Introduction

In his commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka (CŚ) 12.19,¹ the sixth-century Buddhist scholar Dharmapāla criticises the brahmins for having fraudulently arrogated themselves into a position of symbolic, ritual and social domination by composing the Veda, a corpus which, he contends, reflects vested economic self-interests:²

The ancient brahmins, in their shrewdness, secretly invented the Vedas and then said that they existed naturally […] The brahmins were commended [there] as being the most worthy of veneration, while the kṣatriyas and the rest were all [said to be] inferior; if [the latter] provided [the brahmins] with the necessities of life, then they would obtain immeasurable merit.³

Though certainly unique in its scope and severity, Dharmapāla’s charge falls in line with that of the venerable Suttanipāta (Sn), where the brahmins are similarly accused of having composed the (Vedic) mantras out of greed:

Seeing little by little the splendour of the king, and women adorned, and chariots yoked to thoroughbreds, well-made, with variegated coverings, dwellings and houses evenly proportioned and [well] laid out, [and] great human wealth, surrounded by herds of cows, combined with groups of excellent women, the brahmins coveted this. Having composed hymns for this purpose, they then went up to the king.⁴

Thus according to Dharmapāla and the Sn, there once was a (golden) time in which the Vedas did not yet exist and, at least according to the Sn, in which the brahmins were still austere and virtuous. But as other passages of the Sn also insist, human society knew of no animal sacrifices either before the brahmins’ degeneration.⁵ This is, mutatis mutandis, the point made by the author(s) and/or compiler(s) of the paravāda (“allodoxy”) section of the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh, between 270 and 340 CE?⁶) while introducing the “doctrine (according to which ritual) violence is righteous(/beneficial)” (hiṃsādharmavāda), the treatise’s eighth allodoxy.⁷ According to the YBh, the practice of ritual killing mirrors the interests of degenerate brahmins who wish to eat meat. Interestingly enough, here as in its critique of the brahmins’ pride in caste (allodoxy no. 14),⁸ the YBh appropriates the categories of Brahmanical cosmology and apocalypticism while accounting for the brahmins’ turn to blood sacrifices. It is indeed as the kaliyuga dawns that in their eagerness to eat meat the greedy brahmins set about claiming that ritually consecrated meat can be eaten, i.e., that sacrificial killing is non-killing—a ubiquitous Brahmanical claim that apparently goes as far back as the Ṛgveda (ṚV).⁹ But the interest and the originality of the hiṃsādharmavāda subsection of the YBh by no means limits itself to the presentation of the brahmin opponent’s views. For in its nature and scope, the YBh’s critique of these views is without equivalent in Indian Buddhist literature—dogmatic, philosophical or narrative (including Jātakamālā [JM] kk. 10.9–14, discussed below, 382–390). Contrary to the way in which most sūtras challenge the orthodox Brahmanical ideas on ritual killing,¹⁰ the YBh never attempts either to replace these ideas with other ones (alternative, i.e., nonviolent forms of ritual, etc.) or to appeal to the practices of an ideal past (that of the nonviolent ancient ṛṣis and kings), but instead criticises the legitimations provided for ritual violence in a very systematic philosophical way. The YBh thus presents us with an ethico-philosophical discussion in which the practice of ritual killing is not simply condemned because it is repulsive or contradicts the beliefs and practices of other socio-religious groups, but because the justifications adduced for it are inconsistent and fail to stand up to rational analysis.

Besides a fairly detailed doctrinal introduction, the present article provides a diplomatic and a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the passage, an edition of its Tibetan version, and an annotated English translation. In contrast to my approach of the YBh’s treatment of the caste-classes, I have refrained from dealing with the treatise’s arguments against ritual violence in my doctrinal introduction. The reason for this is that, whereas the critique of the brahmins’ pride in caste calls for a detailed exegesis inasmuch as it relies on sūtra materials, the YBh’s arguments against sacrificial killing—most often destructive dilemmas following “analytically” from the opponent’s position—are straightforward enough not to require any paraphrase. Footnotes will hopefully supply the necessary information.

Ritual Killing is Not Killing

According to the YBh, (some) brahmins legitimize their sinful inclination for meat-eating by claiming that killing is not killing if it is accompanied by (Vedic) ritual formulas and injunctions.¹¹ The idea is widely reflected in Brahmanical literature. Thus it is that according to the Mānavadharmaśāstra (MDhŚ) one “may eat meat when it is sacrificially consecrated”¹² and that “a brahmin must never eat animals that have not been consecrated with ritual formulas.”¹³ The reason why ritually consecrated meat can be eaten is that sacrificial killing amounts to non-killing, a conception that apparently goes as far back as the Vedic Saṃhitās. And indeed, in ṚV 1.162.21, the “already dismembered sacrificial horse”¹⁴ is told: “You do not really die here, nor are you hurt.”¹⁵ By the same token, the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa (ŚB) has its ritualist declare, in relation to the animal victim that is led to the place of its immolation, that “that which they lead to the sacrifice, they do not lead to death.”¹⁶ According to Tull,

[h]ere the ritualists […] obfuscate the violent nature of the victim’s death (from which they turn away, declaring, ‘lest we should become eyewitnesses’ [ŚB 3.8.1.15]) by prohibiting the dismemberment of the animal, choosing instead to suffocate it. This process they assert is not really a killing, but a ‘quieting’ of the animal: “One does not say: ‘He strikes [the victim], he kills it,’ […] but that the victim ‘went away’ ” (ŚB 3.8.1.15).¹⁷

The Vedic idea that ritual killing is non-killing is well attested in legal literature as well. Thus according to Manu and Viṣṇu, “[w]hen a killing is sanctioned by the Veda […], it should be regarded definitely as non-killing.”¹⁸ For them, “[w]ithin the sacrifice […] killing is not killing.”¹⁹ The Vāsiṣṭhadharmasūtra (VDhSū) provides an excellent summary of the brahmin’s train of thought: “Without killing a living creature you can never obtain meat; and killing living creatures does not get you to heaven. Killing an animal at a sacrifice, therefore, is not a killing.”²⁰ One could hardly make the argument underlying the claim of the YBh’s brahmin more explicit, as we shall see.

The sacrifice does not only neutralize the nasty eschatological consequences of animal killing,²¹ but also leads the sacrificer and its victim to heaven. It is thus considered ultimately beneficial.²² As the Chāndogyopaniṣad (ChU) has it, “[he who] does not harm any living being, except at sacred [sacrificial] places […], he who behaves thus throughout his life attains the world of Brahma.”²³ According to the ŚB, “the sacrifice, as a whole, is the heavenly ship.”²⁴ Similarly, “the sacrifice has only one foundation, one place of residence, the heavenly world.”²⁵ That the sacrificer reaches heaven as a result of sacrifice is made clear, e.g., in ŚB 9.4.4.15: “Every day the sacrifice is performed; every day [the sacrifice] is completed; every day [the sacrifice] brings the [sacrificer] into possession of the heavenly world; every day, [the sacrificer] goes to the heavenly world thanks to the [sacrifice].”²⁶ In doing so, the human sacrificer imitates the gods who gained heaven and immortality by sacrificing.²⁷ Aitareyabrāhmaṇa (AB) 2.6 provides one of the clearest statements to the effect that the animal victim, too, goes to heaven:²⁸

[T]he victim as it was borne along saw death before it, and was not willing to go to the gods; the gods said to it, ‘Come; we shall make you go to the world of heaven.’ It replied ‘Be it so; but let one of you go before me.’ ‘Be it so’ (they replied). Before it went Agni; it followed after Agni.²⁹

