Summary
This article seeks to contribute to the burgeoning debate on space diplomacy by examining the historic interplay between diplomatic discussions on outer space and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It studies three significant cases since the Cold War, when space technologies constituted a significant topic in diplomatic exchanges and in advancing foreign policy objectives related to global arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The cases trace early negotiations between Washington and Moscow on using satellites to detect nuclear detonations, to multilateral attempts at establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, and conclude with a study on the use of satellite imagery in inspections under the auspices of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq.
1 Introduction1
Echoing heightened tensions during the Cold War, the domain of space has once again been portrayed as an arena of competition in recent years, leading to worsening tensions in major orbits. In asserting power and dominance in space, however, major powers must tread carefully in order to maintain an internationally co-ordinated space environment to avoid global catastrophic events, both on earth (e.g., nuclear winter) and in orbit (e.g., orbital collapse). Past and ongoing discussions point to the impact that the degradation of the space environment could have on global scientific, civil and military endeavours.2 In the engineering and aerospace sectors, historic debates often point to the threat of negative consequences that earlier nuclear-related activities posed to civilian or scientific activities in outer space. In Hubble Wars, Eric Chaisson, former senior scientist for the Hubble Space Telescope (HST), argues that ‘some of the particles and […] distortion in the Van Allen belts might […] be man-made’. It is suggested that these man-made distortions subsequently affected the launch and operations of the HST.3 He notes that earlier nuclear detonations at the peak of the Cold War, such as Project Argus and Starfish, ‘created vast quantities of energetic particles […] at altitudes as high as 300 miles above the South Atlantic Ocean’. Chaisson contended that these detonations and particles damaged satellites and posed challenges to the HST as the telescope orbited through a zone that he called the ‘orbital analogy of the Bermuda Triangle’.4 A more recent study of unclassified materials in 20175 linked high-altitude nuclear tests conducted during the Cold War with examples ‘of some of the space weather effects frequently caused by the sun’.6 Many of the immediate consequences of these tests, whose implications only came to be appreciated years if not decades later, have surprised scientists. As Chaisson notes, ‘[t]oday’s space scientists might well pay a price for the early successes of these outer-space nuclear explosions’.7
Space technologies and infrastructure constitute critical elements in both global peaceful pursuits (e.g., disaster management) and the advance of national security (e.g., military operations such as Desert Storm). As such, the tension between the need for co-operation and the intention to contend for dominance in space cannot be overstated. As space is once again seen as a contested domain, there has never been a more pressing time to review past experiences in averting catastrophes caused by worsening geopolitical discord. In times of heightened political tensions in the past, how did leaders and policy stakeholders de-escalate potentially catastrophic arms and technology confrontations? What lessons can we learn from the role that space technologies played in relation to global nuclear (dis)armament?
2 Background and Article Structure
In 1971, Lyndon Johnson, the 36th President of the United States, observed in his memoir that ‘[a]mid all the discussion of weaponry and defenses, we heard a great deal about space flight. We were all discovering how thin the line was that separated the two areas’.8 There is strong historic evidence indicating the intertwining relationship of global discussions on the topics of space technologies and nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (NPD). Existing literature in strategic and military studies pays considerable attention to nuclear deterrence, security and historic details of the arms race during the Cold War. Many note the defence-related applications of space technologies in these debates.9 Additionally, descriptive and analytical accounts of Cold War confrontations and negotiations are also rich with emphases on the intricate decision-making process of conventional state actors, mainly senior-ranked statespersons such as Henry Kissinger, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. These materials paint a detailed picture of state leaders’ direct involvement in diplomatic discussions over armament and disarmament, with extensive coverage of the militarised aspect that joins discussions on space technologies with those on weaponry and defence capability.10
While national security and technological competition represent dominant and recurring themes in the existing literature, there have also been substantial contributions from authors who emphasise the co-operative aspect brought forward by space technologies. Many of these authors have conceptualised the Cold War as a period of co-operation. In Gaddis’s work The Long Peace, space technologies are referenced as playing a major role in the monitoring and surveillance of bilateral (dis)armament efforts.11 Gaddis went as far as to argue that the initial tolerance of satellite reconnaissance between Moscow and Washington, particularly in surveilling each other’s nuclear and defence capability, constituted a form of ‘tacit cooperation’.12
Similar views of the Cold War as a period of co-operation were put forward by scholars including Roger Kanet and Edward Kolodziej in the early 1990s.13 In more recent work, James Clay Moltz observed the ‘cooperative restraint’ exercised by Moscow and Washington,14 asserting that
[t]he core space security agreements, reached in the 1960s and early 1970s, endured throughout the cold war, as even the most hawkish of U.S. presidents and Soviet general secretaries found collective approaches to space security to be in their best interests.15
Going beyond the Cold War, discussions about space technologies and NPD gradually became more compartmentalised. Such compartmentalisation is in part a result of increasing institutionalisation and specialisation of long- established international mechanisms, norms and practices. Today, technology-heavy intergovernmental entities, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO) and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), all hold defined and separate mandates. The CTBTO in particular has been institutionalised before the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty has entered into force. This development had in the past given rise to significantly specialised knowledge within different UN agencies. Given that there is no explicit verification mechanism associated with the arms control provision in the Outer Space Treaty,16 bridging discussions on space technologies with those on NPD at the UN level could, at the very least, pose some very challenging questions today.
