Abstract
The purpose of this state-of-the-field article is to take stock of the use of international relations theory in the study of cross-Strait relations since 2000. To what degree have studies of cross-Strait relations made use of international relations theory since 2000, and to what degree has international relations theory provided useful insights for understanding Beijing–Taipei relations? I focus my attention on five topics in particular: the prospects for armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait; alliance/alignment politics and the u.s.–China–Taiwan triangular relationship; interactions between domestic politics (in Taipei and Beijing) and the cross-Strait dyadic relationship; cross-Strait economic integration in the shadow of political conflict; and the role of psychology, emotion, and identity in shaping cross-Strait interactions. For each topic, I survey recent studies that apply rigorous international relations theory to the cross-Strait relationship, and where appropriate I make suggestions for further development.
The past decade and a half has seen tremendous change in relations between the People’s Republic of China (prc) and Taiwan. A dozen years ago, relations were tense. The prc had recently passed its anti-secession law, threatening ‘non-peaceful’ retaliation for ‘major incidents’ of Taiwan independence. Chen Shui-bian, who in 2004 had been re-elected as Taiwan’s president in a close (and disputed) election, was pursuing what he termed a ‘rectification of names’ campaign on the island. Long-time observer Alan Romberg (2003: 14) had recently written that the issue of Taiwan’s sovereign status remained ‘the only issue in the world today that could realistically lead to war between two major powers’.
Tensions eased dramatically, of course, after Ma Ying-jeou’s landslide victory in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election. The ensuing years witnessed an unprecedented cross-Strait détente, characterised by frequent dialogue, deepening economic and social interaction, and a raft of new bilateral agreements. Yet, by the late stages of Ma’s presidency the durability of this new-found détente was increasingly in doubt. Ma was increasingly unpopular, and the economic agreements he had negotiated with the prc had helped trigger large-scale protests on the island. Ever fewer people self-identified as ‘Chinese’ in public opinion polls, despite improved cross-Strait relations, and new Chinese president Xi Jinping hinted at a tougher approach to Taiwan than his predecessor, Hu Jintao. Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that relations across the Taiwan Strait have indeed deteriorated since the 2016 election of Tsai Ing-wen, of the Democratic Progressive Party, as Taiwan’s president.
Yet it is hard to assess where cross-Strait relations are likely to go in the future, since numerous factors affect the relationship in complex ways. Some trends, such as growing prc military power or a deepening sense of Taiwan-centric identity, appear to increase tension and perhaps even the risk of military conflict. But other factors, such as continued extensive (though levelling off) cross-Strait economic ties, seem to give reason for optimism about the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait. At the end of the day, if we are going to understand how these different trends affect the China–Taiwan relationship, and how they fit together, we need theory. For instance, to understand whether cross-Strait economic ties reduce the danger of a China–Taiwan military conflict, it is imperative to have a clear understanding of how, and under what conditions, economic ties could affect the probability of conflict in the first place. Only armed with a theory of war, and a theory of how economics affect war, can we credibly assess whether the conditions necessary for a pacific effect are in fact in place in this case. Yu-shan Wu made this basic point 18 years ago in an important article in which he emphasised the need for analysts of cross-Strait relations to move ‘beyond journalistic accounts of events, partisan arguments, policy debates, and wishful thinking’. As he put it, ‘we need theoretical guidance’ (2000: 407–408).
However, Wu observed that most studies of cross-Strait relations have lacked rigorous theorisation: ‘Detailed description of events and preoccupation with current policies preclude detached observation … We are short of theoretical frameworks with which to approach Taipei-Beijing relations’ (Wu, 2000: 408). While Wu, in his article, went on to survey key works on cross-Strait relations that draw from different strands of ir theory, it becomes clear that such studies represented the exception, rather than the rule, in studies of cross-Strait relations at the time.
The purpose of this state-of-the-field article is to take stock of the use of international relations theory in the study of cross-Strait relations in the years since Wu’s article was published. To what degree have studies of cross-Strait relations made greater use of international relations theory since 2000, and to what degree has international relations theory provided useful insights for understanding Beijing–Taipei relations? I show that a considerable amount of progress has been made since Wu’s call for greater theorisation of the cross-Strait relationship. In the pages that follow, I focus my attention on five topics in particular: the prospects for armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait; alliance/alignment politics and the u.s.–China–Taiwan triangular relationship; interactions between domestic politics (in Taipei and Beijing) and the cross-Strait dyadic relationship; cross-Strait economic integration in the shadow of political conflict; and the role of psychology, emotion and identity in shaping cross-Strait interactions. For each topic, I survey recent studies that apply rigorous international relations theory to the cross-Strait relationship, and where appropriate I make suggestions for further development. 1 I focus my attention in particular on English language publications.
