The Yogācārabhūmi against Allodoxies (paravāda): 2 Ritual Violence

In: Indo-Iranian Journal
Vincent Eltschinger École Pratique des Hautes Études

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The Yogācārabhūmi, a massive compilation of the early Yogācāra “school(s),” contains a comparatively short section dedicated to the critical examination of sixteen “allodoxies” (paravāda), mostly non-Buddhist doctrines, practices and institutions, some of which go back to the Brahmajāla- and Śrāmaṇyaphalasūtra of the Dīrghāgama. This section, which could be dated to the late 3rd century CE, is a remarkable milestone in the history of philosophy in the Buddhist environment, in that it summarizes and updates earlier, canonical arguments, adapting them to a new polemical context, and reveals Buddhist philosophy’s profound indebtedness to sūtra literature. The present paper analyzes allodoxy no. 8 (hiṃsādharmavāda), the brahmins’ claim that ritual violence is a religious duty and, as such, no violence at all. The Yogācārabhūmi’s arguments are among the most cogent and systematic Indian Buddhists ever directed against ritual violence.


In his commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka () 12.19,1 the sixth-century Buddhist scholar Dharmapāla criticises the brahmins for having fraudulently arrogated themselves into a position of symbolic, ritual and social domination by composing the Veda, a corpus which, he contends, reflects vested economic self-interests:2

The ancient brahmins, in their shrewdness, secretly invented the Vedas and then said that they existed naturally […] The brahmins were commended [there] as being the most worthy of veneration, while the kṣatriyas and the rest were all [said to be] inferior; if [the latter] provided [the brahmins] with the necessities of life, then they would obtain immeasurable merit.3

Though certainly unique in its scope and severity, Dharmapāla’s charge falls in line with that of the venerable Suttanipāta (Sn), where the brahmins are similarly accused of having composed the (Vedic) mantras out of greed:

Seeing little by little the splendour of the king, and women adorned, and chariots yoked to thoroughbreds, well-made, with variegated coverings, dwellings and houses evenly proportioned and [well] laid out, [and] great human wealth, surrounded by herds of cows, combined with groups of excellent women, the brahmins coveted this. Having composed hymns for this purpose, they then went up to the king.4

Thus according to Dharmapāla and the Sn, there once was a (golden) time in which the Vedas did not yet exist and, at least according to the Sn, in which the brahmins were still austere and virtuous. But as other passages of the Sn also insist, human society knew of no animal sacrifices either before the brahmins’ degeneration.5 This is, mutatis mutandis, the point made by the author(s) and/or compiler(s) of the paravāda (“allodoxy”) section of the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh, between 270 and 340 CE?6) while introducing the “doctrine (according to which ritual) violence is righteous(/beneficial)” (hiṃsādharmavāda), the treatise’s eighth allodoxy.7 According to the YBh, the practice of ritual killing mirrors the interests of degenerate brahmins who wish to eat meat. Interestingly enough, here as in its critique of the brahmins’ pride in caste (allodoxy no. 14),8 the YBh appropriates the categories of Brahmanical cosmology and apocalypticism while accounting for the brahmins’ turn to blood sacrifices. It is indeed as the kaliyuga dawns that in their eagerness to eat meat the greedy brahmins set about claiming that ritually consecrated meat can be eaten, i.e., that sacrificial killing is non-killing—a ubiquitous Brahmanical claim that apparently goes as far back as the Ṛgveda (ṚV).9 But the interest and the originality of the hiṃsādharmavāda subsection of the YBh by no means limits itself to the presentation of the brahmin opponent’s views. For in its nature and scope, the YBh’s critique of these views is without equivalent in Indian Buddhist literature—dogmatic, philosophical or narrative (including Jātakamālā [JM] kk. 10.9–14, discussed below, 382–390). Contrary to the way in which most sūtras challenge the orthodox Brahmanical ideas on ritual killing,10 the YBh never attempts either to replace these ideas with other ones (alternative, i.e., nonviolent forms of ritual, etc.) or to appeal to the practices of an ideal past (that of the nonviolent ancient ṛṣis and kings), but instead criticises the legitimations provided for ritual violence in a very systematic philosophical way. The YBh thus presents us with an ethico-philosophical discussion in which the practice of ritual killing is not simply condemned because it is repulsive or contradicts the beliefs and practices of other socio-religious groups, but because the justifications adduced for it are inconsistent and fail to stand up to rational analysis.

Besides a fairly detailed doctrinal introduction, the present article provides a diplomatic and a critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the passage, an edition of its Tibetan version, and an annotated English translation. In contrast to my approach of the YBh’s treatment of the caste-classes, I have refrained from dealing with the treatise’s arguments against ritual violence in my doctrinal introduction. The reason for this is that, whereas the critique of the brahmins’ pride in caste calls for a detailed exegesis inasmuch as it relies on sūtra materials, the YBh’s arguments against sacrificial killing—most often destructive dilemmas following “analytically” from the opponent’s position—are straightforward enough not to require any paraphrase. Footnotes will hopefully supply the necessary information.

Ritual Killing is Not Killing

According to the YBh, (some) brahmins legitimize their sinful inclination for meat-eating by claiming that killing is not killing if it is accompanied by (Vedic) ritual formulas and injunctions.11 The idea is widely reflected in Brahmanical literature. Thus it is that according to the Mānavadharmaśāstra (MDhŚ) one “may eat meat when it is sacrificially consecrated”12 and that “a brahmin must never eat animals that have not been consecrated with ritual formulas.”13 The reason why ritually consecrated meat can be eaten is that sacrificial killing amounts to non-killing, a conception that apparently goes as far back as the Vedic Saṃhitās. And indeed, in ṚV 1.162.21, the “already dismembered sacrificial horse”14 is told: “You do not really die here, nor are you hurt.”15 By the same token, the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa (ŚB) has its ritualist declare, in relation to the animal victim that is led to the place of its immolation, that “that which they lead to the sacrifice, they do not lead to death.”16 According to Tull,

[h]ere the ritualists […] obfuscate the violent nature of the victim’s death (from which they turn away, declaring, ‘lest we should become eyewitnesses’ [ŚB]) by prohibiting the dismemberment of the animal, choosing instead to suffocate it. This process they assert is not really a killing, but a ‘quieting’ of the animal: “One does not say: ‘He strikes [the victim], he kills it,’ […] but that the victim ‘went away’ ” (ŚB

The Vedic idea that ritual killing is non-killing is well attested in legal literature as well. Thus according to Manu and Viṣṇu, “[w]hen a killing is sanctioned by the Veda […], it should be regarded definitely as non-killing.”18 For them, “[w]ithin the sacrifice […] killing is not killing.”19 The Vāsiṣṭhadharmasūtra (VDhSū) provides an excellent summary of the brahmin’s train of thought: “Without killing a living creature you can never obtain meat; and killing living creatures does not get you to heaven. Killing an animal at a sacrifice, therefore, is not a killing.”20 One could hardly make the argument underlying the claim of the YBh’s brahmin more explicit, as we shall see.

The sacrifice does not only neutralize the nasty eschatological consequences of animal killing,21 but also leads the sacrificer and its victim to heaven. It is thus considered ultimately beneficial.22 As the Chāndogyopaniṣad (ChU) has it, “[he who] does not harm any living being, except at sacred [sacrificial] places […], he who behaves thus throughout his life attains the world of Brahma.”23 According to the ŚB, “the sacrifice, as a whole, is the heavenly ship.”24 Similarly, “the sacrifice has only one foundation, one place of residence, the heavenly world.”25 That the sacrificer reaches heaven as a result of sacrifice is made clear, e.g., in ŚB “Every day the sacrifice is performed; every day [the sacrifice] is completed; every day [the sacrifice] brings the [sacrificer] into possession of the heavenly world; every day, [the sacrificer] goes to the heavenly world thanks to the [sacrifice].”26 In doing so, the human sacrificer imitates the gods who gained heaven and immortality by sacrificing.27 Aitareyabrāhmaṇa (AB) 2.6 provides one of the clearest statements to the effect that the animal victim, too, goes to heaven:28

[T]he victim as it was borne along saw death before it, and was not willing to go to the gods; the gods said to it, ‘Come; we shall make you go to the world of heaven.’ It replied ‘Be it so; but let one of you go before me.’ ‘Be it so’ (they replied). Before it went Agni; it followed after Agni.29

The idea, which can be traced to the Ṛgvedic hymns to the horse,30 finds an interesting expression in the Mahābhārata (MBh): “At the sacrifices, O Brahman, animals are constantly slain by the twice-born. But, it is said, they, too, have obtained heaven [when] consecrated by [ritual] formulas.”31 According to Manu and Viṣṇu, “[w]hen plants, domestic animals, trees, beasts, and birds die for the sake of a sacrifice, they will in turn earn superior births.”32 The same legislators bring us very close to the YBh statement as they declare that, “[w]hen a twice-born man who knows the true meaning of the Veda kills animals for these purposes, he leads himself and those animals to the highest state.”33

On the Kaliyuga and the Degeneration Pattern

As in the case of the Brahmanical claims to socio-religious superiority, the YBh interprets sacrificial killing as typical of the degenerate brahmins of the kaliyuga, and this in a manner (i.e., kaliyuge pratyupasthite) that is reminiscent of epic and purāṇic formulations:34 “When the kaliyuga is at hand, the brahmins who wish to eat meat indulge in this [ritual violence, thus] transgressing the brahmins’ ancient [religious] law.”35 The idea that ritual violence either did not exist or was banned in former times36 but (re)appeared as a result of moral degeneration is not infrequent in Indian Buddhist sources, as is testified by the following excerpt from the Jātakas:

In bygone days the wise, preaching the law from mid-air, and shewing the evil consequences of the practice, made the whole continent renounce it. But now, when their previous existences have become confused in their minds, the practice has sprung up afresh.37

Similar ideas can be found with respect to meat-eating. Thus it is that in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (LASū), which is typical of the Mahāyānist prohibition of meat-eating,38 the Buddha prophecises that unscrupulous future Buddhist legislators (vinaya specialists) will make meat-eating permissible, thus breaking with the rules laid down by him and shared by the ṛṣis of old:

But, O Mahāmati, I have allowed [my disciples] the exquisite food of all the ṛṣis of old, [a food that is] honored by all the noble persons [and] avoided by the non-noble persons [alone, a food] that brings numerous good qualities(/benefits) [and] is exempt from the numerous defects(/evils) [of meat ? ]—food like rice, barley, wheat, kidneybeans, beans, lentils, etc., [prepared] in ghee, sesam oil, honey, raw sugar, treacle, candied sugar, sugarcane juice, etc.—thinking that [such a food] is permissible(/suitable) [for the renouncer]. But in the future, O Mahāmati, some deluded persons will not regard this [food] as exquisite food—[persons] professing various arbitrary(/alternative) explanations (vikalpa) of [texts on monastic] discipline [in order to legitimize meat-eating because], influenced [as they will be] by the imprints of [their former existences in] carnivorous families, [they will] fall prey to craving the taste [of meat].39

Here, degeneration and the resulting delusion are made responsible for the reappearance of a non-vegetarian diet.

In the LASū passage just referred to, the Buddha claims his position to coincide with the practice of the wise and vegetarian ṛṣis of old, those not yet degenerate brahmins whom he regarded as the embodiment of Buddhist values and practice—the so-called “true brahmins.”40 Now, the connection between the ṛṣis, the rise of greed and the concomitant appearance of sacrificial violence is the subject-matter of the Brāhmaṇadhammikasutta of the Sn.41 As already hinted at by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya,42 (a version of) this sutta constitutes the YBh’s most likely source of inspiration for associating these Brahmanical practices with an era of degeneration (the YBh’s kaliyuga). This genealogy is reflected in the very wording of the two texts: whereas the Brāhmaṇadhammikasutta expounds, as its title suggests, the Brahmanical lore/law of the brahmins of old (porāṇānaṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ brāhmaṇadhammo), the YBh accuses the brahmins who sacrifice animal victims of transgressing the ancient Brahmanical lore/law (paurāṇaṃ brāhmaṇadharmam). In the argument of the sutta, the brahmins of Kosala ask the Buddha as follows: “Do brahmins now, Gotama, live in conformity with the Brahmanical lore of the brahmins of old?”43 Gotama’s answer is unambiguous: “No, brahmins, brahmins now do not live in conformity with the Brahmanical lore of the brahmins of old.”44 According to the Buddha, the “seers of old” (isayo pubbakā, Sn 284) were chaste (Sn 284, 285, 290, 291–293), virtuous (Sn 289, 292, 294), learned (Sn 289) and austere (Sn 284, 292). These original brahmins had “no cattle, no gold, no wealth” (Sn 285), and “[w]hat was prepared for them, food made ready at the door, prepared in faith, they thought this was to be given to those who sought.”45 Most importantly, these true brahmins “praised non-violence” (avihiṃsam avaṇṇayuṃ, Sn 292). Accordingly, their rituals involved no animal slaughter:

Having asked for rice, a bed, clothes, and butter and oil, having collected them properly, from that they performed the sacrifice. When the sacrifice occurred, they did not kill cows. Like a mother, father, brother, or other relative too, cows are our best friends, in which medicines are produced. They give food, strength, (good) complexion, and likewise happiness. Knowing this reason, they did not kill cows.46

And “as long as [the lore] existed in the world, this race prospered in happiness.”47 However, a “change” (vipallāsa, Sn 299, Norman, Masefield) for the worse occurred as these brahmins’ covetousness (abhijjhāyiṃsu, Sn 301), desire (icchā, Sn 306) and craving (taṇhā, Sn 306) increased.48 Composing ad hoc ritual formulas (manta, Sn 302, 306) and, one may surmise, inventing related rituals, the brahmins prompted king Okkāka to patronize sacrifices and pay them substantial sacrificial fees. Here is the Sn’s account of the events:

[But] there was a change in them. Seeing little by little the splendour of the king, and women adorned, and chariots yoked to thoroughbreds, well-made, with variegated coverings, dwellings and houses evenly proportioned and [well] laid out, [and] great human wealth, surrounded by herds of cows, combined with groups of excellent women, the brahmins coveted this. Having composed hymns for this purpose, they then went up to Okkāka. ‘You have much wealth and grain. Sacrifice, [for] your property is much. Sacrifice, [for] your wealth is much.’ And then the king, the lord of warriors, induced by the brahmins, having performed these sacrifices, the assamedha, the purisamedha, the sammāpāsa, the vācapeyya, (and) the niraggaḷa, gave wealth to the brahmins: cows, and a bed, and clothes, and adorned women, and chariots yoked to thoroughbreds, well made, with variegated coverings. Having filled delightful dwellings, evenly proportioned, with various sorts of grain, he gave wealth to the brahmins. And they, receiving wealth there, found pleasure in hoarding it up. Overcome by desire, their craving increased the more. Having composed hymns for this purpose, they went up to Okkāka again. ‘As are water, earth, gold, wealth, and grain, so are cows to men. For this is a requisite for living creatures. Sacrifice, [for] your property is much. Sacrifice, [for] your wealth is much.’ And then the king, the lord of warriors, induced by the brahmins, had many hundreds of thousands of cows killed in a sacrifice.49

Thus according to the Brāhmaṇadhammikasutta, ritual violence as a scripturally legitimated practice is the end result of the brahmins’ moral decay, and this is likely to be the reason why the YBh interprets alloxody no. 8, the brahmins’ hiṃsādharmavāda, as typical of the kaliyuga. Note that the label of this allodoxy itself—hiṃsādharmavāda—may reflect the contents of this or a very similar source.50 For as the sutta strongly insists, the animals were the innocent victims of the brahmins’ greed. In other words, the rise of injustice (adhamma) cannot be separated from the appearance of ritual violence ([vi]hiṃsā):