The idea, which can be traced to the Ṛgvedic hymns to the horse,³⁰ finds an interesting expression in the Mahābhārata (MBh): “At the sacrifices, O Brahman, animals are constantly slain by the twice-born. But, it is said, they, too, have obtained heaven [when] consecrated by [ritual] formulas.”³¹ According to Manu and Viṣṇu, “[w]hen plants, domestic animals, trees, beasts, and birds die for the sake of a sacrifice, they will in turn earn superior births.”³² The same legislators bring us very close to the YBh statement as they declare that, “[w]hen a twice-born man who knows the true meaning of the Veda kills animals for these purposes, he leads himself and those animals to the highest state.”³³

On the Kaliyuga and the Degeneration Pattern

As in the case of the Brahmanical claims to socio-religious superiority, the YBh interprets sacrificial killing as typical of the degenerate brahmins of the kaliyuga, and this in a manner (i.e., kaliyuge pratyupasthite) that is reminiscent of epic and purāṇic formulations:³⁴ “When the kaliyuga is at hand, the brahmins who wish to eat meat indulge in this [ritual violence, thus] transgressing the brahmins’ ancient [religious] law.”³⁵ The idea that ritual violence either did not exist or was banned in former times³⁶ but (re)appeared as a result of moral degeneration is not infrequent in Indian Buddhist sources, as is testified by the following excerpt from the Jātakas:

In bygone days the wise, preaching the law from mid-air, and shewing the evil consequences of the practice, made the whole continent renounce it. But now, when their previous existences have become confused in their minds, the practice has sprung up afresh.³⁷

Similar ideas can be found with respect to meat-eating. Thus it is that in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (LASū), which is typical of the Mahāyānist prohibition of meat-eating,³⁸ the Buddha prophecises that unscrupulous future Buddhist legislators (vinaya specialists) will make meat-eating permissible, thus breaking with the rules laid down by him and shared by the ṛṣis of old:

But, O Mahāmati, I have allowed [my disciples] the exquisite food of all the ṛṣis of old, [a food that is] honored by all the noble persons [and] avoided by the non-noble persons [alone, a food] that brings numerous good qualities(/benefits) [and] is exempt from the numerous defects(/evils) [of meat ^? ]—food like rice, barley, wheat, kidneybeans, beans, lentils, etc., [prepared] in ghee, sesam oil, honey, raw sugar, treacle, candied sugar, sugarcane juice, etc.—thinking that [such a food] is permissible(/suitable) [for the renouncer]. But in the future, O Mahāmati, some deluded persons will not regard this [food] as exquisite food—[persons] professing various arbitrary(/alternative) explanations (vikalpa) of [texts on monastic] discipline [in order to legitimize meat-eating because], influenced [as they will be] by the imprints of [their former existences in] carnivorous families, [they will] fall prey to craving the taste [of meat].³⁹

Here, degeneration and the resulting delusion are made responsible for the reappearance of a non-vegetarian diet.

In the LASū passage just referred to, the Buddha claims his position to coincide with the practice of the wise and vegetarian ṛṣis of old, those not yet degenerate brahmins whom he regarded as the embodiment of Buddhist values and practice—the so-called “true brahmins.”⁴⁰ Now, the connection between the ṛṣis, the rise of greed and the concomitant appearance of sacrificial violence is the subject-matter of the Brāhmaṇadhammikasutta of the Sn.⁴¹ As already hinted at by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya,⁴² (a version of) this sutta constitutes the YBh’s most likely source of inspiration for associating these Brahmanical practices with an era of degeneration (the YBh’s kaliyuga). This genealogy is reflected in the very wording of the two texts: whereas the Brāhmaṇadhammikasutta expounds, as its title suggests, the Brahmanical lore/law of the brahmins of old (porāṇānaṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ brāhmaṇadhammo), the YBh accuses the brahmins who sacrifice animal victims of transgressing the ancient Brahmanical lore/law (paurāṇaṃ brāhmaṇadharmam). In the argument of the sutta, the brahmins of Kosala ask the Buddha as follows: “Do brahmins now, Gotama, live in conformity with the Brahmanical lore of the brahmins of old?”⁴³ Gotama’s answer is unambiguous: “No, brahmins, brahmins now do not live in conformity with the Brahmanical lore of the brahmins of old.”⁴⁴ According to the Buddha, the “seers of old” (isayo pubbakā, Sn 284) were chaste (Sn 284, 285, 290, 291–293), virtuous (Sn 289, 292, 294), learned (Sn 289) and austere (Sn 284, 292). These original brahmins had “no cattle, no gold, no wealth” (Sn 285), and “[w]hat was prepared for them, food made ready at the door, prepared in faith, they thought this was to be given to those who sought.”⁴⁵ Most importantly, these true brahmins “praised non-violence” (avihiṃsam avaṇṇayuṃ, Sn 292). Accordingly, their rituals involved no animal slaughter:

Having asked for rice, a bed, clothes, and butter and oil, having collected them properly, from that they performed the sacrifice. When the sacrifice occurred, they did not kill cows. Like a mother, father, brother, or other relative too, cows are our best friends, in which medicines are produced. They give food, strength, (good) complexion, and likewise happiness. Knowing this reason, they did not kill cows.⁴⁶

And “as long as [the lore] existed in the world, this race prospered in happiness.”⁴⁷ However, a “change” (vipallāsa, Sn 299, Norman, Masefield) for the worse occurred as these brahmins’ covetousness (abhijjhāyiṃsu, Sn 301), desire (icchā, Sn 306) and craving (taṇhā, Sn 306) increased.⁴⁸ Composing ad hoc ritual formulas (manta, Sn 302, 306) and, one may surmise, inventing related rituals, the brahmins prompted king Okkāka to patronize sacrifices and pay them substantial sacrificial fees. Here is the Sn’s account of the events:

[But] there was a change in them. Seeing little by little the splendour of the king, and women adorned, and chariots yoked to thoroughbreds, well-made, with variegated coverings, dwellings and houses evenly proportioned and [well] laid out, [and] great human wealth, surrounded by herds of cows, combined with groups of excellent women, the brahmins coveted this. Having composed hymns for this purpose, they then went up to Okkāka. ‘You have much wealth and grain. Sacrifice, [for] your property is much. Sacrifice, [for] your wealth is much.’ And then the king, the lord of warriors, induced by the brahmins, having performed these sacrifices, the assamedha, the purisamedha, the sammāpāsa, the vācapeyya, (and) the niraggaḷa, gave wealth to the brahmins: cows, and a bed, and clothes, and adorned women, and chariots yoked to thoroughbreds, well made, with variegated coverings. Having filled delightful dwellings, evenly proportioned, with various sorts of grain, he gave wealth to the brahmins. And they, receiving wealth there, found pleasure in hoarding it up. Overcome by desire, their craving increased the more. Having composed hymns for this purpose, they went up to Okkāka again. ‘As are water, earth, gold, wealth, and grain, so are cows to men. For this is a requisite for living creatures. Sacrifice, [for] your property is much. Sacrifice, [for] your wealth is much.’ And then the king, the lord of warriors, induced by the brahmins, had many hundreds of thousands of cows killed in a sacrifice.⁴⁹

Thus according to the Brāhmaṇadhammikasutta, ritual violence as a scripturally legitimated practice is the end result of the brahmins’ moral decay, and this is likely to be the reason why the YBh interprets alloxody no. 8, the brahmins’ hiṃsādharmavāda, as typical of the kaliyuga. Note that the label of this allodoxy itself—hiṃsādharmavāda—may reflect the contents of this or a very similar source.⁵⁰ For as the sutta strongly insists, the animals were the innocent victims of the brahmins’ greed. In other words, the rise of injustice (adhamma) cannot be separated from the appearance of ritual violence ([vi]hiṃsā):

