Abstract
This paper concentrates on populism’s functional relationship with religion during times of crisis and how religion is instrumentalized for populist causes. Critical analysis of Philippine populism under President Rodrigo Duterte highlights often-overlooked nuances regarding populism as both disruption and reinforcement of traditional politics and its inherent institutional and religious dimensions. Though Dutertismo disrupts Manila-centric power, it reinforces traditional politics rooted in the Philippine political and cultural ethos. Moreover, because of populism’s institutional and religious dimensions, Dutertismo’s challenges to Philippine Christianity involve both its social and evangelizing missions. As institutions, Christian churches are called to a social mission that helps dismantle traditional politics. Their response involves disentangling their institutions and communities from traditional political networks and providing all Christians with political education towards the good of all, especially those oppressed by traditional politics. Dutertismo’s implicit religious perspective challenges Christianity’s evangelizing mission. Insufficiently discussed in many studies, this underlying Manichean perspective common to populists attracts many through an account of and a strategy against social suffering through the war between the good “we” versus the evil “others.” Christianity then must listen more attentively to the yearnings of the suffering people and accompany them more faithfully in the struggle for social transformation. These responses prepare Philippine Christianity to commemorate in 2021 its five-century presence.
Studies on populism and religion concentrate on their symbiotic relationship.1 Populism is characterized as disrupting global politics.2 and as collaborating with religious traditions and groups for mutual gain. For instance, in the wake of the Covid 19 pandemic, populist governments tap into evangelical fundamentalist views to legitimate their anti-science responses and policies.
Within this horizon, this essay explores relations between “Dutertismo, the movement he [Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte] has given life to”3 and Christianity, the overwhelming majority religion for five centuries. The first section introduces Dutertismo as continuous with, not disruptive of, traditional politics and rooted in its political and cultural ethos. The second explains the impact of the Dutertismo phenomenon on Philippine Christianity. It notes how Duterte undermines the imaginary of the Philippines as Catholic nation by attacking Catholic beliefs and leadership while cultivating support from other Christian groups. Given this, the essay argues that Dutertismo challenges Christianity on two distinct fronts. The first challenge to the institutional social mission of Christian churches consists in subverting Dutertismo’s entrenchment in traditional politics. The second and more fundamental challenge to Christianity’s evangelizing mission responds to Dutertismo’s implicit Manichean view of the war between good and evil in Philippine society. It focuses on how Philippine Christianity needs to witness to the Good News in a society characterized by systemic injustice and social suffering. The concluding section revisits issues related to populism and religion.
Uncovering Dutertismo
Drawing from current research, this introduction describes Dutertismo’s populism in terms of traditional politics. The no-nonsense leader of Davao City then and of the country now “offers the spectacle of a strong leader ready to expose the uncomfortable realities of Philippine politics using the most vulgar vocabulary. He speaks in the vernacular of a five-year-old, identifying enemies and friends, calling for revenge upon people who have bruised his ego.”4 Moreover, being Mindanaoan, his victory becomes “electoral insurgence” against imperial Manila. Beyond borders of decorum and Manila, Dutertismo “signals ‘a shift away from Manila-centered politics’ and an effort to place the south in the center of his administration.”5
Dutertismo as Traditional Politics
Though Dutertismo has disrupted the political establishment, Duterte’s political network, his appointments in government and his treatment of “others” reveal profound entrenchment in traditional politics.
First, Duterte’s genealogy through blood and affinity connects with traditional Leyte and Cebu clans (Roa, Durano and Almendras). Father Vicente G. Duterte, Davao governor (1959–1965), was appointed to President Ferdinand Marcos’ cabinet (1965–1968). His long mayoral tenure, characterized by an uncanny combination of “raising hell” in the drug war and shedding tears for Typhoon Haiyan victims,6 earned support from business, weakened opposition and established his dynasty, with sons Sebastian and Paolo as Davao vice-mayor and congressman, and daughter Sara mayor and founder of the national alliance Hugpong ng Pagbabago [Faction for Change].