Deterrence, the Security Dilemma, and Prospects for Armed Conflict in the Taiwan Strait
Several important articles that appeared in the early to mid-2000s drew from deterrence theory and security dilemma theory to shed important new light on the prospects for stability in China–Taiwan relations. The work of two scholars—Robert Ross and Thomas Christensen—is particularly noteworthy in this regard.
Drawing on broader international relations literatures relating to deterrence and crisis stability, Ross published a series of important articles in the early 2000s which were relatively optimistic about the prospects for continued stability in cross-Strait relations. 2 In these articles, Ross emphasised that contemporary cross-Strait relations are characterised by two deterrence problems: prc efforts to deter formal Taiwan independence, and United States efforts to deter prc military coercion directed at Taiwan. Ross analyses the stability of deterrence in both problems by constructing a conceptual lens using general international relations theory. Drawing heavily on the insights of deterrence scholars such as Schelling (1960, 1966), Jervis (1978), and Huth (1988), Ross identifies several factors that collectively determine the stability of deterrence in a particular dyad, including the degree to which the revisionist state values peace over war, the capabilities and resolve of the deterring state, and security dilemma dynamics. 3 Ross then contextualises his analysis to the Taiwan Strait case in particular, and carefully considers factors such as: To what degree does the prc possess the military capability to pursue a ‘fait accompli’ strategy vis-à-vis Taiwan? 4 To what degree do prc analysts recognise and respect u.s. capabilities and resolve? And, to what degree does Taiwan’s government recognise and respect prc capacity and will to inflict costs on Taiwan in the event of a formal declaration of independence? His optimism on the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait, in turn, derives in large measure from his conclusions that (a) u.s. capabilities and resolve to defend Taiwan are strong, and prc analysts are cognisant of this; (b) the prc has the capacity to impose devastating costs on Taiwan, and Taiwan leaders believe that Beijing also has the resolve to punish Taiwan severely in the event of a formal declaration of independence; and (c) first strike advantages are minimal, and hence security dilemma dynamics are subdued. 5
Thomas Christensen, in his own series of articles on the case, offers a much more pessimistic portrayal of the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait (see Christensen, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2006). Like Ross, Christensen draws heavily from the broader international relations literature on deterrence theory and the security dilemma. However, Christensen argues that traditional security dilemma theorising can lead to a mischaracterisation of the cross-Strait relationship as more stable than it really is. Christensen notes in particular that traditional security dilemma theorising views defensive weapons and postures as non-threatening to stability. The story in the Taiwan Strait, however, is more complicated, as the fundamental deterrence problem centres not on defending territory per se—as most security dilemma theorising assumes—but rather on the issue of Taiwan’s political identity. In this case, even clearly defensive weapons and postures can appear in Beijing as threatening, as they can make it easier for Taiwan to change the political status quo. Christensen thus portrays stability in the Taiwan Strait as much more tenuous than in Ross’s portrayal. Stable deterrence requires not only credible u.s. threats to intervene in the event of prc coercion, but also credible u.s. assurances that Washington will not tolerate changes to the political status quo initiated by Taipei. Failure on the latter point could generate pessimism in Beijing about long-term trends in the Taiwan Strait, which is potentially quite dangerous. A pessimistic Beijing could sense a closing window of opportunity to block Taiwan’s permanent separation from China, which in turn could precipitate prc military action. Christensen’s logic here draws from international relations theory on ‘windows of opportunity and vulnerability’ and the logic of preventive war. 6
Specific policy recommendations regarding u.s. policy in the Taiwan Strait flow from the arguments developed by Ross and Christensen. Ross warned during the early George W. Bush administration that efforts to enhance u.s.–Taiwan military cooperation and upgrade u.s. weapons sales to Taiwan would do little to improve already strong deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, and would instead be counterproductive because such steps would generate frictions in u.s.–China relations (see in particular Ross, 2002). Christensen, meanwhile, engaged a debate that emerged after the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait confrontation concerning the relative merits of ambiguity versus clarity in u.s. commitments to Taiwan’s security. During the crisis, some u.s. officials were famously vague concerning likely u.s. behaviour in the event of a war in the Taiwan Strait—consistent with a broader u.s. policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ relating to Taiwan. A number of u.s. observers, in turn, blamed this ambiguity for increasing uncertainty and encouraging prc coercion against Taiwan. 7 However, given Washington’s need to provide both credible deterrence (to prevent prc coercion against Taiwan) and credible assurances (that the u.s. would not support Taiwan independence), Christensen argued instead for a clear, but conditional, u.s. commitment to Taiwan. 8
A number of more recent studies of cross-Strait relations have explored—often in considerable detail—the risks of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Many of these studies, drawing at least implicitly from realist international relations theory, suggest that a rapidly shifting balance of military power has the potential to undercut stable deterrence in the Strait (e.g., see Bush, 2013: Chapter 7; B. Zhang, 2013). For the most part, however, recent studies assessing the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait have not drawn as extensively from international relations theory as did the earlier studies by Ross and Christensen. In particular, there has been relatively little effort to apply broader advances in rationalist theorising on the causes of war. This is somewhat surprising since the rationalist bargaining model of war has emerged over the past two decades as the ‘workhorse model’ of war in much of the international relations field (Lake, 2010/2011).