Not by their feet, nor by their horns, nor by anything [else] had the cows harmed [anyone]. They were like sheep, meek, giving pails of milk. [Nevertheless] the king, seizing them by the horns, had them killed with a knife. And then the devas, the fathers, Inda, asuras and rakkhasas cried out: ‘[This is] injustice,’ when the knife fell on the cows […] This injustice of using violence has come down [to us] as an ancient practice.51 Innocent [cows] are killed; the sacrificers fall away from justice. Thus this ancient mean practice is blamed by those who understand. Where people see such a thing being done, they blame the sacrificer.52

Buddhist Ideas on Animal Sacrifice and Its Critique

Except for the most radical forms of Tantric antinomianism,53 Indian Buddhism generally regards killing (prāṇātipāta) as the worst possible sin.54 Killing is the first of the ten “evil courses of action” (akuśalakarmapatha) leading to bad rebirth states and one of the four offences resulting in a monk’s permanent expulsion from the community (pārājika).55 As for abstaining from killing, it is the first precept (śikṣāpada) of lay and monastic Buddhist morality (śīla). According to an interesting definition provided by (a pseudo-)Aśvaghoṣa, five conditions must be satisfied for killing to be realised: “There is a sentient being; one has the notion of a sentient being; there is a murderous intention; one undertakes [to kill him/her/it]; one deprives [him/her/it] of [his/her/its] life principle.”56 The overwhelming majority of Buddhists agree that the sentient beings whose killing results in bad eschatological consequences57 are not limited to human beings but include animalcules (flies, etc.) and animals (snakes, deers, cattle, birds, buffalos, etc.).58 This is made particularly clear in dogmatic statements prohibiting the murder of animals either for fun (krīḍārtham) or for subsistence (upabhogārtham). Whereas taking another’s life for mere fun is considered an instance of killing “born of covetousness” (lobhaja),59 butchering, hunting and fishing are regarded as cases of killing “born of delusion” (mohaja).60 Animal sacrifice is another paradigmatic instance of killing born of delusion. In blood rituals indeed, animals are killed on account of the erroneous notion that violence belongs to one’s religious duty (dharmabuddhi; or: is righteous/beneficial)—just as criminals are executed by kings on the deceiving authority of the(ir) legislators (dharmapāṭhakaprāmāṇya).61

Indian Buddhist literature provides several stereotyped descriptions of animal sacrifices. Exemplifying the class of actions that are conducive to a short lifespan (alpāyuḥsaṃvartanīya), the Karmavibhaṅga (KV) refers to (ritual) killing, viz. the “establishment of a piece of open ground [serving as a sacrificial area] where numerous sentient beings such as buffalos, cattle, hogs, and cocks, are slain.”62 In the Kūṭadantasutta (Skt. Kūṭatāṇḍyasūtra),63 the brahmin Kūṭadanta of Khānumata “planned a great sacrifice: seven hundred bulls, seven hundred bullocks, seven hundred heifers, seven hundred he-goats and seven hundred rams were all tied up to the sacrificial posts.”64 Nearly the same is told of king Pasenadi in the Saṃyuttanikāya (SN):

[A]t that time a great sacrifice was arranged to be held for the king, the Kosalan Pasenadi. Five hundred bulls, five hundred bullocks and as many heifers, goats, and rams, were led to the pillar to be sacrificed. And they that were slaves and menials and craftsmen, hectored about by blows and by fear, made the preparations with tearful faces weeping.65

Needless to say, these and similar66 depictions of animal sacrifices are not aimed at documenting cruel non-Buddhist practices in anything like an ethnographical manner, but rather at condemning them on the basis of various rhetorical strategies. One of them is a warning based on the principle of collective moral responsibility. According to the KV indeed, “the sons and the grandsons of the [person] who instigates the sacrifice, as well as [any] other person who follows [him] in longing for a result or [simply due to being] scared, [do also] murder living beings.”67 This type of condemnation relies on the principle that all the persons involved in a single murder are to face the same eschatological retribution, a principle that pertains as well in the case of collective crimes connected with war, hunting and highway robbery.68

Another strategy for condemning blood sacrifices is to regard the ethical-ritual behaviour of virtuous (i.e., not yet degenerate) persons of the past as normative and demand a substitution for animal sacrifices, first with the non-violent rituals of old, and second with Buddhist practices and values interpreted as internalized sacrifices.69 This strategy comes very close to the rhetorics at work in the Brāhmaṇadhammikasutta discussed above. In the Kūṭadantasutta, the Buddha, who “understand[s] how to conduct successfully the triple sacrifice with its sixteen requisites,”70 instructs the learned brahmin Kūṭadanta by telling him the story of the ancient king Mahāvijita’s sacrifice:

In this sacrifice, brahmin, no bulls were slain, no goats or sheep, no cocks and pigs, nor were various living beings subjected to slaughter, nor were trees cut down for sacrificial posts, nor were grasses mown for the sacrificial grass, and those who are called slaves or servants or workmen did not perform their tasks for fear of blows or threats, weeping and in tears. But those who wanted to do something did it, those who did not wish to did not: they did what they wanted to do, and not what they did not want to do. The sacrifice was carried out with ghee, oil, butter, curds, honey and molasses.71

Thus far from condemning all and every type of sacrifice indiscriminately, the Buddha dismisses the blood rituals alone. And indeed, elsewhere the Buddha is seen answering as follows the question whether he praises all sacrifices:

No, brahmin, I do not praise every sacrifice. Yet I would not withhold praise from every sacrifice. In whatever sacrifice, brahmin, cows are slaughtered, goats and sheep are slaughtered, poultry and pigs are slaughtered and divers living creatures come to destruction, —such sacrifice, brahmin, which involves butchery I do not praise. Why so? To such a sacrifice, brahmin, involving butchery neither the worthy ones nor those who have entered on the worthy way draw near. But in whatever sacrifice, brahmin, cows are not slaughtered, goats and sheep are not slaughtered, poultry and pigs are not slaughtered and living creatures come not to destruction, such sacrifice not involving butchery I do praise.72

Yet another reason for repudiating blood sacrifices is that they are apparently considered (at least symbolically) polluting. The very fact that paradigmatically good/moral persons, viz. the arhats/worthy ones and those engaged on the holy/worthy (Buddhist) path (arahamaggaṃ vā samāpannā), do not attend blood sacrifices, is used as an argument against them.73 Finally, the Buddha (or Kassapa) rejects violent sacrifices on the grounds that, contrary to the “reformed” or restored non-animal sacrifices, blood rituals do not bring significant results.74 The idea finds its best expression in the Pāyāsisuttanta of the Dīghanikāya (DN):

At the sort of sacrifice […] where oxen are slain, or goats, or fowls and pigs, or diverse creatures are put an end to; and those that take part in the sacrifice have wrong views, wrong intention, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, wrong endeavour, wrong mindfulness, wrong rapture, such a sacrifice […] is neither of great fruitfulness nor of great profit, nor of great renown, nor of widespread effect. It is just as if a farmer […] were to enter a wood taking with him plough and seed, and were there, in an untilled tract, in unfavourable soil, among unuprooted stumps, to plant seeds that were broken, rotten, spoilt by wind and heat, out of season, not in good condition, and the god were not to give rain in due season. Would those seeds attain to growth, increase and expansion, or would the farmer get abundant returns? No indeed.75

On the contrary, non-violent sacrifices performed in the spirit of the Buddhist eightfold path are comparable in their fruitfulness to the seeds of a farmer who would

enter a wood, taking with him plough and seed, and [would be] there, in a well-tilled tract, in favourable soil well cleared of stumps, to plant seed that was unbroken, free from mildew, unspoilt by wind or heat, in season and in good condition, and the god [would be] to give good rain in due season. Would those seeds grow, increase, expand, and would the farmer get abundant returns? He would indeed.76

Asked by Kūṭadanta whether a less difficult and more fruitful sacrifice exists than the non-animal one, i.e., than the purely external but ethically more satisfactory sacrifice performed by kings and ṛṣis of old, the Buddha answers that such a ritual occurs whenever regular family gifts are given to virtuous ascetics, whenever someone provides shelter for the saṅgha, whenever someone with a pure heart goes for refuge to the Buddha, the dhamma and the saṅgha, and whenever someone with a pure heart undertakes the moral precepts.77 Thus according to the Kūṭadantasutta, on the one side, looking back into the past reveals that ancient sacrifices were performed without killing and harrassment;78 on the other side, analysing the true nature of ritual calls for a reinterpretation of external sacrifice in terms of Buddhist practices and values.79

Mutatis mutandis, this twofold strategy is also the one adopted by Āryaśūra in the tenth story of his JM.80 This jātaka contains a vitriolic critique of animal sacrifice, one whose line of argument presents some interesting similarities with the YBh’s. The story relates the bodhisattva’s former birth as a king whose “entire being was dedicated to benefitting his subjects” (prajāhiteṣv āhitasarvabhāvaḥ, k. 10.1c, Meiland 2009: I.263) and whose “sole duty was to virtue” (dharmaikakārya, k. 10.1d, Meiland 2009: I.263). In spite of his fairness and compassion, however, the king’s realm came to be afflicted by a devastating drought. Asked for advice, the chief priest (purohita) and the brahmin elders (brāhmaṇavṛddha), all of them “esteemed for their knowledge of religion” (dharmatattvajñasaṃmata, JM K 68,11//JM H 96,22, Meiland 2009: I.265), urged the king to “perform a sacrificial ritual prescribed by the Vedas” (vedavihitam … yajñavidhim, JM K 68,23–13/JM H 96,24, Meiland 2009: I.265). According to the brahmins indeed, “[w]hen sacrificed by proper sacrifices, the gods return the honor by delivering rain.”81 The sacrifice involved “the killing and massacre of several hundreds of living creatures” (anekaprāṇiśatavadhārambha, JM K 68,13/JM H 96,24, Meiland 2009: I.265); it was regarded by the brahmins as “heaven’s causeway” (suralokasetu, k. 10.5c, Meiland 2009: I.267) and the surest way for the king to remove his debt to the gods (ṛṇaṃ surāṇām, k. 10.7d, Meiland 2009: I.267).82

The entire jātaka recounts how the bodhisattva-king, unwilling to perform the bloody ritual, tricked his brahmin advisors and managed to make it rain without sacrificing any living creature. Raising the stakes, the king resolved to sacrifice one thousand human victims (puruṣamedhasahasra), to be picked out from among the sinners and the wrongdoers of his realm. Thus it is that he daily had the following promulgation publicized:

From this day forth, whoever takes gleeful pride in indecency, sneering at the royal command revered even by neighboring kings, will, by their own actions, be forced to become sacrificial victims. Wretched with dispair, their body tied to a stake, they will languish before the people’s eyes.83

Fearful of death and trustful of their beloved sovereign, the king’s subjects “abandoned any fondness for immoral behavior and became dedicated to practicing moral restraints” (tyaktadauḥśīlyānurāgāḥ śīlasaṃvarasamādānaparāḥ, JM K 71,4/JM H 100,14–15, Meiland 2009: I.275), “as if they lived in the kṛta era” (kṛtayuga iva babhūvuḥ, JM K 71,7 [kṛta iva yuge babhūvuḥ]/JM H 100,17–18, Meiland 2009: I.275).84 As a result, no one could be selected as a sacrificial victim. Seeing that his people had now become “worthy of sacrificial gifts” (dakṣiṇīyatā, k. 10.22b, Meiland 2009: I.277), the king resolved to give up in sacrifice “the wealth […] intended to be used for sacrifice” (yajñāya dhanaṃ prakalpitam [pratarkitam K], k. 10.22c, Meiland 2009: I.277) and had alms given to all those afflicted by poverty. As a result of this “virtuous sacrifice” (dharmayajña, JM K 72,11/JM H 102,21 and JM K 72,18/JM H 103,1, Meiland 2009: I.279 and 281), “[w]hen the king’s good guidance made the people all incline toward moral conduct, the calamities disappeared without obstacle, their force destroyed by the increased virtue.”85 One of the conclusions of the story is that “[h]arming animals never leads to prosperity. But giving, discipline, self-restraint and other virtues do. Those who seek prosperity should therefore dedicate themselves to giving and other virtues.”86 “Free from any fault of animal-slaughter” (paśuvaiśasavācyadoṣavirahita, JM K 72,18/JM H 103,1, Meiland 2009: I.281), the king’s virtuous sacrifice has indeed achieved more than could be expected from an animal sacrifice, and the king himself, although not a brahmin, has accomplished more than a twiceborn priest. As his chief minister praises him,

You wear no antelope skin across your limbs like a mark on the moon. The natural grace of your gestures is not dulled by the constraints of initiation. Glorious too is your hair-arrangement on your head round as a parasol. Your gifts rid even the god of a hundred sacrifices of his awe, the very basis of his glory.87

But Āryaśūra’s critique of animal sacrifice does not limit itself to a set of implicit assumptions only to be made manifest by the plot. The king’s initial reaction upon listening to the brahmins’ advice is to lament the fact that “these men are in a terrible state.”88 For according to him, “[t]heir delicate minds are taken in by the trust they place in others, as they unquestioningly believe in those devoted to religion.”89 Now the relevance, the rationality and the morality of animal sacrifices are obviously to be questioned, and this critical examination is what engages the king in the inner monologue of stanzas 10.9–14:

The very people considered refuges in the world are the same who turn to violence in religion’s name. Those following the wrong path indicated by such men whirl miserably in the narrow straits of hell.90 How can violence against animals be connected with morality or with dwelling in heaven or pleasing the gods?91 They say an animal goes to heaven when slaughtered by spear-like mantras and so its murder is moral.92 But this is false. Who can obtain in the next world the fruit of another’s action? An animal’s mind has not renounced vice. Nor has it committed itself to good deeds. Why would it go to heaven, if merely killed in sacrifice, without having performed its own actions? If one goes to heaven by being killed in sacrifice, surely brahmins themselves would become sacrificial animals. But since one never sees this practiced, who would accept the words of such men? Would the gods reject their pure nectar, served by fine nymphs, incomparable in scent, richness, flavor, and potency, and take joy in the slaughter of a pitiful animal to feed off its intestines and other parts?93

Just as the YBh, the king’s deliberation reflects the ritualists’ contention that ritual killing is not killing. And from among the arguments he adduces against this idea, one at least echoes the YBh and the Buddhacaritasaṅgrahasūtra (BCSSū):94 if the victim secures heaven from being sacrificed, how is it that the brahmin sacrificer does not offer himself, or his relatives, in sacrifice?95

In attempting to show that ritual violence is both morally wrong and practically irrational, the sources considered so far apparently aimed at restoring the sacrificial practices of the past, at reforming the sacrifice by replacing animal victims with non-animal ones and reinterpreting and/or internalizing it. According to these documents, inasmuch as it yields only little result in the present life and leads to disastrous eschatological consequences, animal sacrifice is counterproductive and detrimental. Moreover, ritual violence did not belong to the exemplary/normative practices of the ṛṣis and the kings of old, those unanimously celebrated embodiments of wisdom and morality. Now, these rhetorical strategies draw most of their persuasiveness, if any, from the Buddha’s extraordinary perceptual abilities: Just as he alone can penetrate the otherwise inconceivable (acintya) machinery of karmic retribution, so does the Buddha alone have a direct cognitive access to past and future events (atītānāgata), including his own former births. In other words, these arguments ultimately rely on the authority of the Buddha rather than on an appraisal of the rationality and internal consistency of the Brahmanical arguments themselves. Herein lies, in my opinion, the interest of the YBh passage edited and translated below, and of its counterpart in the JM. For as I have pointed out elsewhere, the paravāda section of the YBh presents itself as a “critical examination” (parīkṣā) aimed at demonstrating that the sixteen allodoxies “are entirely unreasonable once they are evaluated by means of the twofold [type of] reasoning consisting in a critical examination.”96 Even in its polemics against coreligionists such as the Sarvāstivādins,97 the YBh indeed never resorts to scriptural authority as an autonomous or additional source of argument. Our passage is thus meant as a critical assessment of the scriptural and rational justifications provided by brahmins for ritual killing as a soteriologically oriented practice, and this concern is, at least in its scope and systematicity, unprecedented in Buddhist literature.