Other alliances include political families like Metro Manila’s Cayetano, Ilocos’ Singson and the Marcos-Romualdez clan. With Marcos daughter Imee’s electoral support, he subsequently allowed the dictator’s burial at “Cemetery of Heroes,” weakened agencies recovering Marcos assets and condoned son Bongbong’s protest against Vice-President oppositionist-winner, Leni Robredo.
Second, key appointments are those known or loyal to him—Davaoeños, fellow San Beda Law alumni and military or police officers. Early appointees include Davao-based Carlos Dominguez Jr., Salvador Medialdea and Christopher Go Jr., as well as Bedan lawyer Noel Tijam. Military and police occupy around eleven cabinet portfolios (e.g., local government, defence and social welfare) on account of their “discipline, obedience, and efficiency.”7 They coordinate government responses to natural disasters or the Covid 19 pandemic.
With such appointments and legislators switching allegiance, Duterte’s influence and control undermine the balance of power and the spirit of democratic constitutionalism. This has marginalized the constitutional Commission on Human Rights and the Office of the Vice President.
Third, “others” for Duterte are those outside his network: businesses, Aquino associates and leftist groups. The elite called coños [Sp. “cunt”, derogatorily used for Spanish mestizos] actually refers to non-Duterte allies.8 One prime example is the Filipino-Spanish Zobel de Ayala family involved in telecommunications, water distribution and land development. He attacked the Ayalas and Metro Pacific Group for alleged onerous government contracts, but has since apologized during the pandemic.
His most controversial target is the abs-cbn Corporation’s extensive platform for news, entertainment and social service. Began by Eugenio Lopez Sr. and considered oppositionist, it suffered systematic government persecution. During the Covid 19 quarantine, the National Telecommunications Commission halted its operations; Congress, which long-delayed action on franchise renewal, hastily conducted one-sided hearings. On 10 July 2020, Duterte’s congressional allies rejected its application, and its operations immediately ceased—the same fate Marcos’ regime inflicted by confiscating its assets.
Other targets include Aquino associates and other oppositionists called “Yellow Brigade” for their signature colour. He blames the Aquino governments for current woes like Mindanao’s armed conflict or Manila’s traffic congestion. He condemns leftist groups because of their continuing insurgency, dismissing four left-leaning cabinet secretaries and ending peace negotiations.
Given this entrenchment in traditional politics, Dutertismo appears as its logical culmination. It further centralized its forces for allegedly more effective response to the pandemic. Though its legacy remains open, some scholars express alarm that Dutertismo is a continuation, rather than a disruption of politics as everyday Filipinos know it to be.9
Dutertismo as Philippine-Style Populism
Among studies offering populist typologies, The Oxford Handbook on Populism delineates the ideational, political-strategic, and socio-cultural types.10 Pieterse classifies populism as “political style” rather than ideological substance.11 Like other populist forms, Dutertismo is a mixture of types and thus taps into various threads in the Philippine political and cultural ethos.