Recent rational theorising on war emphasises that, because war is costly, even for the eventual ‘winner’ of any conflict, there should always in principle be outcomes (or ‘bargains’) available that all sides prefer to actually fighting the war (Fearon, 1995). To understand why states fight wars, then, it is necessary to understand why they cannot agree to outcomes that would leave everyone better off than the war outcome. The rationalist literature highlights two general explanations in this regard, and both explanations appear relevant for the Taiwan Strait. First, wars can arise as a consequence of private information combined with incentives to misrepresent that information. That is, it is difficult for leaders in one country to know what sorts of bargains leaders in a second country will accept in lieu of fighting, since they are unlikely to have a perfect understanding of the second country’s military capabilities and its willingness (or resolve) to bear the costs of fighting a war. Furthermore, leaders in the second country—hoping to obtain the best bargain possible—have every reason to exaggerate their true capabilities and resolve. Thus, even though bargains may exist in theory that both countries should prefer over fighting a war, it can be difficult to find these bargains in practice. Second, wars can arise as a consequence of commitment problems, such as when mutually agreeable bargains that might avert war have the effect of altering the balance of power between two countries. 9
While the rationalist bargaining model of war is not without its shortcomings, 10 it nevertheless offers a useful framework to help structure thinking about how conflict in the Taiwan Strait could arise, and how different trends—such as growing prc military power—are affecting the likelihood of war. Given the degree to which the model has influenced the broader international relations literature, it is surprising—to this author at least—that the model has not been applied more widely by scholars of cross-Strait relations. In short, future work assessing the risks of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would benefit from increased engagement with this influential model. 11
Alliance/Alignment Politics and the United States–China–Taiwan Triangular Relationship
The debate over ambiguity in u.s. policy became increasingly sophisticated in the years after Christensen’s seminal contribution—discussed in the previous section—and in many cases scholars deployed international relations theory to build their arguments in this regard. 12 The most rigorous and systematic examination of ambiguity is Brett Benson’s (2012) analysis. Benson constructs a general theory of alliance commitments, in which he identifies (using a formal model) the conditions that yield unconditional commitments, conditional commitments, or probabilistic (i.e., ambiguous) commitments to an ally’s defence. 13 The theory highlights the importance of two parameters in particular in shaping the optimal u.s. security commitment to Taiwan: the degree to which u.s. intervention would shape the outcome of a cross-Strait war, and the degree to which the u.s. ideal settlement of a cross-Strait conflict converges with Taiwan’s ideal settlement. Benson shows that his theory quite clearly predicts ambiguity in u.s. policy toward Taiwan at the time of normalisation of the u.s.–prc relationship, given u.s. relative capabilities and preferences at the time. However, by the late 1990s, the model suggests greater contentiousness within the United States over the merits of ambiguity. By that time, of course, the nature of the cross-Strait dispute had changed. Increasingly, Taiwan’s ideal point was not one of a unified China under roc governance (as was the case prior to democratisation), but rather a democratic and—perhaps—formally independent Taiwan. To the degree that actors in Washington shared this ideal point, optimal u.s. policy was more likely to approach an unconditional (rather than a probabilistic or conditional) commitment to Taiwan. On the other hand, to the degree actors in Washington did not share this objective (fearing, for instance, its impact on the potential for a constructive u.s.–China relationship), then an ambiguous (or perhaps a conditional) commitment remained optimal. Benson’s model, then, provides insight both into the relative merits of ambiguity as an optimal u.s. policy choice, and into changes in the contentiousness within u.s. politics of strategic ambiguity over time. In short, Benson’s analysis shows the potential benefits of applying rigorous international relations theory to the cross-Strait case.