Editorial Conventions

  1. .. illegible akṣara
  2. . illegible part of an akṣara
  3. [ ] contain unclear akṣaras or part(s) of an akṣara
  4. { } contain akṣara(s) added at the top or the bottom of the folio/above or below the line
  5. {{ }} contain akṣara(s) cancelled by means of one/two vertical stroke(s) written above the akṣara
  6. {{{ }}} contain akṣara(s) cancelled by means of erasure
  7. ⟨ ⟩ contain missing akṣara(s)
  8. string-hole area
  9. ā2 ā written as a right-flowing stroke extending from the top of the akṣara
  10. e2, o2, au2 devanāgarī-like e, o, au
  11. 2 plus virāma
  12. * virāma
  13. below
  14. / daṇḍa
  15. \ line-filling daṇḍa

Diplomatic Edition of YBh MS 40b3–41a3

  1. 40b3 himsādharmavādaḥ katamaḥ yathāpīhaikatya iti vi
  2. 40b4 stareṇa pūrvavat* / yajñeṣu mantravidhipūrvakaḥ prāṇātipātaḥ kaś ca juhoti / yaś ca hūyate / ye ca {↓ l.4 ta}tsāhāyāḥ te ☸ ṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ2 svargagamanāya bhavatīti / kena kāraṇe2na evaṃdṛṣṭir bhavatīty evaṃvādī uts{{{th}}}aṃsthavāda eṣaḥ / śaṭhaviṭhapito no ☸ tu yuktim abhisamīkṣya vyavasthāpitaḥ kaliyuge pratyupasthite / brāhmaṇaiḥ paurāṇaṃ brāhmaṇadharmam atikramya māṃsaṃ
  3. 40b5 bhakṣayitukāmair etat* prakalpitaṃ / api tu sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ / kaccid i{{[sat]i}}cchasi / yo sau mantravidhi saddharma ☸ svabhāvo vā / adharmasvabhāvo veti / saced dharmasvabhāvaḥ tena antareṇāpi prāṇātipātaṃ2 svam iṣṭaṃ2 / na nirvarttayaty adharmaṃ2 dharmīkarotīti na yujyate / sace{↓ l.5 d a}[dha]rmasvabhāvaḥ tena svayam aniṣṭaphalo2 dharmaḥ anyam aniṣṭaphalaṃ vyāva{{ya}}rttaya
  4. 40b6 tīti na yujyate / evaṃ2 vyākṛte ca punaḥ saty uttari vadet tadyathā nāma viṣaṃ mantravidhi / parigṛhītaṃ na vini ☸ pātayati / tadvad ihāpi mantravidhir draṣṭavya iti / sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ kaccid icchasi ya{{tra}}thā mantravidhiḥ bāhyaṃ2 viṣaṃ2 praśamayati / evam adhyātmikaṃ2 / rāgadve{{.. ..}}ṣamohaviṣam iti / śacet tathaiva śamayati sa ca praśamaḥ na kutracit kadācit kasya \
  5. 40b7 cit tathopalabhyata iti na yujyate / sacen na tathai[v]a praśamayati / tena yathā mantravidhiḥ bāhyaṃ viṣaṃ praśamayati / ☸ tathā adharmam iti / na yujyate / kaccid icchasi sa mantravidhiḥ sarvatragaḥ {↓ l. 7 a}sarvatrago veti / sacet sarvatragaḥ / iṣṭaḥ svajana ādito na hūyata iti na yujyate / athāsarvatraga tena śaktir asya {{.. ..}} vyabhicaratīti / na yujyate kaccid icchasi
  6. 41a1 mantra[v]idhi[ḥ /] hetum e[va] vyā[va]rttayituṃ [/] samarthaḥ ā2hosvit* [pha]lam api / saced dhetum eva tena phala[śa]ktihīna i ☸ ti / na yujyate / sacet* phalam api pa[śv]ā[śra]yaṃ h[itvā devāśrayaṃ] [vi]gṛ[hṇātī]ti na yujyate / kaccid icchasi yo sau mantrāṇāṃ praṇe2t[ā sa] śaktaḥ / kāruṇiko vā aśaktaḥ akāruṇiko veti / sacec chaktaḥ kāruṇikaḥ / [tad]ānta[reṇa] pr[āṇā]tipā
  7. 41a2 taṃ [sarva]ṃ2 lokaṃ2 svarga[ṃ2] nayatīti na yujyate / saced aśaktaḥ / akāruṇikaḥ tena mantras tasya samṛdhyatīti na yujya ☸ te / iti hi hetuto pi dṛṣṭāntato pi / vyabhicārato pi / phalaśaktihānito pi / mantrapraṇetṛto pi / na yujyate / tasmād eṣo2 pi vādaḥ / ayogavihitaḥ yac ca na dharmāya kalpate / tasya lakṣaṇaṃ2 vakṣyāmi ya[c ca] paravyā[bādhakaṃ2 ka]rma na [ca] dṛṣṭa
  8. 41a3 doṣapratikriyaṃ2 tat tāvan na dharmāya kalpate / yac ca sarvapā[ṣa]ṇḍi[ṣu] siddhāniṣṭaphala[ṃ2] yac ca sarva[jñair e]kāṃ[śe] ☸ na bhāṣitam akuśalam iti / svayam anīpsitaṃ ca yat* kliṣṭena ca cetasā yat samutthāpitaṃ2 vidyādi{{.. ..}}maṅgalop[e]taṃ ca ya ☸ t* / tad api {{{..}}} na [dha]rmāya kalpate /

Critical Edition of YBh MS 40b3–41a3

§ 1. himsādharmavādaḥ katamaḥ / yathāpīhaikatya iti vistareṇa pūrvavat / yajñeṣu mantravidhipūrvakaḥ prāṇātipāto yaś98 ca juhoti yaś ca hūyate ye ca tatsahāyās99 teṣāṃ sarveṣāṃ svargagamanāya bhavatīti / kena kāraṇenaivandṛṣṭir bhavaty100 evaṃvādī101 / utsaṃsthavāda eṣaḥ śaṭhaviṭhapito no102 tu yuktim abhisamīkṣya vyavasthāpitaḥ / kaliyuge pratyupasthite brāhmaṇaiḥ paurāṇaṃ brāhmaṇadharmam atikramya māṃsaṃ bhakṣayitukāmair etat prakalpitam103 /

§ 2.1. api tu104 sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ / kaccid icchasi yo ’sau mantravidhiḥ105 sa dharma106svabhāvo vādharmasvabhāvo veti / saced dharmasvabhāvas tenāntareṇāpi prāṇātipātaṃ svam iṣṭaṃ na nirvartayaty adharmaṃ dharmīkarotīti107 na yujyate / saced adharmasvabhāvas tena svayam aniṣṭaphalo dharmo108 ’nyam aniṣṭaphalaṃ vyāvartayatīti na yujyate /

§ 2.2. evaṃ vyākṛte109 ca punaḥ saty uttari vadet / tadyathā nāma viṣaṃ mantravidhiparigṛhītaṃ na vinipātayati / tadvad ihāpi mantravidhir draṣṭavya iti / sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ / kaccid icchasi yathā mantravidhir bāhyaṃ viṣaṃ praśamayaty evam ādhyātmikaṃ110 rāgadveṣamohaviṣam iti / sacet111 tathaiva śamayati sa ca praśamo na kutracit kadācit kasyacit tathopalabhyata iti na yujyate / sacen na tathaiva112 praśamayati tena yathā mantravidhir bāhyaṃ viṣaṃ praśamayati tathādharmam iti na yujyate /

§ 2.3. kaccid icchasi sa mantravidhiḥ sarvatrago ’sarvatrago veti / sacet sarvatraga iṣṭaḥ svajana ādito na hūyata iti na yujyate / athāsarvatragas113 tena śaktir asya vyabhicaratīti na yujyate /

§ 2.4. kaccid icchasi mantravidhir114 hetum eva vyāvartayituṃ samartha āhosvit phalam api / saced dhetum eva tena phalaśaktihīna iti na yujyate / sacet phalam api tena kāmarūpivat paśur api115 paśvāśrayaṃ hitvā devāśrayaṃ vigṛhṇātīti116 na yujyate /

§ 2.5. kaccid icchasi yo ’sau mantrāṇāṃ praṇetā sa śaktaḥ kāruṇiko vāśakto ’kāruṇiko veti / sacec chaktaḥ kāruṇikas tadā117ntareṇa prāṇātipātaṃ sarvaṃ lokaṃ svargaṃ na nayatīti118 na yujyate / saced aśakto ’kāruṇikas tena mantras tasya samṛdhyatīti na yujyate /

§ 3. iti hi hetuto ’pi dṛṣṭāntato ’pi vyabhicārato ’pi phalaśaktihānito ’pi mantrapraṇetṛto ’pi na yujyate / tasmād eṣo ’pi vādo ’yogavihitaḥ /

§ 4. yac ca na dharmāya kalpate tasya lakṣaṇaṃ vakṣyāmi / yac ca para119vyābādhakaṃ karma na ca dṛṣṭadoṣapratikriyaṃ120 tat tāvan121 na dharmāya kalpate / yac ca sarvapāṣaṇḍiṣu siddhāniṣṭaphalam / yac ca sarvajñair ekāṃśena bhāṣitam akuśalam iti / svayam anīpsitaṃ ca yat / kliṣṭena ca cetasā yat samutthāpitam / vidyā122maṅgalopetaṃ ca yat / svayam avyākṛtaṃ ca yat123 / tad api na dharmāya kalpate124 /.

Tibetan Version (YBh Tib D73b6–74b6/P85b6–86b6)

§ 1. ’tshe ba’i chos su smra ba gaṅ źe na / ’di ltar ’di na kha cig ces bya ba nas rgyas par sṅa ma bźin te / mchod sbyin rnams la P6gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga sṅon du ’gro ba’i125 srog gcod D7par byed de / mchod sbyin byed pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / mchod sbyin du bya ba gaṅ yin pa daṅ / gaṅ dag de’i grogs byed pa de dag thams cad mtho ris su ’gro bar ’gyur ro P7sñam mo // ci’i phyir de ltar lta źiṅ de skad smra źe na / de ni tshig126 las ’das par smra ba yin te / g.yon can gyis D74a1bsgrubs127 pa yin gyi rigs pas128 mṅon par brtags nas bźag129 pa ma yin te / rtsod pa’i dus la bab pa bram P8ze śa za bar ’dod pa rnams kyis bram ze’i chos rñiṅ pa las ’gal bar byas nas ’di byas par zad do //

§ 2.1. de la ’di skad ces brjod par bya ste / ci D2gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga gaṅ yin pa de chos kyi130 ṅo bo ñid yin pa’am / ’on te chos ma yin pa’i P87a1ṅo bo ñid du ’dod / gal te chos kyi ṅo bo ñid yin na ni / des na srog gcod pa med par raṅ gi sdug pa’i ’bras bu mi ’grub la / chos ma yin pa yaṅ chos su byed pas mi ruṅ ṅo // D3gal te chos ma yin pa’i P2ṅo bo ñid yin na ni / des na bdag ñid chos ma yin pa mi sdug pa’i ’bras bu can yin la / mi sdug pa’i ’bras bu gźan zlog131 par byed do źes byar mi ruṅ ṅo //

§ 2.2. de skad du lan btab kyaṅ yaṅ ’di skad du dper na gsaṅ sṅags P3kyi cho gas yoṅs su zin pa’i dug D4gis ’chi bar mi byed pa bźin du / ’dir yaṅ gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga la132 de bźin du blta bar bya’o źes zer na / de la ’di skad ces brjod par bya ste / ci gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho gas phyi rol gyi dug P4ji ltar źi bar byed pa de bźin du naṅ gi ’dod chags daṅ źe sdaṅ daṅ gti D5mug gi dug kyaṅ źi bar byed par133 ’dod dam / gal te de134 kho na bźin du źi bar byed na ni / źi ba de yaṅ / gaṅ du yaṅ su la yaṅ nam yaṅ de ltar mi dmigs P5pas mi ruṅ ṅo // gal te de kho na bźin du źi bar mi byed na ni / des na ji ltar gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho gas phyi rol gyi dug źi D6bar byed pa de bźin du chos ma yin par źi bar byed ces byar mi ruṅ ṅo //

§ 2.3. ci gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga de kun135 tu P6’gro ba’am / ’on te kun tu ’gro ba ma yin par ’dod / gal te kun tu ’gro ba yin na ni / thog mar gñen ’dab sdug pa mchod sbyin du ma byas pas mi ruṅ ṅo // gal te D7kun tu ’gro ba ma yin na ni / des na de’i nus pa la ’khrul pa yod P7pas mi ruṅ ṅo //

§ 2.4. ci gsaṅ sṅags kyi cho ga des rgyu kho na bzlog par nus sam / ’on te ’bras bu yaṅ bzlog nus par ’dod / gal te rgyu kho na bzlog par nus na ni / des na ’bras bu la nus pa med pas mi ruṅ D74b1ṅo // gal te P8’bras bu yaṅ bzlog par nus na ni / des na ’dod dgur sgyur ba’i gzugs can bźin du / phyugs kyaṅ phyugs kyi lus spaṅs nas lha’i lus ’dzin par ’gyur bas mi ruṅ ṅo //

§ 2.5. ci gsaṅ sṅags rnams byed pa gaṅ yin pa P87b1de nus pa yaṅ yod la sñiṅ rje can źig yin D2nam / ’on te nus pa yaṅ med la / sñiṅ rje yaṅ med par ’dod / gal te nus pa yaṅ yod la sñiṅ rje can źig yin na ni / srog gcod pa med par ’jig rten thams cad mtho P2ris su ’jog par mi byed pas mi ruṅ ṅo // gal te nus pa yaṅ med la / sñiṅ rje can yaṅ ma yin na ni / des na D3de’i gsaṅ sṅags ’grub par ’gyur źes byar mi ruṅ ste /

§ 3. de ltar na rgyu daṅ / dpe daṅ / ’khrul pa daṅ / ’bras P3bu la nus pa med pa daṅ / gsaṅ sṅags byed pas kyaṅ mi ruṅ ste / de bas na smra ba ’di yaṅ rigs pas bskyed pa ma yin no //

§ 4. chos kyi phyir byed pa ma yin pa’i mtshan ñid D4gaṅ yin pa yaṅ brjod par bya ste / gaṅ pha rol P4gsod pa’i las byed la / tshe ’di la yaṅ ñes pa’i gñen po mi byed pa de ni chos kyi phyir byed pa ma yin no // ya mtshan can thams cad la mi sdug pa’i ’bras bur grags pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / thams cad mkhyen pas mi P5dge bar gcig tu D5ṅes par gsuṅs pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / bdag mi ’dod pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / ñon moṅs pa can gyi sems136 kyis bskyed pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / rig sṅags daṅ bkra śis daṅ ldan pa gaṅ yin pa daṅ / P6raṅ bźin gyis luṅ du ma bstan pa gaṅ yin pa de dag chos kyi phyir byed pa ma yin D6no //.