First, Duterte’s persona reflects both the folk trickster and “the boss” in traditional politics. He is “the sovereign who decides on the exception, setting aside the law and putting certain groups to death. But he is also the trickster who, in disarming his critics, endears himself to his supporters as a dissipator, one whose performative excess gives expression to what is at once forbidden and desired.”12
National surveys validate this cultural resonance. According to three Pulse Asia’s 2016 surveys, being “courageous /firm /brusque /fighter” best describes Duterte and earlier politicians, actor Joseph E. Estrada and boxer Manny Pacquiao.13 Heydarian thus writes that Duterte’s Philippines has become “a voice for the so-called Asian values argument, which was generously deployed by autocratic leaders in Singapore and Malaysia.”14
Second, Dutertismo rides on nationalist undercurrents generated during Spanish and American colonialism. With other nationalist populisms, “nation” and “the people” remain associated with “autonomy, independence and sovereignty.”15 Thus Philippine history is filled with political leaders and social movements mobilizing “the people” against foreign and local powers.16
His foreign-relations statements underscore this. Reacting to President Barack Obama’s human rights concerns, he refuses “to kneel down before anyone else except the Filipino…I do not have any master but the Filipino people.”17 To similar advocates like the United Nations, European Union and U.S. Congress, he retorts: “Your concern is human rights. Mine is human lives.”18
Third, Dutertismo channels disillusion with local democracy, thus confirming Zakaria’s view of populism’s connection to liberal democratic failures.19 Because Philippine traditional politics has engendered “cacique democracy”—American electoralism wedded to Spanish caciquism.20—post-colonial democracy is characterized by enduring structural inequity. For instance, around ten percent Gross Domestic Product (gdp) depends on overseas Filipino workers. Duterte’s predecessor Benigno Aquino iii instituted some reforms, but “Filipinos experienced only slow incremental change in their incomes…Meanwhile, everyone continued to witness more families, including the Marcoses, getting richer…The promise to increase jobs that could lure back overseas Filipino workers had some potential, but only in the last months of Aquino’s presidency.”21
Given this situation three decades after Marcos’ overthrow, the “unfinished” nature of the 1898 Revolution against Spain applies equally to the 1986 edsa People Power Revolution.22 Through repeated criticisms of “the Yellow Brigade,” Duterte fuels disillusion over the promises of edsa and other attempts at social reform.
But Duterte’s promise of change remains overshadowed by his drug war, “undermin[ing] the Duterte administration’s ability to make the best use of the ‘honeymoon’ period to push for a transformative change.”23 Moreover, neoliberal “Dutertenomics” appears like “status quo plus”24 and has not delivered campaign promises of higher minimum wages and regularized labor tenure.
Duterte vowed to promote national sovereignty and transform elite democracy. Recognizing this desire “to transform society in ways that will improve the difficult lives of the people,” Christopher Maboloc believes “radical means are needed to overcome the failures of Philippine democracy.”25 But other commentators doubt how his unmistakable traditional politics could be “radical” or transformative of Philippine democracy. They note, for example, capitulation to Chinese imperial power in the West Philippine Sea and financial dependence on China and his (Duterte’s) business allies. Nevertheless, Curato contends that Philippine democracy “remains vibrant and contested but is enacted outside the state,” and drawing parallels with the Marcos dictatorship, affirms that “[s]ocieties, ultimately, prove to be stronger than strongmen.”26
Challenging Philippine Christianity
Beyond Duterte’s controversial statements, Dutertismo challenges Christianity’s role in the Philippine society. In contrast to the imaginary of the nation as Christian, it dissociates “Christian” and “nation” and also “Christian” and “Catholic.” It has thus challenged the churches’ social mission and Christianity’s evangelizing mission.
The “Christian Nation” as Backdrop
Related to conjuncture between church and state, this imaginary contextualizes Dutertismo’s challenges. Since 1946 national independence, church-state relations have not been especially belligerent; Buckley’s recent study even calls it “benevolent secularism.”27 American-influenced constitutional provisions on religious freedom and church-state separation have been tested by contentious issues like reproductive health, but remain unchanged.28
Furthermore, church and state foster cooperation despite different presidents’ religious allegiances. Even with Marcos’ regime, communications involved critical and supportive church leaders. Cardinal Jaime Sin’s policy of “critical collaboration” proved strategic until 1986 when the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines declared it lost moral legitimacy because of massive systemic electoral fraud.29
However, this institutional relation operates within the historic conjuncture between nationhood and Christian belonging, generated by conflating the body politic and religious community during Spanish colonization.30 After 1946 independence from American rule, the “Christian nation” imaginary was promoted by church and accepted by state through religious celebrations like the 1954 Second National Eucharistic Congress when President Ramon Magsaysay dedicated the nation to the Sacred Heart. It remains current with overwhelming Christian majority and serves progressive and conservative social positions, most evident during the 1986 edsa People Power Revolution.