Not by their feet, nor by their horns, nor by anything [else] had the cows harmed [anyone]. They were like sheep, meek, giving pails of milk. [Nevertheless] the king, seizing them by the horns, had them killed with a knife. And then the devas, the fathers, Inda, asuras and rakkhasas cried out: ‘[This is] injustice,’ when the knife fell on the cows […] This injustice of using violence has come down [to us] as an ancient practice.⁵¹ Innocent [cows] are killed; the sacrificers fall away from justice. Thus this ancient mean practice is blamed by those who understand. Where people see such a thing being done, they blame the sacrificer.⁵²

Buddhist Ideas on Animal Sacrifice and Its Critique

Except for the most radical forms of Tantric antinomianism,⁵³ Indian Buddhism generally regards killing (prāṇātipāta) as the worst possible sin.⁵⁴ Killing is the first of the ten “evil courses of action” (akuśalakarmapatha) leading to bad rebirth states and one of the four offences resulting in a monk’s permanent expulsion from the community (pārājika).⁵⁵ As for abstaining from killing, it is the first precept (śikṣāpada) of lay and monastic Buddhist morality (śīla). According to an interesting definition provided by (a pseudo-)Aśvaghoṣa, five conditions must be satisfied for killing to be realised: “There is a sentient being; one has the notion of a sentient being; there is a murderous intention; one undertakes [to kill him/her/it]; one deprives [him/her/it] of [his/her/its] life principle.”⁵⁶ The overwhelming majority of Buddhists agree that the sentient beings whose killing results in bad eschatological consequences⁵⁷ are not limited to human beings but include animalcules (flies, etc.) and animals (snakes, deers, cattle, birds, buffalos, etc.).⁵⁸ This is made particularly clear in dogmatic statements prohibiting the murder of animals either for fun (krīḍārtham) or for subsistence (upabhogārtham). Whereas taking another’s life for mere fun is considered an instance of killing “born of covetousness” (lobhaja),⁵⁹ butchering, hunting and fishing are regarded as cases of killing “born of delusion” (mohaja).⁶⁰ Animal sacrifice is another paradigmatic instance of killing born of delusion. In blood rituals indeed, animals are killed on account of the erroneous notion that violence belongs to one’s religious duty (dharmabuddhi; or: is righteous/beneficial)—just as criminals are executed by kings on the deceiving authority of the(ir) legislators (dharmapāṭhakaprāmāṇya).⁶¹

Indian Buddhist literature provides several stereotyped descriptions of animal sacrifices. Exemplifying the class of actions that are conducive to a short lifespan (alpāyuḥsaṃvartanīya), the Karmavibhaṅga (KV) refers to (ritual) killing, viz. the “establishment of a piece of open ground [serving as a sacrificial area] where numerous sentient beings such as buffalos, cattle, hogs, and cocks, are slain.”⁶² In the Kūṭadantasutta (Skt. Kūṭatāṇḍyasūtra),⁶³ the brahmin Kūṭadanta of Khānumata “planned a great sacrifice: seven hundred bulls, seven hundred bullocks, seven hundred heifers, seven hundred he-goats and seven hundred rams were all tied up to the sacrificial posts.”⁶⁴ Nearly the same is told of king Pasenadi in the Saṃyuttanikāya (SN):

[A]t that time a great sacrifice was arranged to be held for the king, the Kosalan Pasenadi. Five hundred bulls, five hundred bullocks and as many heifers, goats, and rams, were led to the pillar to be sacrificed. And they that were slaves and menials and craftsmen, hectored about by blows and by fear, made the preparations with tearful faces weeping.⁶⁵

Needless to say, these and similar⁶⁶ depictions of animal sacrifices are not aimed at documenting cruel non-Buddhist practices in anything like an ethnographical manner, but rather at condemning them on the basis of various rhetorical strategies. One of them is a warning based on the principle of collective moral responsibility. According to the KV indeed, “the sons and the grandsons of the [person] who instigates the sacrifice, as well as [any] other person who follows [him] in longing for a result or [simply due to being] scared, [do also] murder living beings.”⁶⁷ This type of condemnation relies on the principle that all the persons involved in a single murder are to face the same eschatological retribution, a principle that pertains as well in the case of collective crimes connected with war, hunting and highway robbery.⁶⁸

Another strategy for condemning blood sacrifices is to regard the ethical-ritual behaviour of virtuous (i.e., not yet degenerate) persons of the past as normative and demand a substitution for animal sacrifices, first with the non-violent rituals of old, and second with Buddhist practices and values interpreted as internalized sacrifices.⁶⁹ This strategy comes very close to the rhetorics at work in the Brāhmaṇadhammikasutta discussed above. In the Kūṭadantasutta, the Buddha, who “understand[s] how to conduct successfully the triple sacrifice with its sixteen requisites,”⁷⁰ instructs the learned brahmin Kūṭadanta by telling him the story of the ancient king Mahāvijita’s sacrifice:

In this sacrifice, brahmin, no bulls were slain, no goats or sheep, no cocks and pigs, nor were various living beings subjected to slaughter, nor were trees cut down for sacrificial posts, nor were grasses mown for the sacrificial grass, and those who are called slaves or servants or workmen did not perform their tasks for fear of blows or threats, weeping and in tears. But those who wanted to do something did it, those who did not wish to did not: they did what they wanted to do, and not what they did not want to do. The sacrifice was carried out with ghee, oil, butter, curds, honey and molasses.⁷¹

Thus far from condemning all and every type of sacrifice indiscriminately, the Buddha dismisses the blood rituals alone. And indeed, elsewhere the Buddha is seen answering as follows the question whether he praises all sacrifices:

No, brahmin, I do not praise every sacrifice. Yet I would not withhold praise from every sacrifice. In whatever sacrifice, brahmin, cows are slaughtered, goats and sheep are slaughtered, poultry and pigs are slaughtered and divers living creatures come to destruction, —such sacrifice, brahmin, which involves butchery I do not praise. Why so? To such a sacrifice, brahmin, involving butchery neither the worthy ones nor those who have entered on the worthy way draw near. But in whatever sacrifice, brahmin, cows are not slaughtered, goats and sheep are not slaughtered, poultry and pigs are not slaughtered and living creatures come not to destruction, such sacrifice not involving butchery I do praise.⁷²

Yet another reason for repudiating blood sacrifices is that they are apparently considered (at least symbolically) polluting. The very fact that paradigmatically good/moral persons, viz. the arhats/worthy ones and those engaged on the holy/worthy (Buddhist) path (arahamaggaṃ vā samāpannā), do not attend blood sacrifices, is used as an argument against them.⁷³ Finally, the Buddha (or Kassapa) rejects violent sacrifices on the grounds that, contrary to the “reformed” or restored non-animal sacrifices, blood rituals do not bring significant results.⁷⁴ The idea finds its best expression in the Pāyāsisuttanta of the Dīghanikāya (DN):

At the sort of sacrifice […] where oxen are slain, or goats, or fowls and pigs, or diverse creatures are put an end to; and those that take part in the sacrifice have wrong views, wrong intention, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, wrong endeavour, wrong mindfulness, wrong rapture, such a sacrifice […] is neither of great fruitfulness nor of great profit, nor of great renown, nor of widespread effect. It is just as if a farmer […] were to enter a wood taking with him plough and seed, and were there, in an untilled tract, in unfavourable soil, among unuprooted stumps, to plant seeds that were broken, rotten, spoilt by wind and heat, out of season, not in good condition, and the god were not to give rain in due season. Would those seeds attain to growth, increase and expansion, or would the farmer get abundant returns? No indeed.⁷⁵