§ 1. In what does the doctrine [according to which ritual] violence is righteous(/beneficial) consist?137 The full text [that is to be supplied here is] as above: ‘Here [in the world], for instance, a certain [ascetic or a certain brahmin holds such a view, speaks in such a way:]’138 ‘[That type of] killing which, accompanied by a [ritual] formula-cum-injunction, [occurs] during sacrifices, leads all these [beings] to heaven: the one who sacrifices, that which is sacrificed and those who attend him.’139 For what reason does [this ascetic or this brahmin] hold such a view, speak in such a way?140 This [is] a doctrine that violates the established rule.141 [It has been] settled by rogues142 but [has certainly] not [been] established in [due] consideration of reasoning.143 When the kaliyuga is at hand, the brahmins who wish to eat meat indulge in this [ritual violence, thus] transgressing the brahmins’ ancient [religious] law.144

§ 2.1. However (api tu), this very [ascetic or brahmin] ought to be answered as follows. What do you think? The [ritual] formula-cum-injunction [that accompanies killing during sacrifices], is it of a righteous nature or of an unrighteous nature? If it is [claimed to be] of a righteous nature, then this cannot be since145 [on the one hand] it does not bring about its own desirable [result]146 without (antareṇāpi) killing, [but on the other hand] it is [believed to] make righteous [something obviously] unrighteous.147 [But] if it is [claimed to be] of an unrighteous nature, then it cannot be that a factor (dharma) which[, inasmuch as it is unrighteous, itself] has an undesirable result, excludes another one with an [equally] undesirable result [i.e., the evil retribution expected from killing].148

§ 2.2. But even [when one] answers [him] in this way, [our opponent] may further say: ‘Just as a poison, [when it is] overpowered149 by a [ritual] formula-cum-injunction, does not cause death, in the same way, here too, one should consider the [ritual] formula-cum-injunction.’150 The [opponent who claims this] ought to be answered as follows. What do you think? Does [a ritual formula-cum-injunction] neutralize the internal poison of desire, hostility and delusion in the same way as it neutralizes the external poison [of a snake, etc.]? If [it is claimed that] it stops it in exactly the same way, that cannot be since this neutralization [of desire, hostility and delusion] is never observed [to take place in such a way] anywhere for anybody. [But] if it does not neutralize it in exactly the same way, then it cannot be [said] that [a ritual formula-cum-injunction neutralizes] demerit in the same way as it neutralizes the external poison [of a snake, etc.].

§ 2.3. [And] what do you think? Is this [ritual] formula-cum-injunction [of] universal or limited [application/efficacy]? If it is claimed to be of universal [application/efficacy], this cannot be since one [is] not [observed to] sacrifice one’s own dear folks first. [But] if it is [of] limited [application/efficacy], then that cannot be [either] since its efficacy [would thus] be contingent[, hence unreliable].151

§ 2.4. [And] what do you think? Is the [ritual] formula-cum-injunction capable of ridding [one] of the cause alone, or [is it] also [capable of ridding one] of the effect? If [it is capable of ridding one] of the cause alone, then this cannot be since it [would be] devoid of [any] capacity with regard to the effect. [But] if [it is] also [capable of ridding one] of the effect, then this cannot be since [according to you,] just as a [being] whose form [changes] at will, the [sacrificial] animal (paśu) too abandons the body of an animal and takes on the body of a god.152

§ 2.5. [And] what do you think? Is he who is the author153 of the [ritual] formulas capable [and] compassionate,154 or neither capable nor compassionate? If he is [claimed to be] capable [and] compassionate, then it cannot be that he does not lead everyone to heaven without killing.155 [But] if he is neither capable nor compassionate, then it cannot be that his [ritual] formula is successful.

§ 3. Thus it is that, [be it] in respect of the [ritual formula-cum-injunction as a] cause,156 in respect of the [wrong] example [adduced],157 in respect of the [fact that the efficacy of the ritual formula-cum-injunction] is contingent,158 in respect of the [fact that the ritual formula-cum-injunction] lacks [any] efficacy as to the effect,159 [or] in respect of the [possibly incapable and non-compassionate] author of the [ritual] formulas,160 this is [entirely] unjustified. Therefore, this doctrine, too, is irrational.161

§ 4. I am [now] going to state the definition of that which is not righteous(/beneficial). To begin with, the action that causes injury to others162 without counteracting the diseases of the present life is not righteous(/beneficial).163 Nor is any of this righteous(/beneficial): [that] the result of which is recognized as undesirable among all sectarians;164 [that] which is unanimously claimed to be unwholesome by the omniscient [beings]; [that] which is undesirable for oneself;165 [that] which has been brought about by a defiled mind; [that] which is endowed with magic spells and blessings (maṅgala);166 and [finally that] which is in itself [morally] neutral.167


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The present paper is the second in a series dedicated to the so-called paravāda section of the YBh (see Eltschinger 2015 and 2017). It has enormously benefitted from the numerous remarks and suggestions made by Lambert Schmithausen, Louis de La Vallée Poussin redivivus. Most sincere thanks are also due to Isabelle Ratié, Ritsu Akahane (†), Oliver von Criegern, Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Jonathan Silk, and Chlodwig Werba. I am very grateful as well to Johannes Bronkhorst, Martin Delhey, Danielle Feller, Harunaga Isaacson, Shanshan Jia and Ingo Strauch for the useful remarks they made during the two lectures I have dedicated to the present topic (Lausanne, 2 May 2014, and Hamburg, 20 June 2014). Finally, I am much obliged to Katharine Apostle for correcting my English.


= k. 294 in Tillemans 1990: I.108. See also Lang 1986: 117.


My formulation is indebted to Peter Masefield (1986: 149 and 160).


Guang Bai Lun Shi Lun (GBLSL, T. 1571) 220c24–26: 古昔黠慧諸婆羅門。隱造明書言自然有。[…] 讃婆羅門最爲尊貴。刹帝 利等皆是卑賤。給施所須獲無量福。Translation Tillemans 1990: I.109 (I have added “[there]”). According to Dharmapāla (GBLSL 221a11–20, Tillemans 1990: I.110), the reason why the brahmins, who “in reality know nothing” (實無所識), are venerated is that they “continuously recite the Vedas” (於一切時誦諸明論) in a way that is “difficult to execute” (難成) and “because of the world’s esteem for learning” (世間貴勝爲習學故). And “although there is nothing really true in the Vedas, they do nonetheless have some few worldly rituals” (又明論中雖無勝義, 而有世俗少分禮儀). Note 12.21ab (= k. 296ab in Tillemans 1990: I.110): 恭敬婆羅門, 爲誦諸明故, “The world respects the brahmins for reciting the Vedas.” Translation Tillemans 1990: I.110 (cf. Lang 1986: 117–118; the Tibetan version of the original half-stanza reads: ji ltar rig pa blaṅs pa las bram ze gus pa skye ba ltar, “Just as the brahmins are respected for their acquisition of knowledge” [translation Lang 1986: 118]). For the context of this critique, see Tillemans 1990: I.108–109.


Sn 299b–302b. For the Pāli text, see below, n. 49. Translation Norman 1996: 50 (I replace “to the king” for “to Okkāka”).


See below, 374–377.


See Deleanu 2006: I.195.


The subsection dedicated to the hiṃsādharmavāda covers YBh 145,20–147,13 (YBhMS 40b3–41a3, YBhTib D73b6–74b6/P85b5–86b6). On the expression hiṃsādharmavāda, see below, 372–377, and nn. 52 and 61; see also below, n. 93 (JM k. 10.9b). The sixteen allodoxies successively dealt with in this section of the Savitarkasavicārādibhūmi are listed in YBh 118,8–12: hetuphalasadvādaḥ / abhivyaktivādaḥ / atītānāgatadravyasadvādaḥ / ātmavādaḥ / śāśvatavādaḥ / pūrvakṛtahetuvādaḥ / īśvarādikartṛvādaḥ / hiṃsādharmavādaḥ / antānantikavādaḥ / amarāvikṣepikavādaḥ / ahetuvādaḥ / ucchedavādaḥ / nāstikavādaḥ / agravādaḥ / śuddhivādaḥ / kautukamaṅgalavādaś ca /. For text-critical remarks, see Eltschinger 2015: 203, n. 52. “(1) The doctrine [according to which] the effect [pre]exists in [its] cause, (2) the doctrine of manifestation, (3) the doctrine [according to which] the past and the future exist as [real] substances, (4) the doctrine of the self, (5) the doctrine of eternal[ity], (6) the doctrine [according to which present suffering] has past deeds as its [sole] cause, (7) the doctrine [according to which entities] such as God are agents, (8) the doctrine [according to which ritual] violence is righteous(/beneficial), (9) the doctrine of finite[ness]-and-infinite[ness], (10) the doctrine of ‘eel-wriggling’(/equivocation), (11) the doctrine [according to which things are] without a cause, (12) the doctrine of annihilation, (13) the doctrine of the [universal] deniers, (14) the doctrine [according to which the brahmins are] the best [caste-class], (15) the doctrine of purity, and (16) the doctrine of festivals and auspicious things.” On the paravāda section, see Delhey 2013: 516, Eltschinger 2015 and 2017. On the notions of, and the distinction between, heterodoxy(/heresy) and allodoxy, see Scherrer-Schaub 1991: xli, n. 63, and Eltschinger 2014: 36, n. 3. For references on animal sacrifice in Buddhist canonical scriptures, see Schmithausen 2009: 51, n. 16, and 84, n. 210.


YBh 155,6–157,17, YBhMS 43a1–7, YBhTib D78a7–79a5/P90b5–91b5. See Eltschinger 2017.


See below, 372–374. On the kaliyuga, see Eltschinger 2014: 40–70, and 40, n. 16, for references. On the Buddhist appropriation of the kaliyuga, see Eltschinger forthc. a, § 2. Although apparently without any hint at the kaliyuga or even a degeneration scenario, similar Brahmanical ideas on the permissibility of killing in the context of (Vedic) ritual recur in the works of the slightly later Buddhist scholars Saṅghabhadra (between 350 and 450 CE?) and Bhāviveka (500–570 CE?), the first of whom at least may have been aware of the YBh passage under consideration (see below, n. 156). On these authors’ opinions on sacrificial violence, see Kataoka 2012.


See below, 381–386.


See below, 397–398; see also below, 389–390 and n. 93 (JM k. 10.11).


MDhŚ 5.27a: prokṣitaṃ bhakṣayen māṃsam. Translation Olivelle 2005a: 139.


MDhŚ 5.36ab = VSm 51.59ab: asaṃskṛtān paśūn mantrair nādyād vipraḥ kathañcana /. Translation Olivelle 2005a: 140 (cf. Jolly 2002: 169). The verse continues (pādas cd): mantrais tu saṃskṛtān adyāc chāśvataṃ vidhim āsthitaḥ //. “Abiding by the eternal rule, however, he must eat those that have been consecrated with ritual formulas.” Translation Olivelle 2005a: 140 (cf. Jolly 2002: 169). Note also MDhŚ 5.31ab1 (unidentified quotation): yajñāya jagdhir māṃsasyeti. “The sacrifice is the reason for eating meat.” Translation Olivelle 2005a: 139. Manu was apparently famous among the Brahmanical legislators for allowing this exception to an otherwise rather strict vegetarian diet (on bhakṣyābhakṣya, see Kane 1997: 771–788). Note VDhSū 4.5–6: pitṛdevatātithipūjāyām apy evaṃ paśuṃ hiṃsyād iti mānavam / madhuparke ca yajñe ca pitṛdaivatakarmaṇi / atraiva ca paśuṃ hiṃsyān nānyathety abravīn manuḥ /. “The treatise of Manu states: ‘An animal may be killed only on the occasion of paying homage to ancestors, gods, or guests.’ When offering the honey mixture, at a sacrifice, and during rites for ancestors and gods—only on these occasions, Manu has declared, should an animal be killed.” Translation Olivelle 2005b: 140. The MDhŚ locus here referred to is 5.41.


Tull 1996: 225.


ṚV 1.162.21a: ná vā́ u etán mriyase ná riṣyasi. Translation Tull 1996: 225. See also Houben 1999: 118.


ŚB ná vā́’etáṃ mṛtyáve nayanti yáṃ yajñā́ya náyanti […]. Translation Tull 1996: 226.


Tull 1996: 226.


MDhŚ 5.44 = VSm 51.67: yā vedavihitā hiṃsā […] ahiṃsām eva tāṃ vidyāt […] //. Translation Olivelle 2005a: 140 (cf. Jolly 2002: 170).


MDhŚ 5.39d = VSm 51.61d: tasmād yajñe vadho ’vadhaḥ. Translation Olivelle 2005a: 140 (cf. Jolly 2002: 169).


VDhSū 4.7: nākṛtvā prāṇināṃ hiṃsāṃ māṃsam utpadyate kvacit / na ca prāṇivadhaḥ svargyas tasmād yāge vadho ’vadhaḥ /. Translation Olivelle 2005b: 140.


For Buddhist conceptions on the matter, see below, n. 57.


Note Nyāyānusāra (NA, T. 1562) 530b18–19: 祠祀明呪, 意欲利樂所害羊等。故能害者, 雖害有情, 猶如良醫, 不招苦果。 “Ritual mantras […] aim at benefitting goats, etc. to be killed. Therefore the agent of killing, though he hurts creatures, does not bring about suffering-fruit, just like a good doctor.” Translation Kataoka 2012: 356. See also below, 389–390, and n. 93 (JM k. 10.11).


ChU 8.15: ahiṃsan sarvabhūtāny anyatra tīrthebhyaḥ […] sa khalv evaṃ vartayan yāvadāyuṣaṃ brahmalokam abhisampadyate […]. Translation Houben 1999: 115. On the meaning of tīrtha in the present context, see Houben 1999: 115, n. 16.


ŚB (as quoted in Lévi 2003: 87, n. 6): sarva eva yajño nauḥ svargyā. “The heavenly ship,” or: “the ship that leads to heaven.” See also Lévi 2003: 87. On svargya, see also above, n. 20.


ŚB (as quoted in Lévi 2003: 87, n. 4): ekā hy eva yajñasya pratiṣṭhaikaṃ nidhanaṃ svarga eva lokaḥ. See also Lévi 2003: 87.


ŚB (as quoted in Lévi 2003: 90, n. 4): ahar ahar vā eṣa yajñas tāyate ’har ahaḥ santiṣṭhate ’har ahar enaṃ svargasya lokasya gatyai yuṅkte ’har ahar enena svargaṃ lokaṃ gacchati. See also Lévi 2003: 90.


Neither the gods nor the humans could originally reach the heavenly world. As the Taittirīyasaṃhitā (TS) has it (, as quoted in Lévi 2003: 41, n. 4): yathā vai manuṣyā evaṃ devā agra āsan te ’kāmayantāvartiṃ pāpmānaṃ mṛtyum apahatya daivīṃ saṃsadaṃ gacchemeti […] tenāyajanta tato vai te ’vartiṃ pāpmānaṃ mṛtyum apahatya daivīṃ saṃsadam agacchan. “The gods were in the beginning as the humans. They wished they could rid themselves of distress, evil and death and [thus] reach the celestial assembly. With that [rite] they sacrificed. As a result, they got rid of distress, evil and death and [thus] reached the celestial assembly.” The idea that it is thanks to the sacrifice that the gods went to heaven is recurrent in Vedic literature. Note, e.g., ŚB (as quoted in Lévi 2003: 55, n. 1): yajñena vai devā divam upodakrāman. “It is with the victim that the gods reached heaven.” Note also TS (as quoted in Lévi 2003: 55, n. 1): sarveṇa vai yajñena devāḥ suvargaṃ lokam āyan. “It is thanks to the sacrifice as a whole that the gods went to the heavenly world.” Note, finally, AB 3.5.36 (as quoted in Lévi 2003: 55, n. 1): yajñena vai tad devā yajñam ayajanta […] te svargaṃ lokam āyan. “It is thanks to the sacrifice that the gods sacrificed the sacrifice [and thus] went to the heavenly world.”


The victim is sometimes considered to precede the sacrificer. Note Malamoud 1996: 172: “It is by virtue of their [= the victim’s and the sacrificer’s, VE] affinity that the torch borne before the victim as it is led to the sacrificial post also lights up the path that will lead the sacrificer, after his death, to the celestial world: the animal victim is simply preceding him along this future path.”