However, its currency facilitates traditional political practice between state and church. Often sharing family or class ties reinforced by cultural values, political and church leaders nourish official and unofficial relations. Church institutions receive assistance, especially financial, from government agencies. Even with noteworthy intentions and no irregularities, these transactions promote traditional patronage, and compromise churches’ independence.
Challenge for the Churches’ Social Mission
Protective of turf, Duterte and his allies undermine this imaginary by dissociating nation and Christian as well as Christian and Catholic. These differentiations correct the harmful identification of “Filipino” and “Christian” that marginalizes Muslim Filipinos, but Dutertismo’s challenge to Christian social mission remains.
Duterte’s attacks on church leaders assert non-deference to and independence from them; for instance, cursing Pope Francis for traffic during his historic visit and calling priests and bishops crazy. Unbeholden to Catholic leadership and confident of popular support, his government appears virtually unhampered. It deported Australian missionary and human rights advocate Sr. Patricia Fox and investigates bishops and priests for meeting potential whistleblowers against Duterte allies.
But Duterte nurtures relations with other Christian groups. His government is supported by Apollo Quiboloy’s Davao-based Kingdom of God, and Iglesia ni Cristo known for electoral block voting. Last 16 January 2020, he graced the 120-Year Anniversary of the Baptist Churches in the Philippines. With these, he has effectively dissociated “Christian” and “nation” as well as “Christian” and “Catholic.”
Divisions also mark Christian reaction to Dutertismo. Official leaders of Catholics, Protestants and Evangelicals issued statements against the drug war, some stronger than others.31 Concerns involve human rights, due process and extrajudicial killings among the poor. But despite these, national surveys show that the majority, including Catholics and other Christians, support the drug war. Hence, some Catholics call for leaders like Cardinal Jaime Sin at the edsa People Power Revolution.
Within this divided situation dominated by traditional politics, Christian churches are challenged to reshape their social mission. The 1997 Catholic Bishops’ Pastoral Letter on Politics condemned well-known practices of patronage and fraudulent activities before, during and after election.32 Similar pre-election letters enjoin citizens in voting wisely, resisting patronage politics, and supporting monitoring organizations.
But these fall short because the challenge to social mission is transformation of traditional politics exemplified by Dutertismo. This mission would involve disentangling Christian institutions from traditional politics, integrating political education for the common good in church formation, and networking with other civil society constituencies.33 Pilario articulates this challenge in terms of various forms of resistance: open criticism, civil disobedience, martyrdom, defensive apologetics and care for victim-survivors.34 Thus Dutertismo has not diminished but even invigorates Christian churches toward the social mission, critical of traditional politics.
Challenge for Christianity’s Evangelizing Mission
This deeper challenge engages Christianity’s evangelical mission in an unjust and suffering society. Christianity must respond to Dutertismo’s Manichaean perspective implicit in Duterte’s religious background and anti-Catholic comments and the religious quality behind his support.
Though formed by Catholic devout mother and institutions, Duterte spurns Catholicism and “does not believe in the Supreme Being of his critics who, he said, are portraying him as the devil.”35 Moreover, some observe, “that supporting his leadership is not just a political choice. It is also religious.”36 Curato explains this as “a product of a broad church, not a personality cult. Within this church are anxious, ambivalent, sceptical, denialist, and engaged citizens who find their voice—not all the time but occasionally—in a man who can lay bare their hidden injuries and sense of abandonment in the public sphere.”37
Other Duterte comments uncover the Manichaean perspective in Dutertismo and other populisms. This perspective from Mani (b. 214 ce) describes cosmic and historical reality as the battle between good and evil.38 According to De la Torre and others, populism is “a Manichaean discourse that divides politics and society as the struggle between two irreconcilable and antagonistic camps: the people and the oligarchy or the power block.”39 Dutertismo exemplifies this perspective in the spiritualization of the drug war and the interrogation about God’s apparent absence in an evil world.
