifice and voluntary efforts without obvious material rewards.

Diasporans’ potential responses to identity challenges are difficult to predict. The COO-related aspects of their identity may be latent; emerging, for example, only when their COO experiences a crisis that propels it to the world stage, or when an element of that identity is directly challenged, compelling a defensive response. After 9/11, some Afghan-Americans mobilized around an Afghan identity for the first time. Diasporans are known to be extremely generous in their response to natural disasters in their country of origin, and this extends beyond financial donations. They mobilize voluntary efforts to respond to immediate needs, and sometimes these efforts may evolve into formal organizations that move beyond relief to promote more sustainable economic development (as seen in Haiti following the devastating earthquake in 2010).

Safeguarding one’s heritage can be a powerful mobilizer of latent diasporans. Diasporas may be particularly important and potent for place branding, influencing thoughts, feelings and associations with a place.25 Ethiopian diasporans organized a campaign to protect Ethiopia’s geographic coffee branding from Starbucks’ efforts to usurp these powerful cultural symbols for profit.26 Accomplished diasporan professionals with broad networks and a deep understanding of American society, government and business led the campaign. They assisted the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office and Oxfam America to mobilize 100,000 petitioners against Starbucks. Starbucks eventually signed voluntary trademark licensing agreements and the US Patent Trade Office ultimately legalized them.

Diasporas’ Response to Global Political Crises

Manuel Castells describes global political crises that impact governance institutions.27 Two are relevant to diasporas’ distinctions in public diplomacy. In a crisis of identity, people see ‘their nation and their culture increasingly disjointed from the mechanisms of political decision-making’. For diasporans, ‘nation’ and ‘culture’ transcend a particular nation-state. Rather than leading them to a resistance identity, as Castells argues, diasporans may mobilize their cultural identity through diverse networks, potentially implicating two or more nation-states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), global civil society, or international organizations, etc. They may sense potential efficacy vis-à-vis more than one mechanism or source of political decision-making, and feel empowered. The US-based Chadian diaspora organized the Groupe de Réflexions et d’Analyses d’Intêréts Tchadiens (GRANIT), a think tank to address ‘the paucity of reflective analysis benefiting the Chadian interest’.28 GRANIT partnered with an international NGO and engaged in numerous international-level policy and advocacy efforts, including crafting policy recommendations to the European Union, US President Barack Obama’s administration and the United Nations.

Castells also describes a crisis of equity, where ‘the process of globalization […] often increases inequality between countries and between social groups within countries’.29 Diasporans often suffer direct, personal experience with these inequities. They may enjoy a quality of life that is inaccessible to most of their compatriots in the COO, including family members. Alternatively, they may provide so much support to family and friends at ‘home’ that they are unable to enjoy the quality of life of those surrounding them in the COR. This visceral understanding spawns their direct interventions, which may bypass governing institutions. They may take the form of individuals or hometown associations directly supporting other individuals and communities through remittances and philanthropy. Diasporans may ask why their family, friends and compatriots do not have access to the same opportunities and institutions and why that lack should be inevitable. They may engage in more targeted advocacy, or institutional interventions, such as knowledge transfer and investment.

In-between Advantage

These identity characteristics and motivations contribute to diasporas’ potential in-between advantage for public diplomacy. These include the back-with-the-future effect and psycho-social and operational advantages.30 Diasporans know what the future can be for their COO, because they have already lived it as diaspora. They have direct understanding and experience, and they may be positioned to ‘translate’ new ideas in local culturally appropriate ways. They may be uniquely able to persuade their COO actors (both official and general publics) to adopt new ideas, as they may be able to connect these ideas to local circumstances with which they may have emotional and socio-cognitive experience.

They may employ socio-cognitive advantages as well as operational ones. They may have the opportunity to operate by exception, since they are not wholly of one culture or the other. And they may use this to their advantage by hedging their identities. They can engage in potentially culturally inappropriate ways while claiming their American selves, including skirting expectations to practise favouritism that reinforces inequitable systems. For example, rather than make promises that she knows she will not want to keep, Nermien Riad, founder of Coptic Orphans, can respond ‘insha’Allah’ (God willing). She operates by exception in Egypt as a woman who is not wealthy, but nevertheless can gain an audience with the Coptic Orthodox Pope.

Operationally, diasporans can connect various sources of resources, both material (funding, expertise and network extensions) and non-material (legitimacy, moral support and authority). They may be well positioned to develop multi-polar influence efforts. They may speak the language of both the COO and the COR; and they may speak the cultural language of different sets of actors, official and unofficial, local and international. For example, Ethiopian diasporan (living in the United States) and economist Eleni Gabre-Madhin was able to do so when she negotiated for donor support — with the Ethiopian prime minister’s blessing — to create the Ethiopian Commodities Exchange.31

What Lies Ahead?