AB 2.1.6: paśur vai nīyamānaḥ sa mṛtyuṃ prāpaśyat sa devān nānv akāmayataituṃ taṃ devā abruvann ehi svargaṃ vai tvā lokaṃ gamayiṣyāma iti sa tathety abravīt tasya vai me yuṣmākam ekaḥ purastād aitv iti tatheti tasyāgniḥ purastād ait so ’gnim anu prācyavata […]. Translation Keith 1920: 139. Concerning the “divinization of the sacrificed victim,” Tull (1996: 235) also refers to ŚB and ŚB


Oberlies (1998: I.288) refers to ṚV 1.162.7, 8, 15, 21 and 1.163.13, saying: “unversehrt […] soll das den Opfertod sterbende Pferd in den Himmel überführt werden.” Pūṣan acts here as a psychopomp (Oberlies 1998: I.288, n. 669).


MBh 3.199.9: yajñeṣu paśavo brahman vadhyante satataṃ dvijaiḥ / saṃskṛtāḥ kila mantraiś ca te ’pi svargam avāpnuvan //. See also Kane 1997: 781.


MDhŚ 5.40 = VSm 51.63: oṣadhyaḥ paśavo vṛkṣās tiryañcaḥ pakṣiṇas tathā / yajñārthaṃ nidhanaṃ prāptāḥ prāpnuvanty ucchritīḥ punaḥ //. Translation Olivelle 2005a: 140 (cf. Jolly 2002: 169).


MDhŚ 5.42 = VSm 51.65: eṣv artheṣu paśūn hiṃsan vedatattvārthavid dvijaḥ / ātmānaṃ ca paśūṃś caiva gamayaty uttamāṃ gatim //. Translation Olivelle 2005a: 140 (cf. Jolly 2002: 170). “These purposes” refers to sacrifice and offerings to the gods or the ancestors (MDhŚ 5.41: pitṛdaivatakarman).


Note, e.g., MBh 3.186.33a: yugānte samanuprāpte, and MBh 3.188.19d, 35d, 36d, 37d, 39d, 43d, 44d, 47d, 54d, 76d, 81d, 82d, 83d: yugānte paryupasthite. Early Brahmanical descriptions of the kaliyuga contain surprisingly few references to hiṃsā and māṃsabhakṣaṇa. See, e.g., MBh 3.186.27cd: brāhmaṇāḥ sarvabhakṣāś ca bhaviṣyanti kalau yuge //. “And in the kaliyuga, the brahmins will be omnivorous.” Other allusions to dietary breaks (but not necessarily on the part of the brahmins) include MBh 3.188.25cd, MBh 3.188.59, MBh 3.188.67, ViP 6.2.20ab, ViP 6.2.24ab.


For the Sanskrit text, see below, 393–394 (§ 1).


The idea that neither meat-eating nor animal sacrifice existed originally may not have been entirely absent in Vedic literature itself, which contains statements to the effect that the animals themselves refused to be used as food and/or as sacrificial victims. As Tull (1996: 233) points out, “cattle are said not to have originally acquiesced to their exploitation at the hands of man: ‘in the beginning cattle did not submit to becoming food (anna), as they have now become food’ (ŚB*); ‘in the beginning cattle did not submit [to being used] for the sacrificial gift (dāna)’ (ŚB**).” *tathā na ha vā’tasmā’gre paśavaś cakṣamire yad annam abhaviṣyan yathedam annaṃ bhūtāḥ. **na ha vā’gre paśavo dānāya cakṣamire.


Jātaka I.166,12–15: pubbe paṇḍitā ākāse nisajja dhammaṃ desetvā ettha ādīnavaṃ kathetvā sakalajambudīpavāsike etaṃ kammaṃ jahāpesuṃ, idāni pana bhavasaṃkhepagatattā puna pātibhūtan ti […]. Translation Chalmers 1895: 51 (with “the law” instead of “the Truth”).


On meat-eating in the Mahāyāna, see Seyfort Ruegg 1980, Schmithausen 2000: 155–193 and Schmithausen 2005: 190–194. On the prohibition of animal sacrifices to the bodhisattva, note the following passage from the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBhD 82,24–27/BoBhW 117,27–118,5): mṛgavadhaśikṣāṃ bodhisattvo na dadāti / kṣudrayajñeṣu ca mahārambheṣu yeṣu bahavaḥ prāṇinaḥ saṅghātam āpadya jīvitād vyaparopyante / tadrūpān yajñān na svayaṃ yajati na parair yājayati / nāpi devakuleṣu paśuvadham anuprayacchati /. “The bodhisattva does not instruct [anybody] about the slaughter of wild animals. Neither does he offer nor does he have others offer sacrifices such as those cruel sacrifices with great slaughterings in which numerous living beings are killed and deprived of [their] life-principle. Nor does he offer animal slaughter in temples.”


LASū 249,14–250,6 (LASūTib D248a7–b4), as provisionally reedited by Lambert Schmithausen (personal communication, 7 March 2015): anujñātavāṃs tv ahaṃ Mahāmate sarvāryajanasevitam anāryajanavivarjitam anekaguṇāvāhakam anekadoṣavivarjitaṃ sarvapūrvarṣipraṇītabhojanaṃ yaduta śāliyavagodhūmamudgamāṣamasūrādi sarpistailamadhuphāṇitaguḍakhaṇḍamatsyaṇḍikādiṣu samupapadyamānaṃ bhojanaṃ kalpyam iti kṛtvā / na ca Mahāmate ’nāgate ’dhvany ekeṣāṃ mohapuruṣāṇāṃ vividhavinayavikalpavādināṃ kravyādakulavāsanāvāsitānāṃ rasatṛṣṇādhyavasitānām idaṃ praṇītabhojanaṃ pratibhāsyate /. Lambert Schmithausen’s provisional reedition of the passage was accompanied by very detailed philological and doctrinal explanations that cannot be reproduced in the present context. On meat-eating in the LASū, see Suzuki 1999: 368–371, Schmithausen 2000: 186–190 and Schmithausen 2005: 193 (and passim). For references on the “exquisite foodstuffs” (p[r]aṇītabhojana), see Schmithausen 2005: 188, n. 19.


For references and observations on the true brahmin, see especially Masefield 1986: 146–164 (154 for canonical references), and also Eltschinger 2017: 210, n. 29, and 214–215, n. 46.


Sn 284–315 (pp. 50–55). See Norman 1996: 49–51.


See YBh, p. 146, n. 4.


Sn p. 50: sandissanti nu kho bho gotama etarahi brāhmaṇā porāṇānaṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ brāhmaṇadhamme ti. Translation Norman 1996: 49 (with “brahmins” instead of “brahmans”).


Sn p. 50: na kho brāhmaṇā sandissanti etarahi brāhmaṇā porāṇānaṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ brāhmaṇadhamme ti. Translation Norman 1996: 49 (with “brahmins” instead of “brahmans”).


Sn 286: yaṃ tesaṃ pakataṃ āsi dvārabhaṭṭaṃ upaṭṭhitaṃ saddhāpakataṃ esānaṃ dātave tad amaññisum. Translation Norman 1996: 49. See also Masefield 1986: 152.


Sn 295–297: taṇḍulaṃ sayanaṃ vatthaṃ sappitelañ ca yāciya dhammena samudānetvā tato yaññam akappayuṃ, upaṭṭhitasmiṃ yaññasmiṃ nāssu gāvo haniṃsu te. yathā mātā pitā bhātā aññe vā pi ca ñātakā gāvo no paramā mittā, yāsu jāyanti osadhā. annadā baladā c’etā vaṇṇadā sukhadā tathā etam atthavasaṃ ñatvā nāssu gāvo haniṃsu te. Translation Norman 1996: 50.


Sn 298d: yāva loke avattiṃsu, sukhaṃ edhittha ayaṃ pajā. Translation Norman 1996: 50.


Note Masefield 1986: 151, who suggests that the Buddha, “far from being critical of the early ideal of the brahmin […], instead uses this against his contemporary counterpart, who is found lacking in several respects: […] he lives a life of great luxury, driving about in chariots. Compare how one day Ānanda saw ‘the brahmin Jānussoṇi driving out of Sāvatthī in his chariot, drawn by pure white mares; white were the steeds harnessed thereto and white the trappings, white the chariot, white were the fittings, white the reins, the goad, the canopy, his turban, his clothes and sandals, and by a white goad was he fanned.’


Sn 299–308: tesaṃ āsi vipallāso: disvāna aṇuto aṇuṃ rājino ca viyākāraṃ nariyo ca samalaṃkatā rathe cājaññasaṃyutte sukate cittasibbane nivesane nivese ca vibhatte bhāgaso mite gomaṇḍalaparibbūḷhaṃ nārīvaragaṇāyutaṃ uḷāraṃ mānusaṃ bhogaṃ abhijjhāyiṃsu brāhmaṇā. te tattha mante ganthetvā okkākaṃ tad upāgamum: ‘pahūtadhanadhañño si, yajassu, bahu te vittaṃ, yajassu, bahu te dhanaṃ’ tato ca rājā saññatto brāhmaṇehi rathesabho assamedhaṃ purisamedhaṃ sammāpāsaṃ vācapeyyaṃ niraggaḷaṃ, ete yāge yajitvāna brāhmaṇānaṃ adā dhanaṃ: gāvo sayanañ ca vatthañ ca nariyo ca samalaṃkatā rathe cājaññasaṃyutte sukate cittasibbane, nivesanāni rammāni suvibhattāni bhāgaso nānādhaññassa pūretvā brāhmaṇānaṃ adā dhanaṃ. te ca tattha dhanaṃ laddhā sannidhiṃ samarocayuṃ, tesaṃ icchāvatiṇṇānaṃ bhiyyo taṇhā pavaḍḍhatha. te tattha mante ganthetvā okkākaṃ punam upagamuṃ: yathā āpo ca paṭhavī ca hiraññaṃ dhanadhāniyaṃ, evaṃ gāvo manussānaṃ, parikkhāro so hi pāṇinaṃ, yajassu, bahu te vittaṃ, yajassu, bahu te dhanaṃ. tato ca rājā saññatto brāhmaṇehi rathesabho nekā satasahassiyo gāvo yaññe aghātayi. Translation Norman 1996: 50–51 (with “brahmins” instead of “brahmans”). See also Masefield 1986: 152–153 (SN IV.117–118 presents a different account of the fall).


See also below, n. 61.


For a similar statement, see BCSSū 747a23–24, and Beal 1875: 159. BCSSū 747a29 (see Beal 1875: 159) explicitly links the practice of blood sacrifice to the Veda.


Sn 309–310 and 312–313: na pādā na visāṇena nāssu hiṃsanti kenaci gāvo eḷakasamānā soratā kumbhadūhanā, tā visāṇe gahetvāna rājā satthena ghātayi. tato ca devā pitaro indo asurarakkhasā ‘adhammo’ iti pakkanduṃ, yaṃ satthaṃ nipatī gave. […] eso adhammo daṇḍānaṃ okkanto purāṇo ahū: adūsikāyo haññanti dhammā dhaṃsenti yājakā. evam eso aṇudhammo purāṇo viññugarahito, yattha edisakaṃ passati, yājakaṃ garahatī jano. Translation Norman 1996: 51.


See Schmithausen 1991a: 52 and Schmithausen 2005: 193.


On killing, see Traité II.784–794 and Kośa III.153–155. On the expression prāṇātipāta, see Caillat 1993: 213–216 and Schmithausen 1991b: 1, n. 2 (to the effect that in the compound prāṇātipāta, prāṇa, “life[/breath],” has/can have the same meaning as prāṇin, “living[/breathing/animate] being”; see also below, n. 56).


The four offenses are: (1) unchastity, (2) stealing, (3) killing, (4) falsely claiming superhuman powers. On killing, see especially Prātimokṣasūtra (PrSū) 14,11–15,2 (Prebish 1996: 51–53). For the specific prātimokṣa injunction not to kill animals (tiryagyonigata), see below, n. 58.


Daśakuśalakarmapathāḥ (as quoted in Traité II.784, n. 1; see Lévi 1929: 269): prāṇī ca bhavati / prāṇasañjñī ca bhavati / vadhakacittaṃ ca bhavati / upakramaṃ ca karoti / jīvitād vyavaropayati /. On the criterion of intention(ality), see Schmithausen 1991a: 30–32, Schmithausen/Maithrimurthi 2009: 60–61, and n. 67 for references, La Vallée Poussin 2001: 127–130, and Kataoka 2012: 352–353, n. 13. Intention(ality) as a necessary condition also appears in Vasubandhu’s short definition of prāṇātipāta in AK 4.73ab: prāṇātipātaḥ sañcintya parasyābhrāntimāraṇam /. “Killing consists in murdering someone else intentionally [and] without error [on the identity of the victim].” See also Kośa III.153 and PrSū 14,11–15,2.


The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh 254,17–21, together with AK 4.85cd, as edited in Kataoka 2012: 352, n. 10) associates killing with three kinds of fruit: prāṇātipātaṃ hi tāvat kurvatā māryamāṇasya duḥkham utpāditaṃ māritam ojo nāśitam / ato ’sya—duḥkhanān māraṇād ojonāśanāt trividhaṃ phalam // parasya duḥkhanād vipākaphalena narake duḥkhito bhavati / māraṇān niṣyandaphalenālpāyur bhavati / ojonāśanād adhipatiphalenālpaujaso bāhyā oṣadhayo bhavanti /. “To explain, first a slayer has caused pain to the object being killed, killed it, and destroyed its power. Therefore he [will suffer] three kinds of fruit, because he has caused pain, killed it, and destroyed its power (4.85cd). Because he has caused pain to the other, he will suffer in hell due to ‘the maturation effect.’ Because he has killed [it], he will have a shorter life due to ‘the out-flow effect.’ Because he has destroyed its power, external herbs will be powerless due to ‘the dominant effect.’ ” Translation Kataoka 2012: 351–352. On the retribution in hell, see also below, 389–390 and n. 93 (JM k. 10.9).


Generally to the exclusion of plants and seeds. On the question of the (in)sentience of plants, see Schmithausen 1991a, 1991b, and 2009. Killing animals is the object of a specific prātimokṣa rule, viz. pā(ta)yantika/pācattika no. 61. Note PrSū 41,7–8: *yaḥ punar bhikṣuḥ sañcintya tiryagyonigataṃ prāṇinaṃ jīvitād vyaparopayet pāyantikā /. “Whatever monk should intentionally deprive an animal of life, that is a pāyantika.” Translation Prebish 1996: 87. An offence to be atoned (or: “repented for and confessed to the assembly of the saṅgha,” Pachow 2000: 35) is much weaker than a pārājika offence (see above, n. 55).


See AKBh 240,20–22 and Kośa III.144.


See respectively AKBh 240,20–22 and Kośa III.144, and AKBh 240,25–241,1 and Kośa III.145–146, n. 4. See also Schmithausen 1991a: 5, n. 21, and, for a parallel distinction in classical Yoga, Houben 1999: 140–141. See also MN I.343, where butchers (of sheep, of pigs), fowlers, trappers, hunters, fishermen, thieves, executioners, prison wardens, “or one who follows any other such bloody occupation” (ye vā pan’aññe pi keci kurūrakammantā, translation Ñāṇamoli/Bodhi 1995: 447), are labelled “persons who torment others and pursue the practice of torturing others” (parantapo paraparitāpanānuyogam anuyutto; translation Ñāṇamoli/Bodhi 1995: 447).


See AKBh 240,22–23 and Kośa III.145. As we shall see below (397–398), regarding ritual violence (hiṃsā) as being righteous/virtuous (dharma) is precisely the position of the brahmin opponent in the paravāda section of the YBh. On the title—hiṃsādharmavāda—of this part of the paravāda section, see above, nn. 50 and 52.


KV 32,8–9: sthaṇḍilapratiṣṭhāpanaṃ yatra bahavaḥ prāṇino ghātyante mahiṣapaśuśūkarakukkuṭādayaḥ /.


DN I.127–148 (Walshe 1995: 133–141). A Sanskrit manuscript of the Sarvāstivāda Dīrghāgama (MS) containing most of the Kūṭatāṇḍyasūtra has been preserved. See von Criegern 2002.