First, Dutertismo frames the drug war as battle against evil. Duterte’s combative conduct recalls Ricoeur’s description of the Manichaean battle of the ruler representing “god who overcomes chaos” against the enemy “represent[ing] the forces of evil in our history.”40 Not surprisingly then, supportive megachurch pastors spiritualize the drug war: “The ‘righteousness’ of the war on drugs and the evangelistic opportunities it has opened up for megachurch pastors ultimately rest on the worldview that drug addiction is a spiritual condition.”41 Arbitrary arrests and raids become weapons. Such spiritualizing legitimizes extrajudicial killing. For Pastor John, “although Marlon was a drug user, what happened to him was that ‘past sins merely haunted him’. Pastor John is convinced that Marlon’s death is ‘not in vain…as he is now with the Lord’.”42
Second, the Manichaean perspective also surfaces in Dutertismo’s traditional theodicy about God’s absence in an evil world. Duterte believes in Catholicism’s failure because its God is nowhere in natural disasters and atrocities by Islamist terrorists: “Where is God, he asked on 26 September, when a baby ‘is taken from the mother’s arms brought under a jeep and raped and killed,’ referring to atrocities by isil.”43
Belief in Original Sin Ridiculed
Duterte ridicules original sin through a vulgar interpretation of the creation story.
What she did—Eve ate [the apple]. Then Eve woke up Adam. They probably just finished [having sex]. You also eat. So, Adam ate. Then malice was born. Who is this stupid God? If so, this [‘son of a bitch’] is really stupid. You created some—something perfect and then you think of an event that would tempt and destroy the quality of your work. How—how can you rationalize a God? You believe? [Translation from Filipino mine]44
In rejecting this God tempting his creatures, Duterte recognizes the sourc of evil and rationalizes his strategic battle against evil forces, most visible in his battle against drugs and political opposition. Though unaware of this underlying perspective, Dutertismo like other populisms attracts popular support for offering an explanation for and a strategy against evil.
Dutertismo on Failure of Christianity and Christian Responses
Christian responses to Dutertismo remain incomplete. Caloocan Bishop and biblical scholar Pablo David reacted to Duterte’s version: “Sin is not about eating a forbidden fruit (the story does not identify it as an apple) that brings about evil. It involves the desire of humans to ‘be like gods’ or ‘idols.’”45 Such reactions from exegesis do not sufficiently recognize that the religious challenge lies, not in philosophical theodicy but in the existential lament of people suffering endemic poverty and injustice from traditional politics.
Thus, in the words of the presidential spokesman, Salvador Panelo, Duterte only intended to “initiate an intellectual discussion” for the “faithful’s enlightenment and spiritual awakening.”46 Responding on religious grounds, Philippine Christianity is called to examine its evangelizing mission. This examen acknowledges, on the one hand, the quasi-Manichean vestiges expressed in traditional formulations of original sin47 and often popularized in local preaching about the ever-present devil.48 These often promote the ideological view of suffering as “God’s will” and test of our faith. On the other, the examen values our people’s vibrant faith expressed in their lives and in Christian participation in social and national concerns.
Learning from this examen, its response must consist in transformative evangelizing mission. This “new evangelization” must directly address the profound yearnings of the suffering people for integral wellbeing and equal justice. Philippine Christianity embraces pain inflicted by traditional politics, refuses to combat persons as evil, and works in solidarity along the tortuous road to God’s Kingdom. All this could serve as a preparation for the 2021 commemoration of its five-century presence.
Revisiting Populism and Religion
As a contribution toward the global populist map, this essay shows how religion, populism and democracy are unavoidably entangled in Dutertismo. Though such entanglements appear in populist forms elsewhere, they take on nuances regarding populism as disruption of traditional politics and the institutional and religious dimensions in populism’s relation to religion.