The role of conventional policy stakeholders (i.e., presidents, prime ministers) is well documented in the existing literature, as are the bilateral and trilateral interactions between Moscow, London and Washington. Nevertheless, in view of the specialised and technical knowledge developed over the years, there remain key aspects that warrant further investigation. Historical documents reveal a time when technical elements of space technologies were not merely instrumental, but overlapped with arms control negotiations and even shaped the boundaries of global disarmament efforts. These debates often went beyond bilateral interactions between Moscow and Washington and included actors from non-traditional, non-hegemonic powers, such as neutral states. Additionally, diplomatic processes associated with these discussions often directly and indirectly involved actors beyond statespersons, including technical and scientific experts. Major scientific figures in NPD negotiations during the Cold War, including Glenn Seaborg and Lord Solly Zuckerman, also appeared to be well versed in, and to a certain extent influential across, a variety of key issue-domains at the time. Notably, contrary to contemporary practices and assumptions, some of the most prominent scientists involved in early disarmament and space treaty negotiations did not come from an aerospace background. For example, Seaborg was most renowned for his work in chemistry, while Lord Zuckerman was originally trained as an anatomist.17 This was likely due to the pioneering nature of space science during the Cold War, when it was still a rapidly developing rather than a fully established field. As such, discussions during the Cold War appear to have been much less compartmentalised, and much more interdisciplinary, compared with those of today.
There is scope to extend existing work to fully capture the complex dynamics between technological advances, policy objectives and international politics. The involvement of scientific officers and technicians in these diplomatic efforts warrants more explicit references and investigation to complement existing work. Seeking to investigate the co-operative opportunities brought by space technologies in de-escalating arms tensions, this article will analyse three cases of the use of satellite imagery, detection and monitoring. The cases were chosen from three eras of space diplomacy that reflect the evolution of global dynamics in recent decades, namely the 1950s-1960s, a period of bipolar influence and dominance by Moscow and Washington on the world stage; the 1970s-1980s, a time of gradual decline of the USSR and the emergence of multilateralism; and the 1990s, an era marked by a US-led new world order against the backdrop of development.18
While space technologies have a wide range of applications, all cases studied in this research will focus on the use of satellite imagery, monitoring and detection in a global context, specifically in relation to ensuring compliance with established or nascent international NPD norms and practices. Earlier work offered extensive examination of the interplay between major statespersons of the two Cold War rivals. This study enriches existing work by investigating the role that scientists and technical experts played in shaping space diplomacy and NPD debates. These cases are significant as they all have a global/ multilateral element, going beyond bilateral negotiations such as the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaties (SALT I & II), which have already been widely studied. Significant cases to be examined include the following:
1) 1950s-1960s: early negotiations between the West and the USSR on outer space affairs and establishing a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT);
2) 1970s-1980s: multilateral debates on the prospect of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA); and
3) 1990s: the use of space technologies and methodologies in the deception and verification of nuclear weapons facilities.
By examining UN documents and archival materials, accounts of former on-site inspectors, letters, books, and memoirs of major decision-makers and scientists since the Cold War, this research identifies and comprehends the conditions under which discussions on the topic of space succeeded or failed in leveraging political capital for global NPD. It represents a modest but timely attempt at unpacking the intricate linkages between space diplomacy and wider global security concerns.
3 Space Diplomacy
3.1 Defining Space: Domain, Infrastructure, Technologies
One of the most challenging aspects of discussing space diplomacy is the diversity of views when it comes to outer space. To start, an internationally binding universal definition of where ‘space’ begins is yet to emerge.19 This ambiguity has in the past allowed political deadlock to be broken in international negotiations. For example, discussions on the prospect of a Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (PTBT) broke the US–USSR negotiation stalemate over details of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. However, this ambiguity also opened up space-related treaties to diverging interpretations, rendering a shared understanding of the rules difficult at times. To some international legal scholars, space represents a domain with physical and territorial characteristics that requires governance akin to agreements associated with the seabed and the Antarctic (i.e., the Seabed Treaty 1971, the Antarctic Treaty 1959). To others, such as scientists and engineers, space is first and foremost an area of scientific curiosity, research, technological breakthroughs and innovation. This can range from observational astronomy, looking into deep space in search of the origin of the universe, to pioneering hardware and software solutions aimed at mitigating space debris risk. For the defence sector, space is often viewed as the ‘ultimate high ground’, where space technologies play a critical role in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities, and where strategic advantages can be gained to ensure both operational and national interests.20 To many ordinary citizens, however, it is the smooth functioning of the space infrastructure that enables their vital day-to-day socio-economic activities, such as SatNav-assisted driving, weather forecasting and time-stamping in financial markets. In this sense, the smooth operation of the space infrastructure includes not only physical elements such as the global satellite navigation systems (GNSS), but also intangible elements such as international governance, norms and practices that ensure the robust allocation of spectrum and orbital positions. All these elements are critical in limiting disruptions caused by competition and radio frequency interference.
The priorities of these diverse groups of stakeholders in relation to space might vary greatly from one group to another. The astronomy community has expressed concern over light pollution caused by the latest trend of installing mega-satellite constellations. Operators of satellite constellations are in turn concerned with increasing competition for frequency spectrum — specific wavelengths that are essential for connecting satellites in orbit with ground stations. As radio frequency is a resource shared by both ground-based and space-based technologies (e.g., 5G, mobile network backhaul, satellite broadcast), the proliferation of off-the-shelf satellites could have implications for the roll-out of future and emerging technologies, and vice versa. Non-governmental organisations and intergovernmental agencies (e.g., IAEA, CTBTO) rely on space data and communications for analysis and the relay of critical information, both in times of crisis (e.g., Fukushima) and in peaceful time. Amid heightening geopolitical tensions and weakening multilateralism, the international community’s ability to share reliable space data (e.g., satellite imagery in high resolution) and secure satellite communications is paramount for the continuous monitoring of compliance with international regimes.21 Finally, military personnel are concerned with kinetic, software, spoofing and jamming attacks on its space-associated assets.22 Events such as the 2019 Mission Shakti, when an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test was conducted,23 suggest that emerging spacefaring countries (e.g., India) could pose just as much threat as established spacefarers (e.g., United States, China) of disrupting the smooth functioning of the space infrastructure.