The future of diasporas’ engagement in public diplomacy is likely to reflect increasing complexity. Its features include layered identities that motivate engagement differently, at different times. We have not resolved conceptually or practically how to classify ‘returned’ diasporans and especially those who engage in circular migration — keeping a toehold in more than one country simultaneously or sequentially. Returned Ethiopian diaspora entrepreneurs migrate back and forth between, for example, Ethiopia and the United States. The founding partners of Ernst & Young Ethiopia — returned diaspora entrepreneurs — aspired to serve as much of Africa as possible. The firm’s successful restructuring of Ethiopia Airlines enabled them to specialize in airline restructuring continent-wide.

What might we expect in the future? First, we will see more issue-based diplomacy. Territory of citizenship will likely become less relevant and state power will increasingly become a multi-polar target. For example, the Multicultural Network of Women Workers for Peace (MWPN) assembles women from a variety of diasporas, mostly from countries of origin experiencing conflict. In 2004, the MWPN supported an international mission of women from a variety of diasporas (then living in the Netherlands) to visit Burundi and provide training and support to women politicians to run for parliament. Diplomacy agendas are likely to focus increasingly on shared humanistic concerns and experiences. Within countries of settlement, diasporans from numerous COOs might promote and/or be enabled to come together based on shared experiences related to discrimination, integration and common foreign-policy approaches vis-à-vis countries of origin. This occurred in the United States as various diaspora groups united to protest the Trump administration’s so-called ‘Muslim ban’.

Second, these issue-based diplomatic efforts, as well as campaigns specific to particular identities and experiences, are likely to occur more frequently and with greater potential impact. The role of diasporas in public diplomacy is on the rise. Refugee diasporas are a particular case. Survivors of a concentration camp in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, petitioned the European Union to pressure Serbia and Bosnian Serb authorities to recognize their suffering. They also secured the support of a multinational corporation to pressure local authorities to issue a permit for building a memorial on the site, and to construct a memorial in London.32

Telecommunications and advancements in education and development in both the COR and other identity-based territories have facilitated the enactment of such identities. The Global North’s advantage in information and communications technology (ICT) applies less and less in today’s world. Diasporans have incentives to equip their family members with telecommunication devices for the purpose not only of communicating, but also for financial transfers. The Syrian diaspora, for example, has been credited with ‘shaping the world’s image of the Syrian uprising’.33 Specifically, Syrian diasporans have coordinated social-media sites and internet news channels and trained citizen journalists who remain inside Syria.

Third, telecommunications are imminently manipulatable. Just as we witness a plethora of ‘fake news’, it may become increasingly difficult to decipher ‘fake’ diaspora diplomacy from well-intended and representative diaspora engagement. Misleading diaspora public diplomacy is not new. The Tamil Tigers famously produced their own media, with significant impact on both their diasporas and the general public. Information technologies broaden the tool kit for masking true intentions and maximizing impact on selected audiences.

Need for a New Paradigm?

Ho and McConnell argue that diaspora diplomacy helps to crystallize the limits of our conceptual understanding of public diplomacy. They question, ‘Who has the right to speak for and represent a particular community?’34 Public diplomacy is not a realm where we typically ask whether a particular individual or group has a right to engage. Rather, it behoves us to consider the diaspora connection as a potential motivating and possible explanatory factor for individuals’ and groups’ choice of engagement, subject matter and means. In bringing public and diaspora diplomacy together, we should not be tempted to allow the diaspora’s inclusion to derail what we understand of the bedrock of public diplomacy.

The more appropriate question is whether targets of influence (such as governments and international organizations) should privilege these actors when considering response options. Diasporas are important constituents that may warrant specific outreach and engagement strategies. As with all official diplomacy, it is important to ask whether specific voices are ‘legitimate’ in terms of shared agendas/interests and representativeness of broader constituencies. The potential unique and advantageous features of diaspora diplomacy that are reviewed above should be approached as hypotheses for particular groups and individuals, not as givens. Diasporans are unique actors in public diplomacy in some respects, and no different in others. Diaspora diplomacy suggests a need to develop specialized knowledge. Researchers and policy-makers should focus attention on how to integrate diasporas into existing efforts to account for the complexity of transnational relations broadly. What is needed for diaspora and public diplomacy is not a new conceptual framework, but an enriched one. As global migration continues unabated, and is aided by telecommunications’ innovations, public diplomacy will become increasingly diasporic, with all the opportunities and challenges that diasporas represent.

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff

is Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs, and Associate Dean for Faculty Affairs and Research Initiatives, at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. She holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration from the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. Her most recent book is Institutional Reform and Diaspora Entrepreneurs: The In-Between Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). She won the 2016 Fred Riggs Award for Lifetime Achievement in International and Comparative Public Administration, and is an elected Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration.

1

Hillary Clinton, ‘Keynote Address’ at Global Diaspora Forum (17 May 2011), available online at http://www.diasporaalliance.org/2011-global-diaspora-forum/.

2

See, for example, Emmanuel Ma Mung, ‘Chinese Migration and China’s Foreign Policy in Africa’, Journal of Chinese Overseas, vol. 4, no. 1 (2008), pp. 91-109.

3

Tony Smith, ‘Convergence and Divergence Yesterday and Today in Diaspora–National Government Relations’, in Josh DeWind and Renata Segura (eds), Diaspora Lobbies and the US Government: Convergence and Divergence in Making Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Social Science Research Council and New York University Press, 2014), pp. 239-268.