Other recent studies have drawn from alliance politics theory to analyse constraints on Taiwan in the context of the Washington–Beijing–Taipei triangle. The work by Yu-shan Wu (2015) is particularly insightful here. Building on Dittmer (1981) and his own prior work on triangle theory, 14 Wu shows that Taiwan has strong incentives to pursue accommodating policies toward Beijing when u.s.–prc relations are good. Otherwise, Taiwan risks being the outcast—as was the case during much of the Chen Shui-bian administration when both Beijing and Washington were highly critical of Taipei. When u.s.–prc relations are bad, however, Taiwan’s incentives are somewhat less obvious, and ultimately hinge on whether Washington views Taiwan as ‘valuable and flexible enough to warrant us courtship’ (Wu, 2015: 31).
Domestic-International Interactions: Diversionary Theory and Audience Costs
The past 25 years have seen a proliferation of scholarship on interactions between domestic and international politics in the broader international relations literature, as the field moved beyond the increasingly stale neorealist/neoliberal debate of the 1980s. Robert Putnam’s (1988) seminal article on two-level games had an especially galvanising effect in this regard. Some scholars of cross-Strait relations have, in turn, incorporated insights from this literature to the study of China–Taiwan interactions (e.g., Chan, 2016; Chan, Hu, & Sohn, 2013; V. Wang, 2008; Q. Zhang, 2006). 15 Here I briefly highlight two lines of inquiry (relating to domestic–international interactions) that have been underexplored in cross-Strait relations, but that have the potential to shed considerable light on the prospects for stability in the Taiwan Strait: diversionary theory and audience costs theory.
Diversionary theory explores the degree to which leaders who face domestic instability (or loss of support) initiate or escalate international disputes in an effort to divert the public’s attention and generate instead a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. 16 The most systematic application of diversionary theory to the cross-Strait relationship is a study by Y. Li, James, and Drury (2009), which finds that Chen Shui-bian was particularly likely to emphasise Taiwan independence when his approval rating was low in the years prior to the 2004 presidential election. The authors suggest that Chen was, in essence, seeking to distract voters from domestic problems (like a sluggish economy) by redirecting their attention to the cross-Strait sovereignty dispute. Although the authors’ conceptualisation of Taiwan independence is problematic (as pointed out by Sullivan, 2011), the study offers a useful conceptualisation of how diversionary incentives could influence the making of Taiwan’s cross-Strait policies, and more work along these lines is clearly needed. Meanwhile, although it is widely believed that diversionary incentives could influence prc foreign policy were social instability to increase inside China, there has been little in the way of systematic application of diversionary theory to prc behaviour in the Taiwan Strait. Given that use of actual military force—were it to occur—would almost certainly be initiated by China, future research should explore how and under what conditions diversionary incentives might shape prc decision-making on the use of force in the Strait (although systematic empirical research along these lines is obviously difficult given the opacity of the prc political system). 17
A growing body of international relations literature has also utilised the concept of audience costs. Simply put, audience costs are typically conceptualised as the domestic political costs leaders pay for not following through on international commitments. Though some early works on the topic suggested that democratic leaders are likely to be more constrained by audience costs than non-democratic leaders, 18 more recent studies have also applied the concept to non-democracies. Jessica Chen Weiss, for instance, shows that Chinese leaders can generate audience costs by allowing anti-foreign protests to form during periods of international tension or crisis. 19 The presence of such protests makes it harder for Chinese leaders to back down in the face of foreign pressure, as doing so would raise the ire of protestors already on the streets, and potentially undercut regime stability. Audience costs would seem to be highly relevant in the Taiwan Strait. In the prc, for instance, it is widely assumed that any government that ‘lost’ Taiwan—by ‘allowing’ it to become formally independent—would lose the support of the Chinese people (Shirk, 2007: 186–187). Moreover, in part because regime legitimacy depends on nationalism, leaders who appear weak on Taiwan run the risk of having the issue used against them in internal political struggles (Christensen, 2001/2). In this context, leaders who back down in the midst of a dispute in the Taiwan Strait are likely to pay substantial audience costs. Future research should explore—and ideally model—how these costs might affect prc decision-making in a crisis. To my knowledge, little existing (English language) research has applied audience costs to the Taiwan Strait in a rigorous manner.