3.2 Science Diplomacy: The Interplay between Science and Diplomacy
The previous examples give only a glimpse of the multifaceted nature of global space governance. Military space activities (e.g., ASAT, high-altitude nuclear tests) can have direct consequences for the civilian use of outer space and related technologies beyond national boundaries. Space debris and radiation can affect available orbital trajectories. Given society’s reliance on the space infrastructure, the topic of space has long constituted a topic of international diplomatic exchanges, not only between established spacefarers but also with countries that may or may not have explicit space ambitions. Yet, beyond a focus on Washington and Moscow during the Cold War, there have been few attempts at comprehensively understanding when and how space issues have shaped, informed or interacted with global diplomatic discourse.
Here, a new body of work on science diplomacy — designed to provide a more coherent framework for appreciating the linkages between diplomatic and scientific efforts — may be of relevance. This work, while still in the development stage, could serve to inform debates in the burgeoning field of space diplomacy.
In conceptualising the interplay between science and diplomacy, the Royal Society in 2010 proposed three key dimensions through which ‘science can contribute to foreign policy objectives’, namely: 1) science in diplomacy, when scientific evidence and/or advice is used to inform foreign policy and international discussions; 2) diplomacy for science, when diplomacy plays a role in facilitating global scientific co-operation; and 3) science for diplomacy, when scientific collaboration is utilised to improve international relations.24 One prominent example of science for diplomacy is the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East (SESAME), a collaborative project with Jordan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority as founding members. It is a significant co-operative endeavour aimed at improving diplomatic relations — many of the founding members did not have official diplomatic links when the project was first conceived.25 That said, the role that science has played in diplomacy has often been more subtle, despite the success of a few prominent and observable international collaborative projects such as the International Space Station (ISS), SESAME and the European Council for Nuclear Research (CERN). While successes in science for diplomacy (e.g., CERN) often put science diplomacy in the public spotlight, many significant cases have escaped in-depth analysis, particularly those that have occurred behind the scenes in the dimensions of science in diplomacy and diplomacy for science.
Similar to particle physics, which has witnessed major international collaboration (e.g., CERN, SESAME), space has also been a major scientific area of international importance. Ever since the first satellite — Sputnik I — was launched in 1957, scientific communities across the globe have engaged in national and international endeavours with major impact. From the USSR Academy of Sciences’ involvement in the development of Sputnik, to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee’s discussions on space activities at the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in Vienna, scientific communities have been an integral part of policy-making at the national, regional and international levels. Space diplomacy, like science diplomacy, can benefit from conceptual dimensions of space in diplomacy, diplomacy for space and space for diplomacy.
Successful space for diplomacy initiatives, such as the ISS, have been extensively studied. Noting that space diplomacy goes beyond observable projects such as the ISS, this article seeks to redress a literature gap in the discussions of space imagery, monitoring and detection technologies. The following case studies identify significant instances when space discussions have constituted major diplomatic efforts amid a changing environment of military and geopolitical tensions. Together they form a comprehensive attempt at analysing how space technologies have interacted with and engendered the discourse of arms control and global NPD efforts.
4 1950s-1960s: Early Integration of Space Technologies into Global Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Efforts
4.1 Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the VELA Program
Although many refer to US President John F. Kennedy’s ambitious speech in 1962 as the watershed moment for the topic of space,26 US–USSR discussions on space actually date back to the Eisenhower administration. Dwight Eisenhower has long been described as having been sceptical of Kennedy’s space programmes and has been quoted as calling the Apollo project ‘nuts’.27 Yet, as President, Eisenhower’s policy vis-à-vis Moscow suggests he may have seen space technologies as having utilitarian value for specific foreign policy objectives. In the initial stage of the nuclear test-ban negotiations in the 1950s, satellite technologies were seen by both Washington and Moscow as a viable means of non-intrusive verification and detection of nuclear detonations. Shortly after an agreement was reached between Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev in May 1959, the Technical Working Group I of the Geneva Conference proposed the installation of up to six satellites in orbit for the detection of radiation — measures designed to play a part in the wider detection system to ensure compliance with the ban on nuclear explosions in outer space.28 These recommendations were subsequently taken up by Washington, and the VELA Satellite Detectors Program (hereafter the VELA Program) was conceived. The VELA Program comprised three sub-programs: ‘a) detection of underground detonations; b) detection, by means of satellites, of nuclear explosions in space; and c) detection of nuclear explosions in space through ground equipment’.29 The VELA Program was supervised by the US Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) — the predecessor of today’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Its specific objective was to develop mechanism(s) to monitor a CTBT.30 In 1964, Glenn Seaborg, the first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a Nobel laureate in Chemistry, reported to the US Congress that detection satellites had already been installed in 1963, and the plan was for these to be followed by further launches and installations.31
4.2 Satellite Verification and Attempts at Concluding a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
It is remarkable to see how the VELA Program, with a substantial space element, was specifically tied to the goal of supporting monitoring for a CTBT in the 1960s. Scientists involved in NPD during the Cold War often expressed disappointment at the diplomatic community’s failure in securing a CTBT.32 For decades, the CTBT has been a thorny subject in national politics and international diplomacy. Conceived over half a century ago, it still has not entered into force as of 2022. Successive US presidents since Kennedy, including Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, have attempted to secure the US Senate’s ratification of the treaty domestically, but none has been successful thus far.33 Today, whenever a new president is sworn into office in Washington, one of the first questions asked is whether (s)he will pursue ratification of the CTBT. Early in his tenure, Obama expressed his intention to secure the CTBT’s ratification and a world free of nuclear weapons, most famously in his Prague speech.34 However, he never did present the Senate with the ratification proposal during his two terms in the White House. The Clinton administration went the furthest, having put forward the CTBT to the Senate for ratification in 1999. Unfortunately, the proposal was rejected by a vote of 51 to 48.35