On the contrary, non-violent sacrifices performed in the spirit of the Buddhist eightfold path are comparable in their fruitfulness to the seeds of a farmer who would

enter a wood, taking with him plough and seed, and [would be] there, in a well-tilled tract, in favourable soil well cleared of stumps, to plant seed that was unbroken, free from mildew, unspoilt by wind or heat, in season and in good condition, and the god [would be] to give good rain in due season. Would those seeds grow, increase, expand, and would the farmer get abundant returns? He would indeed.⁷⁶

Asked by Kūṭadanta whether a less difficult and more fruitful sacrifice exists than the non-animal one, i.e., than the purely external but ethically more satisfactory sacrifice performed by kings and ṛṣis of old, the Buddha answers that such a ritual occurs whenever regular family gifts are given to virtuous ascetics, whenever someone provides shelter for the saṅgha, whenever someone with a pure heart goes for refuge to the Buddha, the dhamma and the saṅgha, and whenever someone with a pure heart undertakes the moral precepts.⁷⁷ Thus according to the Kūṭadantasutta, on the one side, looking back into the past reveals that ancient sacrifices were performed without killing and harrassment;⁷⁸ on the other side, analysing the true nature of ritual calls for a reinterpretation of external sacrifice in terms of Buddhist practices and values.⁷⁹

Mutatis mutandis, this twofold strategy is also the one adopted by Āryaśūra in the tenth story of his JM.⁸⁰ This jātaka contains a vitriolic critique of animal sacrifice, one whose line of argument presents some interesting similarities with the YBh’s. The story relates the bodhisattva’s former birth as a king whose “entire being was dedicated to benefitting his subjects” (prajāhiteṣv āhitasarvabhāvaḥ, k. 10.1c, Meiland 2009: I.263) and whose “sole duty was to virtue” (dharmaikakārya, k. 10.1d, Meiland 2009: I.263). In spite of his fairness and compassion, however, the king’s realm came to be afflicted by a devastating drought. Asked for advice, the chief priest (purohita) and the brahmin elders (brāhmaṇavṛddha), all of them “esteemed for their knowledge of religion” (dharmatattvajñasaṃmata, JM _K 68,11//JM _H 96,22, Meiland 2009: I.265), urged the king to “perform a sacrificial ritual prescribed by the Vedas” (vedavihitam … yajñavidhim, JM _K 68,23–13/JM _H 96,24, Meiland 2009: I.265). According to the brahmins indeed, “[w]hen sacrificed by proper sacrifices, the gods return the honor by delivering rain.”⁸¹ The sacrifice involved “the killing and massacre of several hundreds of living creatures” (anekaprāṇiśatavadhārambha, JM _K 68,13/JM _H 96,24, Meiland 2009: I.265); it was regarded by the brahmins as “heaven’s causeway” (suralokasetu, k. 10.5c, Meiland 2009: I.267) and the surest way for the king to remove his debt to the gods (ṛṇaṃ surāṇām, k. 10.7d, Meiland 2009: I.267).⁸²

The entire jātaka recounts how the bodhisattva-king, unwilling to perform the bloody ritual, tricked his brahmin advisors and managed to make it rain without sacrificing any living creature. Raising the stakes, the king resolved to sacrifice one thousand human victims (puruṣamedhasahasra), to be picked out from among the sinners and the wrongdoers of his realm. Thus it is that he daily had the following promulgation publicized:

From this day forth, whoever takes gleeful pride in indecency, sneering at the royal command revered even by neighboring kings, will, by their own actions, be forced to become sacrificial victims. Wretched with dispair, their body tied to a stake, they will languish before the people’s eyes.⁸³

Fearful of death and trustful of their beloved sovereign, the king’s subjects “abandoned any fondness for immoral behavior and became dedicated to practicing moral restraints” (tyaktadauḥśīlyānurāgāḥ śīlasaṃvarasamādānaparāḥ, JM _K 71,4/JM _H 100,14–15, Meiland 2009: I.275), “as if they lived in the kṛta era” (kṛtayuga iva babhūvuḥ, JM _K 71,7 [kṛta iva yuge babhūvuḥ]/JM _H 100,17–18, Meiland 2009: I.275).⁸⁴ As a result, no one could be selected as a sacrificial victim. Seeing that his people had now become “worthy of sacrificial gifts” (dakṣiṇīyatā, k. 10.22b, Meiland 2009: I.277), the king resolved to give up in sacrifice “the wealth […] intended to be used for sacrifice” (yajñāya dhanaṃ prakalpitam [pratarkitam K], k. 10.22c, Meiland 2009: I.277) and had alms given to all those afflicted by poverty. As a result of this “virtuous sacrifice” (dharmayajña, JM _K 72,11/JM _H 102,21 and JM _K 72,18/JM _H 103,1, Meiland 2009: I.279 and 281), “[w]hen the king’s good guidance made the people all incline toward moral conduct, the calamities disappeared without obstacle, their force destroyed by the increased virtue.”⁸⁵ One of the conclusions of the story is that “[h]arming animals never leads to prosperity. But giving, discipline, self-restraint and other virtues do. Those who seek prosperity should therefore dedicate themselves to giving and other virtues.”⁸⁶ “Free from any fault of animal-slaughter” (paśuvaiśasavācyadoṣavirahita, JM _K 72,18/JM _H 103,1, Meiland 2009: I.281), the king’s virtuous sacrifice has indeed achieved more than could be expected from an animal sacrifice, and the king himself, although not a brahmin, has accomplished more than a twiceborn priest. As his chief minister praises him,

You wear no antelope skin across your limbs like a mark on the moon. The natural grace of your gestures is not dulled by the constraints of initiation. Glorious too is your hair-arrangement on your head round as a parasol. Your gifts rid even the god of a hundred sacrifices of his awe, the very basis of his glory.⁸⁷

But Āryaśūra’s critique of animal sacrifice does not limit itself to a set of implicit assumptions only to be made manifest by the plot. The king’s initial reaction upon listening to the brahmins’ advice is to lament the fact that “these men are in a terrible state.”⁸⁸ For according to him, “[t]heir delicate minds are taken in by the trust they place in others, as they unquestioningly believe in those devoted to religion.”⁸⁹ Now the relevance, the rationality and the morality of animal sacrifices are obviously to be questioned, and this critical examination is what engages the king in the inner monologue of stanzas 10.9–14:

The very people considered refuges in the world are the same who turn to violence in religion’s name. Those following the wrong path indicated by such men whirl miserably in the narrow straits of hell.⁹⁰ How can violence against animals be connected with morality or with dwelling in heaven or pleasing the gods?⁹¹ They say an animal goes to heaven when slaughtered by spear-like mantras and so its murder is moral.⁹² But this is false. Who can obtain in the next world the fruit of another’s action? An animal’s mind has not renounced vice. Nor has it committed itself to good deeds. Why would it go to heaven, if merely killed in sacrifice, without having performed its own actions? If one goes to heaven by being killed in sacrifice, surely brahmins themselves would become sacrificial animals. But since one never sees this practiced, who would accept the words of such men? Would the gods reject their pure nectar, served by fine nymphs, incomparable in scent, richness, flavor, and potency, and take joy in the slaughter of a pitiful animal to feed off its intestines and other parts?⁹³

Just as the YBh, the king’s deliberation reflects the ritualists’ contention that ritual killing is not killing. And from among the arguments he adduces against this idea, one at least echoes the YBh and the Buddhacaritasaṅgrahasūtra (BCSSū):⁹⁴ if the victim secures heaven from being sacrificed, how is it that the brahmin sacrificer does not offer himself, or his relatives, in sacrifice?⁹⁵

