1 Introduction

Bangladesh is hosting Rohingya refugees and the earliest comings recorded in 1978, 1991–1992, 2016 and the latest inflow in 2017. In 1991–1992 influx, around 250,000 Rohingya persecuted in Myanmar and has taken shelter in Bangladesh,¹ and later Bangladesh recognized them as refugee and has given shelter within 20 camps in the Cox’s Bazaar district. As of May 2007, there are 2camps remaining housing 26,317 refugees who have been in a camp setting for over 16 years though without freedom of movement, permission to work or educational facilities. Bangladesh estimated that around 100,000–200,000 Rohingya have not been recognized as refugees and are therefore living ‘illegally’ outside the camps.² In the recent and largest influx 2017, over 943,000 Rohingya refugees has taken shelter and reside at Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas in Bangladesh, as of October 2022.³ Most of them are residing in 34 enormously crowded camps, including the largest single site, the Kutupalong-Balukhali Expansion Site, which is host around 635,000 Rohingya.⁴ The Rohingya refugees in Myanmar were subjected to grave human rights violations, including violence, discrimination, and statelessness. Improving living conditions, political and diplomatic dynamics, and Myanmar’s involvement in repatriation are critical. International pressure and assistance are required to handle the issue, but donor fatigue and regional stability concerns are also important. The huge refugee population has an influence on local communities, resulting in competition for resources and potential social tensions. Cultural and language difficulties must be overcome while integrating migrants into local communities. Presently, the situation is stabilized and the basic assistance is being provided, living situations have developed somewhat and calamity threat vindication actions have been mostly successful.⁵ Rohingya continue to face danger in camps, despite a 2017 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Bangladesh and Myanmar aiming for repatriation within two months.⁶ A MoU signed between Myanmar and the unhcr in 1993 mandating unhcr to protect refugees from Myanmar has limited the registered refugees in the original camps and kept track of the urban refugees, but failed to tackle the undocumented Rohingya Community. Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a bilateral agreement and physical arrangement deals on November 23, 2017 and January 16, 2018 respectively which set January 23, 2019 deadline to repatriate 670,000 Rohingya, who fled during the atrocities in the Arakan state. But no solution has yet been reached. Bangladesh has not granted refugee status to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Bangladesh limits Rohingya rights since the country is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Additional Protocol. The repatriation process is especially difficult due to Myanmar’s uncertain security situation. The international community has a vital role in tackling the Rohingya refugee problem through diplomatic pressure, financial assistance, and legal measures. This study underlines the complexities of the Rohingya refugee crisis, as well as the need for multifaceted and collaborative methods to ensure long-term stability and human dignity for the afflicted populations.

Methodology of Research: This paper is largely followed doctrinal research as a method of research. The existing literature is reviewed in relation to the research hypothesis by using this method.

2 Rohingya Crisis in Bangladesh

The Cox’s Bazar area is selected as dangerous security ‘Phase 1’ posting for UN staff, which means that among other security measures, unhcr vehicles are not allowed on the road after dark.⁷ A tightly organized crime ring is there who controls the camps. This crime ring composed with some corrupted government officials, police, some local villagers and the refugee ‘leaders’ appointed by the government known as ‘Majhi’.⁸ Human Trafficking, ration scams, and control the lives of the people in the different camps are managing by this crime ring.⁹ Everything from marriage/divorce registration, family books, food rations and going to school, to leaving the camps to find work, or visit relatives in jails outside the camp, appears to carry a price whether financial or in kind.¹⁰ Failure to pay bribes can result in false accusations, imprisonment or physical violence.¹¹ Females also fear sexual violence. The Majhis have become very important and powerful in the camps and with their close family members play an important role in supporting the corrupt authorities. This situation has left the refugees with no means to appeal against the violence, exploitation and extortion that shape their lives. If someone reports their corruption to unhcr, this act would place them in danger of more violence and false accusations.¹² There are some other problems including infectious diseases, Non-Communicable Diseases (ncd s), Nutritional Deficiency, Child Health, Sexual and Reproductive Health, Gender-Based Violence (gbv), and Education, are facing by Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The main health complications dominant amongst Rohingya refugees in the camps are mysterious fever (227,928), acute lung infection (223,651), and diarrhea (192,560).