Economic Integration in the Shadow of Political Conflict
The interesting dichotomy of cross-Strait political hostility and rapidly deepening economic ties has been a major topic of inquiry by scholars of cross-Strait relations dating back to the early 1990s. Writing in 1997, Yun-han Chu pointed toward this ‘perplexing duality’ as a ‘paradox for the student of international relations’, and important early works by prominent Taiwan scholars such as Chu (1997), Yu-shan Wu (1995), and Tse-kang Leng (1996) sought to unravel the paradox by exploring the causes and implications of economic integration in the shadow of political conflict. More recent studies have drawn heavily from international relations theory in building on these earlier works. Some have focused on the determinants of deepening economic integration. Kastner (2009), for instance, emphasises the political strength of internationalist economic interests as a key intervening variable shaping the conditions under which political conflict affects cross-border economic flows. Seeking to place cross-Strait relations within a comparative and theoretical framework, he suggests that strong internationalist economic interests in Taipei made it difficult for Taiwan to place effective policy restrictions on cross-Strait exchange; internationalist economic interests in China, meanwhile, facilitated the making of credible commitments to Taiwan businesses.
A much broader literature explores some of the political consequences of expanding cross-Strait economic ties. Some of these studies draw from the burgeoning—and increasingly sophisticated—international relations literature on commercial liberalism 20 to consider whether cross-Strait economic ties reduce the risk of armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 21 McDonald (2009), for example, develops a Taiwan Strait case study as part of a larger study on the relationship between capitalism and peace. Briefly, McDonald argues that ‘the pursuit of wealth by private individuals interacting in competitive markets [emphasis in original] reduces the risks of war among states’ (2009: 15); as part of the more general argument, McDonald contends that reductions in barriers to trade make war less likely. In the Taiwan Strait case, large-scale cross-Strait trade and investment flows have created powerful vested interests favouring peace in both the prc and Taiwan. Deepening economic ties thus help to allay fears in Beijing that Taiwan may be drifting toward independence, and further encourage restraint in the prc. In a similar vein, Chan (2009, 2012, 2016) suggests that the willingness of Taiwan’s government to tolerate extensive cross-Strait economic integration serves as a powerful assurance signal to Beijing. It ‘signifies a down payment in stable cross-Strait relations’, representing a ‘nonverbal assurance that commits Taiwan not to declare independence and therefore not [emphases in original] to escalate political and military tension with Beijing’ given the high costs that would be involved (2012: 102). Peng Li (2013) views the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement as facilitating stability in the Taiwan Strait because it increases the costs of war (thus making leaders more cautious) and also because it helps to reinforce the prc’s preferred policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan. And Gartzke and Li (2003) argue that cross-Strait economic integration fosters peace by enabling both sides to signal resolve more credibly. Economic integration makes both economies more sensitive to tensions and verbal threats; threats thus become more costly, and thus credible, thereby reducing the risk that conflict could arise as a consequence of informational asymmetries.
Other studies have considered the degree to which cross-Strait economic integration affords the prc increased political influence over Taiwan. Much of this literature is grounded in the economic statecraft literature, 22 and highlights Taiwan’s asymmetrical dependence on the cross-Strait economic relationship. 23 By the 1990s it had become conventional wisdom that Taiwan’s growing dependence on the prc market left the island vulnerable to possible economic coercion, and the Lee Teng-hui administration sought to moderate the growth of cross-Strait economic integration in part to limit this vulnerability. It was widely assumed that integration could also generate a ‘Hirschmanesque’ influence effect in Taiwan, whereby a business community increasingly tied to the prc market would lobby for moderation in Taiwan’s cross-Strait policies. 24 However, several studies published during the 2000s called into question how much political influence economic integration actually affords Beijing. Some (e.g., Kastner, 2009; Tanner, 2007; Tung, 2003) highlight practical difficulties the prc would face in trying to use economic ties as a tool of coercion against Taiwan. Keng and Schubert (2010)—in a detailed study of Taiwan businesspeople operating in China (the taishang)—show that the taishang are neither hostages nor agents of the prc government. 25 One more recent study (Yu, Yu, & Lin, 2016), basing its conclusions in part on interviews conducted in China, suggests that Beijing’s economic statecraft toward Taiwan is becoming unsustainable due to growing economic nationalism and local protectionism in the prc itself.