In attempting to show that ritual violence is both morally wrong and practically irrational, the sources considered so far apparently aimed at restoring the sacrificial practices of the past, at reforming the sacrifice by replacing animal victims with non-animal ones and reinterpreting and/or internalizing it. According to these documents, inasmuch as it yields only little result in the present life and leads to disastrous eschatological consequences, animal sacrifice is counterproductive and detrimental. Moreover, ritual violence did not belong to the exemplary/normative practices of the ṛṣis and the kings of old, those unanimously celebrated embodiments of wisdom and morality. Now, these rhetorical strategies draw most of their persuasiveness, if any, from the Buddha’s extraordinary perceptual abilities: Just as he alone can penetrate the otherwise inconceivable (acintya) machinery of karmic retribution, so does the Buddha alone have a direct cognitive access to past and future events (atītānāgata), including his own former births. In other words, these arguments ultimately rely on the authority of the Buddha rather than on an appraisal of the rationality and internal consistency of the Brahmanical arguments themselves. Herein lies, in my opinion, the interest of the YBh passage edited and translated below, and of its counterpart in the JM. For as I have pointed out elsewhere, the paravāda section of the YBh presents itself as a “critical examination” (parīkṣā) aimed at demonstrating that the sixteen allodoxies “are entirely unreasonable once they are evaluated by means of the twofold [type of] reasoning consisting in a critical examination.”⁹⁶ Even in its polemics against coreligionists such as the Sarvāstivādins,⁹⁷ the YBh indeed never resorts to scriptural authority as an autonomous or additional source of argument. Our passage is thus meant as a critical assessment of the scriptural and rational justifications provided by brahmins for ritual killing as a soteriologically oriented practice, and this concern is, at least in its scope and systematicity, unprecedented in Buddhist literature.

Editorial Conventions

1. .. illegible akṣara
2. . illegible part of an akṣara
3. [ ] contain unclear akṣaras or part(s) of an akṣara
4. { } contain akṣara(s) added at the top or the bottom of the folio/above or below the line
5. {{ }} contain akṣara(s) cancelled by means of one/two vertical stroke(s) written above the akṣara
6. {{{ }}} contain akṣara(s) cancelled by means of erasure
7. ⟨ ⟩ contain missing akṣara(s)
8. ☸ string-hole area
9. ā² ā written as a right-flowing stroke extending from the top of the akṣara
10. e², o², au² devanāgarī-like e, o, au
11. ṃ² ṃ plus virāma
12. * virāma
13. _↓ below
14. / daṇḍa
15. \ line-filling daṇḍa

Diplomatic Edition of YBh _MS 40b3–41a3

1. 40b3 himsādharmavādaḥ katamaḥ yathāpīhaikatya iti vi
2. 40b4 stareṇa pūrvavat* / yajñeṣu mantravidhipūrvakaḥ prāṇātipātaḥ kaś ca juhoti / yaś ca hūyate / ye ca {↓ l.4 ta}tsāhāyāḥ te ☸ ṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ² svargagamanāya bhavatīti / kena kāraṇe²na evaṃdṛṣṭir bhavatīty evaṃvādī uts{{{th}}}aṃsthavāda eṣaḥ / śaṭhaviṭhapito no ☸ tu yuktim abhisamīkṣya vyavasthāpitaḥ kaliyuge pratyupasthite / brāhmaṇaiḥ paurāṇaṃ brāhmaṇadharmam atikramya māṃsaṃ
3. 40b5 bhakṣayitukāmair etat* prakalpitaṃ / api tu sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ / kaccid i{{[sat]i}}cchasi / yo sau mantravidhi saddharma ☸ svabhāvo vā / adharmasvabhāvo veti / saced dharmasvabhāvaḥ tena antareṇāpi prāṇātipātaṃ² svam iṣṭaṃ² / na nirvarttayaty adharmaṃ² dharmīkarotīti na yujyate / sace{↓ l.5 d a}[dha]rmasvabhāvaḥ tena svayam aniṣṭaphalo² dharmaḥ anyam aniṣṭaphalaṃ vyāva{{ya}}rttaya
4. 40b6 tīti na yujyate / evaṃ² vyākṛte ca punaḥ saty uttari vadet tadyathā nāma viṣaṃ mantravidhi / parigṛhītaṃ na vini ☸ pātayati / tadvad ihāpi mantravidhir draṣṭavya iti / sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ kaccid icchasi ya{{tra}}thā mantravidhiḥ bāhyaṃ² viṣaṃ² praśamayati / evam adhyātmikaṃ² / rāgadve{{.. ..}}ṣamohaviṣam iti / śacet tathaiva śamayati sa ca praśamaḥ na kutracit kadācit kasya \
5. 40b7 cit tathopalabhyata iti na yujyate / sacen na tathai[v]a praśamayati / tena yathā mantravidhiḥ bāhyaṃ viṣaṃ praśamayati / ☸ tathā adharmam iti / na yujyate / kaccid icchasi sa mantravidhiḥ sarvatragaḥ {↓ l. 7 a}sarvatrago veti / sacet sarvatragaḥ / iṣṭaḥ svajana ādito na hūyata iti na yujyate / athāsarvatraga tena śaktir asya {{.. ..}} vyabhicaratīti / na yujyate kaccid icchasi
6. 41a1 mantra[v]idhi[ḥ /] hetum e[va] vyā[va]rttayituṃ [/] samarthaḥ ā²hosvit* [pha]lam api / saced dhetum eva tena phala[śa]ktihīna i ☸ ti / na yujyate / sacet* phalam api pa[śv]ā[śra]yaṃ h[itvā devāśrayaṃ] [vi]gṛ[hṇātī]ti na yujyate / kaccid icchasi yo sau mantrāṇāṃ praṇe²t[ā sa] śaktaḥ / kāruṇiko vā aśaktaḥ akāruṇiko veti / sacec chaktaḥ kāruṇikaḥ / [tad]ānta[reṇa] pr[āṇā]tipā
7. 41a2 taṃ [sarva]ṃ² lokaṃ² svarga[ṃ²] nayatīti na yujyate / saced aśaktaḥ / akāruṇikaḥ tena mantras tasya samṛdhyatīti na yujya ☸ te / iti hi hetuto pi dṛṣṭāntato pi / vyabhicārato pi / phalaśaktihānito pi / mantrapraṇetṛto pi / na yujyate / tasmād eṣo² pi vādaḥ / ayogavihitaḥ yac ca na dharmāya kalpate / tasya lakṣaṇaṃ² vakṣyāmi ya[c ca] paravyā[bādhakaṃ² ka]rma na [ca] dṛṣṭa
8. 41a3 doṣapratikriyaṃ² tat tāvan na dharmāya kalpate / yac ca sarvapā[ṣa]ṇḍi[ṣu] siddhāniṣṭaphala[ṃ²] yac ca sarva[jñair e]kāṃ[śe] ☸ na bhāṣitam akuśalam iti / svayam anīpsitaṃ ca yat* kliṣṭena ca cetasā yat samutthāpitaṃ² vidyādi{{.. ..}}maṅgalop[e]taṃ ca ya ☸ t* / tad api {{{..}}} na [dha]rmāya kalpate /

Critical Edition of YBh _MS 40b3–41a3

§ 1. himsādharmavādaḥ katamaḥ / yathāpīhaikatya iti vistareṇa pūrvavat / yajñeṣu mantravidhipūrvakaḥ prāṇātipāto yaś⁹⁸ ca juhoti yaś ca hūyate ye ca tatsahāyās⁹⁹ teṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ svargagamanāya bhavatīti / kena kāraṇenaivandṛṣṭir bhavaty¹⁰⁰ evaṃvādī¹⁰¹ / utsaṃsthavāda eṣaḥ śaṭhaviṭhapito no¹⁰² tu yuktim abhisamīkṣya vyavasthāpitaḥ / kaliyuge pratyupasthite brāhmaṇaiḥ paurāṇaṃ brāhmaṇadharmam atikramya māṃsaṃ bhakṣayitukāmair etat prakalpitam¹⁰³ /