First, populism must be understood as disruption and continuity. Though studies focus on its disruptive impact, Dutertismo underscores the significance of what populism disrupts and what it reinforces. It disrupts the current situation on many levels. As a mixture of political-strategic, socio-cultural and ideational populisms, Dutertismo wields power with direct support from predominantly unorganized followers, promotes politics based on cultural nationalism, and divides the body politic into allies and enemies. Thus, Dutertismo is acclaimed as “populist revolt against elite democracy.”
But this claim is indeed misplaced because what Dutertismo promotes regarding human rights and other values are neither liberal nor democratic. Its entrenchment in traditional politics subverts its avowed aim to transform “cacique democracy.” Thus like in other cases of failed democracies, alternatives like “deliberative democracy” are proposed.49
Second, populism has institutional and religious dimensions. Hence, challenges to and responses from religion engage both the realms. But because of the collaboration between populist leaders and religious groups, studies have only focused on functional instrumentalization.
Dutertismo’s cultivated distance from Christianity highlights other aspects. It challenges the institutional churches’ social mission in a situation dominated by traditional politics. More forthcoming than elsewhere, Philippine churches must denounce traditional political practices, disengage from their networks, and form constituencies for action toward the common good. Though these appear like a struggle for social capital, Christian social mission demands no compromise.
The religious challenge implicit in Dutertismo – like other forms of populism – addresses Christianity’s evangelizing mission in the world. Many studies surprisingly overlook this religious dimension, despite what sociologists of religion point out as the religious underpinnings of social groups and the “salvific” impulse behind social movements.
But given the multifaceted religious quality of many past and recent social movements in the Philippines, Dutertismo’s implicit religious perspective is crucial. This Manichaean perspective offers both an explanation for and a strategy against social evil, and thus challenges Philippine Christianity’s witness in a society characterized by systemic and endemic suffering. Its evangelizing mission cannot simply provide counterargument against Dutertismo’s perspective, but must listen more intently to the profound religious yearnings of the marginalized and engage more faithfully in the transformation of their lives. Then would the iconic World Press photograph of Typhoon Haiyan survivors clutching Black Nazarene statues be an authentic representation of Christianity not just for but also of the people.
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Ronald D. Holmes, ‘Who Supports Rodrigo Duterte?’, in Curato, ed,A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte’s Early Presidency, pp. 57–75 at p. 71.
Richard Javad Heydarian, The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt against Elite Democracy (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 7.
Benjamin De Cleen, ‘Populism and Nationalism’, in Kaltwasswer, et. al., eds, The Oxford Handbook on Populism, pp. 342–362 at p. 355.
Webb and Curato, ‘Populism in the Philippines’, in Stockemer, ed, Populism Around the World, pp. 49–65.
Pia Ranada, ‘Who is Obama to ask me about Human Rights?’, Rappler.com, 6:9 (2016), para. 1–16 at para. 11–12, https://www.rappler.com/nation/145296-duterte-obama-human-rights-asean-summit [accessed 29 May 2020].
Felipe Villamor, ‘Denied Vote on Peace Deal, Duterte Defends Drug War’, The New York Times (24 July 2018), Section A, p. 5.
Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs 1 November 1997, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illberal-democracy.
Benedict Anderson, ‘Cacique Democracy in the Philippines’, in The Spectre of Comparison: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World (London and New York: Verso, 1998), pp. 192–226. (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2017).
Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines 2nd ed. (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2017), p. 328.
Reynaldo C. Ileto, Filipinos and their Revolution: Event, Discourse, and Historiography (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998), pp. 177–201.
Heydarian, The Rise of Duterte: A Populist Revolt against Elite Democracy, p. 107.
Ibid, 102.
Christopher Ryan Maboloc, ‘The Radical Politics of Nation-States; The Case of President Rodrigo Duterte’, Journal of asean Studies, 6:1 (2018), pp. 82–95, p. 82.