Increasingly, scholars of cross-Strait relations are exploring the microfoundations of an influence effect in Taiwan. That is, scholars are asking whether economic integration affects identity and views on cross-Strait relations at an individual level. For instance, several recent studies (e.g., Huang, 2010; Keng and Schubert, 2010; Lee, 2012; Schubert, 2010) have explored, via in-depth interviews, the views and identities of the taishang. Others (e.g., Keng, Chen, & Huang, 2006; L. Chen, Y. Chen, & Wang, 2013) have used survey data to examine a possible influence effect, although a key hurdle with these studies is reliably measuring the degree to which an individual has a personal economic stake in stable cross-Strait relations. 26 Some new studies have examined the electoral implications of prc efforts to ‘win Taiwan hearts and minds’ via trade concessions. Stan Hok-wui Wong and Nicole Wu (2016), for instance, find reason to be sceptical in this regard: using fine-grained township-level data, they find little evidence to suggest that the dpp suffered electorally in areas that benefited the most from prc agricultural concessions. 27
In short, the literature on the political and security implications of cross-Strait economic ties has been quite productive, and has benefited from the use of theory. For instance, international relations theory has helped scholars sharpen expectations about whether and how economic ties might translate into an influence effect in Taiwan, and theory gives us a clearer understanding of what we should look for in Taiwan if an influence effect occurs. In turn, a new wave of empirical research has begun to test whether these observable implications are in fact present. For example, are individuals living in areas that benefit the most from cross-Strait economic ties more likely to vote for candidates promising to pursue policies that accommodate prc interests? This is a promising line of research that has the potential to give us a much stronger understanding of the political implications of cross-Strait economic exchange.
Identity, Cognition, and Emotion
A growing body of research draws from non-rationalist international relations theory to help make sense of complicated patterns in cross-Strait relations. Many recent studies employ constructivist theory to evaluate the implications of shifting patterns of identity in Taiwan, 28 and to explore lacunae left in more rationalist accounts of the China–Taiwan relationship. Yitan Li (2014), for instance, suggests that only via an analysis of nationalism and identity change in Taiwan and the prc can we fully understand the cross-Strait paradox of economic convergence and political divergence. Ching-chang Chen (2012) likewise appeals to constructivist theory in asking why Taiwan’s policymakers prior to the Ma Ying-jeou administration viewed cross-Strait economic ties as threatening. Chen argues that these economic restrictions were meant, in part, to help demarcate a boundary between Taiwan and the prc, and to help reinforce a separate Taiwan identity. 29 Chengxin Pan (2012) makes the somewhat paradoxical argument that an important source of cross-Strait hostility lies in converging conceptions of Westphalian sovereignty. Pan argues that there is a tendency to search for divergence when trying to assess the root causes of conflict between countries. In the cross-Strait case, however, each side’s commitment to Westphalian sovereignty, with its focus on exclusionary authority and territoriality, helps to ensure that the cross-Strait conflict remains zero-sum. Yinan He (2014) uses the Self-Other theory to explore changing patterns in Taiwan identity, and in particular how China and Japan enter into Taiwan’s identity discourses. Wei (2015) uses a constructivist lens to trace the evolution of the ‘1992 consensus’ in Taiwan, and S. Lin (2016) focuses on shifting conceptions of identity in Taiwan to make sense of evolving economic policy toward the prc.
It is likely that future research on cross-Strait relations will continue to draw extensively from constructivist theory, given the obvious importance of identity in the case. Furthermore, since rationalist models have (in my view, as discussed earlier) also proven useful in making sense of cross-Strait relations, analyses that combine constructivist and rationalist approaches under a single theoretical umbrella are especially welcome, and some recent articles have moved in this direction. For instance, Baohui Zhang (2011) draws from literature on grand strategy and strategic readjustment to explore the motivations behind Ma Ying-jeou’s accommodationist approach toward cross-Strait relations, and shows how ideational and material factors combined to explain the shift in policy. In a new article, Wei and Lai (2017) develop a theory on Taiwan’s approach to cross-Strait exchanges; in their account, what is rational in a given context is conditional on identity.
Other recent studies have explored the degree to which psychological theories of international politics can provide explanatory leverage in China–Taiwan relations. Prospect theory, which examines decision-making under conditions of risk, seems especially useful in the cross-Strait case. The theory predicts that an individual will be more or less willing to assume risk depending on the reference point of that individual. Those perceiving themselves to be in the domain of gains—that is, in an improved situation relative to the reference point—will be less willing to assume risk than those in the domain of losses. A gambler, for instance, will tend to make risky bets to try to recoup losses on a bad night, but will be more cautious if he is ahead for the night. 30 K. He and Feng (2009) provide the most developed application of prospect theory to China–Taiwan relations. The authors explore changing prc policies toward Taiwan, and conceptualise the reference point of the prc leadership as centring on stable regime security. When in the domain of losses (domestic instability and high external threats), the authors predict riskier moves in the Taiwan Strait (military coercion such as the 1996 missile exercises). When in the domain of gains (few internal and external challenges), leaders should pursue less risky policies (political pressure as seen during most of the Chen Shui-bian administration). Credibly assessing the reference points of leaders in Taiwan and China represents arguably the key challenge to applying prospect theory in a fruitful manner to the cross-Strait case. Still, future research should continue to grapple with ways to apply the theory productively in China–Taiwan relations. For instance, a growing number of analysts have in recent years called on the United States to consider scaling back its commitment to Taiwan; these analyses often implicitly assume that changing power realities in the Taiwan Strait will naturally produce an outcome where Taiwan arrives at some sort of accommodation vis-à-vis the prc on sovereignty issues. 31 One problem with this line of thinking is the growing consensus on the island that Taiwan (or, at least the roc) is currently a sovereign and independent country; yielding ground on this important issue presumably puts Taiwan in a domain of losses, and may consequently lead to more risk-acceptant behaviour in Taipei. Future work, in short, should probe the explanatory power of prospect theory in Taiwan as well as in the prc.