Reflecting on the decades-long test-ban negotiations with Moscow, Seaborg in 1981 explored a counter-factual scenario — one in which both Kennedy and Khrushchev had survived. Seaborg recalled Averell Harriman, then Ambassador at Large, recounting Kennedy’s intention to further improve relations with Moscow should he win a second term. Seaborg contended that ‘it is logical to believe that a comprehensive test ban would have been the centerpiece of [Kennedy’s] efforts [should he had survived]’.36 Whether Kennedy would have been successful in garnering the domestic support necessary for such a goal, Seaborg argued, would have hinged on convincing the military and domestic opposition that adequate verification provisions were in place to dissuade Moscow from non-compliance. Seaborg expressed confidence in the rapid advance of detection techniques enabled by VELA in the 1960s, and he believed that ‘verification would have proven less of a stumbling block in Kennedy’s second term’.37 Should Kennedy have survived and won a second election, Seaborg believed that Kennedy would have likely secured the domestic support necessary for a comprehensive test ban.38
4.3 Space Diplomacy as an Opportunity for De-escalating the Arms Race
Conventional interpretations of science in diplomacy mainly focus on how scientific evidence informs decision-making (e.g., ozone depletion, climate change). The role of space science here, however, takes on an additional layer of importance and relevance: the (perceived) maturity and advances of detection technologies, including satellite technologies, are seen to have played a critical role in convincing not only Moscow, but also the military and domestic opposition in the United States, that a comprehensive test ban could be enforced.
Historically, verification had always been a challenging topic in arms control and disarmament negotiations. It was a contentious topic in domestic US politics, and it also proved to be a frequent point of disagreement between Washington and Moscow. This observation was made not only by Seaborg, but also by Lord Solly Zuckerman, then Chief Scientific Advisor of the British Ministry of Defence (MOD).39 During the negotiations of the PTBT, Moscow found Washington’s insistence on numerous on-site inspections (OSI) difficult to accommodate. Given Moscow’s general aversion to the use of OSI in detecting treaty violations, the potential of non-intrusive methods, such as satellite monitoring and detection, opened a door to continued diplomatic efforts between the Kennedy and Khrushchev administrations in de-escalating the arms race.
One of the first concessions the West made in 1961 was to agree to a total test ban in outer space. This concession was put forward even as the effectiveness of the verification mechanism proposed by the Technical Working Group I in Geneva remained in question.40 Later on, in the late 1960s, Seaborg asserted that the significant progress in the VELA Program had led ‘Western powers to abandon the requirement for a network of internationally manned detection stations on Soviet soil’.41 Although many involved in the process regretted that the negotiations did not break the impasse over a CTBT, the PTBT and the Outer Space Treaty were successfully ratified in 1963 and 1967 respectively. These treaties ensure that no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are placed in orbit, installed on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space in any other manner. They also ensure that no nuclear detonation can be carried out in or beyond earth’s atmosphere. Since these treaties were concluded, to date, there have not been any atmospheric tests or nuclear detonations in outer space, nor have there been any installations of WMD detected in orbit. While many found these international instruments insufficient in advancing the cause of NPD, these are not negligible achievements. In the 1960s, there were genuine fears that orbital bombs would be deployed, which would lead to catastrophic events as well as potentially disastrous arms escalation. As such, these treaties concluded at the peak of Cold War tensions should not be taken for granted. Commencing the chapter on space in his memoir, Lyndon Johnson hailed the conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 as a ‘great achievement’ and ‘an inspiring moment in the history of the human race’.42
5 Late 1970s-Early 1980s: Proposal for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency
Following earlier discussions between the US and Soviet Union, the idea to explicitly link space technologies to the monitoring of security agreements re-emerged in the late 1970s at the intergovernmental level. At the 33rd regular session of the UN General Assembly in 1978, France, along with 26 UN member states, proposed to establish an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA).43 The original idea of the agency, as detailed by France, was
[to participate] in monitoring the implementation of international disarmament and security agreements, and […] in the investigation of specific situations. In the first case, the parties to a disarmament agreement would jointly specify the link to be established between the agreement in question and the agency’s monitoring work. In the second case, the agency might be called in by the Security Council in accordance with Article 34 of the United Nations Charter. […] The agency would be established as a specialized agency of the United Nations.44
This can be seen as an attempt to scale up the predominantly bilateral disarmament agreements between Washington and Moscow and further institutionalise the use of space technologies for global peace and security through the establishment of a specialised UN entity. It would have been an international undertaking demanding resources and contributions from members beyond the two dominant powers (i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union). Not only would it have allowed declared nuclear weapons states (NWS) to monitor each other’s compliance, it would also have equipped the wider international community, including non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) (e.g., neutral states such as Austria), with the means to check the adherence of NWS to international disarmament agreements. This could be seen as a continuation of the international community’s ‘unrelenting’ call on the NWS for a CTBT, as observed by Seaborg in the 1960s.45 The Austrian delegation elaborated on its support for the ISMA proposal, arguing that the formation of the agency would reduce global geopolitical tensions and strengthen international confidence in the international disarmament regime:
The de facto exclusion of almost all States from the possibility to observe, for instance, the current status and deployment of strategic nuclear-weapon systems, which jeopardize the security of all States of the world, is one of the main reasons for the uneasiness and distrust of many States vis-à-vis those States that possess these weapon systems in unimaginable quantities and which at the same time are in the sole position to verify each other’s nuclear capacities. […] The proposal to establish an international satellite monitoring agency […] would […] contribute considerably to increasing international confidence and reducing international tensions.46
This statement from Vienna aptly captured the essence of international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts at the time — NNWS were to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons with the understanding that NWS, in addition to extending their nuclear umbrellas, would commit to disarmament and reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles. Up to that point, the monitoring of disarmament efforts of NWS remained largely national and bilateral affairs within and between major NWS. Austria’s statement thus represented the hope of the international community to build an intergovernmental mechanism, equipped with the technological capacity to ensure not only that NNWS comply with the non-proliferation clause, but also that NWS honour their end of the bargain.
