Derring-do is how aggressive a predator is in stalking and capturing prey. We model predator–prey interactions in which prey adjust vigilance behavior to mitigate risk of predation and predators their derring-do to manage risk of injury from capturing prey. High derring-do increases a predator's likelihood of capturing prey, but at higher risk of injury to itself. For fixed predator derring-do, prey increase vigilance in response to predator abundance, predator lethality, and predator encounter probability with prey and decrease vigilance with their own feeding rate; there is a humped-shaped relationship between prey vigilance and effectiveness of vigilance. For fixed prey vigilance, predators increase derring-do with the abundance of prey and predator lethality and decrease it with benefit of vigilance to prey and level of prey vigilance. When both prey and predator are behaviorally flexible, a predator–prey foraging game ensues whose solution represents an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). At the ESS, prey provide themselves with a public good as their vigilance causes predators to decrease derring-do. Conversely, predators have negative indirect effects on themselves as their derring-do causes prey to be more vigilant. These behavioral feedbacks create negative intra-specific interaction coefficients. Increasing the population size of prey (or predators) now has a direct negative effect on the prey (or predators). Both effects help stabilize predator–prey dynamics. Besides highlighting a common way by which predators may experience a food-safety tradeoff via dangerous prey, the model suggests why natural selection favors even small defensive measures by prey and hulky predators.
Purchase
Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):
Institutional Login
Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials
Personal login
Log in with your brill.com account
Abrams PA.2000. The evolution of predator-prey interactions: theory and evidence. Ann Rev Ecol Syst. 31:79–105.
Ale SB, , Brown JS. 2007. The contingencies of group size and vigilance. Evol Ecol Res. 9:1263–1276.
Bakker RT., 1983. The deer flees, the wolf pursues: incongruencies in predator-prey coevolution. In: Futuyma DJ, , Slatkin M, editors. Coevolution. Southerland (MD): Sinauer; p. 350–382.
Berger-Tal O, , Mukherjee S, , Kotler BP, , Brown JS. 2009. Look before you leap: Is risk of injury a foraging cost? Behav Ecol Sociobiol. 63:1821–1827.
Berger-Tal O, , Polak T, , Oron A, , Lubin Y, , Kotler BP, , Saltz D. 2011. Integrating animal behavior and conservation biology: a conceptual framework. Behav Ecol. 22:236–239.
Bouskila A.2001. A habitat selection game of interactions between rodents and their predators Ann Zool Fenn. 38:55–70.
Brodie ED, , Ridenhour BJ, , Brodie ED. 2002. The evolutionary response of predators to dangerous prey: hotspots and coldspots in the geographic mosaic of coevolution between garter snakes and newts. Evolution. 56:2067–2082.
Brown JS, , Kotler BP. 2004. Hazardous duty pay and the foraging cost of predation. Ecol Letters. 7:999–1014.
Brown JS, , Kotler BP, , Bouskila A. 2001. Ecology of fear: foraging games between predators and prey with pulsed resources. Ann Zool Fenn. 38:71–87.
Brown JS, , Laundre JW, , Gurung M. 1999. The ecology of fear: optimal foraging, game theory, and trophic interactions. J Mammal. 80:385–399.
Brown JS., 1998. Game theory and habitat selection In: Dugatkin LA, , Reeve HK, editors. Game theory and animal behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press; p. 188–220.
Brown JS.1999. Vigilance, patch use and habitat selection: foraging under predation risk. Evol Ecol Res. 1:49–71.
Brown JS., 2010. Ecology of fear. . In: Breed MD, , Moore J, editors. Encyclopedia of animal behavior. Oxford: Academic Press; p 581–587.
Charnov EL, , Orians GH, , Hyatt K. 1976. Ecological implications of resource depression. Am Nat. 110:247–259.
Daniel MJ.1960. Porcupine quills in viscera of fisher. J Mammal. 41:133–133.
Davenport J, , Spikes M, , Thornton SM, , Kelly BO. 1992. Crab-eating in the diamondback terrapin Malaclemys terrapin: dealing with dangerous prey. J Mar Biological Assoc UK. 72:835–848.
Dawkins R.1976. The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dietl GP.2003. Coevolution of a marine gastropod predator and its dangerous bivalve prey. Biol J Linn Soc. 80:409–436.
Dusseldorp GL.2010. Prey choice during the South African Middle Stone Age: avoiding dangerous prey or maximising returns? Afr Archaeol Rev. 27:107–133.