Nicole Curato, ‘The Power and Limits of Populism in the Philippines’, Current History (September 2018), pp. 209–214, p. 214.
David T. Buckley, Faithful to Secularism: The Religious Politics of Democracy in Ireland, Senegal, and the Philippines (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).
José Mario C. Francisco, ‘Letting the Texts on rh Speak for Themselves: (Dis)Continuity and (Counter)Point in cbcp Statements’, Philippine Studies, 63:2 (2015), pp. 223–246.
‘cbcp on the Post-Election’, in Pedro iii, ed, Pastoral Letters 1945–1995 (Manila: Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, 1996).
José Mario C. Francisco, ‘People of God, People of the Nation: Official Catholic Discourse on Nation and Nationalism’, Philippine Studies 62:3–4 (2014), pp. 341–375.
Jayeel Cornelio and Ia Marañon, ‘A ‘Righteous Intervention’: Megachurch Christianity and Duterte’s War on Drugs in the Philippines’, International Journal of Asian Christianity, 2:2 (2019), pp. 211–230, pp. 212–213.
‘Pastoral Exhortation on Philippine Politics’, in Pedro Quitorio iii, ed, cbcp on the Threshold of the Next Millennium (Manila: Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, 1999).
José Mario C. Francisco, ‘Philippine Populism and Traditional Politics: Pastoral Implications for the Church’s Mission’, in Simon Pinto, Antony Lawrence and Stany C. Fernandes, eds, Politics and Mission in Critical Times: Local and Global Perspectives (Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 2020), pp. 250–266.
Daniel Franklin Pilario, ‘Extrajudicial Killings: The Church Confronts the State in the Philippines’, lecture delivered at the International Conference on Theology and Religion: Church-State Relations at De La Salle University on 26 July 2019.
Alexis Romero, ‘In the Holy Land, Duterte Affirms his belief in God’, Philippine Star Website, 4:9 (2018), para. 1–10 at para. 1. <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/09/04/1848588/holy-land-duterte-affirms-belief-his-god> [accessed 29 May 2020].
Jayeel Cornelio and Erron Medina, ‘Duterte’s enduring popularity is not just a political choice—it is also religious’, New Mandala Website, 3:9 (2018), para. 1–41, <https://www.newmandala.org/dutertes-enduring-popularity-not-just-political-choice-also-religious/> [accessed 29 May 2020].
Nicole Curato, ‘The Power and Limits of Populism in the Philippines’, Current History (September 2018), pp. 209–214, pp. 212–213.
Carlos de la Torre, ‘Populism in America’, in The Oxford Handbook on Populism, pp. 195–213 at p. 195.
Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, p.196.
Cornelio and Maranon, ‘A “Righteous Intervention”: Megachurch Christianity and Duterte’s War on Drugs in the Philippines’, International Journal of Asian Christianity, 2:2 (2019), pp. 211–230, p. 221.
Ibid, 220.
Steve Mollman, ‘God would weep: Duterte’s dark twisted relationship with faith and religion’, Quartz, 18:10 (2016), para. 1–15 at para. 9, https://qz.com/811901/god-will-weep-philippines-president-rodrigo-dutertes-dark-twisted-relationship-with-faith-and-religion/ [accessed 29 May 2020].
Ibid.
Pablo Virgilio David, ‘On Adam and Eve and the Catholic Faith’, Facebook, 25:6 (2018), para. 1–5 at para. 3, https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=pablo%20david%20book%20of%20genesis&epa=SEARCH_BOX [accessed 29 May 2020].
Aika Rey, ‘Panelo: Duterte only ‘puts religion to the test’ when he says the Trinity is silly’, Rappler.com 2:1 (2010), para. 1–18 at para. 9 <https://www.rappler.com/nation/220140-malacanang-message-duterte-put-religion-test> [accessed 29 May 2020].
Paul Ricoeur, ‘“Original Sin”: A Study in Meaning’, in Don Ihde, ed, The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 269–286.