5.1 Diplomacy for Space and Space in Diplomacy
Considering the ambition and collaborative efforts required in proposing the agency, this initiative reflects at least two interwoven dimensions of space diplomacy, namely, diplomacy for space, and space in diplomacy. Diplomacy for space is observed as diplomatic efforts were made to examine the potential of creating a technology- and science-intensive international entity, leading to the proposal for ISMA tabled by France with 26 member states. Here, space technologies were identified as an area for strengthening international co-operation. Had the proposal been adopted, the international community would have seen further institutionalisation of international norms, practices and expectations associated with using satellite technologies to ensure compliance with international regimes. This would in turn constitute space in diplomacy, whereby stronger institutionalised capacity would contribute to better enforcement of international arms control and disarmament agreements.
5.2 Obstacles to Intergovernmental Co-operation
Following Paris’s proposal, then UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim requested a group of experts to study the technical, legal and financial implications associated with the creation of such an agency.47 The group of experts, chaired by Hubert G. Bortzmeyer, submitted a unanimous report with the following key findings:
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The group recognised that satellite monitoring could make valuable contributions to verifying arms control and disarmament agreements; it could also play a role in resolving international crises and contribute to confidence-building.48
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The group found that satellite observations for the purpose of monitoring and the verification of compliance with international treaties is ‘both possible and feasible’, and that technical challenges could be tackled by breaking down the establishment of the agency into different development stages.49
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Legally, the group found no provision in international law that would prohibit the establishment of such an organisation.50
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Providing various financial estimates based on a variety of technical options, the group contended that even in the most expensive scenario, the agency would not cost the international community more than 1 per cent of the total annual expenditure on armaments per year.51
The expert group appeared to have found no major technical, legal or financial obstacles to the establishment of an agency that utilises space data for monitoring compliance with arms control and disarmament treaties. However, one major obstacle for the report to gain critical support was the absence of direct input from Moscow and Washington. When findings of the report were presented to the Secretary-General in July 1981 through a series of inter-office memoranda, Ben Sanders, Officer-in-Charge of the Centre for Disarmament, noted that ‘the two powers principally engaged with satellite monitoring — the USSR and the USA — did not participate’.52 Others noted the lack of specifics for concretely implementing the initiative, with one note in the archive folder describing the report as ‘innocuous’ and saying that ‘the tricky points (verification, conflict monitoring) remain to be studied in depth’.53
In fact, difficulties in moving the initiative forward could be observed even before the study was conducted. To the disappointment of the member states who had put forward the idea, the proposal faced resistance even before the feasibility report was concluded, most notably from the United States. Washington voiced its reservations and argued that such an agency ‘would be neither feasible nor desirable in the foreseeable future’.54 It expressed concerns over a variety of political, organisational, technical and financial issues, including cost, decision-making mechanisms within the agency, potential disputes within the agency that might erode confidence in verification, and members states’ access to sensitive data. The most important and nuanced concern, however, was whether satellite imagery could be independently authoritative in monitoring compliance with international regimes. Washington argued that satellite images and data often rely on other sources of information in their interpretations.55 This suggests there would be considerable challenges in monitoring and verification, even if an ISMA-controlled satellite constellation could be installed. This last point remains a major concern for Washington even as space technologies have significantly matured since 1979. During UN-sanctioned inspections under the auspices of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), the objectivity and independent authority of satellite imagery resurfaced as a major issue that has direct consequences for progress of the inspectorate.
5.3 Multilateral Attempts at Building Rules of the Road
Discussions over ISMA in 1979 revealed how policy stakeholders perceived both the potential and the limitations of utilising satellite imagery for verification of arms control and disarmament. Reservations over the use of satellites trumped the potential benefits discussed, and the proposal for ISMA did not crystallise. Parallel to debates over the prospect of ISMA, 1979 also witnessed the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (also known as the Moon Treaty) opened for signatures. The Moon Treaty subsequently entered into force in 1984, but none of the states with human spaceflight or moon-landing capability ratified the treaty. The late 1970s to early 1980s thus were a dynamic period when the international community dedicated considerable attention to, and made attempts at, establishing a shared understanding of ‘rules of the road’ for the usage of satellite technologies and the development of space activities. We know in hindsight that the intergovernmental co-operation that France envisaged — a highly institutionalised form of interstate co-operation — did not materialise. However, discussions on ISMA can be conceptualised as an important part of the wider process of space diplomacy. In contrast to exchanges in the previous decade, the space and NPD discussions were no longer limited to states most assertively developing the technology (i.e., the US and USSR). The ISMA initiative opened up the dialogue on space affairs and NPD to actors beyond London, Moscow and Washington. They brought to the UN General Assembly perspectives from NNWS, as well as from neutral countries (e.g., Austria, Switzerland) that were not aligned with established security communities. Hence, discussions on ISMA in the 1970s and 1980s represent an important milestone in the evolution of the post-hegemonic world order. While the influence of Moscow and Washington remained comparatively more impactful than that of other states, discussions on ISMA and the Moon Treaty reflected the decline of US–USSR bipolar dominance in world affairs, with both Moscow’s and Washington’s control over international agenda-setting — on what could or could not be discussed — gradually diminishing.