4

Yossi Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and Their Homelands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); see also Nadejda K. Marinova, Ask What You Can Do for Your (New) Country (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017).

5

‘Geographic Divide: Taking the Pulse of Jews in America and Israel’, Editorial, Jerusalem Post (14 June 2018).

7

Roopal Shah (co-founder of Indicorps), Remarks to the IRG Discussion Forum on Rethinking the Diaspora: Financial Capital Flows, Washington, DC (22 June 2007).

8

See Benjamin A.T. Graham, Investing in the Homeland: The Political Economy of Diaspora Direct Investment (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2019).

9

Daniel P. Erikson, ‘The Haitian Diaspora: Building Bridges After Catastrophe’, in Josh DeWind and Renata Segura (eds), Diaspora Lobbies and the US Government: Convergence and Divergence in Making Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Social Science Research Council and New York University Press, 2014), pp. 185-211.

10

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, ‘Digital Diasporas and International Development: Afghan-Americans and the Reconstruction of Afghanistan’, Public Administration and Development, vol. 24, no. 5 (December 2004), pp. 397-413.

11

Joaquin Jay Gonzalez, III, Diaspora Diplomacy: Philippine Migration and its Soft Power Influences (Minneapolis, MN: Mill City Press, 2012).

12

Josh DeWind and Renata Segura, ‘Diaspora–Government Relations in Forging US Foreign Policy’, in Josh DeWind and Renata Segura (eds), Diaspora Lobbies and the US Government: Convergence and Divergence in Making Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Social Science Research Council and New York University Press, 2014), pp. 3-27.

13

C. Jovenir, ‘Diaspora Diplomacy: Functions, Duties, and Challenges of an Ambassador’, paper for the Understanding Diaspora Diplomacy series (June 2013), available online at http://www.academia.edu/13397113/Diaspora_Diplomacy (accessed 19 December 2018).

14

Elaine L.E. Ho and Fiona McConnell, ‘Conceptualizing “Diaspora Diplomacy”: Territory and Populations betwixt the Domestic and Foreign’, Progress in Human Geography (2017), pp. 1-21, available online at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0309132517740217?journalCode=phgb.

15

Ho and McConnell, ‘Conceptualizing “Diaspora Diplomacy”’, p. 3.

16

See Laura Joseph Mogul, ‘For Former Jamaican Consul General, Cortlandt Manor Is Now Home’, Westchester Magazine (15 July 2015).

17

Ho and McConnell, ‘Conceptualizing “Diaspora Diplomacy”’.

18

Ahmed Chalabi convinced US policy-makers that Iraqis would welcome the 2003 US invasion of Iraq with great enthusiasm and that he enjoyed broad legitimacy from the Iraqi people.

19

Manuel Castells, ‘The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, no. 1 (2008), pp. 78-93.

20

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, Institutional Reform and Diaspora Entrepreneurs: The In-Between Advantage (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016).

21

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, ‘Diaspora Identity and the Potential for Violence: Toward an Identity-Mobilization Framework’, Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research, vol. 8, no. 1 (January 2008), pp. 67-88.

22

Manuel Orozco, Migrant Remittances and Development in the Global Economy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013).

23

Maria Otero, Remarks to the Global Diaspora Forum (17 May 2011).

24

Malugetah Asmallash, Remarks on the Dir Foundation Coffee project in Ethiopia, Policy Seminar on Migration and Development: Diasporas and Policy Dialogue, African Development Policy Centre (with support from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Institute of Social Studies, The Hague (24 October 2007).

25

Peter Van Ham, ‘Place Branding: The State of the Art’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, no. 1 (2008), pp. 126-149.

26

Brinkerhoff, Institutional Reform and Diaspora Entrepreneurs.

27

Castells, ‘The New Public Sphere’, pp. 78-93.

28

Brinkerhoff, Institutional Reform and Diaspora Entrepreneurs.

29

Castells, ‘The New Public Sphere’, p. 78.

30

See Brinkerhoff, Institutional Reform and Diaspora Entrepreneurs.

31

See Brinkerhoff, Institutional Reform and Diaspora Entrepreneurs.

32

Maria Koinova and Dzeneta Karabegovic., ‘Diasporas and Transitional Justice: Transnational Activism from Local to Global Levels of Engagement’, Global Networks, vol. 17, no. 2 (2017), pp. 212-233; see also Maria Koinova, ‘How Refugee Diasporas Respond to Trauma’, Current History, vol. 115, no. 784 (2016), pp. 322-324.

33

Kari Andén-Papadopoulos and Mervi Pantti, ‘The Media Work of Syrian Diaspora Activists: Brokering between the Protest and Mainstream Media’, International Journal of Communication, vol. 7 (2013), pp. 2185-2206 at p. 2185.

34

Ho and McConnell, ‘Conceptualizing “Diaspora Diplomacy”’, p. 15.

Content Metrics

All Time Past Year Past 30 Days
Abstract Views 3513 483 0
Full Text Views 477 134 41
PDF Views & Downloads 741 233 61