¹³ They experienced a unexpected epidemic of diphtheria in November 2017 and a measles outbreak in December 2017-April 2018.¹⁴ Though no arrangement has been established yet to detect tuberculosis (tb) cases in camps, it can be anticipated that tb cases are very dominant among Rohingya considering the fact that Myanmar is one of the top 30 countries with the highest tb burden.¹⁵ The study on estimating the predominance of ncd s among Rohingya in Bangladesh is hardly found. A need assessment report conducted by brac in March 2018 which reported that 51.5% had hypertension and 14.2% had diabetes. Besides, thirty six thousand nine hundred and thirty Rohingya were distress from injuries.¹⁶ ncd s risk factors, such as smoking, using smokeless tobacco products, and indoor air pollution, are also very predominant among Rohingya. Nutritional deficiencies are vastly dominant in camps, especially among children. A latest population-based, cross-sectional study piloted in the Kutupalong camp which reported that in children, aged six to fifty nine months, around half of them were distress from stunting (height for age z-score <-2) and anemia and about one-fourth had Global Acute Malnutrition (gam) (weight for height z-score: <-2 or bilateral pitting edema).¹⁷Among children, 4.1% and 4.2% were suffering from severe acute malnutrition and moderate acute malnutrition respectively.¹⁸ The nutritional status of adolescent girls, as well as pregnant and lactating women in Rohingya camps, was also relatively poor.¹⁹ There are 54% of Rohingya refugees are children, and 703,000 of them need humanitarian assistance.²⁰ Report shows that, 82,382 discussions among children aged under 5 through investigation between August 25 and November 18, 2017.²¹ Among these, nearly one-third (32%) and just above one-fourth (27%) were cases of lung infections (ari s) and unexplained fever, respectively. Cases of acute watery diarrhea, skin diseases, injuries, eye infections, and malaria were also found among this group of children.²² Female children also reported facing mental trauma concerning their privacy matters, as they are using share toilets with males and they do not have separate space in their tents for sleeping, bathing, and changing their clothes.²³ unhcr reported that, in family counting exercise demographic data survey, more than half of the Rohingya refugees are women and around 316,000 of them are of reproductive age.²⁴ who reported that in February 2018, more than 50,000 women in the Rohingya community were pregnant.²⁵ Between February 2018 and May 2018, the expected cases of delivery and obstetrical complications were estimated at 16,513 and 2,477, respectively. The existing data expose that a significant percentage of pregnant Rohingya women could not receive antenatal care (anc) because of the unavailability or inaccessibility of the service.²⁶ In many sexual and reproductive health centers, there is a limited facility of essential anc components such as blood testing, urine testing, and tetanus vaccination.²⁷ A latest study showed, in the Kutupalong and Nayapara refugee camps, that Rohingya women repeatedly experience sexual abuse including rape, forced sexual favors, and unwanted sex.²⁸ unfpa reported that more than 14,000 Rohingya girls and women experienced gbv between August 2017 and December 2017.²⁹ Twelve point eight percent (12.8%) of women and girls experienced forced sexual favors, and 8.1% experienced forced and unwanted sex.³⁰ Sexual and gbv is endemic in the camps. Women and girls as young as nine years old are routinely abducted by local villagers and forced into so-called marriages only to be returned to the camps when they become pregnant. There were reports of young girls and young women being abducted and trafficked into the sex market in nearby Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong and of organized child prostitution within the camp. Traditional parenting and the practice of many of the cultural ceremonies are not allowed, and parents are powerless to protect their children. Young people are drifting away from the authority of the parents and elders and from the influence of religion into an aimless and antisocial lifestyle.³¹ Educated Parents regarded education as critical, the only way forward for their children if they are ever to have a future. Education in the camps is very basic and only offered to primary level. The students sit at crude wooden benches in overcrowded huts without electricity. Books are scarce and only three subjects are taught. The teachers have often only received basic education themselves. Some attempts have been made by older educated refugees to run private classes for the older children. This was forbidden by the authorities and both the students and teachers were fined, beaten or imprisoned if they were discovered. Parents commented that it was difficult for the children to study when they were constantly hungry. There is no lighting for the children to study at night. There are limited play areas for the children; authorities have banned the children from playing organized games. unhcr has recently formed youth groups to try and address some of these problems. The Majhis have done the whole thing in their power to close down these groups and stop the young people attending.