§ 2.1. api tu¹⁰⁴ sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ / kaccid icchasi yo ’sau mantravidhiḥ¹⁰⁵ sa dharma¹⁰⁶svabhāvo vādharmasvabhāvo veti / saced dharmasvabhāvas tenāntareṇāpi prāṇātipātaṃ svam iṣṭaṃ na nirvartayaty adharmaṃ dharmīkarotīti¹⁰⁷ na yujyate / saced adharmasvabhāvas tena svayam aniṣṭaphalo dharmo¹⁰⁸ ’nyam aniṣṭaphalaṃ vyāvartayatīti na yujyate /

§ 2.2. evaṃ vyākṛte¹⁰⁹ ca punaḥ saty uttari vadet / tadyathā nāma viṣaṃ mantravidhiparigṛhītaṃ na vinipātayati / tadvad ihāpi mantravidhir draṣṭavya iti / sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ / kaccid icchasi yathā mantravidhir bāhyaṃ viṣaṃ praśamayaty evam ādhyātmikaṃ¹¹⁰ rāgadveṣamohaviṣam iti / sacet¹¹¹ tathaiva śamayati sa ca praśamo na kutracit kadācit kasyacit tathopalabhyata iti na yujyate / sacen na tathaiva¹¹² praśamayati tena yathā mantravidhir bāhyaṃ viṣaṃ praśamayati tathādharmam iti na yujyate /

§ 2.3. kaccid icchasi sa mantravidhiḥ sarvatrago ’sarvatrago veti / sacet sarvatraga iṣṭaḥ svajana ādito na hūyata iti na yujyate / athāsarvatragas¹¹³ tena śaktir asya vyabhicaratīti na yujyate /

§ 2.4. kaccid icchasi mantravidhir¹¹⁴ hetum eva vyāvartayituṃ samartha āhosvit phalam api / saced dhetum eva tena phalaśaktihīna iti na yujyate / sacet phalam api tena kāmarūpivat paśur api¹¹⁵ paśvāśrayaṃ hitvā devāśrayaṃ vigṛhṇātīti¹¹⁶ na yujyate /

§ 2.5. kaccid icchasi yo ’sau mantrāṇāṃ praṇetā sa śaktaḥ kāruṇiko vāśakto ’kāruṇiko veti / sacec chaktaḥ kāruṇikas tadā¹¹⁷ntareṇa prāṇātipātaṃ sarvaṃ lokaṃ svargaṃ na nayatīti¹¹⁸ na yujyate / saced aśakto ’kāruṇikas tena mantras tasya samṛdhyatīti na yujyate /

§ 3. iti hi hetuto ’pi dṛṣṭāntato ’pi vyabhicārato ’pi phalaśaktihānito ’pi mantrapraṇetṛto ’pi na yujyate / tasmād eṣo ’pi vādo ’yogavihitaḥ /

§ 4. yac ca na dharmāya kalpate tasya lakṣaṇaṃ vakṣyāmi / yac ca para¹¹⁹vyābādhakaṃ karma na ca dṛṣṭadoṣapratikriyaṃ¹²⁰ tat tāvan¹²¹ na dharmāya kalpate / yac ca sarvapāṣaṇḍiṣu siddhāniṣṭaphalam / yac ca sarvajñair ekāṃśena bhāṣitam akuśalam iti / svayam anīpsitaṃ ca yat / kliṣṭena ca cetasā yat samutthāpitam / vidyā¹²²maṅgalopetaṃ ca yat / svayam avyākṛtaṃ ca yat¹²³ / tad api na dharmāya kalpate¹²⁴ /.

Tibetan Version (YBh _Tib D73b6–74b6/P85b6–86b6)

§ 1. ’tshe ba’i chos su smra ba gaṅ źe na / ’di ltar ’di na kha cig ces bya ba nas rgyas par sṅa ma bźin te / mchod sbyin rnams la ^P6gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga sṅon du ’gro ba’i¹²⁵ srog gcod ^D7par byed de / mchod sbyin byed pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / mchod sbyin du bya ba gaṅ yin pa daṅ / gaṅ dag de’i grogs byed pa de dag thams cad mtho ris su ’gro bar ’gyur ro ^P7sñam mo // ci’i phyir de ltar lta źiṅ de skad smra źe na / de ni tshig¹²⁶ las ’das par smra ba yin te / g.yon can gyis ^D74a1bsgrubs¹²⁷ pa yin gyi rigs pas¹²⁸ mṅon par brtags nas bźag¹²⁹ pa ma yin te / rtsod pa’i dus la bab pa bram ^P8ze śa za bar ’dod pa rnams kyis bram ze’i chos rñiṅ pa las ’gal bar byas nas ’di byas par zad do //

§ 2.1. de la ’di skad ces brjod par bya ste / ci ^D2gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga gaṅ yin pa de chos kyi¹³⁰ ṅo bo ñid yin pa’am / ’on te chos ma yin pa’i ^P87a1ṅo bo ñid du ’dod / gal te chos kyi ṅo bo ñid yin na ni / des na srog gcod pa med par raṅ gi sdug pa’i ’bras bu mi ’grub la / chos ma yin pa yaṅ chos su byed pas mi ruṅ ṅo // ^D3gal te chos ma yin pa’i ^P2ṅo bo ñid yin na ni / des na bdag ñid chos ma yin pa mi sdug pa’i ’bras bu can yin la / mi sdug pa’i ’bras bu gźan zlog¹³¹ par byed do źes byar mi ruṅ ṅo //

§ 2.2. de skad du lan btab kyaṅ yaṅ ’di skad du dper na gsaṅ sṅags ^P3kyi cho gas yoṅs su zin pa’i dug ^D4gis ’chi bar mi byed pa bźin du / ’dir yaṅ gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga la¹³² de bźin du blta bar bya’o źes zer na / de la ’di skad ces brjod par bya ste / ci gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho gas phyi rol gyi dug ^P4ji ltar źi bar byed pa de bźin du naṅ gi ’dod chags daṅ źe sdaṅ daṅ gti ^D5mug gi dug kyaṅ źi bar byed par¹³³ ’dod dam / gal te de¹³⁴ kho na bźin du źi bar byed na ni / źi ba de yaṅ / gaṅ du yaṅ su la yaṅ nam yaṅ de ltar mi dmigs ^P5pas mi ruṅ ṅo // gal te de kho na bźin du źi bar mi byed na ni / des na ji ltar gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho gas phyi rol gyi dug źi ^D6bar byed pa de bźin du chos ma yin par źi bar byed ces byar mi ruṅ ṅo //

§ 2.3. ci gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga de kun¹³⁵ tu ^P6’gro ba’am / ’on te kun tu ’gro ba ma yin par ’dod / gal te kun tu ’gro ba yin na ni / thog mar gñen ’dab sdug pa mchod sbyin du ma byas pas mi ruṅ ṅo // gal te ^D7kun tu ’gro ba ma yin na ni / des na de’i nus pa la ’khrul pa yod ^P7pas mi ruṅ ṅo //

§ 2.4. ci gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga des rgyu kho na bzlog par nus sam / ’on te ’bras bu yaṅ bzlog nus par ’dod / gal te rgyu kho na bzlog par nus na ni / des na ’bras bu la nus pa med pas mi ruṅ ^D74b1ṅo // gal te ^P8’bras bu yaṅ bzlog par nus na ni / des na ’dod dgur sgyur ba’i gzugs can bźin du / phyugs kyaṅ phyugs kyi lus spaṅs nas lha’i lus ’dzin par ’gyur bas mi ruṅ ṅo //