Embar K, , Raveh A, , Burns D, , Kotler BP. 2014. To dare or not to dare? Risk management by owls in a predator-prey foraging game. Oecologia. 175:825–834.
Harris RN.1989. Nonlethal injury to organisms as a mechanism of population regulation. Am Nat. 134:835–847.
Hugie DM, , Dill LM. 1994. Fish and game: a game theoretic approach to habitat selection by predators and prey. J Fish Biol. 45:151–169.
Laundré JW, , Hernández L, , Ripple WJ. 2010. The landscape of fear: ecological implications of being afraid. Open Ecol J. 3:1–7.
Líznarová E, , Pekár S.2013. Dangerous prey is associated with a type 4 functional response in spiders. Anim Behav. 85:1183–1190.
Kotler BP, , Brown JS, , Dall SRX, , Gresser S, , Ganey D, , Bouskila A. 2002. Foraging games between gerbils and their predators: Temporal dynamics of resource depletion and apprehension in gerbils. Evol Ecol Res. 4:495–518.
Kotler BP, , Brown JS, , Mukherjee S, , Berger-Tal O, , Bouskila O. 2010. Moonlight avoidance in gerbils reveals a sophisticated interplay among time allocation, vigilance and state-dependent foraging Proc R Soc Lon B. 277:1469–1474.
Lima SL, , Dill LM. 1990. Behavioral decisions made under the risk of predation: a review and prospectus Can J Zool. 68:619–640.
Lotka AJ.1925. Elements of physical biology. Baltimore (MD): Williams & Wilkins.
Mitchell WA, , Lima SL. 2002. Predator-prey shell games: large-scale movement and its implications for decision-making by prey. Oikos. 99:249–259.
Mukherjee S, , Heithaus MR. 2013. Dangerous prey and daring predators: a review. Biol Rev. 88:550–563.
O'Connell DJ, , Formanowicz DR Jr. 1998. Differential handling of dangerous and non-dangerous prey by naive and experienced Texas spotted whiptail lizards, Cnemidophorus gularis. J Herpetol. 32:75–79.
Perlman Y, , Tsurim I. 2008. Daring, risk assessment and body condition interactions in steppe buzzards Buteo buteo vulpinus. J Avian Biol. 39:226–228.
Rosenheim JA.2004. Top predators constrain the habitat selection games played by intermediate predators and their prey. Isr J Zool. 50:129–138.
Rosenzweig ML,, MacArthur RH.1963. Graphical representation and stability conditions of predator-prey interactions. Am Nat. 97:209–223.
Simoni LS.2012. Living with large carnivores: insights from diet choice, habitat use, and the ecology of fear [doctoral dissertation]. Urbana (IL): Illinois Natural History Survey.
Sweitzer RA.1996. Predation or starvation: consequences of foraging decisions by porcupines (Erethizon dorsatum). J Mammal. 77:1068–1077.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 746 | 182 | 28 |
| Full Text Views | 64 | 5 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 57 | 10 | 0 |
Derring-do is how aggressive a predator is in stalking and capturing prey. We model predator–prey interactions in which prey adjust vigilance behavior to mitigate risk of predation and predators their derring-do to manage risk of injury from capturing prey. High derring-do increases a predator's likelihood of capturing prey, but at higher risk of injury to itself. For fixed predator derring-do, prey increase vigilance in response to predator abundance, predator lethality, and predator encounter probability with prey and decrease vigilance with their own feeding rate; there is a humped-shaped relationship between prey vigilance and effectiveness of vigilance. For fixed prey vigilance, predators increase derring-do with the abundance of prey and predator lethality and decrease it with benefit of vigilance to prey and level of prey vigilance. When both prey and predator are behaviorally flexible, a predator–prey foraging game ensues whose solution represents an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). At the ESS, prey provide themselves with a public good as their vigilance causes predators to decrease derring-do. Conversely, predators have negative indirect effects on themselves as their derring-do causes prey to be more vigilant. These behavioral feedbacks create negative intra-specific interaction coefficients. Increasing the population size of prey (or predators) now has a direct negative effect on the prey (or predators). Both effects help stabilize predator–prey dynamics. Besides highlighting a common way by which predators may experience a food-safety tradeoff via dangerous prey, the model suggests why natural selection favors even small defensive measures by prey and hulky predators.
| All Time | Past 365 days | Past 30 Days | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstract Views | 746 | 182 | 28 |
| Full Text Views | 64 | 5 | 0 |
| PDF Views & Downloads | 57 | 10 | 0 |