³² The Rohingya crisis has significantly impacted the economy and employment structures in Cox’s Bazar district, with the Rohingya refugees and locals adopting a similar language.³³ Therefore, Rohingya is blend with the local people, which is a possible threat to Bangladesh. Many unemployed local students are working with the government, non-government and development partners in various capacities.³⁴ As jobs are readily available, the day labourers are also switching to work in the camps with the aid agencies. This job opportunity has created a shortage of labor in the local market, and finding workers has been a problem for the local farmers. Furthermore, another economic impact is that in Saint Martin Island of Cox’s Bazar, the current Rohingya crisis has created a low tourist turnout. Ship traffic is banned as of the continuing uncertainty along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border. Different tour operators have claimed that Bangladesh is at risk of losing more than a million tourists. Reports show Rohingya refugees in camps are involved in crime syndicates for smuggling, with fees ranging from taka 20,000 to taka 50,000. This has led to an alarming rise in human trafficking, particularly among girls, causing multifaceted effects and abuse of their basic human rights. The covid-19 pandemic in 2020 has amplified the problem, putting locals at risk of violence, drug abuse, trafficking, and prostitution. The district has become an alarming base for organized crimes and trafficking.³⁵ A number of Bangladeshi elected community leaders or the Syndicates have assisted them in exchange of money. This syndicates manages all the procedures including birth registration certificates, citizenship certificate, and police clearance.³⁶ Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh have been able to obtain National Identity Document (nid) cards from a syndicate charging over one Lakh per passport. In June 2021, an election commission officer was arrested for aiding Rohingya. The Anti-Corruption Commission accused seventeen people, including police inspectors and a senior election official, of providing fake documents.³⁷ In 2019, a detained Rohingya, in his statement before a metropolitan court said that over 300 Rohingya people had been trafficked abroad with Bangladeshi passports.³⁸ Using the nid card, they are obtaining national benefits including Bangladeshi Passport, even some of them are going abroad as labor migrants by using Bangladeshi Passport. They are falling in the tricks of human traffickers and suffer a lot reportedly.³⁹ Around four hundred and twenty cases were found between December 2018 and June 2019, which was a fourfold jump on the preceding fourteen months.⁴⁰ Bangladesh Ministry of Home Affairs (mha) stated that, 250 Rohingya were rescued from traffickers between January and June 2018, and mha had saved seventy thousand Rohingya found outside the camps and sent them back.⁴¹ Drug distribution in Rohingya camps attracts crime gangs, who resort to murder, abduction, and extortion to control and regulate trafficking. They target Rohingya youths, community leaders, and those raising voices against crimes or helping authorities identify gang members.⁴² Statelessness, regulated refugee camps and lack of accessibility to basic services have influenced as strong push factors to take up ‘Yaba’, popularly known as the madness drug, drug trafficking in Bangladesh.⁴³ Law enforcement Agencies have taken many operations against drug trade especially of ‘Yaba’ and in 2018 it was recorded around 53 million methamphetamine pills were seized. Approximately three hundred suspected drug dealers were killed out of which forty were from Teknaf area near to Rohingya camps. Some 25,000 were arrested, out of which few were Rohingya.⁴⁴ Bangladesh has experienced climate change and displacement due to the 2017 Rohingya influx, which destroyed nearly 4,818 acres of reserved forest, including 58.5% natural forests and 41.5% artificial forests, according to Cox’s Bazar forest department.⁴⁵ Rohingya refugees collected more than 750,000 kg of timber,⁴⁶ shrubbery and tree roots from the forest for their daily cooking fuel. The other two areas, the Teknaf and Ukhiya sub-district of Cox’s Bazar, where the majority of the Rohingya live, require 700 tons of firewood per day. This wood is collected from the forest, leading to the loss of huge forest assets.⁴⁷

3 Analytical Framework and Challenges for Durable Solutions