§ 2.5. ci gsaṅ sṅags rnams byed pa gaṅ yin pa ^P87b1de nus pa yaṅ yod la sñiṅ rje can źig yin ^D2nam / ’on te nus pa yaṅ med la / sñiṅ rje yaṅ med par ’dod / gal te nus pa yaṅ yod la sñiṅ rje can źig yin na ni / srog gcod pa med par ’jig rten thams cad mtho ^P2ris su ’jog par mi byed pas mi ruṅ ṅo // gal te nus pa yaṅ med la / sñiṅ rje can yaṅ ma yin na ni / des na ^D3de’i gsaṅ sṅags ’grub par ’gyur źes byar mi ruṅ ste /

§ 3. de ltar na rgyu daṅ / dpe daṅ / ’khrul pa daṅ / ’bras ^P3bu la nus pa med pa daṅ / gsaṅ sṅags byed pas kyaṅ mi ruṅ ste / de bas na smra ba ’di yaṅ rigs pas bskyed pa ma yin no //

§ 4. chos kyi phyir byed pa ma yin pa’i mtshan ñid ^D4gaṅ yin pa yaṅ brjod par bya ste / gaṅ pha rol ^P4gsod pa’i las byed la / tshe ’di la yaṅ ñes pa’i gñen po mi byed pa de ni chos kyi phyir byed pa ma yin no // ya mtshan can thams cad la mi sdug pa’i ’bras bur grags pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / thams cad mkhyen pas mi ^P5dge bar gcig tu ^D5ṅes par gsuṅs pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / bdag mi ’dod pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / ñon moṅs pa can gyi sems¹³⁶ kyis bskyed pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / rig sṅags daṅ bkra śis daṅ ldan pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / ^P6raṅ bźin gyis luṅ du ma bstan pa gaṅ yin pa de dag chos kyi phyir byed pa ma yin ^D6no //.

Translation

§ 1. In what does the doctrine [according to which ritual] violence is righteous(/beneficial) consist?¹³⁷ The full text [that is to be supplied here is] as above: ‘Here [in the world], for instance, a certain [ascetic or a certain brahmin holds such a view, speaks in such a way:]’¹³⁸ ‘[That type of] killing which, accompanied by a [ritual] formula-cum-injunction, [occurs] during sacrifices, leads all these [beings] to heaven: the one who sacrifices, that which is sacrificed and those who attend him.’¹³⁹ For what reason does [this ascetic or this brahmin] hold such a view, speak in such a way?¹⁴⁰ This [is] a doctrine that violates the established rule.¹⁴¹ [It has been] settled by rogues¹⁴² but [has certainly] not [been] established in [due] consideration of reasoning.¹⁴³ When the kaliyuga is at hand, the brahmins who wish to eat meat indulge in this [ritual violence, thus] transgressing the brahmins’ ancient [religious] law.¹⁴⁴

§ 2.1. However (api tu), this very [ascetic or brahmin] ought to be answered as follows. What do you think? The [ritual] formula-cum-injunction [that accompanies killing during sacrifices], is it of a righteous nature or of an unrighteous nature? If it is [claimed to be] of a righteous nature, then this cannot be since¹⁴⁵ [on the one hand] it does not bring about its own desirable [result]¹⁴⁶ without (antareṇāpi) killing, [but on the other hand] it is [believed to] make righteous [something obviously] unrighteous.¹⁴⁷ [But] if it is [claimed to be] of an unrighteous nature, then it cannot be that a factor (dharma) which[, inasmuch as it is unrighteous, itself] has an undesirable result, excludes another one with an [equally] undesirable result [i.e., the evil retribution expected from killing].¹⁴⁸

§ 2.2. But even [when one] answers [him] in this way, [our opponent] may further say: ‘Just as a poison, [when it is] overpowered¹⁴⁹ by a [ritual] formula-cum-injunction, does not cause death, in the same way, here too, one should consider the [ritual] formula-cum-injunction.’¹⁵⁰ The [opponent who claims this] ought to be answered as follows. What do you think? Does [a ritual formula-cum-injunction] neutralize the internal poison of desire, hostility and delusion in the same way as it neutralizes the external poison [of a snake, etc.]? If [it is claimed that] it stops it in exactly the same way, that cannot be since this neutralization [of desire, hostility and delusion] is never observed [to take place in such a way] anywhere for anybody. [But] if it does not neutralize it in exactly the same way, then it cannot be [said] that [a ritual formula-cum-injunction neutralizes] demerit in the same way as it neutralizes the external poison [of a snake, etc.].

§ 2.3. [And] what do you think? Is this [ritual] formula-cum-injunction [of] universal or limited [application/efficacy]? If it is claimed to be of universal [application/efficacy], this cannot be since one [is] not [observed to] sacrifice one’s own dear folks first. [But] if it is [of] limited [application/efficacy], then that cannot be [either] since its efficacy [would thus] be contingent[, hence unreliable].¹⁵¹

§ 2.4. [And] what do you think? Is the [ritual] formula-cum-injunction capable of ridding [one] of the cause alone, or [is it] also [capable of ridding one] of the effect? If [it is capable of ridding one] of the cause alone, then this cannot be since it [would be] devoid of [any] capacity with regard to the effect. [But] if [it is] also [capable of ridding one] of the effect, then this cannot be since [according to you,] just as a [being] whose form [changes] at will, the [sacrificial] animal (paśu) too abandons the body of an animal and takes on the body of a god.¹⁵²

§ 2.5. [And] what do you think? Is he who is the author¹⁵³ of the [ritual] formulas capable [and] compassionate,¹⁵⁴ or neither capable nor compassionate? If he is [claimed to be] capable [and] compassionate, then it cannot be that he does not lead everyone to heaven without killing.¹⁵⁵ [But] if he is neither capable nor compassionate, then it cannot be that his [ritual] formula is successful.

§ 3. Thus it is that, [be it] in respect of the [ritual formula-cum-injunction as a] cause,¹⁵⁶ in respect of the [wrong] example [adduced],¹⁵⁷ in respect of the [fact that the efficacy of the ritual formula-cum-injunction] is contingent,¹⁵⁸ in respect of the [fact that the ritual formula-cum-injunction] lacks [any] efficacy as to the effect,¹⁵⁹ [or] in respect of the [possibly incapable and non-compassionate] author of the [ritual] formulas,¹⁶⁰ this is [entirely] unjustified. Therefore, this doctrine, too, is irrational.¹⁶¹

§ 4. I am [now] going to state the definition of that which is not righteous(/beneficial). To begin with, the action that causes injury to others¹⁶² without counteracting the diseases of the present life is not righteous(/beneficial).¹⁶³ Nor is any of this righteous(/beneficial): [that] the result of which is recognized as undesirable among all sectarians;¹⁶⁴ [that] which is unanimously claimed to be unwholesome by the omniscient [beings]; [that] which is undesirable for oneself;¹⁶⁵ [that] which has been brought about by a defiled mind; [that] which is endowed with magic spells and blessings (maṅgala);¹⁶⁶ and [finally that] which is in itself [morally] neutral.¹⁶⁷