DN I.127: mahāyañño upakkhaṭo hati, satta ca usabha-satāni satta ca vacchatarasatāni satta ca vacchatari-satāni satta ca aja-satāni satta ca urabbhasatāni thūṇūpanītāni honti yaññatthāya. Translation Walshe 1995: 133. Note also MS § 1.3 (401r5–6): tena khalu samayena kūṭatāṇḍyasya brāhmaṇasyāyam evaṃrūpo mahāyajñaḥ pratyupasthitaḥ pañcamātrāṇy asya rṣabhaśatāni sthūṇopanibaddhāni yajñārthaṃ pañcamātrāṇy uṣṭrāṇāṃ mahiṣā mahiṣyo dhenavo vatsā vatsatarā ajā urabhrā vividhākṣudrānukṣudrāḥ prāṇinaḥ sthūṇopanibaddhā yajñārthaṃ prabhūtaṃ ca khādanīyabhojanīyam ānītaṃ dānārtham /. “Zu jener Zeit nun hatte der Brahmane Kūṭatāṇḍya ein solches großes Opfer vorbereitet: fünfhundert seiner Stiere waren an Pfosten angebunden für das Opfer, fünf[hundert] Kamele, Büffel, Büffelkühe, Kühe, Kälber, entwöhnte Kälber, Ziegen, Schafe und mancherlei kleine und ganz kleine Tiere waren an Pfosten angebunden für das Opfer und viel Essen und Trinken war herbeigebracht um zu geben.” Translation von Criegern 2002: 53.


SN I.75–76: tena kho pana samayena rañño pasenadikosalassa mahāyañño paccupaṭṭhito hoti. pañca ca usabhasatāni pañca ca vacchatarasatāni pañca ca vacchatarīsatāni pañca ca ajasatāni pañca ca urabbhasatāni thūṇūpanītāni honti yaññatthāya. ye pi-ssa te honti dāsā ti vā pessā ti vā kammakarā ti vā te pi daṇḍatajjitā bhayatajjitā assumukhā rudamānā parikammāni karonti. Translation Rhys Davids 1979: 102. According to SN I.76, the blood sacrifices described here are the assamedha, the purisamedha, the sammāpāsa, the vājapeyya, and the niraggaḷa (on these sacrifices, see also above, n. 49). On the terror and the sadness of the servants preparing the sacrifice, see also KV 32,10 (below, n. 67), DN I.141 and MS § 9.6 (below, n. 71), and MN I.344 (below, n. 66). For another example of a massive ritual slaughter (including animals as well as humans—king Kṛkin’s ministers and beloved daughter Mālinī, her 500 female attendants, and brahmins), see Chavannes 1962: II.347 (no. 369). King Kṛkin is later converted by the former Buddha Kāśyapa and resolves not to perform the ritual slaughter (Chavannes 1962: II.349): “A partir de maintenant j’ aimerais mieux perdre la vie que de tuer intentionnellement un être vivant; à combien plus forte raison ne tuerai-je pas des hommes; je ne blesserais plus intentionnellement des vers ou des fourmis; à combien plus forte raison ne blesserai-je pas ma fille et ses compagnes.”


As an example of persons who torture themselves as well as others, MN I.343–344 points to a king or a sacrificer undergoing dīkṣā in order to perform a blood sacrifice: idha bhikkhave ekacco puggalo rājā vā hoti khattiyo muddhāvasitto brāhmaṇo vā mahāsālo. so puratthimena nagarassa navaṃ santhāgāraṃ kārāpetvā kesamassuṃ ohāretvā kharājinaṃ nivāsetvā sappitelena kāyaṃ abbhañjitvā magavisāṇena piṭṭhiṃ kaṇḍūvamāno santhāgāraṃ pavisati saddhiṃ mahesiyā brāhmaṇena ca purohitena. […] so evam āha–ettakā usabhā haññantu yaññatthāya, ettakā vacchatarā haññantu yaññatthāya, ettikā vacchatariyo haññantu yaññatthāya, ettakā ajā haññantu yaññatthāya, ettakā urabbhā haññantu yaññatthāya, ettakā rukkhā chijjantu yaññatthāya, ettakā dabbhā lūyantu barihisatthāyāti. ye pi’ssa te honti dāsā ti vā pessā ti vā kammakarā ti vā te pi daṇḍatajjitā bhayatajjitā assumukhā rudamānā parikammāni karonti. “Here some person is a head-anointed noble king or a well-to-do brahmin. Having had a new sacrificial temple built to the east of the city, and having shaved off his hair and beard, dressed himself in rough hide, and greased his body with ghee and oil, scratching his back with a deer’s horn, he enters the sacrificial temple together with his chief queen and his brahmin high priest […] He says thus: ‘Let so many bulls be slaughtered for sacrifice, let so many bullocks be slaughtered for sacrifice, let so many heifers be slaughtered for sacrifice, let so many goats be slaughtered for sacrifice, let so many sheep be slaughtered for sacrifice, let so many trees be felled for the sacrificial posts, let so much grass be cut for the sacrificial grass.’ And then his slaves, messengers, and servants make preparations, weeping with tearful faces, being spurred on by threats of punishment and by fear.” Translation Ñāṇamoli/Bodhi 1995: 447–448. This or a very similar passage (see MS § 5.1–4 [403r3–7; von Criegern 2002: 59]) is the source of Saṅgītiparyāya ad Saṅgītisūtra IV.44 (Stache-Rosen 1968: 123). According to the BCSSū (see de Jong 1997–1998: 250–251, Durt 2004: 56, Overbey 2010: 27–30, Tournier 2012, § and, and below, n. 94), 747a20–22 (see Beal 1875: 159), the king of Mithilā also “slaughtered living beings in no small number” (殺害衆生。其數不少) in a sacrifice destined to ensure him “post-mortem happiness” (求後受樂). See also below, 386–387.


KV 32,9–11: tasya yajñapravartakasya putrāḥ pautrāś cānye ca janāḥ phalārthino bhayabhītāś cānuvṛttiṃ kurvāṇāḥ sattvān nirghātayanti /. For other allusions to the servants’ fear, see above, nn. 65–66, and below, n. 71.


See AKBh 243,5–9 (together with AK 4.72cd): yat senāpātamṛgayāvaskandeṣua pareṣāṃ vadhārthaṃ bahavaḥ samagrāḥ patanty ekaś ca prāṇātipātaṃ karoti kas tena samanvāgato bhavati / senādiṣv ekakāryatvāt sarve kartṛvad anvitāḥ / yathaiva hi kartā tathā sarve samanvāgatā bhavanty ekakāryatvāt / arthato hi te ’nyonyaṃ prayoktāro bhavanti /. a°skandeṣu em.: °skandheṣu Ed. “When numerous [beings] come to be associated in order to murder other [beings] in attacking [them] militarily, hunting [them] or assaulting [them], but [only] one [of them actually] performs the killing, who bears [the responsibility for] this [murder]? [Answer:] Because armies, etc., have a single goal[, that of killing other beings], all [their constituent members] are as connected [with the murder] as the [direct] agent [himself]. Indeed, just as the agent [himself], all [of them] bear [responsibility for this murder], because [all] have a single goal. They are indeed indirectly, one with the other, the executors [of the action of killing].” See also Kośa III.152. On the more general idea of the moral co-responsibility of the consumer of meat, see Schmithausen 2005: 192.


Aśvaghoṣa’s description of Śuddhodana’s golden-age-like realm provides an excellent example of a reference to the normative practice of the kings of the past. Note BC 2.49: sthitvā pathi prāthamakalpikānāṃ rājarṣabhāṇāṃ yaśasānvitānām / śuklāny amuktvāpi tapāṃsy atapta yajñaiś ca hiṃsārahitair ayaṣṭa //. “Abiding in the path of the famous great kings of the golden age, he practised austerities without even doffing the white garments of ordinary life and worshipped with sacrifices that brought no injury to living creatures.” Translation Johnston 1984: (II.)30, adding “famous” (Johnston left yaśasānvitānām untranslated). Note also BC 2.14 (concerning Śuddhodana’s subjects in Kapilavāstu): kaścit siṣeve rataye na kāmaṃ kāmārtham arthaṃ na jugopa kaścit / kaścid dhanārthaṃ na cacāra dharmaṃ dharmāya kaścin na cakāra hiṃsām //. “None pursued love for sensual pleasures; none withheld wealth from others to gratifiy his own desires; none practised religion for the sake of riches; none did hurt on the plea of religion.” Translation Johnston 1984: (II.)22. Aśvaghoṣa’s critique of animal sacrifice occurs at BC 11.64–67 (Sarvārthasiddha to Śreṇya Bimbasāra): yad āttha cāpīṣṭaphalāṃ kulocitāṃ kuruṣva dharmāya makhakriyām iti / namo makhebhyo na hi kāmaye sukhaṃ parasya duḥkhakriyayā yad iṣyate // paraṃ hi hantuṃ vivaśaṃ phalepsayā na yuktarūpaṃ karuṇātmanaḥ sataḥ / kratoḥ phalaṃ yady api śāśvataṃ bhavet tathāpi kṛtvā kim u yat kṣayātmakam // bhavec ca dharmo yadi nāparo vidhir vratena śīlena manaḥśamena vā / tathāpi naivārhati sevituṃ kratuṃ viśasya yasmin param ucyate phalam // ihāpi tāvat puruṣasya tiṣṭhataḥ pravartate yat parahiṃsayā sukham / tad apy aniṣṭaṃ saghṛṇasya dhīmato bhavāntare kiṃ bata yan na dṛśyate //. “And as for your saying that for the sake of dharma I should carry out the sacrificial ceremonies which are customary in my family and which bring the desired fruit, I do not approve of sacrifices; for I do not care for happiness which is sought at the price of others’ suffering. For it does not befit the man of compassionate heart to kill another being, who is helpless, out of a desire for a profitable outcome, even though the fruit of the sacrifice should be permanent; how much less should one act thus, when the fruit is transitory? And if the true dharma were not a different rule of life to be carried out by vows, moral restraint, or quietude, nevertheless it would still be wrong to practise sacrifice, in which the fruit is described as attained by killing another. That happiness even, which accrues to a man, while still existing in the world, through hurt to another, is not agreeable to a wise compassionate man; how much more so that which is beyond his sight in another existence?” Translation Johnston 1984: (II.)162–163.


DN I.134: tividhayaññasampadaṃ soḷasaparikkhāraṃ jānātīti. Translation Walshe 1995: 135. In the Pāyāsisuttanta (DN II.316–357; Rhys Davids/Rhys Davids 1977: 349–374), it is Kumāra Kassapa who is asked to instruct the chieftain Pāyāsi on how to conduct the great sacrifice “that might bring [him] long welfare and happiness” (DN II.352: yaṃ mama dīgharattaṃ hitāya sukhāyāti. Translation Rhys Davids/Rhys Davids 1977: 370).


DN I.141: tasmiṃ kho brāhmaṇa yaññe n’eva gāvo haññiṃsu na ajeḷakā haññiṃsu na kukkuṭasūkarā haññiṃsu, na vividhā pāṇā saṃghātaṃ āpajjiṃsu, na rukkhā chijjiṃsu yūpatthāya, na dabbhā lūyiṃsu barihisatthāya, ye pi ’ssa ahesuṃ dāsā ti vā pessā ti vā kammakarā ti vā te pi na daṇḍatajjitā na bhayatajjitā, na assumukhā rudamānā parikammāni aksaṃsu. atha kho ye icchiṃsu te akaṃsu, ye na icchiṃsu te na aksaṃsu, yaṃ icchiṃsu taṃ akaṃsu, yaṃ na icchiṃsu, na taṃ akaṃsu. sappitelanavanītadadhimadhuphāṇitena c’eva so yañño niṭṭhānaṃ agamāsi. Translation Walshe 1995: 138. Note also MS § 9.5–6 (405v6–7): tasmin khalu yajñe na rṣabhā hanyante noṣṭrā na mahiṣā na mahiṣyo na dhenavo na vatsā na vatsatarā nājā norabhrā na vividhākṣudrānukṣudrāḥ prāṇinaḥ saṅghātam āpadya jīvitād vyavaropyante / dāsīdāsakarmapauruṣeyam adaṇḍatarjitam abhayatarjitaṃ smitapūrvaṅgamam āttamanaskam abhirāddhaṃ parikarma karoti /. “Bei diesem Opfer nun wurden keine Stiere getötet, keine Kamele, keine Büffel, keine Büffelkühe, keine Kühe, keine Kälber, keine entwöhnten Kälber, keine Ziegen, keine Schafe, keine kleinen und ganz kleinen Tiere kamen zu Tode, wurden aus dem Leben gerissen. Die Dienerschaft verrichtete ihre Arbeit, ohne mit dem Stock bedroht zu werden, ohne mit Schrecken bedroht zu werden, lächelnd, heiteren Sinnes, dafür eingenommen.” Translation von Criegern 2002: 59–60. For a partial translation of the Dharmaguptaka version of the passage (T. 1.1, 100b5–6), see Schmithausen 2009: 25, n. 22; see also Schmithausen 2009: 24.


AN II.43: na kho ahaṃ brāhmaṇa sabbaṃ yaññaṃ vaṇṇemi na panāhaṃ brāhmaṇa sabbaṃ yaññaṃ na vaṇṇemi. yathārūpe kho brāhmaṇa yaññe gāvo haññanti ajeḷakā haññanti kukkuṭasūkarā haññanti vividhā pāṇā saṅghātaṃ āpajjanti, evarūpaṃ kho ahaṃ brāhmaṇa sārambhaṃ yaññaṃ na vaṇṇemi. taṃ kissa hetu. evarūpaṃ hi brāhmaṇa sārambhaṃ yaññaṃ na upasaṅkamanti arahanto vā arahamaggaṃ vā samāpannā. yathārūpe ca kho brāhmaṇa yaññe n’eva gāvo haññanti na ajeḷakā haññanti na kukkuṭasūkarā haññanti na vividhā pāṇā saṅghātaṃ āpajjanti, evarūpaṃ kho ahaṃ brāhmaṇa nirārambhaṃ yaññaṃ vaṇṇemi. Translation Woodward 1973: 49 (with “brahmin” instead of “brāhmin”).


See AN II.42–43 (Woodward 1973: 49–51), and above, n. 72.


SN I.76: na te honti mahapphalā. See also below, n. 75.


DN II.352–353: yathārūpe kho […] yaññe gāvo vā haññanti, ajeḷakā vā haññanti, kukkuṭasūkarā vā haññanti, vividhā vā pāṇā saṃghātaṃ āpajjanti, paṭiggāhakā ca honti micchādiṭṭhī micchāsaṃkappā micchāvācā micchākammantā micchājīvā micchāvāyāmā micchāsatī micchāsamādhī, evarūpo kho […] yañño nāma na mahapphalo hoti na mahānisaṃso na mahājutiko na mahāvipphāro. seyyathā pi […] kassako bījanaṅgalaṃ ādāya vanaṃ paviseyya. so tattha dukkhette dubbhūme avihatakhānuke bījāni patiṭṭhāpeyya khaṇḍāni pūtīni vātātapahatāni asāradāni asukhasayitāni, devo ca na kālena kālaṃ sammādhāraṃ anuppaveccheyya. api nu tāni bījāni vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjeyyuṃ, kassako vā vipulaphalaṃ adhigaccheyyāti no h’idaṃ. Translation Rhys Davids/Rhys Davids 1977: 370–371.


DN II.353–354: seyyathā pi […] kassako bījanaṅgalaṃ ādāya vanaṃ paviseyya. so tattha sukkhette subhūme suvihatakhānuke bījāni patiṭṭhāpeyya akhaṇḍāni apūtīni avātātapahatāni sāradāni sukhasayitāni, devo ca kālena kālaṃ sammādhāraṃ anuppaveccheyya. api nu tāni bījāni vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjeyyuṃ, kassako vā vipulaphalaṃ adhigaccheyyāti. evaṃ. Translation Rhys Davids/Rhys Davids 1977: 371.