Everyone wants to live with human dignity and has no interest to be a refugee for indefinite period. Refugees have right to return in their home country and they have right not to be returned to a place where their life is in under risk or their security and liberty in danger.⁴⁸ Refugee protection must include the search for an appropriate durable solution. Durable solutions allow refugees to live in safety and dignity, without the prospect of persecution, and to rebuild their lives in a secure environment. A durable solution is attained when refugees no longer have any physical, legal, social, and economic protection needs that are related to their displacement and can resume their normal lives in a safe and healthy environment. Durable solutions, as outlined in the 1951 Convention on Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 oau Convention, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Statute, focus on voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. ga Res. 428(V) of 14 December 1950, adopting the unhcr Statute, calls upon governments to co-operate with the High Commissioner in the exercise of functions by “assisting the High Commissioner in efforts to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees.” The Executive Committee (excom) Conclusions first examined the topic of voluntary repatriation in detail in 1980, and in Conclusion 18(xxxi) of that year codified unhcr’s special competence concerning returnees. In 1985, excom adopted Conclusion 40(xxxvi) on the same issue and significantly settled the doctrine with regard to voluntary repatriation, through a clear reiteration of protection doctrines and through demarcation in detail concrete methods and means of upholding this solution and making it justly durable. These Conclusions were reaffirmed in excom Conclusion 74 (xlv) which also underscored “the leading role of unhcr in promoting, facilitating and co-coordinating voluntary repatriation.” Voluntary repatriation is the preferred for refugees, ensuring their safety and dignity, with the help of international organizations like unhcr facilitating this process.⁴⁹

In August 2017, Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to repatriate Rohingya from Bangladesh under a MoU. Before signing this MoU, Myanmar along with the unhcr and the undp announced that they had agreed to a MoU intended to create conditions for the “voluntary, safe dignified and sustainable” return of Rohingya. The commissioner for refugee relief and repatriation, Mr. Mohammad Abul Kalam, has appreciated this decision.⁵⁰ He told Benar News that, this MoU will benefit forthe repatriation process.⁵¹ That agreement between Myanmar and the U.N. agencies, and the MoU between Bangladesh and Myanmar will be an effective tool to repatriate Rohingya refugees to Myanmar.⁵² “The agreement will provide a framework for unhcr and undp to be given access to Rakhine State, including to refugees’ places of origin and areas of potential return that has not been permitted since violence broke out in August 2017,” unhcr said in a statement on 31st May 2018.⁵³ The main object of this MoU was to create a favorable situation for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable repatriation of Rohingya refugees.⁵⁴ The proposed the idea to repatriate 650,000 Rohingya back to Myanmar. The agreement was signed by both parties in the first quarter of 2018 and decided to complete the repatriation process within two years, with scheme of 300 people being repatriated to Myanmar every day. However, the majority of the Rohingya have resisted this move. They resisted because there was no such safe and secure environment in Myanmar. The Myanmar government continuously failed to restore peace and security in the Rakhaine state. So, voluntary repatriation process is failed in this regard. The nature of the voluntariness of the repatriation is a major point of contention and a barrier to identifying solutions to the current situation. Despite the limits of the unhcr and the international community, voluntary return has emerged as the most crucial and long-term solution to the refugee crisis. It is regarded as the “ideal” answer, with alternative long-term remedies viewed as just palliatives to the refugees’ aberrant situation. The notion of voluntary repatriation is to respect the voluntary character of repatriation, allow individuals to voice their wishes openly, be aware of the situation in their place of origin, and carry out repatriation with safety and dignity. The nation of origin must take steps to prevent forced migration and safeguard the safety of returns, and returnees should not face penalties for requesting refuge in another country. The unhcr must have access to all returnees and return locations.⁵⁵ Through their bilateral Joint Working Group on repatriation, Myanmar conveyed to the Government of Bangladesh the names of 3,450 Rohingya refugees who have been cleared for return to Rakhine State, Myanmar. unhcr sees Myanmar’s engagement in this process as a positive step in the affirmation of the right to return of Rohingya refugees.⁵⁶ Voluntariness is not mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention, which discusses instead the principle of ‘safe return’, implying that returnees will be protected by the state. Some scholars have argued that ‘once a receiving state determines that protection in the country of origin is viable, it is entitled to withdraw refugee status’.⁵⁷ The notions of subjective and objective assessment of ‘safe return’ have become central to the argument. B.S Chimni argues that one of the most important principles of voluntary repatriation and non-refoulement is that ‘refugees cannot be returned against their will to a home country that in their subjective assessment has not appreciably changed for the better’.