Abbreviations

1. AB Paṇḍit Satyavrata Samasrami: The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa of the Ṛg-veda with the Commentary of Sāyaṇa Āchārya. 5 vols. Calcutta 1895–1898: Bibliotheca Buddhica, New Series, 847, 849, 850, 852, 861.
2. AKBh Prahlad Pradhan: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya by Vasubandhu. Patna 1967: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8).
3. AN II Richard Morris: The Aṅguttara-Nikāya. Part II: Catukka Nipāta. London 1976 (1888¹): Pali Text Society.
4. BC E.H. Johnston: The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha. Delhi 1984 (Lahore 1936¹): Motilal Banarsidass.
5. BCSSū *Buddhacaritasaṅgrahasūtra, T. 190, vol. III (佛本行集經).
6. BHSD Franklin Edgerton: Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. Vol. II: Dictionary. Delhi 1993 (New Haven 1953¹): Motilal Banarsidass.
7. BoBh_D Nalinaksha Dutt: Bodhisattvabhūmiḥ (Being the XVth Section of Asaṅgapā=da’s Yogācārabhūmiḥ). Patna 1978: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 7).
8. BoBh_W Unrai Wogihara: Bodhisattvabhūmi. A Statement of Whole Course of the Bodhisattva (Being Fifteenth Section of Yogācārabhūmi). Tokyo 1971 (1930–1936¹): Sankibo Buddhist Book Store.
9. ChU Pp. 170–286 in Patrick Olivelle: The Early Upaniṣads. Annotated Text and Translation. New York 1998: Oxford University Press.
10. CŚ Catuḥśataka (Āryadeva). See Lang 1986 and Tillemans 1990.
11. D Derge (sDe dge) Edition of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon. A.W. Barber: The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Taipei Edition. Taipei 1991: SMC Publishing Inc.
12. DĀ_MS Dīrghāgama Manuscript containing i.a. the Kūṭatāṇḍyasūtra. See von Criegern 2002.
13. DN I T.W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter: The Dīgha Nikāya. Vol. I. London 1967 (1890¹): Pali Text Society.
14. DN II T.W. Rhys Davids and J. Estlin Carpenter: The Dīgha Nikāya. Vol. II. London 1947 (1903¹): Pali Text Society.
15. GBLSL Guang Bai Lun Shi Lun (Dharmapāla), T. 1571, vol. XXX (廣百論釋論).
16. Jātaka I V. Fausbøll: The Jātaka together with Its Commentary, Being Tales of the Anterior Births of Gotama Buddha. Vol. I. London 1962 (1877¹): Pali Text Society.
17. JM_H Albrecht Hanisch: Āryaśūras Jātakamālā. Philologische Untersuchungen zu den Legenden 1- bis 15. Teil 1: Einleitung, Textausgabe, Anhänge, Register. Marburg 2005: Indica et Tibetica Verlag (Indica et Tibetica 43,1).
18. JM_K Hendrik Kern: The Jātakamālā or Bodhisattvāvadānamālā by Ārya-çūra. Boston 1891: Harvard University (Harvard Oriental Series 1). See also Meiland 2009.
19. KV Karmavibhaṅga. Pp. 21–105 in Lévi 1932.
20. k(k). kārikā(s).
21. Kośa Louis de La Vallée Poussin: L’ Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Nouvelle édition anastatique présentée par Étienne Lamotte. 6 vols. Bruxelles 1980 (Paris 1923–1931¹): Institut Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises.
22. LASū Bunyiu Nanjio: The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Kyoto 1956 (1923¹): Otani University Press (Bibliotheca Otaniensis 1).
23. LASū_Tib Laṅkāvatārasūtra, Tibetan version. D 107, Ca 56a1–191b7.
24. MBh Vishnu S. Sukthankar and S.K. Belvalkar: The Mahābhārata. For the First Time Critically Edited. 19 vols. Pune 1933–1959: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
25. MDhŚ See Olivelle 2005a.
26. MHK Christian Lindtner: Madhyamakahṛdayam of Bhavya. Chennai 2001: The Adyar Library and Research Centre (The Adyar Library Series 123).
27. MN I V. Trenckner: The Majjhima-Nikāya. Vol. I. London 1935 (1888¹): Pali Text Society.
28. MW Monier Monier-Williams: A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Delhi 1993 (Oxford 1899¹): Motilal Banarsidass.
29. NA Abhidharmanyāyānusāraśāstra (Saṅghabhadra), T. 1562, vol. XXIX (阿毘達磨順正理論).
30. Negi J.S. Negi: Bod skad daṅ legs sbyar gyi tshig mdzod chen mo/Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary. Vol. VI. Sarnath, Varanasi 2000: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies.
31. P Daisetz T. Suzuki: The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Tokyo/Kyoto 1957: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute.
32. PrSū Prātimokṣasūtra of the Mūlasarvāstivādins. See Banerjee 1977.
33. PVSV Raniero Gnoli: The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Roma 1960: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma 23).
34. ṚV Barend A. van Nooten and Gary B. Holland: Rig Veda. A Metrically Restored Text with an Introduction and Notes. Cambridge, Mass., 1994: The Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Harvard University (Harvard Oriental Series 50).
35. Saṅgītiparyāya Valentina Stache-Rosen: Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus. II. Das Saṅgītisūtra und sein Kommentar Saṅgītiparyāya. Berlin 1968: Akademie-Verlag (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden 9).
36. ŚB Albrecht Weber: The Çatapatha-Brâhmaṇa in the Mâdhyandina-Çâkhâ […]. Leipzig 1924 (Berlin 1855¹): Otto Harrassowitz.
37. Sn Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith: Suttanipāta. London 1965 (1913¹): Pali Text Society.
38. ŚL Śiṣyalekha (Candragomin). See Hahn 1999.
39. SN I Léon Feer: The Saṃyutta-Nikāya of the Sutta-Piṭaka. Part I: Sagātha-Vagga. London 1973 (1884¹): Pali Text Society.
40. SN IV Léon Feer: The Saṃyutta-Nikāya of the Sutta-Piṭaka. Part IV: Saḷayatana-Vagga. London 1973 (1894¹): Pali Text Society.
41. SWTTF Heinz Bechert, dir., et al.: Sanskrit Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden. Göttingen 1973 ff.: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen.
42. T Junjiro Takakusu and Kaigyoku Watanabe: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, The Tripiṭaka in Chinese. 100 vols. Tokyo 1924–1934: Taisho Issaikyo Kankokai.
43. Traité II Étienne Lamotte: Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra). Louvain-la-Neuve 1981 (1949¹): Université de Louvain, Institut orientaliste (Publications de l’ Institut orientaliste de Louvain 26 [Bibliothèque du Muséon 18¹]).
44. TS T.N. Dharmadhikari: Taittirīya Saṃhitā with the Padapāṭha and the Commentaries of Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara Miśra and Sāyaṇācārya. Vol. IV, Part II (kāṇḍa VIIth). New Delhi 2010: Adarsha Sanskrit Shodha Samstha.
45. VDhSū Pp. 350–462 in Patrick Olivelle: Dharmasūtras. The Law Codes of Āpastamba, Gautama, Baudhāyana, and Vasiṣṭha. Delhi 2000: Motilal Banarsidass.
46. ViP M.M. Pathak: The Critical Edition of the Viṣṇupurāṇam/Viṣṇupurāṇam (samīkṣitā vṛttiḥ). 2 vols. Vadodara 1997: Oriental Institute.
47. VSm Viṣṇusmṛti. See Jolly 2002.
48. YBh Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya: The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga. The Sanskrit Text Compared with the Tibetan Version. 2 vols. Calcutta 1957: University of Calcutta.
49. YBh_Ch Yogācārabhūmi, Chinese translation. T. 1579, vol. XXX (瑜伽師地論).
50. YBh_MS Yogācārabhūmi, “Patna” manuscript. See Delhey 2013: 508–509.
51. YBh_Tib Yogācārabhūmi, Tibetan version. D 4035, Tshi 1b1–283a7/P 5536, Dzi 1–332a2.

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