6 1990s: Satellite Imagery and Compliance with International Regimes; United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, 1991-1999
The previous two cases highlight how satellite technologies were proposed and/or utilised as a non-intrusive mechanism to monitor compliance with international agreements. The following case investigates the use of space technologies in implementing international agreements even when intrusive measures can be deployed. It highlights how space technologies, in addition to playing an enabling role during treaty formation, are often integral to the enforcement of international agreements.
6.1 UNSCOM and the Al-Tarmiya Facility
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 687 mandating that Iraq dismantle its WMD. Resolution 687 represents one of the earliest forms of international disarmament verification, authorising one of the most intrusive inspection regimes to date.56 To implement the resolution, the UNSCOM was created in 1991 to inspect and oversee the disarmament of the country’s chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missile capabilities, as well as its production and storage facilities. The dismantling of the country’s nuclear weapons programme was also mandated, and the IAEA was tasked with ensuring compliance with Resolution 687. At the same time, UNSCOM was tasked with assisting and co-operating with the IAEA in implementing the resolution.57
6.1.1 Photointerpretation of Satellite Imagery: Verification and Deception in International Inspections
According to Jonathan Tucker, a former UNSCOM inspector, the inspection regime was considered one of the most intrusive: UNSCOM and the IAEA were granted the right to run no-notice inspections throughout Iraq.58 Yet even with such an unprecedented mandate, inspections remained a challenging and expensive endeavour. Firstly, the UN relied on member states to commit resources and personnel to the mission. As such, the mission required the pooling of resources from member states with varying views on UNSCOM’s priority. Secondly, even if resources and personnel had not been a concern, the mission still needed to identify and prioritise potential sites and facilities relevant to verification. The mission had neither the time nor the means to go in and inspect random locations, which would have put undue pressure on its limited resources.
The identification of these sites relied on intelligence, particularly from the US. Satellite imagery thus constituted one major source of intelligence before the inspection team was dispatched on site.
6.1.2 Deception and Photointerpretation
While Washington resisted the establishment of multilateral agencies such as ISMA in the 1970s, there was evidence to suggest that the United States did share satellite data and intelligence on a bilateral and case-by-case basis with other countries. According to Tucker, collaborations between the United States and Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s means that Iraqi counterintelligence was familiar with the Western methodology of reconnaissance satellite imagery. Iraqi counterintelligence was thus aware of the methodology’s potentials and limitations, as well as how the imagery was interpreted and deciphered.59 Tucker argued that the Iraqi nuclear enrichment programme was deliberately designed in such a way that it did not contain signatures of conventional enrichment facilities observable by satellites. Instead of adopting more contemporary methods, Baghdad opted for a legacy enrichment technology dating back to the 1940s — electro-magnetic isotope separation (EMIS) — a technology that has long become obsolete since the end of the Second World War.60
Additionally, according to a report from the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, the EMIS facility in Al-Tarmiya was designed with no visible major power source nor security fences. It thus gave the impression that the facility was not of any strategic importance.61 Inspectors only later found out that the facility was powered by a 30-kV underground electrical feed, connected to a 150MWe substation kilometres away from the site. It was also located within a larger military security zone, which explains the lack of a security presence in the facility’s immediate vicinity.62 Tucker observed:
Iraqi counterintelligence officials have sought to exploit deep-seated misconceptions and prejudices on the part of Western intelligence analysts. They are aware that Western analysts tend to engage in ‘mirror-imaging’ — the false assumption that other countries use the same production technologies and safety and environmental standards as those employed in the West.63
Having observed the non-co-operative environment in which the international inspectorate had to operate, Tucker contended that intelligence played a key role in guiding the mission. He pointed to the limitations of relying on satellite imagery: the classified nature of the resolution of satellite images meant that only a handful of staff had access to this medium of intelligence, namely, the Office of the Executive Chairman, and the chief inspectors. Others on the UNSCOM team could not independently analyse these satellite resources.64 This begs the question: had the images been opened up to scrutiny and analysis by a wider group, with a more diverse range of perspectives, would Al-Tarmiya have been located much earlier, saving valuable human and financial resources in the process?
The Al-Tarmiya case reflects the nuanced scenario in which space technologies (i.e., the methodology and technical specificities of satellite images) are utilised in both the concealing and the verification of WMDs. Diplomatically, this case showed that science and technology (S&T) are heavily relied upon for international monitoring and verification, to the extent that they set the scope and boundaries of what an inspectorate could achieve. Satellite technologies also played a key role in the exchanges between Baghdad, the IAEA and the international inspectorate over the co-ordination of no-notice inspections. Thus, this constitutes a complex scenario of space in diplomacy, in which scientific methodologies (e.g., photointerpretation), along with satellite specificities, both enabled and hindered global efforts in monitoring compliance with international disarmament instruments (i.e., Resolution 687). Firstly, space-derived data and scientific interpretation of the evidence shaped, informed and determined potential sites of UNSCOM inspections. Secondly, the Al-Tarmiya facility was fundamentally shaped by the methodology established for the photointerpretation of satellite images. It was built with the intention of evading detection from space by satellites. There cannot be a stronger case to highlight how the epistemology of space technologies played a determining role in the policy of great national and international importance.