Finally, Hall (2011) considers the role of emotion in the cross-Strait relationship. Hall develops a theoretical framework through which to view what he terms the ‘diplomacy of anger’, and then applies the framework to the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. Beijing’s official discourse during the crisis was laden with words such as ‘shock’, ‘extreme indignation’, and ‘righteous anger’, especially in the immediate aftermath of Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 speech at Cornell University. Hall argues that the decision to use a diplomacy of anger is grounded in both a strategic logic and a social logic. Socially, projecting anger signals ‘that a violation has occurred concerning a normative, emotionally salient issue’, and that the issue at hand is one of principle. But the decision to project anger is also a strategic one, where the downside risks of harming important international relationships or even outright conflict are taken into consideration. Given the frequency with which emotion enters in to cross-Strait discourses, future work should build on Hall’s analysis in analysing the role of emotion as an explanatory variable in China–Taiwan relations.
Conclusion
The brief review presented in this article suggests that the field has come a long way since Yu-shan Wu called for greater theorising of cross-Strait relations in his article published 18 years ago. Scholars have productively utilised cutting-edge international relations theory to analyse different dimensions of China–Taiwan relations, ranging from the prospects for conflict and peace, to the implications of deepening cross-Strait economic integration, to the role of emotion in shaping relations across the Strait. In some cases, scholars have also used the cross-Strait case as a laboratory in which to test new theories of international relations. The relationship between economic and security relations across the Taiwan Strait offers a clear example of a research agenda that has benefited from international relations theory. For instance, different strands of liberal international relations theory—such as commercial liberalism or functionalism—have helped to motivate a new wave of rigorous microlevel studies on how cross-Strait economic ties and policies affect attitudes on an individual level in Taiwan.
While much progress has been made, many contemporary research programmes in cross-Strait relations could benefit from more engagement with theory. Most analyses of the cross-Strait military balance of power, for instance, tend to be relatively descriptive and technical in nature. Such analyses are extremely important, but theory is ultimately necessary to answer questions such as: Under what conditions can the prc leverage its growing military capabilities to obtain more favourable political bargains in the Taiwan Strait? Does a shifting balance of power make military conflict more likely, and if so, why? Are there ways to maintain stable deterrence even if the military balance is shifting? I suggested earlier that increased use of bargaining theory might prove useful when exploring questions such as these, but of course other theoretical perspectives might likewise help to organise thinking on these matters. Along these lines, future studies should more rigorously apply concepts like diversionary theory and audience costs to China–Taiwan relations, and should further probe the explanatory power of cognitive theories of behaviour in this case. Wu’s assertion that ‘only by theorising on cross-Strait relations can we get a firm grasp of the subject, and avoid being driven by ephemeral incidents and breaking news’ (2000: 428), remains—in my view—as valid today as it was 18 years ago, and future students of cross-Strait relations should continue to strive to place the relationship within a theoretical framework.
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I do not make sweeping claims in this article concerning which broad theoretical approach or paradigm is most useful or appropriate in this case. To the contrary, my view of theory is pragmatic: I believe that the nature of a particular problem generally dictates which theoretical approach is likely to prove most useful. For instance, I argue below that bargaining theory can be quite useful in assessing prospects for conflict or political integration in China–Taiwan relations. But bargaining theory is less helpful in making sense of where prc and Taiwan interests on sovereignty-related issues come from in the first place; here constructivist accounts, for instance, are likely to prove more appropriate.
See in particular Ross (2000, 2002, 2006).
The security dilemma, in its most basic form, simply observes that actions one state might take to increase its own security often have the effect of making other states less secure; those states, in turn, may take countermeasures which further undercut the first state’s security. Factors that are typically thought to intensify the dilemma include strong advantages to acting offensively rather than defensively and difficulties in differentiating between offensive and defensive weapons. See Jervis (1978).
Such a strategy involves a surprise attack designed to secure Taiwan’s capitulation before the United States could effectively intervene in the conflict.