⁵⁸ unhcr insists that decisions must be made based on objective facts. However, it can be contended that the determination by unhcr and the states of what is ‘objective’ is in fact a subjective interpretation to suit their current actions.⁵⁹ It would be difficult for the government of Bangladesh or unhcr to argue that ‘safe return’ had ever been established for the Rohingya when all credible evidence points to the opposite. Since unhcr, as the mandated agency of the international community, has granted the Rohingya the status of ‘prima facie’ refugees, it is hard to argue that what has happened to this population over the years is not in fact refoulement. Many refugees did and do wish to return to a safe homeland, but very few wish to return to the persecution from which they have fled.⁶⁰ unhcr claimed that given the circumstances in Bangladesh, they had a moral obligation to ensure that repatriation did as little harm as possible, even if doing so meant involving itself in forced repatriation.⁶¹ They distanced themselves by naming it as ‘imposed return’.⁶² Currently, unhcr has acknowledged that return is not a viable option for the Rohingya refugees. The main challenge for voluntary repatriation of the Rohingya is that they are not considered as citizen under the 1982 Citizenship Act of Myanmar. Myanmar arguing that Rohingya originated from Bangladesh, and Bangladesh denying by stating they are not Bangladeshi. The former Foreign Minister of Myanmar, U Ohn Gyaw stated in 1992 that there has never been a “Rohingya” race in Myanmar, as Muslim immigrants from neighboring countries illegally entered Naing-Ngan since 1824, without immigration papers.⁶³ So, as of now it is the most disputed issue is about the nationality of Rohingya population. Historically, they are traced by different literature and it is evident that they started living there hundreds of years back, as noted by Dr. Francis Buchanan-Hamilton in 1799. Dr. Francis Buchanan-Hamilton, a British physician and geographer, noted that the Mohammedans, who settled in Arakan, are known as ‘Rooinga’ while the Rakhine adhere to Buddha’s teachings.⁶⁴ Arakan was independent from 1430 to 1784 until the Burmese King Bodawpaya conquered and dominated until 1824.⁶⁵ Arakan, once independent, fell under British domination in 1826 after the Anglo-Burman War, resulting in a prolonged armed conflict along the Bengal-Arakan border.⁶⁶ During British rule, Buddhists were less supportive, leading to Muslims gaining administrative positions. During ww-ii, Japan invaded Burma, leading to conflict between the Burmese and Rohingya, with the Burmese receiving support from Japan and the Rohingya receiving British support.⁶⁷ Burma gained independence in 1948, leading to increased political violence among ethnic minorities. The British Government failed to establish an independent Muslim state, establishing a Mujahid movement demanding autonomy. In 1961, the U Nu government signed ceasefire agreements with Mujahid groups and established the Mayu Frontier Administration Area, covering Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Western Rathedaung districts.⁶⁸ Under General Ne Win, Rohingya oppression intensified, with human rights abuses and forced labor becoming routine in ethnic minority regions, particularly under the “Four Cuts” military operation.⁶⁹ However, Continuous conflict and absence of guarantees for safety, citizenship, and rights in Myanmar make repatriation difficult. Many Rohingya are unwilling to return due to fear of persecution and lack of trust in the Myanmar government. Therefore, voluntary repatriation would not be a good process as durable solution for Rohingya because Myanmar is not recognizing them as citizen of Myanmar. On the other hand, Local Integration has a minimum possibility as durable solution. Bangladesh is overpopulated (180 Million) country. It is possible to accommodate some Rohingya but not the total number. Since December 2020, Bangladesh has shifted nearly twenty thousand Rohingya to Bhasan Char, an isolated silt island in the Bay of Bengal.⁷⁰ With the approaching monsoon season, Rohingya and the humanitarian workers similarly fear that insufficient rainstorm protection might put those on the island at severe threat.⁷¹ This, alongside food shortages, unpredictable water sources, lack of educational facilities, medical care, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement, makes many refugees fear they are stuck on “an island jail in the middle of the sea,” as one child described it.⁷² The aim of the government of Bangladesh is to shift 100,000 Rohingya refugees there though it is a matter of concern that this island is not a safe place for settlement. It was formed in the last twenty years by silt deposit in the delta, and the shape and shorelines have frequently shifted. It has limited capacity for evacuation in the event of a cyclone.⁷³ Therefore, Bangladesh has not granted refugee status to the Rohingya and limiting their rights and opportunities for local integration. In addition of this, there will be a significant strain on the economy and public/private service in Bangladesh if Rohingya are considered for local integration.