6.2 Satellite Imagery and Its Reliance on Additional Intelligence for Interpretations
The Al-Tarmiya experience showed that the human factor will always play a role in interpreting space-derived evidence. Even for more recent efforts, such as the tracking of North Korea’s nuclear activities, analysts agree that there is an element of human interpretation in the process. As Jeremy Hsu has argued, ‘[i]nterpretation of satellite imagery still depends heavily on human expertise factor. And experienced analysts are always careful to caution that satellite images represent just one piece of a much larger puzzle when it comes to gathering intelligence on North Korea’.65
The Al-Tarmiya facility escaped initial identification in the early stage of inspection. The UNSCOM experience in the 1990s echoes one persistent concern: that additional information and intelligence are always needed in deciphering satellite imagery. Recalling the UNSCOM experience, Tucker remarked that Western photointerpreters at one point were puzzled by numerous large saucer-shaped objects that they had observed in intelligence images. They were unable to interpret the functions of these calutrons as they did not mirror any instruments linked to WMD production in the West. It was not until the second IAEA inspection, with the help of intelligence from human sources, that the team realised these were powerful electromagnets, employed to separate isotopes for uranium enrichment.66 In the case of Al-Tarmiya, the photointerpreters assumed Baghdad’s nuclear enrichment programmes would share signatures and characteristics of Western ones. The human factor in interpretation thus played a role in the inspection, verification and, by extension, diplomatic processes.
The sensitivity of the resolution of satellite imagery might have justified UNSCOM’s limited access to these resources. Yet the experience of the inspectorate showed that a highly specialised approach to deciphering satellite images, known only to a small group of experts sharing similar backgrounds, might have rendered Baghdad’s concealment possible.
Satellite reconnaissance may still have constituted a sophisticated technology exclusive to a few states in the 1990s. Today, however, the technology has become much more accessible. Commercial satellite imagery has matured considerably and is now an economically and technologically accessible resource for a wide variety of applications, including investigative journalism (e.g., finding the ‘smoking gun’), climate change modelling, monitoring of human rights situations and more. The technology has matured and been commercialised to such an extent that commercial providers today are obligated to artificially degrade the image resolution before the imagery can be sold.67
Given the recent proliferation and accessibility of satellite imagery, it is curious that satellite imagery and earth observation technologies are yet to have a more prominent role in UN NPD efforts. The satellite infrastructure is indeed relied upon for both communications and data relay for major disarmament entities, including the IAEA and the CTBTO. The satellite communications infrastructure also plays a critical role in enabling the transmission of data gathered by various monitoring technologies. For example, the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS) utilises seismic, hydro-acoustic, infra-sound and radionuclide monitoring stations and laboratories for NPD purposes, as well as for providing early warning for natural disasters.68 Nevertheless, satellite monitoring is yet to be fully integrated in the IMS mechanism for NPD purposes.
7 Discussion
7.1 Space Diplomacy in Action
Summarising observations from the previous three cases, space diplomacy reflects a process which has often involved actors beyond statespersons. Input from scientists, weapons inspectors and photo-interpreters, whose roles are sometimes thought to be merely functional, often have a direct or indirect impact on actions, processes and even results in foreign policy and diplomatic exchanges. For example, photointerpretation methodology in the Al-Tarmiya case demonstrated that the methodology affected both national technology policy and international inspection processes.
The above cases reflect instances when space diplomacy was employed in persuasion and communications in the process of advancing certain foreign policy objectives. However, the success or failure of space diplomacy in persuading and communicating hinges upon multiple additional factors, including the geopolitical contexts under which key stakeholders operate, domestic support, as well as varying degrees of sensitivity towards technology transfer. The following two examples illustrate how space diplomacy was employed in the above cases to facilitate diplomatic exchanges or to advance foreign policy objectives.
7.1.1 Persuasion
At the peak of the Cold War, space technologies played a role in persuading policy stakeholders that newly developed S&T could adequately monitor compliance, build confidence between rivals and deter cheating in arms control agreements. In the United States, they additionally played a role in convincing the domestic opposition and the military that co-operation, rather than escalating competition, could be a viable approach to be pursued with their Cold War counterparts.
7.1.2 Communicating at the International Level
Structural realists may argue that a bipolar world order represents a more favourable environment to conclude binding international agreements, as observed in the success of compromises (e.g., Outer Space Treaty, PTBT) during protracted test-ban negotiations in the 1960s. Subsequently, the international community attempted to strengthen the communication of goodwill and commitment to binding international agreements. It sought to achieve confidence-building through establishing shared rules and norms by introducing the ISMA. However, it transpired that the major powers were sensitive to the transfer of knowledge and information multilaterally. Cremins observed that Washington ‘continue[d] to express discomfort when concepts like ISMA are discussed’.69 He attributed ‘a large part of this discomfort […] to reasonable concerns about large, global bureaucratic security systems and the transfer of national sovereignty’.70 Thus, while satellite technologies were hailed by Moscow and Washington as a viable non-intrusive instrument to monitor each other’s compliance with disarmament efforts, traditional or hegemonic power(s) appeared to feel uneasy about the same technology and data being accessed by, and communicated to, a wider group of stakeholders for the purposes of monitoring their own behaviour.
7.2 Space Diplomacy through the Ages
The three cases examined also epitomise three different eras of space diplomacy, all operating against the backdrop of a changing geopolitical context and evolving international order. The three eras examined thus provide good examples to illustrate the evolution of major theories in International Relations (IR), giving contexts under which major IR theories and academic discussions were shaped. Drawing on references to key IR theories, the following sections analyse the dynamic interplay between actors, technologies and the corresponding political structure under which space diplomacy thrived and waned.
7.2.1 1950s-1960s: Bipolar World Order and VELA
Amid the escalating arms race, space technologies became a burgeoning field of technological breakthrough and innovation for the two superpowers. In a time when stalemate over intrusive verification (i.e., OSI, international network of monitoring stations) severely hindered arms control negotiations, advances in satellite detection techniques opened up discussions and brought about possible compromises between Moscow and Washington. Realist scholars would argue that the two superpowers were trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma and a zero-sum game, with defecting being the ‘rational’ option. Here, the development (and the perceived ability) of space detection techniques served to bridge the information gap, enabling the emergence of limited co-operation in disarmament and non-proliferation. Equipped now with a certain level of capacity to detect violations or defection without compromising national sovereignty, the two powers were able to move beyond the deadlock of the prisoner’s dilemma game and reach limited agreements in arms control.