These conclusions are laid out most explicitly in Ross (2006).
See especially Christensen (2006). Fravel (2008) makes a similar argument about likely prc behaviour in the face of declining claim strength in a territorial dispute, and applies the logic to Taiwan (see esp. pp. 30–33 and 254–265). On preventive war, see especially van Evera (1999) and Reiter (1995).
For criticisms of ambiguity in the media, see Feder (2002) and Jacoby (1996).
See especially Christensen (2002). I return to strategic ambiguity in the next section.
On rationalist approaches to armed conflict, see especially Fearon (1995). See also Gartzke (1999); Lake (2010/2011); Powell (2002); Reed (2003); Reiter (2003).
See Lake (2010/2011) and Reiter (2003) for a discussion of some of these shortcomings.
For a recent exception, see Kastner (2015/2016). Other studies, such as Chan (2009) and Gartzke and Li (2003), apply bargaining theory when examining the impact of cross-Strait economic exchange on the prospects for cross-Strait peace. I return to these studies later.
See, for instance, Benson and Niou, 2001; D. Chen, 2014; Hsu, 2010; G. Lin, 2007; Z. Pan, 2003.
Benson also considers compellent alliances, which I set aside here.
See, for instance, Wu (2005). See also Dittmer (2005, 2014) on the u.s.–China–Taiwan triangle.
Chan (2016, Chapter 5) draws extensively from Putnam in developing a two-level model of cross-Strait interactions.
For a recent study that employs and develops diversionary theory in the context of an analysis of pre-World War ii Japanese foreign policy, see Nicholls, Huth, and Appel (2010).
See Cabestan (2009) for a detailed consideration of how various domestic political factors in the prc affect Beijing’s approach to the Taiwan issue; Cabestan speculates only briefly (p. 17) on the issue of diversionary conflict. See also Q. Zhang (2006).
See Fearon’s (1994) seminal article. See also Schultz (2001). For an experimental study that examines the magnitude of audience costs in the u.s., see Tomz (2007).
See Weiss (2014). On audience costs in non-democracies more generally, see Weeks (2008).
Commercial liberalism here simply refers to the idea that trade between states makes military conflict less likely. The theoretical literature on the trade-conflict relationship, and its causal underpinnings, is vast. For a recent overview of this literature, see Gartzke and Zhang (2015).
In some cases, these studies also aim to make contributions to the broader theoretical literature (not just apply it to the cross-Strait case). See McDonald (2009) and Benson and Niou (2007) for examples in this regard.
Classic works in this literature include Hirschman (1945) and Baldwin (1985).
Fuller’s (2008) analysis highlights the limits of crude indicators of asymmetry (such as cross-Strait trade as a percentage of gdp), as he shows that the prc has benefited greatly from cross-Strait exchange even though such exchange represents a smaller percentage of its overall economy. In this regard see also M. Chu (2015), who examines the semiconductor industry in particular.
On ‘Hirschmanesque’ effects, see Abdelal and Kirshner (1999/2000). See Seanon S. Wong (2005) for an example of a study that pointed to this sort of effect in the context of cross-Strait relations.
Tanner (2007) also makes arguments along similar lines. For a study that places prc economic engagement policies toward Taiwan in a comparative context, see Kahler and Kastner (2006). For a recent article that critically examines taishang studies, see Schubert, Lin, and Tseng (2016).
L. Chen, Y. Chen, and Wang (2013), for instance, ask respondents whether increased economic ties with China help or hurt them personally, and then correlate this with an individual’s position on sovereignty issues. One issue here is that individual views on sovereignty could affect views on whether one personally benefits or not from economic ties.
See Kastner and Pearson (2016) for a theoretical discussion of the likely efficacy of prc engagement policies toward Taiwan.
For earlier studies of Taiwan identity, see for instance Brown (2004); Lynch (2004); Rigger (1999); Schubert (2004).
A study by T.Y. Wang, Cheng, Yu, and Chen, appearing in the same edited volume as Chen’s analysis, suggests that this sort of identity, of a Taiwan under threat, continues to shape Taiwan public opinion on cross-Strait economic ties even during the Ma Ying-jeou administration. In focus-group interviews the authors find widespread tendency to view cross-Strait economic ties through a realist lens, with a ‘common concern that expanded cross-Strait exchanges could further deepen the island country’s economic dependence on the Chinese mainland’ (2012: 144).
On prospect theory, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979). On applications to international relations, see Levy (1997).
See, for instance, Glaser (2015). On the inevitability of accommodation in Taiwan, see Sutter (2011).