See DN I.143–146 (Walshe 1995: 139–140) and MS § 14.1–16 (408v1–409v2; von Criegern 2002: 62–64). In AN II.42, the Buddha claims to praise those sacrifices which do not involve butchery, “such as, for instance, a long-established charity, an oblation for the welfare of the family” (yadidaṃ niccadānaṃ anukulayaññaṃ. Translation Woodward 1973: 49). Note also AN II.43 ≈ SN I.76: ye ca yaññā nirārambhā yajanti anukulaṃ sadā/ ajeḷakā ca gāvo ca vividhā n’ettha haññare/ tañ ca sammaggatā yaññaṃ upayanti mahesino/ etaṃ yajetha medhāvī eso yañño mahapphalo/ etaṃ hi yajamānassa seyyo hoti na pāpiyo/ yañño ca vipulo hoti pasīdanti ca devatāti/. “Sacrifices free from cruelty which men keep up for profit of the clan, where goats and sheep and kine of diverse sorts are never sacrificed, —to such as these go sages great who’ve travelled the right way. Such should the thoughtful celebrate: and great the fruit of such; profit they bring, not loss. Lavish the offering, devas therewith are pleased.” Translation Woodward 1973: 50 (cf. Rhys Davids 1979: 103).


See above, 374–377 and n. 46.


On this point, see Amore 1971, Masson 1975: 103–104 and Masefield 1986: 156–161.


For an English translation, see Speyer 1971: 93–104 and Meiland 2009: I.261–283. Story no. 10 only partly echoes Jātaka no. 50 (see Chalmers 1895: 126–128), the argument of which is as follows (Jātaka I.259,13–20): tasmiṃ samaye bārāṇasivāsino devatāmaṃgalikā honti, devatā namassanti, bahuajeḷakakukkuṭasūkarādayo vadhitvā nānappakārehi pupphagandhehi c’eva maṃsalohitehi ca balikammaṃ karonti. bodhisattvo cintesi: idāni sattā devatāmaṃgalikā bahuṃ pāṇavadhaṃ karonti, mahājano yebhuyyena adhammasmiṃ yeva niviṭṭho, ahaṃ pitu accayena rajjaṃ labhitvā ekam pi akilametvā upāyen‘ eva pāṇavadhaṃ kātuṃ na dassāmīti. “Now in those days the Benares folk were much given to festivals to ‘gods,’ and used to shew honour to ‘gods.’ It was their wont to massacre numbers of sheep, goats, poultry, swine, and other living creatures, and perform their rites not merely with flowers and perfumes but with gory carcasses. Thought the destined Lord of Mercy to himself, ‘Led astray by superstition, men now wantonly sacrifice life; the multitude are for the most part given up to irreligion: but when at my father’s death I succeed to my inheritance, I will find means to end such destruction of life. I will devise some clever stratagem whereby the evil shall be stopped without harming a single human being.’ ” Translation Chalmers 1895: 126–127. None of the JM’s arguments against animal sacrifice occur in Jātaka no. 50.


JM k. 10.8ab: sviṣṭyābhituṣṭāni hi daivatāni bhūtāni vṛṣṭyā pratimānayanti /. Translation Meiland 2009: I.267.


On the four debts of man (to the gods, to the seers, to the manes, and to the humans), see ŚB 1.7.2.


JM k. 10.18: tad yaḥ kaś cid itaḥ (ataḥ K) prabhṛty avinayaślāghānuvṛttyuddhavāt sāmantakṣitipārcitām api nṛpasyājñām avajñāsyati / sa svair eva viṣahya yajñapaśutām āpāditaḥ karmabhir yūpābaddhatanur viṣādakṛpaṇaḥ śuṣyañ janair drakṣyate //. Translation Meiland 2009: I.273.


On the kṛtayuga, see also JM kk. 10.27–30, quoted below, n. 85.


JM k. 10.27: iti nṛpasya sunītiguṇāśrayāt sucaritābhimukhe nikhile jane (jane om. K) / samabhibhūtabalāḥ kuśalocchrayair vilayam īyur asaṅgam upadravāḥ //. Translation Meiland 2009: I.279. This stanza is the first in a description of the king’s realm in terms of kṛtayuga (JM kk. 10.28–30): aviṣamatvasukhā ṛtavo ’bhavan navanṛpā iva dharmaparāyaṇāḥ / vividhasasyadharā ca vasundharā sakamalāmalanīlajalāśayā // na janam abhyarujan prabalā rujaḥ paṭutaraṃ guṇam oṣadhayo dadhuḥ / ṛtuvaśena vavau niyato ’nilaḥ pariyayuś ca śubhena pathā grahāḥ // na paracakrakṛtaṃ samabhūd bhayaṃ na ca parasparajaṃ na ca daivikam / niyamadharmapare nibhṛte jane kṛtam ivātra yugaṃ samapadyata //. “The seasons became pleasantly regular, like newly installed kings performing their duty. The earth bore various crops, her waters pure, blue, and lotus-covered. No violent sufferings afflicted the people. The herbs became more potent. The wind blew regularly and in season. The planets moved in auspicious paths. There was no danger from any enemy, nor from one another nor the gods. The people were calm, intent on restraint and morality. It was as if the kṛta era had appeared.” Translation Meiland 2009: I.279.


JMK 73,15–17/JMH 104,6–8: na paśuhiṃsā kadā cid abhyudayāya dānadamasaṃyamādayas tv abhyudayāyeti tadarthinā dānādipareṇa bhavitavyam. Translation Meiland 2009: I.283.


JM k.10.32: lakṣmeva kṣaṇadākarasya vitataṃ gātre na kṛṣṇājinaṃ dīkṣāyantraṇayā nisargalalitāś (-lalitā K) ceṣṭā na mandodyamāḥ (-odyamaḥ K) / mūrdhnaś chattranibhasya keśaracanā śobhā tathaivātha ca tyāgais te śatayajvano ’py apahṛtaḥ kīrtyāśrayo vismayaḥ //. Translation Meiland 2009: I.281.


JMK 69,5–6/JMH 97,21–22: atidurnyasto batāyaṃ […] janaḥ. Translation Meiland 2009: I.267.


JMK 69,5–6/JMH 97,21–22: parapratyayahāryapelavamatir amīmāṃsako dharmapriyaśraddadhāno (-priyaḥ śraddadhāno K) janaḥ. Translation Meiland 2009: I.267. The adjective amīmāṃsaka (lit. “uninquiring, uninvestigating”), which Meiland renders adverbially as “unquestioningly,” is likely a pun on “Mīmāṃsaka,” the representative of Brahmanical orthopraxy/ritualism and the most uncompromising advocate of Vedic sacrifices.


See above, 378–379 and n. 57.


Note also JM k. 10.33ab: hiṃsāviṣaktaḥ kṛpaṇaḥ phalepsoḥ prāyeṇa lokasya […] yajñaḥ /. “When people sacrifice to seek a reward, it is usually a low and violent act.” Translation Meiland 2009: I.281.


See above, 369–372.


JM kk. 10.9–14: ya eva lokeṣu śaraṇyasaṃmatās ta eva hiṃsām api dharmato gatāḥ / vivartate kaṣṭam apāyasaṅkaṭe janas tadādeśitakāpathānugaḥ // ko hi nāmābhisambandho dharmasya paśuhiṃsayā / suralokādhivāsasya daivataprīṇanasya vā // viśasyamānaḥ kila mantraśaktibhiḥ paśur divaṃ gacchati tena tadvadhaḥ / upaiti dharmatvam itīdam apy asat paraiḥ kṛtaṃ ko hi paratra lapsyate // asatpravṛtter anivṛttamānasaḥ śubheṣu karmasv avirūḍhaniścayaḥ / paśur divaṃ yāsyati kena hetunā hato ’pi yajñe svakṛtāśrayaṃ (-āśrayād K) vinā // hataś ca yajñe tridivaṃ yadi vrajen nanu vrajeyuḥ paśutāṃ svayaṃ dvijāḥ / yatas tu nāyaṃ vidhir īkṣyate kva cid vacas tad eṣāṃ ka iva grahīṣyati // atulyagandharddhirasaujasaṃ śubhāṃ sudhāṃ kilotsṛjya varāpsarodhṛtām / mudaṃ prayāsyanti vapādikāraṇād vadhena śocyasya paśor divaukasaḥ //. Translation Meiland 2009: I.267–269.


Quite intriguingly, a passage from the BCSSū (747a20–b5, see Beal 1875: 158–159) provides an interesting parallel to several of the YBh arguments against ritual killing (see below, nn. 147 and 151). As far as I can see, nothing can be said at present on the chronological and doctrinal relationships between the two texts, and whether a common source is to be postulated. In any event this sūtra, “an immense compilation of different biographies of the Buddha” (de Jong 1997–1998: 250; see above, n. 66 for references), was translated into Chinese (or compiled?) by the Gandhāran monk *Jñānagupta (*Jinagupta?) about 590 CE, i.e., two or three centuries after the presumed dates of the paravāda section of the YBh and Āryaśūra’s period of activity (early 4th c. CE?).


See below, 400 (§ 2.3) and n. 151.


YBh 160,8–9: dvayābhinirhārayā parīkṣāyuktyopaparīkṣya sarvathā na yujyante /. For text-critical notes and a discussion, see Eltschinger 2015: 201–202 (§ 1.5), and n. 48. On the Buddhist conception of parīkṣā, see Eltschinger 2014: 1–34.


See Eltschinger 2015: 206–207 (§ 2.2.3).


yaś Ed., Tib. (gaṅ yin pa): kaś MS.


°sahāyās Ed.: °sāhāyās MS.


bhavaty Ed. (Tib.): bhavatīty MS.; see Eltschinger 2015: 214, n. 102.


evaṃvādī MS: evaṃvādī bhavatīti Ed.; see Eltschinger 2015: 214, n. 102.


no MS: na Ed.; see Eltschinger 2015: 214, n. 102.


prakalpitam MS: pratyupakalpitam Ed.


api tu Ed., MS: api tu om. Tib. The wording sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ (without api tu) occurs, e.g., in YBh 119,17, 121,4, 125,9, 126,3, 130,15, 131,13, 132,13, 134,3, 134,11, 134,18, 135,4, 135,8, 135,13, 140,6, 143, 12, 144,17, 148,13, 150,13, 151,11, 153,7, 154,11, 155,15, 158,8, 158,15, 160,1. To the best of my knowledge, this is the only occurrence of the formula in the form: api tu sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ. But the formula occurs once in the form: api ca sa idaṃ syād vacanīyaḥ (YBh 139,4, YBhMS 38b5–6, YBhTib D70a4/P81b8).


°vidhiḥ Ed.: °vidhi MS.


sa dharma° Ed., Tib. (de chos …): saddharma° MS.


adharmaṃ dharmīkarotīti MS, Tib. (chos ma yin pa … chos su byed pas): adharmadharmī karotīti Ed.


See below, n. 148.


vyākṛte MS, Tib. (lan btab): vyāvṛtte Ed.


ādhyātmikaṃ Ed.: adhyātmikaṃ MS. YBhMS seems to be generally inconsistent (ădhyātmika in 9b5 and 6 [YBh 30,19 and 31,2] vs. ādhyātmika in 9b6 [YBh 31,4]); see also SWTTF I.255a s.v. ādhyātmika.


sacet Ed.: śacet MS.


tathaiva MS, Tib. (de kho na bźin du): tathaiva om. Ed.


athāsarvatragas em. (Tib. gal te kun tu ’gro ba ma yin na ni): athāsarvatraga MS: atha sarvatragas Ed.


mantravidhir Ed., MS: sṅags kyi cho ga des (*sa mantravidhir) Tib.


Reconstructed from YBhTib: des na ’dod dgur sgyur ba’i gzugs can bźin du phyugs kyaṅ, which the Ed. renounced to reconstruct except for tena paśur api (see YBh n. 1, p. 147). For ’dod dgur sgyur ba’i gzugs can, Negi 2602a s.v. gives *prakāmarūpin/*prakāmarūpika (certainly more satisfactory in the present context than prākāmyaṃ rūpikaḥ, Negi 2602a s.v.), but also *kāmarūpin, which is to be preferred in view of the fact that the expression occurs at YBh 40,14, where kāmarūpī bhūtvā is rendered ’dod dgur gzugs bsgyur nas.


paśvāśrayaṃ hitvā devāśrayaṃ vigṛhṇātīti1 MS, Tib. (phyugs kyi lus spaṅs nas lha’i lus ’dzin par ’gyur bas): paśukāyaṃ hitvā devakāyaṃ gṛhṇātīti Ed. 1Or does YBhMS read ⟨pa⟩rigṛhṇāti?


tadā° Ed., MS: tadā° om. Tib.


na nayatīti em. (Tib. ’jog par mi byed pas): nayatīti Ed., MS.


yac ca para° MS: yat para° Ed.


dṛṣṭadoṣapratikriyaṃ MS, Tib. (tshe ’di la yaṅ ñes pa’i gñen po … byed pa), Schmithausen 2013: 484, n. 262: dṛṣṭaṃ doṣapratikriyaṃ Ed. See BHSD 269a s.v. dṛṣṭa-.


tāvan Ed., MS: tāvan om. Tib.


vidyā° em. (Tib. rig sṅags): vidyādi° Ed., MS.


Reconstructed from YBhTib: (daṅ /) raṅ bźin gyis luṅ du ma bstan pa gaṅ yin pa, which the Ed. (see n. 9, p. 147) reconstructs: *svayaṃ nānāgamoktaṃ ca yat.


kalpate MS, Tib. (byed pa): bhavati Ed.


ba’i em. : bas DP.


tshig D : tshigs P.


bsgrubs D : bsgrub P.


pas D : pa P.


bźag em. : gźag DP.


kyi D : kyis P.


zlog D : bzlog P.


la D : la om. P.


par D : pas P.


de D : de om. P.


kun D : gun P.


sems D : sems can P.


On the title of the subsection, hiṃsādharmavāda, see above, 374–377 and 378–379, and nn. 52, 61 and 93.


See, e.g., YBh 118,14–119,1, 120,13–14 or 129,6–7: yathāpīhaikatyaḥ śramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vaivandṛṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī /.


On this doctrine, see above, 370–372. On the servants and those in charge of preparing the sacrifice, see above, n. 65.


Here one would expect the usual answer referring to scripture (āgama) and reasoning (yukti) as the two sources of the opponent’s doctrine, as in YBh 119,4, 120,17, 123,2–3, 129,9, 143,5, 144,10, 152,1, 155,11–12: āgamato yuktitaś ca /. “[So he does] on account of [both] scripture and reasoning.” Scripture and reasoning are then defined in general terms, as in YBh 119,5–6 (āgamaḥ katamaḥ / tatpratisaṃyuktānuśravaparamparāpiṭakasampradānayogenaiṣām āgatam bhavati […] iti /): “What does scripture consist of? By means of the continuous tradition and the transmission of a [textual] corpus [to this effect], it has come down to those [who think and speak thus] that […],” and in YBh 119,7–9 (yuktiḥ katamā / yathāpi tat sa eva śramaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā tārkiko bhavati mīmāṃsakas tarkaparyāpannāyāṃ bhūmau sthitaḥ svayamprātibhānikyāṃ pārthagjanikyāṃ mīmāṃsānucaritāyām / tasyaivaṃ bhavati /): “What does reasoning consist of? For instance [here in the world, (a certain/)]this ascetic or (a certain/)this brahmin is a reasoner, an investigator who remains on the level of ratiocination, [a level] which is based on one’s own wit, [which is] ordinary and pervaded with [philosophical] investigation. The following occurs to him.” For text-critical notes and remarks on these passages, see Eltschinger 2015: 200, nn. 43–44.