However, considering all the challenges Resettlement has come to be seen as the only way in which they can regain a meaningful life. Countries may not accept Rohingya Refugees in their territory due to political, social, and economic reasons but there is no better way than Resettlement process as durable solution for Rohingya Rrefugees, though it is a lengthy process. Until 2006, resettlement was not considered to be an option for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The government refused permission for refugee travel and countries offering programmes of resettlement showed no active interest in accepting this caseload. However, unhcr has instigated a programme of resettlement for the most vulnerable cases. As of May 2007, Canada had accepted 23 Rohingya refugees with the potential of accepting 200 more. New Zealand had agreed to take 50 people, and the UK had expressed interest in this population.⁷⁴ The US Department of State made the announcement in a statement yesterday, a week after US Assistant Secretary of the US Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Julieta Valls Noyes ended a five-day visit to Bangladesh.⁷⁵ On December 8, the day after she left Dhaka, at least 24 Rohingya left for the US. They were among the 62 vulnerable Rohingya identified.⁷⁶ This is very good initiative though it is very minimum number. To solve the Rohingya crisis in Bangladesh, burden-sharing will be the most effective solution. Therefore, unhcr has been focusing on the use of durable solutions to prevent human degradation and protect voluntariness. This has led to the publication of an Agenda for Protection, a Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern, and the Convention Plus initiative, which led to the agreement on a Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement.⁷⁷ The Framework emphasizes the ‘4Rs’: Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction, and the concepts of Development Assistance for Refugees and Development through Local Integration. The unhcr has also implemented new approaches in three areas: development assistance targeting, migratory movements, and resettlement. The book concludes by discussing the multilateral and political context in which unhcr has tried to facilitate international cooperation to improve access to durable solutions.⁷⁸

4 Conclusion

Bangladesh provides a significant global public good order by hosting over one million Rohingya refugees. Safe, voluntary, and sustainable Rohingya repatriation to Myanmar is ultimately the best solution. However, the repatriation process is currently does not exist and Myanmar has not confirmed expressive development toward establishing them. Reports shows that Rohingya refugees want to stay in the camps in cox’s bazar for at least 10 years from now, even if conditions will be improved. While the international community must maintain maximum pressure on Myanmar to ensure accountability and conditions for return, it should also engage in medium-term planning given the likelihood of protracted displacement. The durable solutions are needed in dealing with the protracted situation of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. The recent agreement between Bangladesh and Myanmar on repatriating more than 600,000 Rohingya within two years is not the best option unless both parties agree to guarantee the aspect of repatriation based on voluntary, safety and dignity. Moreover, with little involvement of unhcr in the process of repatriation, the durable solution is only an illusion. Thus, when Rohingya insist not changing its current policy on Rohingya, when the violation of human rights is still haunt the Rohingya, the repatriation is not a feasible solution. The solution of resettlement is also call into doubt when the neighborhood country like Thailand and Malaysia also filled with numbers of Rohingya fleeing the persecution. Thus, the most durable solution is to implement de facto integration, which is not only a matter of legal status provision by Government, but also the provision of self-sufficiency and settlement for refugees in local community. Resettlement may be serves as one of the best durable solution to protect Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and expression of international burden-sharing, making it most effective when applied as part of a comprehensive international protection approach. The Core Group on Resettlement was created in the Convention Plus initiative, drafting the Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement. In recent years, the strategic use of resettlement has been emphasized, maximizing benefits for other refugees, host states, and the international protection regime. This approach is most effective when applied alongside other durable solutions in situation-specific plans of action, such as when a small group stifles peace negotiations or wider repatriation agreements.