7.2.2 Late 1970s-Early 1980s: A Budding Multilateral World Order and ISMA
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed increasing multilateral interest in utilising space technologies for global monitoring of disarmament agreements. As the tensions of the arms race eased with a period of détente, the global power dynamic shifted. The debate on space and nuclear disarmament now involved a wider group of stakeholders, including non-traditional powers that held no major military capabilities, such as Austria. Reassurances of commitment to arms control treaties were now being requested from NWS, not only to show other NWS that there had been no violations, but also to address the demands of NNWS. The international community proposed further institutionalisation of the use of space technologies to ensure compliance with international arms control regimes. This development could be of particular interest to liberal institutionalists, who focus on co-operation enabled by institutions. In this instance, states that backed the ISMA proposal wished to enhance multilateral co-operation by establishing institutions, with the goal to build confidence and reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. While hegemonic powers (e.g., the US) are said to have shaped the post-war international order, we now see that non-hegemonic powers (e.g., France) also took the initiative to shape the intergovernmental machinery. Nevertheless, major powers such as the United States remained influential, and the ISMA was not able to proceed without the support of Washington.
7.2.3 1990s: UNSCOM and Challenges to the International Order
By the 1990s, the world had moved beyond a bipolar world order and sanctions against Iraq demonstrated that multilateralism, led by Washington, was in full swing. In a rare occurrence in the Security Council, Resolution 687 — considered one of the most intrusive UN missions to date — was passed with no veto and no abstention from the permanent members. The international inspectorate was formed, with (former) hegemons contributing considerable support to a series of inspections. Support included the sharing of satellite imagery, albeit only with limited personnel of the inspectorate. Inadvertently, the case showed just how integral and influential space technologies and their associated methodologies are in shaping national policies and international affairs. To begin with, the case demonstrated the more conventional use of space data — as a source of intelligence in signposting sites of interest for the inspectorate. Then came the more nuanced use of the technology, when the knowledge of photointerpretation methodology was exploited to evade detection of enrichment facilities. In spite of the asymmetry in resources, technology and conventional military capabilities between Baghdad and Washington, the Al-Tarmiya facility succeeded in evading early detection by the international inspection regime. This move challenged conventional theories’ emphasis on material powers. In this specific instance of deception, conventional powers’ dominance in developing and shaping global S&T methodology was exploited, rendering it difficult for the West to perceive alternative ways to utilise S&T. Rather than a strength, major powers’ dominance in S&T here was manifested as a weakness in the course of their pursuit of their desired foreign policy objectives.
8 Conclusion: Lessons for Today
Analysis of the interplay between outer space, arms control and disarmament affairs has revealed a complex dynamic. The three cases saw the ever-changing political context, diverse contributions from foreign policy stakeholders (including statesmen, scientists and technical advisers), and the actual and perceived capability of technological advances, all converge to shape interstate diplomatic relations. While major theories in IR (e.g., realism, liberal institutionalism) are helpful in understanding some aspects of the successes and failures of space diplomacy, the cases discussed here show that the topic cannot be fully unpacked without an appreciation for the technical specificities of some of the science and technologies involved. Although this article focuses on interstate exchanges, it is evident that factors both above and below the state level, including structural context and individual actors such as photointerpreters, also played a considerable role in the process. There is a need for further studies across multiple levels of analysis, and greater synergy across disciplines in comprehending the diplomatic process related to space technologies and NPD.
There is also a need for greater awareness of the danger of increasing compartmentalisation in the study of diplomacy and global affairs. Parallel advances in space detection and nuclear weapons in the Cold War caution against borrowing nuclear deterrence logic to prescriptively conceptualise ‘space power’. While policy stakeholders at the peak of the Cold War were cognisant of the offensive potential of space technologies, they also appeared to have consciously pursued avenues where these technologies could enable and/or open up co-operation with their rivals (i.e., space detection to ensure compliance with international agreements). The personal disappointment at the failure to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty during the Cold War, so adamantly expressed in many books and memoirs by policy-makers and scientists involved in the negotiations,71 reflects a level of duality that stakeholders at the time often exhibited: while they may have had to support confrontational measures in their official capacity, personally many had hoped to see tensions de-escalated. In a time when discussions on space technologies are becoming increasingly linked to military and defence debates, and to (great) power rivalry, the most relevant lesson from these cases could very well be that co-operation and confrontation are but two sides of the same coin. And space technologies, while they have roots tracing back to an era of Cold War rivalry, have never been an inherently offensive innovation waiting to be exploited in times of interstate discord.
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Nikita Chiu
is a Senior Lecturer in Innovation Policy at the University of Exeter. In 2019, she was named the Ad Astra Distinguished Fellow in Robotic and Outer Space Governance by the Space Engineering Research Center at the University of Southern California. A former Research Fellow in Robotics and Outer Space Technologies at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and former Research Affiliate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge, she read Technology Policy at St Edmund’s College at the University of Cambridge and gained her PhD from the Graduate Institute in Geneva. Dr Chiu’s ongoing research investigates the dynamics between technological advances and governance, with a focus on understanding the socio-economic, policy and security impact brought by the increasing commercialisation of robotics, quantum and space technologies. Her previous work on space sustainability was published in Acta Astronautica.
Research conducted in autumn 2022 was supported by a fellowship hosted at the Institute of Advanced Study, Durham University.
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