On utsaṃstha, see Eltschinger 2015: 213, n. 100.


On śaṭha, see Eltschinger 2015: 214, n. 101.


A somewhat similar statement occurs in the ViP (3.18.26ab; the asuras, recently converted to Buddhism by Māyāmoha, are speaking): naitad yuktisahaṃ vākyaṃ hiṃsā dharmāya neṣyate /. “[To regard sacrificial violence as virtuous,] this [is] not a discourse that stands to reasoning, [for] it is not accepted [by us] that [sacrificial] violence is conducive to [religious] merit(/is beneficial).” See also Eltschinger 2014: 61–62.


On this idea, see above, 372–377, and especially 374–377.


Unless otherwise stated, my translation of the iti preceding the na yujyate reflects the interpretation of the Tibetan translators: either “since” when the translators resorted to a syntactic instrumental, or “that” when they used źes byar. The translation of these iti is made problematic by the terseness of certain arguments.


Righteous factors have desirable (iṣṭa) results, whereas unrighteous factors have undesirable (aniṣṭa) results.


According to Lambert Schmithausen (personal communication, 7 March 2015), this interpretation is supported by Xuanzang’s understanding of the passage in YBhCh 309c21–23: 若是法自體者, 離彼殺生 不能感得自所愛果, 而能轉彼非法以為正法, 不應道理。 “Wenn [wir annehmen], es sei ‘dharma-naturig’, so ist [eure Position] nicht vernünftig, [da die rituellen Formeln einerseits] ohne jenes Töten von Lebewesen die erwünschte Wirkung nicht zustandezubringen vermögen, aber [andererseits] imstande sein [sollen], jenen adharma (sc. das Töten von Lebewesen) in dharma umzuwandeln.” A somewhat similar criticism occurs in BCSSū 747a25–27: 菩薩報言: 何有苦他名爲法也。有塵坌身, 還將塵拭, 能得淨乎。有血塗身, 還以血洗, 豈能得淨。有行非法。當得於法無有是處。 “The bodhisattva replied: ‘How can causing others to suffer be termed dharma? When a body is dirtied, can it be cleansed by once again rubbing it with dirt? When a body is smeared with blood, how can it be cleansed by once again washing it with blood? It is impossible (*asthānam etat, nedaṃ sthānaṃ vidyate?) that practising adharma will lead to dharma!’ ” See also Beal 1875: 159.


For a scholastic interpretation of this first part of the YBh’s critique, see below, n. 156. In an earlier version of the present paper, I emended YBhMS dharmo to adharmo according to YBhTib chos ma yin pa and translated: “[But] if it is [claimed to be] of an unrighteous nature, then it cannot be that something unrighteous, which of itself has an undesirable result, rids [one] from another undesirable result [i.e., the evil retribution expected from killing].” Lambert Schmithausen (personal communication, 7 March 2015) has suggested to me that dharmo is perhaps better interpreted here in its neutral sense of “factor,” as Xuanzang obviously does in YBhCh 309c23–25: 若是非法自體者, 自是不愛果法, 而能轉捨餘不愛果法者, 不應道理。 “Wenn [die Formeln] adharma-naturig sind, dann ist [eure Position] nicht vernünftig, [insofern ihr zufolge] ein Faktor (dharma), der (als adharma = something unrighteous) selbst einer ist, der eine unerfreuliche Wirkung hat, imstande sein [soll], einen anderen Faktor, der eine unerfreuliche Wirkung hat, ‘umzupolen.’ ” I would not rule out the possibility that the manuscript(s) translated by Xuanzang erroneously read dharmo for ’dharmo/adharmo.


For similar uses of pari√grah and its derivatives in the context of the neutralization of poison through mantras, see Kataoka 2012: 354, n. 15.


I.e., in the case of ritual killing, too, the evil consequences of killing are neutralized by ritual formulas and injunctions. MHK 9.32ac strongly echoes our YBh passage: viṣopayuktivad dhiṃsā yadi mantraparigrahāt / nābhīṣṭāniṣṭaphaladā. “[Proposition: Ritual] killing is not regarded as [a cause] that brings about an undesirable fruit. [Reason:] Because it is controlled by a mantra. [Example:] Just like the [beneficial] use of poison [controlled by a mantra].” Translation Kataoka 2012: 354 (with “mantra” instead of “spell”). Note also, as an additional example, ŚL 76ab saṃsṛṣṭaṃ vrajati viṣaṃ viṣeṇa śāntiṃ sanmantrair agadadharaiś ca sādhyamānam /. “When poison is mixed with poison and prepared with the proper mantras and antidotes, it is rendered ineffective.” Translation Hahn 1999: 103.


According to the YBh, one would be eager to sacrifice one’s own relatives if the ritual formula were to bring, “naturally” and indiscriminately, all sacrificial victims to heaven. The argument somehow anticipates the one Dharmakīrti resorts to in his polemics on the efficacy of mantras against the Mīmāṃsā (PVSV 155,18–164,24; see Eltschinger 2001: 83–116, Eltschinger 2008 and Eltschinger 2012: 84–115): if the (Vedic) mantras possess a natural efficacy (bhāvaśakti, inasmuch as they are claimed to be authorless—apauruṣeya—by the Mīmāṃsakas), then this efficacy cannot be limited to the twice-borns alone (to the exclusion of śūdras), as the brahmins claim. It is only if superior human beings “author” the (Vedic) mantras, i.e., perceptually identify them as efficacious phonetic sequences, empower (adhi√sthā) and associate them with ritual, psychological and behavioural rules (to which the user is requested to conform), that the mantras can yield their results arbitrarily and conventionally (see Eltschinger 2012: 94–102)—but then their authorlessness is lost. Albeit without any allusion to the distinction between sarvatraga and asarvatraga, an argument similar to the YBh’s occurs in JM k. 10.13: “If one goes to heaven by being killed in sacrifice, surely brahmins themselves would become sacrificial animals. But since one never sees this practiced, who would accept the words of such men?” (For the Sanskrit and the context of this passage, see above, n. 98 and § Note also BCSSū 747b2–4 (see also Beal 1875: 159): 菩薩又言。我且問汝世間近法。若人殺羊, 祭祀天已, 得如法者。何故不殺所愛親族, 而祭祀天。是故我知殺羊祭祀。無有功徳。 “The bodhisattva continued: ‘I will ask you now about the worldly law. Suppose someone were to kill a sheep. Having offered it as a sacrifice to heaven, this would accord with the dharma. Why then would he not kill his beloved relatives and offer them as a sacrifice to heaven? Therefore I know that killing sheep and offering them as sacrifices is wholly without merit(/benefit).’ ”


The import of this argument remains obscure to me.


Dharmakīrti and his successors frequently use pra√nī and its derivatives to refer to the person who reveals the mantras. See PVSV 155,21 (Eltschinger 2001: 25) and 163,21; see also Eltschinger 2001: 26, n. 90; 104, nn. 442 and 444; 120–123; Eltschinger 2008: 274–275.


śakti is one of the eight mantrahetus (“causes of mantras”) or mantrakriyāsādhanas (“means of making mantras”) listed by Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin as properties of the “author” of mantras (see Eltschinger 2001: 20–21 and 74; Eltschinger 2008: 274–275), and already occurs in the same context in PVSV 124,18. Dharmakīrti also refers to this exceptional person’s prabhāva (PVSV 162,13; Eltschinger 2001: 18, n. 53), which (s)he can owe to his/her austerities (tapas), veracity (satya) and transmigrational status (due to the accumulation of merit, puṇya), or to the success (siddhi) of a mantra favoured by a deity (devatā) (see Eltschinger 2001: 19). The prabhāva also consists in this person’s capacity to neutralize (a snake’s) poison (see Eltschinger 2001: 19, and n. 62, and 75, n. 306). As for compassion (parārthaparatā, kṛpālutā), it can belong, just as (the search for) glory (yaśas), to the motivations of the author of mantras (see Eltschinger 2001: 26–27, and n. 93; Eltschinger 2008: 276, and n. 35). This is all the more evident that in the Mahāyāna, those who reveal (√bhāṣ, etc.) the mantras are most frequently buddhas and bodhisattvas (see Eltschinger 2001: 78–79).


Or, according to YBhTib, “then this cannot be since he does not lead every people to heaven without killing.”


According to the brahmin opponent, ritual killing, which is evil, brings about a desirable result (see above, 369–370). In slightly later scholastic literature, this claim recurs as a typical example of viṣamahetuvāda, “the doctrine of unequal causes” (Kataoka 2012: 351). According to Kataoka (2012: 351), Saṅghabhadra’s viṣamahetuvādin “assumes that ritual killing, which is regarded as evil by the Buddhists, is rather meritorious in that it is a cause of a desirable fruit (*iṣṭaphala).a He distinguishes between ritual and non-ritual actions of killing, and claims that killing preceded by mantras in a ritual can bring about a desirable fruit (*yajñe mantrapūrvikā bhūtahiṃseṣṭaphaladāyinī).b That an apparently evil action rather leads to merit can be named a fault of *hetuphala(bhāva)vaiparītya or inversion (of the relationship) between cause and effect.c Here Saṅghabhadra (and Vasubandhu as well) is defending the Abhidharma theory of similarity (sādṛśya) between cause and effect in opposition to the proponent of unequal causation (*viṣamahetuvādin).” aKataoka 2012: 351, n. 6 refers to NA 529c23–24. bKataoka 2012: 351, n. 7 refers to NA 530b14–15. cKataoka 2012: 351, n. 8 refers to NA 530b9–14. The wording of Saṅghabhadra’s pūrvapakṣa (reconstructed by Kataoka as *yajñe mantrapūrvikā bhūtahiṃsā) is strongly reminiscent of the YBh (yajñeṣu mantravidhipūrvikaḥ prāṇātipātaḥ). The same can be said of MHK 9.36ab: yajñe paśūnāṃ hiṃsā cen nāniṣṭaphaladāyinī /. “[Objection:] The killing of animals during a sacrifice does not bring about an undesirable result.” See also Kataoka 2012: 359. It is hard to believe that Saṅghabhadra and Bhāviveka were not aware of this section of the YBh.


I.e., that of poison and its neutralization by mantras (see above, § 2.2).


See above, § 2.3.


See above, § 2.4.


See above, § 2.5.


The critique of each of the sixteen allodoxies ends with this formula, which is to be interpreted against the background of the section’s final statement (YBh 160,8–9; see Eltschinger 2015: 201–202 (§ 1.5), and n. 48, and Eltschinger 2017: 203–206, and n. 10).


Injuring oneself, others or both (attabyābādhāya pi saṃvatteyya parabyābādhāya pi saṃvatteyya ubhayabyābādhāya pi saṃvatteyya) is the characteristic of unwholesome/evil bodily, verbal and mental actions “with painful consequences, with painful results” (dukkhudrayaṃ dukkhavipākam) according to MN I.415 (Ñāṇamoli/Bodhi 1995: 524–525). For further references, see Schmithausen 2013: 481, and n. 244.


On this sentence, see Schmithausen 2013: 484, n. 262.


pāṣaṇḍa/pāṣaṇḍin is a well-known deprecative designation of non- or anti-Vedic groups/denominations (Buddhist, Jainas, materialists and other “nihilists”) on the part of orthodox Brahmanical circles in (epic and especially) purāṇic literature (see Eltschinger 2014: 36, n. 3, for a discussion and references). The YBh’s apparently neutral and pluralistic use of the term rather echoes its meaning in the inscriptions of Aśoka. In Rock Edict 12 (see Bloch 1950: 121–124), sarvapāṣaṇḍa covers both pravrajitas (wandering ascetics) and gṛhasthas (householders). In Rock Edict 7 (see Bloch 1950: 110–111), the sarvapāṣaṇḍas are said to wish “la maîtrise des sens et la pureté de l’ âme” (Bloch 1950: 110, sayamaṃ ca bhāvasuddhiṃ ca [Girnar]). In Pillar Edict 6 (see Bloch 1950: 166–168), the expression enters an interesting but problematic relationship with sarvanikāya (“tous les groupes,” Bloch 1950: 168). Contrary to later usage, and much like pāṣaṇḍin in the YBh, pāṣaṇḍa seems to refer here to “sectarians” (Norman 1990: 147) or “members of a religious sect” (Bailey 1952: 427) in a neutral way—hence perhaps its Greek translation (in the rendering of the twelfth Rock Edict) as διατριβή, “école philosophique,” “école (de pensée)” (Benveniste 1964: 139 and passim; Schlumberger/Benveniste 1967–1968: 194 and 199: “In the Asoka inscriptions it designates any kind of faith, including the king’s faith”).


I.e., maybe in the framework of the “golden rule,” that which is not desired by the agent himself.


According to SWTTF III.319a s.v. maṅgala.


AKBh 227,5–10 (Kośa III.105–106) distinguishes three kinds of actions: those that are wholesome/good (kuśala), are conducive to security (kṣema) and have a desirable retribution (iṣṭavipāka); those that are unwholesome/evil (akuśala), are conducive to insecurity (akṣema) and have an undesirable retribution (yasyāniṣṭo vipākaḥ); and those that are morally neutral (avyākṛta, lit. “[left] unanswered [by the Buddha],” viz. “undefined”), which are neither wholesome/good nor unwholesome/evil and cause neither comfort nor discomfort.

  • 6

    See Deleanu 2006: I.195.

  • 14

    Tull 1996: 225.

  • 17

    Tull 1996: 226.

  • 42

    See YBh, p. 146, n. 4.

  • 48

    Note Masefield 1986: 151, who suggests that the Buddha, “far from being critical of the early ideal of the brahmin […], instead uses this against his contemporary counterpart, who is found lacking in several respects: […] he lives a life of great luxury, driving about in chariots. Compare how one day Ānanda saw ‘the brahmin Jānussoṇi driving out of Sāvatthī in his chariot, drawn by pure white mares; white were the steeds harnessed thereto and white the trappings, white the chariot, white were the fittings, white the reins, the goad, the canopy, his turban, his clothes and sandals, and by a white goad was he fanned.’

  • 53

    See Schmithausen 1991a: 52 and Schmithausen 2005: 193.

  • 79

    On this point, see Amore 1971, Masson 1975: 103–104 and Masefield 1986: 156–161.

  • 80

    For an English translation, see Speyer 1971: 93–104 and Meiland 2009: I.261–283. Story no. 10 only partly echoes Jātaka no. 50 (see Chalmers 1895: 126–128), the argument of which is as follows (JātakaI.259,13–20): tasmiṃ samaye bārāṇasivāsino devatāmaṃgalikā honti, devatā namassanti, bahuajeḷakakukkuṭasūkarādayo vadhitvā nānappakārehi pupphagandhehi c’eva maṃsalohitehi ca balikammaṃ karonti. bodhisattvo cintesi: idāni sattā devatāmaṃgalikā bahuṃ pāṇavadhaṃ karonti, mahājano yebhuyyena adhammasmiṃ yeva niviṭṭho, ahaṃ pitu accayena rajjaṃ labhitvā ekam pi akilametvā upāyen‘ eva pāṇavadhaṃ kātuṃ na dassāmīti. “Now in those days the Benares folk were much given to festivals to ‘gods,’ and used to shew honour to ‘gods.’ It was their wont to massacre numbers of sheep, goats, poultry, swine, and other living creatures, and perform their rites not merely with flowers and perfumes but with gory carcasses. Thought the destined Lord of Mercy to himself, ‘Led astray by superstition, men now wantonly sacrifice life; the multitude are for the most part given up to irreligion: but when at my father’s death I succeed to my inheritance, I will find means to end such destruction of life. I will devise some clever stratagem whereby the evil shall be stopped without harming a single human being.’ ” Translation Chalmers 1895: 126–127. None of the JM’s arguments against animal sacrifice occur in Jātaka no. 50.

  • 97

    See Eltschinger 2015: 206–207 (§ 2.2.3).

  • 163

    On this sentence, see Schmithausen 2013: 484, n. 262.

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